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The rise and deceleration of female labor
force participation in Latin America
One of the most salient socioeconomic 
changes over the last half-century has been 
the strong rise in female labor force 
participation across the world. Latin 
America has not been an exception. 
However, since the early 2000s, there are 
signs of a widespread and significant 
deceleration in women's entry into labor 
markets in Latin America. The slowed 
increase of women in the workforce has 
delayed the closing of the gender gap in 
labor participation, and may also 
compromise poverty reduction targets.
This book, written at CEDLAS-Universidad 
Nacional de La Plata, documents the recent 
deceleration of female labor participation 
in Latin America, explores its causes, 
evaluates its implications, and discusses the 
limitations and challenges facing public 
policies that aim to empower women and 
foster gender equality.
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Overview
Leonardo Gasparini and 
Mariana Marchionni
1. Introduction 
In the 1960s two out of ten adult women in Brazil were in the labor force, 
either employed or actively seeking for a job; half a century later this figure 
has changed dramatically, climbing to seven out of ten. This pattern has been 
typical of all Latin American countries, although with different intensities. 
Compared to the situation some decades ago, women in the region now allocate 
a larger share of their time to market activities rather than working at home. 
The gap with men in labor market participation remains far from being closed, 
and it is still larger than in several regions of the world, but its width has been 
substantially reduced. 
Arguably, the strong increase in female labor force participation (LFP) is among 
the most salient socioeconomic changes in Latin America in the last half-century. 
This fact not only implies a profound transformation in the daily life of millions 
of Latin American women and families, but also has substantial economy-wide 
labor and social consequences. Poverty, inequality, unemployment and education 
–just to mention a few social issues– are all affected by a more intense entry of 
women into the workforce. 
Although remarkable, the long-run pattern of female gains has been insufficient 
to close the gap with males in most labor variables, such as wages, employment 
and labor force participation. Gender equality in the labor market remains a 
difficult challenge in the region. While gender gaps in education attainment have 
been substantially reduced or even eliminated, the region stills performs poorly 
in guaranteeing equality in the economic and labor dimensions. For instance, 
while Latin America ranks among the regions with relatively small gender gaps 
12
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based on the Global Index of the World Economic Forum,1 the performance 
becomes more mediocre in the Economic Participation and Opportunity Sub 
index, which captures the gender gap in labor force participation rates, earned 
incomes, and employment in top positions. 
This book highlights a change in the trend of female labor force participation 
that makes the situation potentially more worrisome: after around half a century 
of sustained growth, there are signs of a widespread and significant deceleration 
in the entry of women into the Latin American labor markets. That deceleration 
seems to have been taking place since the early/mid-2000s, and it applies to all 
groups of women, but particularly to those married2, and in more vulnerable 
households. The slower entry of women into the workforce has delayed the closing 
of the gender gap in labor participation, and makes improbable the fulfillment 
of the gender-equity Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) related to female 
employment. Although this book provides a general view of the issue of female 
LFP, the recent deceleration is highlighted in several of its chapters. 
The contributions of this book 
This book contributes to the understanding of female labor force participation 
in Latin America by documenting the changes that took place over the last two 
decades, exploring their determinants, analyzing the consequences on labor and 
social outcomes, and discussing the public policy implications. Ultimately, the 
book is aimed at contributing to the debate on public policies on employment in 
Latin America, from a gender perspective. A better understanding of the patterns, 
determinants and implications of female labor force participation is essential for a 
richer and more informed policy debate on gender, labor and poverty issues. 
We believe the book makes six broad contributions to the rich literature that 
documents and analyzes labor participation in Latin America with a gender 
perspective.3 First, it provides careful evidence on female labor force participation 
based on microdata from a large set of national household surveys, which were 
1 Introduced by the World Economic Forum in 2006, the Global Gender Gap Index measures 
gaps in gender equality based on a set of outcome variables for four categories or subindexes 
– health and survival, educational attainment, economic participation and opportunity, and 
political empowerment (World Economic Forum, 2014).
2 Throughout the book we do not make distinctions between women formally married and 
women cohabiting with a partner (consensual unions); for simplicity we include both under 
the group of married. 
3 See Amador et al. (2013); Chioda (2011); Elías and Ñopo (2010); Piras (2004); and World 
Bank (2012 a, b), among others. 
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previously standardized to increase the comparability of the results across countries. 
This database, which includes information on all Latin American countries over 
the period 1992-2012, allows an assessment of female LFP in Latin America with a 
wider coverage, higher frequency and greater detail than those of previous studies.4
Second, the study unveils a potentially interesting fact, which to our knowledge has 
not been highlighted yet: after several decades of steep and uninterrupted increase, 
the pace of growth in female labor force participation substantially slowed down 
in the 2000s. We believe this changing scenario should be of public concern, and 
in particular it should be placed high in the research agenda, arguably above the 
traditional inquiry on the causes of the long-run increase in female LFP.
Third, this study provides a detailed characterization of the pattern of change 
in female LFP, concluding that the recent deceleration was particularly intense 
among more vulnerable groups. This unbalanced change has some relevant 
implications. In contrast to what happened in previous decades, inequality 
among groups of women is growing in some countries, nourishing the possibility 
of a dual scenario in which labor participation of skilled richer women living in 
large cities converges to the levels of developed economies, while labor supply 
of women in more vulnerable groups reaches a plateau at substantially lower 
levels. In addition, the stronger deceleration in female LFP in disadvantaged 
groups substantially debilitates the poverty-reducing effect that characterized the 
growth in female labor supply in previous decades, and may turn the effect on 
the income distribution inequality-increasing. 
Fourth, this study inquires into various alternative hypotheses on the contrast 
between the rapid growth in female labor force participation in the 1990s and 
the deceleration in the 2000s. Identifying causal relationships for complex 
socioeconomic variables in a large geographic region is extremely hard: the 
evidence shown in this book is never conclusive, and admits alternative 
explanations. Our preferred interpretation of the existing body of evidence is 
that the fast economic growth experienced by the region in the 2000s was an 
important (although certainly not the only one) determinant of the deceleration 
in female LFP. Lower unemployment and higher earnings of other income earners 
at the household (mostly male partners), plus increased social assistance, may 
have reduced the urgency of vulnerable women to take low quality jobs. Under 
this interpretation the deceleration in female LFP may not necessarily be seen as 
4 The dataset includes demographic, socioeconomic and labor information on more than 
20 million people in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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a setback, but rather as the natural adjustment at the family level to an improved 
economic situation with some positive implications, such as perspectives of better 
job matching, and more time for mothers for better childcare. However, on the 
other hand, the deceleration may help to reinforce the traditional gender roles 
within the household under which men go to work and women stay at home. If 
the deceleration becomes a plateau, as it has recently been the case in some Latin 
American countries, it could have long-run negative repercussions on female 
empowerment and gender equality.
Fifth, this book discusses the effect of the deceleration in female LFP on various 
socioeconomic outcomes. In particular, it quantifies the impact of the changes 
in female labor supply and other related phenomena, such as the reduction in 
fertility levels, on the income distribution. We conclude that the perspectives for 
the reduction of poverty and inequality in Latin America are less encouraging if 
the scenario of low growth in female LFP persists. 
Finally, this study contributes with discussions and evidence on various policy 
instruments that could foster women employment. In particular, we survey a 
wide range of policies currently in effect in Latin America and some strategies 
applied in other regions. We derive some general policy lessons from the existing 
body of evidence, which is still fragmentary and incomplete. 
Certainly, as a piece written by economists specialized in empirical quantitative 
evidence, the book has some limitations. For instance, there are few references 
to the historical context, to the sociological literature, to qualitative results, and 
to case studies. Some of these dimensions are tackled in the research program to 
which this book belongs,5 but are mostly ignored in our study, partly as a necessary 
strategy to go deeper into some issues and delve into certain types of analysis. This 
book should then be viewed as a contribution from the empirical economics to the 
knowledge and debate of a very complex socio-economic issue –female labor force 
participation in Latin America– to which many other areas should contribute. 
This overview
This initial chapter serves as an introduction and overview of the book. Since the 
chapters are written by different authors, it also helps to provide a more unified 
view of the results and arguments. In this overview we summarize the main 
results of the book and discuss the main policy implications. 
5 “Enhancing women labor market participation and economic empowerment through better 
policies in Latin America”; CEDLAS, CIEDUR and IDRC. 
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The rest of this overview is organized as follows. In the next section we clarify 
some basic issues regarding the measurement of labor force participation and 
employment in Latin America. In section 3 we summarize the main results 
regarding the patterns of change in female LFP, including inquiries into 
its determinants, while section 4 reviews the main policy implications, and 
summarizes the debate on policy instruments regarding female employment and 
empowerment. We close the overview in section 5 with a brief presentation of 
the chapters of the book. 
As usual, there are many ways to read a book. For the non-technical time-
constrained reader this overview may be enough: all the main results and policy 
implications are summarized in this chapter. Naturally, a summary ignores 
many issues and over-simplifies others. Reading the whole book is the only way 
to go deeper into the results and arguments sketched in this overview. Moreover, 
we believe that one of the main contributions of the book is the large amount 
of empirical evidence derived from our own database of national household 
surveys. In this initial chapter we just mention a few illustrative statistics from a 
much larger body of evidence.
2. The measurement of labor force participation 
In this section we discuss issues regarding the measurement of labor force 
participation and employment in Latin America. We start by revising some 
definitions and then give details on the data sources used in the study. 
Definitions 
Although the concepts of being in the labor force and being employed are in 
principle simple to grasp, the precise definitions imply significant conceptual 
challenges and are often empirically hard to implement without ambiguities. A 
person is employed if she is regularly engaged in an economic activity. The idea 
is simple, but raises some issues difficult to solve: what is an “economic activity”?, 
what implies to be “regularly” engaged? The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) takes a particular definition: the employed are “those persons who during 
a specified brief period such as one week or one day, (a) performed some work for 
wage or salary in cash or in kind, (b) had a formal attachment to their job but 
were temporarily not at work during the reference period, (c) performed some 
work for profit or family gain in cash or in kind, or (d) were with an enterprise 
such as a business, farm or service but who were temporarily not at work during 
the reference period for any specific reason”. 
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The national statistical offices of Latin America follow these general 
recommendations and measure employment using the ILO guidance. However, 
even when a similar general definition is applied, various specific methodological 
issues are still decided by the national statistical offices, a fact that generates 
substantial differences in the measurement of labor variables across countries. 
Moreover, insofar the sources of information are not identical across countries, the 
empirical implementation of the concept of employment becomes heterogeneous. 
For instance, a more detailed questionnaire in the national survey or census of a 
given country allows more precise (and hence different) measures than in other 
countries with shorter questionnaires. Unfortunately, employment is measured 
with considerable heterogeneity across the economies of Latin America. 
The practical definition of employment raises some relevant conceptual debates. 
We briefly discuss two of the most important ones. First, under the usual definition 
a person who works one hour in a week is classified as “employed”, although 
her attachment to the labor market is very loose. Second, some activities, such 
as housework and children rearing, are not counted as employment when they 
are not performed for wage or salary, as is the typical situation for housewives. 
Of course, this is a controversial issue that is particularly relevant for studying 
female employment. In this book we follow the usual practice of including only 
the market activities as employment, although we believe that there are areas in 
which a wider, more comprehensive definition of employment should be applied 
(e.g. social protection and labor benefits).
This discussion highlights another way of contemplate the issue of female labor 
force participation: as a decision (usually taken under various constraints) 
between market and non-market activities. Through this lens an increasing 
pattern in female labor force participation is not necessarily a phenomenon of 
more women deciding to work, but one of more women deciding to get a job in 
the market, instead of working at home.
Besides these conceptual matters, in some cases the absence of a clear distinction 
between market production and work for the family blurs the measurement of 
labor force participation. That situation is more likely for women, in particular 
in early phases of economic development, or in certain areas (e.g. rural areas).
The definition of being in the labor force introduces more complications. Typically, 
a person is in the labor force if she is either employed or actively seeking a job. 
We have already discussed some issues regarding the definition of employed. The 
concept of being “actively seeking a job” is also full of ambiguities, and it is difficult 
to capture in a typical household survey or census, as it requires a detailed inquiry 
into all the activities that a person carried out with the aim of finding a job. 
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The heterogeneity across countries in measuring employment is magnified when 
measuring labor force participation. Being aware of these comparability problems 
does not mean dismissing the use of data altogether. With all their limitations 
surveys and censuses still provide valuable information, being the best available 
sources to generate useful statistics on labor and socio-economic variables.
Labor force participation and employment are closely related, in particular 
when unemployment rates do not change much. Given this close association, 
the analysis of the determinants, consequences and policy implications of both 
phenomena becomes similar. In this book we focus on female LFP but most of 
the results and discussions apply equally well to female employment.
Data sources 
There are two main types of data sources that are useful to study labor force 
participation: household surveys and censuses. Relying on household survey data 
has two main drawbacks. The first one is the typical statistical limitation of 
working with samples instead of with the whole population, while the second 
one is the scarcity of national surveys in decades before the 1990s. Mainly due 
to these reasons, part of the literature has used censuses as the main source of 
data to study long-run trends in labor force participation in Latin America (e.g. 
Chioda, 2011). 
Despite these arguments, in our case four reasons tip the scales towards the use of 
household survey data: (i) our focus is on the developments of the labor markets 
over the last two decades, when the system of national household surveys was 
already fully developed in most Latin American countries; (ii) we are interested 
in studying the interactions between labor force participation and other variables 
that are reported in household surveys, but typically not in censuses, such as 
income or earnings; (iii) labor force participation is better measured in surveys 
that are designed to capture labor market variables, rather than in censuses that 
typically include a smaller set of questions;6 and (iv) survey data allows a closer 
monitoring of the developments in the labor market, as information is collected 
on a yearly basis and not every ten years as in censuses. 
Most statistics in this book are obtained by processing microdata from household 
surveys, which are part of the Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and 
6 For instance, in the ILO labor database “a strict preference was given to labour force survey-
based data, with population census-derived estimates only included for countries in which 
no labour force survey-based participation data exist.” (ILO, 2011).
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the Caribbean (SEDLAC), a project jointly developed by CEDLAS at the 
Universidad Nacional de La Plata and the World Bank’s LAC poverty group 
(LCSPP). SEDLAC contains information on more than 300 household surveys 
in all Latin American countries. Table 1.1 lists the surveys used in this book 
for the 18 Latin American countries. When analyzing trends over the last two 
decades we exclude Colombia, Dominican Republic and Guatemala since they 
have a consistent and comparable body of national household surveys only 
for the 2000s.7 Most household surveys included in the sample are nationally 
representative; the exceptions are Uruguay before 2006 and Argentina, where 
surveys cover only urban population which nonetheless represents more than 
85% of the total population of those countries. 
Household surveys are not uniform across Latin American countries and in several 
cases not even within a country over time. The issue of comparability is of a great 
concern. Owning to that situation, we have made all possible efforts to make 
statistics comparable across countries and over time by using similar definitions of 
variables in each country/year, and by applying consistent methods of processing 
the data (see SEDLAC (2014) for details on the harmonization process). 
Averages across Latin America
Although patterns and trends in labor force participation are not homogeneous 
across nations, and delving into the country experiences often unveils some 
interesting stories, in most of the book we present average statistics for Latin 
America, as a way to summarize an enormous bulk of information. Computing 
averages is straightforward; however some methodological details should be 
clarified. First, we present unweighted averages across countries, a practice that is 
consistent with the typical cross-country approach in the economics literature. 
Weighting by population would imply an assessment of a given phenomenon 
strongly affected by highly-populated countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, and 
almost ignoring the situation in other less-populated nations. Second, reporting 
averages for each year requires having a balanced panel; that is, information on a 
given variable for the same sample of countries every year. Since several countries 
in the region do not have national household surveys each year, we constructed 
a balanced panel filling the gaps where surveys were missing by interpolating 
information from adjacent surveys. 
7 Cuba is not included since microdata from national household surveys are not publicly 
available. 
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Sample 
Most of the analysis on labor supply is restricted in this study to people aged 
25 to 54 years old.8 Labor market decisions for the youth are usually more 
volatile, and driven by some factors whose relevance is weaker in the rest of 
the active life, such as education enrollment. We prefer to isolate our analysis 
from factors that are more related to the issue of youth employment than to 
gender employment. Also, we limit our analysis to individuals younger than 55, 
since employment in older people has other determinants and dynamics (e.g. the 
relevance of a pension system).9 
Period under analysis 
Most of our analysis is focused on the period 1992-2012. The choice is driven by 
data availability: data before the early 1990s is scattered and in some countries 
surveys covered only urban areas; on the other hand, at the time of writing this 
book only a few countries had released microdata for their 2013 or 2014 surveys. 
In addition, the chosen period is convenient, since it is naturally divided into 
two decades: 1992-2002 and 2002-2012. Certainly, the division is arbitrary but 
captures changes in some fundamental socioeconomic variables: in the early 
2000s most Latin American economies entered a phase of strong economic 
growth with falling poverty and inequality, while their governments intensified 
their social and labor policies. Moreover, female labor force participation in 
Latin America seems to have decelerated since around 2002. For simplicity, 
throughout the book we label the period 1992-2002 as “the 1990s” and the 
period 2002-2012 as “the 2000s”.
3. The results 
In this section we review the main results of the chapters, deferring for the next 
section the discussion of the policy implications. 
The scenario 
Changes in female labor supply have taken place in a socioeconomic scenario 
affected by significant transformations. Throughout the book we highlight 
8 The international literature also often chooses this age bracket (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2013).
9 See Chapter 3 for arguments and evidence to justify the threshold at 55 years old.
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four main areas with strong interactions with female labor force participation: 
education, demography, economic growth, and policies. Changes in these areas 
have affected the pace of the entry of women into the labor market, and in some 
cases they have also been affected by that entry in a multi-directional causal 
process. 
Education affects wages and positions to which women can aspire, the attitudes 
of women towards work, career, and family, and social norms that shape the 
roles of women inside and outside the household. In Latin America, female 
educational attainment has increased over the years, along with the improvement 
of other development indicators. Twenty years ago, a typical Latin American 
woman would have left school right after completing primary education, while 
today the same woman would continue attending halfway secondary school. 
This increase in years of schooling is significant in terms of skills and knowledge 
and therefore on job prospects. Even though men’s educational attainment has 
also improved in Latin America, progress has been faster for women, so that the 
gap that initially favored males has been closing over the years, and even reversed 
recently. Increasing schooling not only raises the prospect of employment for 
students in the future, but also eases the participation of their parents, mainly 
mothers, in the labor market. In particular, availability of educational facilities 
for young children promotes labor participation of mothers, beyond the benefits 
of early education on cognitive development and future educational attainment. 
Latin America has experienced advances in this area: preschool attendance rose 
from 33% to 53% over the last two decades. 
The drop in fertility is a relevant factor in the explanation of the increase in 
female labor force participation during the twentieth century. The strong 
negative correlation between fertility rates and female participation in the labor 
market is a stylized fact in the world, and Latin America is no exception. Fertility 
rates began its downward trend only in the mid-1960s, reaching an average of 
2.5 children per woman in 2005-2010. This significant reduction implies a clear 
convergence towards the levels of the most advanced regions of the world. The 
dramatic decline in fertility occurred without significant changes in the timing or 
prevalence of marriages, either formal or consensual. The percentage of married 
women has remained high over the years despite a slight decreasing trend, while 
the age at first marriage and first birth continues to be relatively low compared to 
developed regions. Instead, there have been profound transformations in family 
arrangements and household structure. In particular, female headship has risen 
markedly in the region, despite the slowdown in the share of females’ earnings in 
total household incomes. The growth in female headship, which goes beyond the 
increase in the prevalence of single-parent households, reflects a slow process of 
empowerment of women within households.
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The region has experienced substantial economic transformations with potential 
implications on female LFP. After a decade of stagnation, economic growth 
resumed in the 1990s, although in a context of still high volatility and structural 
reforms that kept unemployment high in several economies. Various disequilibria 
and international shocks combined to generate a wave of rather short but deep 
macroeconomic crises that hit the region at the turn of the century. Since the 
early 2000s Latin America experienced a “golden decade” in terms of economic 
growth.10 A large increase in the terms of trade, a more favorable international 
scenario regarding financial conditions and direct foreign investments, and 
more prudent macroeconomic policies were key to sustain high growth rates 
during several years. An improved economic situation may affect female labor 
participation through various channels. Two of the most important have opposite 
signs: on the one hand, an increase in the spouse’s income alleviates the pressure 
on women to look for a job (conditional on traditional gender roles), while on 
the other hand the better economic perspectives may encourage women to enter 
a more attractive labor market. 
The Latin American economies not only grew in size, but their structures 
experienced transformations. While the share of employment in primary 
activities and the manufacturing industry continued a decreasing path initiated 
decades before, some sectors gained participation. Interestingly, sectors that 
expanded during the 2000s were not necessarily those with higher than average 
women-to-men ratio (e.g. construction, utilities and transportation). Instead, 
there is evidence suggesting changes in the structure of employment within 
sectors toward tasks with a higher women participation. This unbalanced growth 
across tasks may have consequences in terms of female labor force participation 
and ultimately employment. 
Changes in the policy environment are also crucial to understand patterns in 
female LFP. In particular, in the last decades Latin American countries have 
substantially expanded their social security systems, mainly through the extension 
of conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) and non-contributory pensions. 
CCTs have had an undeniable positive social impact in terms of poverty and 
inequality reduction, and human capital accumulation, and hence are genuinely 
seen as a major improvement in social policy in the region. However, these 
programs could affect female LFP through various channels; in particular the 
fact that in most cases mothers receive the transfer and are responsible for the 
compliance of the conditionalities may reinforce traditional gender roles within 
the household, implying a disincentive for participation in the labor market. 
10 See Fields et al. (2015) for evidence on growth in Latin America over the last decades. 
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In addition to cash transfers, several initiatives were introduced to protect and 
foster female employment in the region. These initiatives include policies geared 
to freeing up women’s time, supporting the participation and productivity in 
the workplace through active labor market policies and labor regulations, and 
eliminating institutional biases against women economic participation and 
entitlements. These policies have been useful to foster women employment, 
although in many cases the impact has been limited, partly because the high 
informality levels that are prevalent in the Latin American economies. 
The evidence on female labor force participation 
Based on a large database of harmonized variables drawn from Latin American 
national household surveys (SEDLAC), in this book we document the trends of 
female labor force participation in the region over the last two decades (1992-2012). 
Some interesting patterns emerge from the inspection of the empirical evidence. 
The long process of increasing female labor force participation initiated in the 
last century has continued up to the present, contributing to a sizeable reduction 
of the gap between men and women. While male LFP stayed roughly unchanged 
around 95%, the rate for prime-age females climbed from 53% in 1992 to 65% 
two decades later. The female-male gap is far from being closed and it is still larger 
than in several regions of the world, including some developing ones, but its 
width has shrunk dramatically. The long-run increase in labor force participation 
has been strong for all groups of adult women.
This book highlights, however, a fact that has so far been overlooked: there 
are clear signs of a deceleration in the process of increasing female labor force 
participation since the early 2000s (Figure 1.1). While the female LFP rose at 
a rate of 0.9 percentage points per year between 1992 and 2002, that rate went 
down to 0.3 percentage points in the following decade. The contrast between 
a strong increase in female labor market participation during the 1990s and a 
substantial deceleration in the 2000s has been typical of most countries in the 
region, although not generalized to all economies. The set of countries in which 
there is evidence of a leveling off in female LFP includes Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela.
The deceleration has taken place in all groups, but it is particularly noticeable 
among the most vulnerable women; i.e. those with low education, living in 
rural areas, with children and married to low-earnings spouses (Figure 1.2). For 
instance, while in the 1990s the LFP increased 0.8 points a year for women 
with low education (without a high school degree) and 0.24 points for those 
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with tertiary education, in the 2000s the rates were 0.17 and 0.13 points a year, 
respectively. In contrast to previous decades, the gap in LFP between non-poor 
and poor women is growing in some countries, and ceasing to shrink in others. 
The slower entry of vulnerable women into the labor markets calls for a serious 
discussion about its determinants and policy implications.
Changes in hours of work for female workers were not large, not very different 
between decades, and not significantly different from those of males. Similarly, 
changes in unemployment seem to have been smaller and with no significant 
gender differences. These patterns reinforce the claim that the dynamics of labor 
force participation are among the most noticeable labor phenomena with a clear 
gender dimension over the last decades. 
Interestingly, while the entry of women into the labor market in the 2000s was 
less intense than in the previous decade, it took place in better job positions. 
The share of women in full-time, salaried, formal jobs with social insurance 
significantly increased in the 2000s, a decade characterized by stronger labor 
markets and economic growth. Instead, the structure of employment across 
economic sectors seems to have moved slowly. 
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Figure 1.1: Female labor force participation 
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: women aged 25-54. Unweighted means for Latin American countries. 
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The determinants 
Disentangling all the factors that may account for the observed pattern in 
women labor supply is not an easy task, since several potential driving factors 
were simultaneously at play in the period under study. Endogeneity issues and 
lack of data are among the serious obstacles for the empirical identification of the 
causal links between female participation and its covariates.
Since a comprehensive general equilibrium assessment of all the driving factors 
is not feasible, in this book we take a more modest approach: we deploy several 
empirical strategies aimed at contributing with pieces of evidence to assess the 
relevance of different plausible factors behind the observed patterns in female 
labor supply. Although certainly imperfect and incomplete, we expect that this 
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patchwork of evidence sheds some light to the understanding of the processes 
that have shaped female LFP in Latin America. 
Increasing female labor supply is typically associated to the process of economic 
development. Some of the phenomena that characterize modern development, 
such as the expansion in education, the reduction in fertility, the increase in 
white-collar activities and migration to urban areas are linked to an increase 
in female participation in market activities. To explore these issues we initially 
carry out a set of decompositions that suggests the extent to which observed 
changes in female LFP are accounted for by changes in the distribution of some 
direct determinants of the labor supply decision. For instance, the increase in 
female LFP could be just the natural consequence of an expansion in education, 
and the fact that women with higher education credentials are more attached 
to the labor market. The results of the decompositions suggest that changes 
in education, marriage, fertility, location and type of work (tasks) all favored 
a more intense labor market involvement of women in Latin America. Adult 
females are now more educated, have less children and are more likely to be 
single than two decades ago, while there is evidence suggesting changes in the 
structure of employment toward tasks with higher women participation. In this 
scenario, even with the same conditional propensity to participate in the labor 
market, the overall female LFP should increase. The relative contribution of these 
factors to the observed increase in female LFP was significant in the 1990s. In 
the 2000s these factors continued operating; in fact, without them, the observed 
deceleration in the growth of female LFP in Latin America would have been even 
more marked. 
We confirm these results with a meta-analysis and in a multivariate regression 
framework based on a panel dataset of Latin American countries. In sum, some 
structural factors, such as education, fertility, location and job type, along with 
innovations or expansions in health (e.g. contraceptive methods), home (e.g. 
household appliances) and work technologies (e.g. telework), and some cultural 
changes seem important to account for the long-run increase in female LFP that 
characterized Latin American societies in the last decades. However, these factors 
cannot explain the recent deceleration in female LFP. In fact, that deceleration 
took place despite the fact several of those factors continued operating.
Identifying the reasons behind the slowdown in the growth of female labor supply 
in many Latin American countries is not an easy task, since the change coincides 
with many other socioeconomic and political transformations. To begin with, 
there are some factors that should not be ignored into the global explanation, 
although their contribution is likely to be small. First, male labor supply was 
also sluggish in the 2000s: the stagnation in female LFP may in part be traced to 
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some more general negative forces affecting labor market participation. Second, 
changes in the sectoral structure of the economy did not benefit the entry of 
women into the labor markets as much as in the previous decade. The evidence 
we present in the book suggests that these two effects were probably small, 
leaving the phenomenon of strong deceleration mostly unexplained.
Unfortunately, it is still too early and the evidence is still too fragmentary to 
conclude whether the deceleration is a transitory phenomenon, or it is a sign 
of convergence to a long-run plateau. In fact, one possibility is that female 
LFP in Latin America is approaching a ceiling, which is mainly determined 
by cultural factors. In this scenario the LFP will not continue increasing, or 
will be crawling slowly, even when the region continues its path of economic 
growth and demographic changes. In this book we argue that this possibility 
is unlikely, although certainly not implausible. With a few exceptions, even 
the most developed countries have not reached a ceiling. Developed countries 
and several developing countries have female LFP rates well above those in 
Latin America and still increasing. If Latin America were indeed reaching a 
ceiling, the permanent gap with more developed countries, and even with other 
developing countries, would be large, growing, and not easy to explain. Another 
argument against the existence of a ceiling is that the deceleration occurred in 
most Latin American countries, even in those with low levels of female LFP, and 
then presumably far from the ceiling. Finally, in most countries the leveling off 
pattern is more noticeable among vulnerable women, who are still far from the 
participation levels of their more educated richer counterparts. 
An alternative view is that the deceleration in female labor force participation 
could be just a transient phenomenon. The strong economic growth that 
experienced the region in the 2000s (Figure 1.3) may have allowed a surge in 
earnings and social protection benefits that slowed down the entry of women 
into the labor market. Without a more pressing need to seek for a job, given the 
higher earnings of their partners or the protection brought about by new social 
programs, some women may have delayed their decision to participate in the labor 
market.11 In fact, the evidence suggests that on average those that did decide to 
participate found more decent jobs than in the past. In that light, the deceleration 
in LFP may be interpreted not as a setback, but rather as an optimal response to a 
positive economic scenario. If Latin American economies continue growing, the 
availability of good jobs rises, and women’s education keeps expanding, it seems 
natural that female LFP will resume its pace of growth in the near future. 
11 In addition there is evidence of stagnation in the reduction of the gender wage gaps in the 
region, a fact that could have contributed to the slowdown in the entry of women into the 
labor markets. 
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Figure 1.3: Female LFP and per capita GDP 
Latin America, 1992-2012
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
GDP per capita (in PPP adjusted US$) from WDI. 
Note: LFP for women aged 25-54. Unweighted means. 
An alternative view is more worrisome. The initially short-term impact of an 
improved economic situation and more generous social programs on female labor 
supply may have long-term consequences. Women who prefer to stay out of the 
labor market given the new economic situation may be less prone to participate 
in the future, even in a scenario of improved supply of decent jobs. Being out of 
the labor market for some time may imply loss of productivity, and may reinforce 
traditional gender roles in the household, causing a reduction in the female 
attachment to the labor force.
The implications 
The changing pattern of female labor force participation may have profound 
economic and social consequences. When a woman finds a paid job, a significant 
change in household income takes place, which may affect the poverty status of 
the family. In fact, the entry of women into the labor market could be a relevant 
driver of the whole income distribution. 
40
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
45
50
55
60
65
70
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
Female LFP
Female LFP GDP per capita
GDP per capita
28
Bridging gender gaps? The rise and deceleration of female  
labor force participation in Latin America
By means of a set of microsimulations we conclude that the changes in female 
employment in Latin America over the last decades contributed to the observed 
fall in income poverty and inequality. The stronger insertion of vulnerable 
women in the labor market allowed some families to escape income poverty, 
and reduced the income gaps with more affluent households. Although this is 
certainly not the main reason behind the recent fall in poverty and inequality in 
Latin America, its contribution to that pattern appears to be significant. Given 
the positive distributive implications of the increased female employment levels, a 
natural concern emerges about the social consequences of the recent deceleration 
in female labor force participation. To further investigate this issue we project 
poverty and inequality trends in the region under two alternative scenarios 
regarding LFP (Figure 1.4). We conclude that if the observed deceleration of 
female labor force participation in the 2000s is not a transient phenomenon, 
and instead it is the beginning of a stage of low or even null growth in female 
labor supply, then the contribution of female LFP to the poverty reduction in the 
region would be negligible. This almost null effect contrasts with a significant, 
although small, poverty-reduction effect that would occur if the growth in female 
LFP observed in the 1990s and in most of the twentieth century resumed. The 
results are similar for inequality. In most countries the deceleration in labor force 
participation in the 2000s was larger among women with low education. This 
implies a deceleration of the inequality-reducing impact of the patterns in female 
LFP. The projected reduction is a negligible 0.1 Gini points in two decades under 
this scenario.
Figure 1.4: Poverty and inequality based on projections of female LFP 
Latin America, 2012-2032
Source: own calculations based on national household surveys. 
Note: poverty is measured with the headcount ratio with a line fixed at USD 4 a day adjusted 
for PPP; inequality is measured with the Gini coefficient for household per capita income. 
Unweighted means across Latin American countries. Female LFP for each year is projected 
according to the growth rates prevailing between 1992 and 2002 (scenario 1), and alternatively in 
the period 2002-2012 (scenario 2). See chapter 7 for methodological details. 
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The implications of increasing female labor participation (and its deceleration in 
the last years) go well beyond the income dimension. A host of adjustments in 
family behavior may take place as a consequence of the female transition from 
inactivity to employment. Women’s empowerment, child care, family violence, 
education, male employment, and fertility are just examples of areas in which 
female labor force participation may have a significant impact. 
The share of family income earned by women, and potentially the share of family 
resources under women’s control, has grown over time along with the expansion 
of female LFP in Latin America. Although female labor participation contributes 
to the economic empowerment of women, the evidence suggests a growing trend 
of female empowerment (as measured by self-assessment of female headship) 
that manifests even when LFP stagnates. It is likely that this phenomenon is 
due to changes in social norms that influence empowerment beyond the strictly 
economic dimensions. 
There is also evidence that larger female income shares increase the share of 
expenditures on children, and eventually contributes to children’s human capital 
accumulation. However, it is not clear to what extent these conclusions would 
hold in other contexts with less gender inequality, nor is it obvious that economic 
development by itself would lead to more gender equality.
The increase in female LFP generates demands for childcare that are only partially 
met by the public sector, allowing a heterogeneous supply to bridge the gap. 
While children from high-income households can access the high-quality private 
institutions, children from poorer households have access only to lower-quality 
services. This means fewer opportunities for the less-advantaged children. The 
situation worsens as labor participation of women from worse-off households (or 
in more precarious jobs) increases, which was particularly the case during the 
1990s. Also, higher female LFP may be associated to higher school segregation if 
the women entering the labor market come from better-off households (or access 
better-paid jobs), thus having means to choose private schools with extended 
hours that allow them to work, unlike their poorer counterparts. 
Theoretical models and empirical evidence highlight the link between LFP and 
a woman’s risk of suffering domestic violence, but results are mixed and further 
research is needed to better understand the ways in which women’s LFP impacts 
the risk of suffering domestic violence, and whether the effect varies with other 
characteristics such as education. 
Although this book is mainly concerned with female labor force participation, 
we have also documented other changes that affect women’s lives and that 
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could have sizeable implications on their incomes and standards of living. In 
particular, fertility rates have been significantly falling during the last decades 
in Latin America. The average number of children decreased in households from 
all population groups, but the gap between the most and the least vulnerable 
groups shrunk, owing to a sharper decline in the number of children living 
in poor households. By applying decomposition techniques we find that in 
most countries the changes in fertility that took place over the last decades 
contributed to a reduction in income inequality as well as in poverty. The fall 
in fertility among the income-deprived contributed to a reduction in poverty. 
Besides, since it was larger than the fall among the non-poor, it contributed 
to the reduction in inequality, as well. The main channel was straightforward: 
lower fertility rates implied smaller families and hence larger per capita incomes 
that reduced the probability of falling into income poverty. Lower fertility also 
fostered labor force participation, especially among women, which contributed 
to the reduction of poverty and inequality in most countries, although the size 
of this effect was small. 
4. Policy implications 
Female labor force participation is desirable on several grounds, including but 
not limited to female empowerment and poverty reduction. For these and other 
reasons, promoting female employment should be among a society’s objectives. In 
fact, one of the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals is to “promote 
gender equality and empower women”, a goal monitored by the share of women in 
employment, among other indicators. Promoting female LFP seems particularly 
relevant in Latin America, given two facts that are stressed in this book: the 
level of female engagement in the workforce is lower than in other regions of 
the world, and it has largely reduced its speed of growth over the last decade. 
Moreover, both facts are particularly marked for vulnerable women. While 
highly-educated women in large urban areas in Latin America have employment 
levels not far from their counterparts in developed countries, vulnerable women 
are either less attracted to join the workforce or find more restrictions to enter 
the labor market. This dual situation is complex, and it reflects a host of different 
driving factors, from social norms to the weak labor perspectives for women with 
low formal education and other social disadvantages.
This study shows that the gender gap in employment remains very significant, 
and that its closure is still distant. The recent slowdown in female LFP is likely 
to place active labor policies at the center of the policy debate, after decades 
in which their need was less evident. In particular, the stronger deceleration 
for vulnerable women reinforces the need to consider employment initiatives 
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for groups with less attractive job prospects, and more prone to leave the labor 
market when there are no urgent needs.
This book identifies and discusses a large set of policy interventions that may 
help foster female employment, especially among the most disadvantaged. Some 
of these initiatives are already in place in Latin America, some are taken from the 
experience of developed countries, and some could be explored as new options. 
Achieving women’s economic empowerment demands multiple interventions. 
Policy strategies can be classified according to three main objectives: relaxing 
the constraints on women’s time, improving women’s agency, and attaining fair 
labor markets. 
Relaxing the constraints on women’s time 
Reducing the time-burden attached to family responsibilities may enhance 
women’s economic empowerment. Significant decisions concerning education, 
work, and fertility overlap with women’s active age. As a result, family decisions 
may crowd out labor market insertion for mothers and wives. The intrinsic gender 
roles related to maternity increase the costs of women’s engagement in a labor 
market experience and are sometimes reinforced by the caregiving and home-
production responsibilities that rely substantially on women. As a response, co-
responsibility and care policies seek to alter the within-household distribution of 
roles to promote women’s engagement in paid work. 
Maternity leave is a mandatory break period from labor before and after birth, 
during which time entitled women receive a full salary. The evidence, mostly 
for developed countries, suggests that maternity leave has a positive impact on 
female LFP. In Latin America, all countries offer maternity leave schemes with 
100% income replacement and almost half of them have paternity leave for birth; 
only a few extend the benefit to childcare. However, extended maternity leave 
may deepen traditional gender roles to the extent that they take for granted that 
women are the primary caregivers, thus detaching them from the labor market 
for longer periods and eroding their seniority and human capital accumulation. 
Moreover, small or inexistent paternity leave schemes could make it difficult 
for women to return to work. The experiences of some countries suggest other 
promising options: paternity leave that cannot be transferred to women, parental 
leave for childcare, more flexible schedules and collective financing. 
Poor women face serious economic barriers to addressing childcare demands. 
The weak pre-primary public school systems increase the demand of care services 
at the household level, raising the costs for mothers who participate in the labor 
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market. In addition, even when these services exist, they provide an incomplete 
solution because early childhood school hours are shorter than the typical 
workday. Early childhood education thus does not fully ameliorate the pressures 
placed on women’s work-family balance. Many Latin American countries are 
advancing in this area, extending the compulsory years of pre-primary education, 
investing in formal education at that level, and launching public programs that 
provide assistance during early childhood to families in poverty. In many cases 
these programs are based in community centers. However, these initiatives are 
vastly insufficient and programs have still very low coverage. 
The supply of care services for the elderly and people with disabilities also appears 
as a relevant demand for women, as these care responsibilities are also gender-
biased. State support to conciliate labor participation with elderly care is almost 
inexistent in Latin America.
A serious strategy to facilitate the labor force participation of vulnerable women 
will give a high priority to policies that expand childcare centers and pre-primary 
education, extend school hours, and provide care services for the elderly. Such 
measures can help bridge the gap between vulnerable women and men as well 
as the gap between vulnerable and well-off women. Men and well-off women 
represent two groups that experience a comparatively reduced child and elderly 
care burden, owing to various cultural and economic reasons. 
Pregnancy may imply a severe obstacle to the labor prospects of young 
disadvantaged women. Pregnancy and childbearing at a younger age can 
generate a work interruption that may have permanent consequences on a 
woman’s attachment to the labor market. By comparison, having children in a 
later stage of career advancement could ease her return to her previous position. 
Evidence indicates that the timing of childbearing matters for labor supply, 
and that negative labor-market consequences are more severe for poor and less 
educated women.12 Data from the Demographic and Health Survey for four 
Latin American countries reveals that while most women in their thirties have at 
least one child, regardless of their socioeconomic status, the situation of women 
in their early twenties is very different: while more than 80% of those with low 
education have at least one child, only 20% of those with high education are 
mothers at that age. Although fertility decisions are obviously within the private 
sphere, governments and the civil society can provide information, ease access 
12 In addition to the timing of childbearing, the number of children is as important. The 
evidence suggests that the desired number of children per woman is below the actual number 
in Latin America, especially in high-fertility countries and among poor and less-educated 
women. 
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to contraceptive methods and avoid incentives to increase or jumpstart fertility 
decisions, which might be implicit in some public policies.
In addition to labor and social policies, advances in other areas may ease time 
constraints and enhance labor force participation. As an illustration, many poor 
women face some serious limitations: (i) insecure neighborhoods imply that they 
spend time protecting their families and homes from crime; (ii) poor public 
transportation systems limit the possibility of working far from home; (iii) low 
access to time-saving home appliances, and in some cases even basic services of 
water and electricity imply a heavy burden on women and could hinder labor 
market participation.13 Improvements in these areas, and in the possibilities to 
work for the market at home, will certainly facilitate the entry of vulnerable 
women into the workforce, and improve their job prospects. 
Gender roles are culturally rooted but are not immutable features of a society, 
as the history of women’s achievements in the last century teaches us. In most 
Latin American families, caregiving and home-production responsibilities 
disproportionally depend on women, reducing the time available for working 
outside home.14 Advocacy for co-responsibility at home may help modify some 
cultural norms on household arrangements, empower women, and in turn ease 
time constraints and facilitate their insertion into the labor markets. 
Improving women’s agency
Women’s agency refers to the ability to exercise control over resources, sometimes 
denied by norms or as a result of gender inequality in the economic sense. Policies 
that ameliorate unequal access to economic resources aim to provide autonomy, 
promote self-worth and encourage women to participate on equal, rather than 
subordinated terms. Education, social protection and regulatory policies are 
examples of this set of policies. 
There has been undeniable progress in terms of education enrollment in all 
Latin American countries over the last decades. Improvements have especially 
benefited women, closing the gaps with men in all educational levels, in most 
countries. Universal coverage in primary school has almost been achieved in 
13 For instance, in Bolivia only 70% of women in the poorest decile of the distribution have 
access to electricity and just 3.5% have a washing machine. The figures are even lower in El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua.
14 For instance, in 85% of the poorest households (four bottom deciles) of Argentina, women 
are the main responsible for the household chores, whereas only 43% of men help with those 
chores.
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several Latin American nations, but the target of universal coverage in secondary 
school is not under reach in the near future, whereas in most countries only 
a minority of the population has access to tertiary education. Undoubtedly, 
extending education to the disadvantaged groups, including vulnerable women, 
remains a top priority in the policy agenda, with sizeable repercussions in terms 
of labor force participation. 
Conditional cash transfer programs have been major policy innovations in 
Latin America over the last 15 years. CCTs have had unambiguous positive 
social consequences, contributing to the substantial fall in income poverty 
and inequality over the 2000s, and fostering the accumulation of human 
capital. Despite these positive effects, the impact of CCTs on gender-related 
issues is subject to debate. The majority of CCTs entitle women to receive the 
transfer, a design feature that has promoted women’s empowerment in terms 
of household managing. However, the cash subsidy may be viewed as income 
earned by mothers for taking care of the children and assuring compliance with 
the program conditions, and hence it may reinforce traditional intrahousehold 
gender roles, and act as a disincentive for women to participate in the labor 
market. In addition, CCTs may capture the space and efforts in the public arena 
to develop more employment-oriented interventions, especially those active 
labor market policies focused on vulnerable women. 
The evidence on the impact of CCTs on female labor supply is still mixed. 
Although most of the studies do not find significant short-run effects of cash 
transfers on LFP, the global validity of this result cannot be taken for granted. 
In fact, recent studies find evidence on labor supply disincentives of CCTs in 
some countries and for some groups. We believe that CCTs should be defended 
as key instruments in the national strategies for poverty alleviation and income 
redistribution; however, it should not be simply assumed that these programs 
have no negative impact on labor outcomes. Governments should pay attention 
to the unintended effects of CCTs on gender issues, and be creative in the 
design of new components that help alleviate some of these potential side 
effects. A few countries in the region have become aware of possible negative 
effects and are complementing CCTs with access to labor-oriented programs 
and training courses. 
Regulations on property rights are aimed at guaranteeing women’s ability to 
exercise decisions over economic resources in equitable conditions. For instance, 
the evidence suggests that land property programs increase women’s involvement 
in household and production decisions. Laws should avoid discriminatory clauses 
that deny women access to land or housing titles, inheritance or marital assets. 
There is still room for improvement on this issue. 
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Labor policies 
Active labor market programs (ALMP) include a broad set of interventions such 
as training, employment services, incentives to small business development, 
protected employment, and direct employment generation through public 
employment programs. They seek to overcome poor endowments in education, 
employment tenure, social networks, and productive assets in order to increase 
employability among women. Rigorous evaluations of the impacts of these policies 
on female labor outcomes are scarce, and the results are mixed. In particular, it 
seems that many programs fail to generate sizeable effects on employability and 
employment quality. 
Anti-discriminatory clauses as well as women’s participation quotas in 
employment are enforced in labor legislations across the region. These labor 
laws designed to empower women are subject to a lively debate concerning 
their actual payoffs. Some protective norms may create incentives that warrant 
their purposes inoperative or even generate adverse outcomes. For example, 
laws that restrict women’s working hours may deter employees from hiring 
women. Similarly, part-time job schemes or reduced working hours for women 
may promote female participation but could also favor precarious employment 
relationships in segmented markets. In contrast, other protective legislations, like 
anti-discrimination regulations, guarantee equal treatment. 
Finally, policy advocacy pursues changes in social attitudes regarding female 
stereotypes. Policies that raise awareness about the importance of integrating 
women and generating gender equality in the economy are reflected in initiatives 
to promote transparency in recruitment and promotion practices, and generating 
gender balances in top-level boards, seniority positions, and political decision-
making. Policy advocacy also implies the dissemination of information about 
replicable public policies. Some countries in the region have advanced policies 
that provide firms’ certification on gender policies, advise employers on how to 
create gender-equality corporate policies, or seek to promote anti-discriminatory 
practices and enable workers to balance work-life responsibilities. These initiatives 
could be taken as models for countries that lag behind in this arena.
Job flexibility and labor informality 
The issue of job flexibility lies at the core of the debate over gender and labor 
policy. In most societies, and Latin American ones are not exceptions, women 
have heavier responsibilities at home, at least during certain periods of their 
lives. Given this, more flexible labor arrangements may be a useful to achieve 
36
Bridging gender gaps? The rise and deceleration of female  
labor force participation in Latin America
the individuals’ objectives of caring for children and older adults at home, 
while at the same time participating in the labor market and pursuing a career. 
Policies should be aimed at facilitating women insertion into the labor market 
without losing sight that staying at home, at least some hours a day, could be the 
optimal choice in some cases. In a recent study Goldin (2014) argues that next 
advances in the struggle toward gender equality must “involve changes in the 
labor market, especially how jobs are structured and remunerated to enhance 
temporal flexibility”. 
Although job flexibility may be a key instrument to attract more women to 
the labor market, it has some potentially relevant drawbacks that makes the 
assessment of its convenience ambiguous, and calls for a case-by-case evaluation. 
Blau and Kahn (2013) conclude that “there may be a tradeoff between some 
policies that make it easier for women to combine work and family and women’s 
advancement at work”. On the one hand, family-friendly policies facilitate the 
labor force entry of women who are at a stage in the life cycle when they would 
prefer to reduce labor market commitments, but at the same time entitlements to 
part-time work, longer leave and other related benefits may encourage part-time 
work and employment in lower level positions. 
Developing countries, such as those in Latin America, are characterized by a 
form of job flexibility: labor informality. Most workers in the region are self-
employed or part-time salaried workers in small, precarious firms without a 
signed contract in compliance with the labor regulations. Despite some changes 
in the last decade, labor informality continues to be a key feature of the Latin 
American labor markets: more than half of the workers in the region (56.6%) are 
informal. Labor informality may have a positive side in a developing country: 
unskilled workers could avoid unemployment by carrying out low-productivity 
activities in the more flexible informal sector of the economy. In particular, that 
sector could act as a shelter for unskilled workers when the economy enters a 
downturn. Labor informality may also be useful for people who cannot engage 
in more stable labor arrangements, a situation that is more likely among women 
than among men. However, the benefits of more flexibility come usually at a 
considerable cost: informality is associated to a lack of social and labor benefits, 
and frequently also lower wages. While the social costs of informality have been 
largely discussed elsewhere, we stress an additional relevant downside. Many 
policies that favor female employment and empowerment require regulations in 
the formal sector of the economy (maternity leave, income taxation, in-the-job 
care services, gender quotas). Insofar as informality levels remain high, especially 
for vulnerable women, these policy instruments will be of a limited scope. In 
that sense, efforts to increase labor formalization would be central to a strategy 
of supporting improvements in female employment and empowerment. 
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Policy evaluation 
There has been undeniable progress in the rigorous evaluation of public policies 
in Latin America over the last decade. The body of evidence on the impact of 
public programs on various outcomes is increasing at a high pace, encouraged by 
the active support of international organizations and most governments. In this 
book we review the evidence on the impact of several policies on female labor 
participation and other related outcomes. Although the literature is growing, the 
evidence is still fragmentary. Rigorous impact evaluations are lacking for many 
specific programs, and there are broad policies with gender and labor consequences 
that are difficult to evaluate with the available data and instruments. While in 
many cases the existing pieces of evidence do not allow for clear identification 
of the causal links between policies and outcomes, they provide some warnings 
about dimensions that should be taken into account. 
The task of identifying best policy practices is full of difficult challenges. The 
task is even harder, given that the choice of the optimal policy varies with the 
context. However, although the challenge is enormous, more empirical evidence 
is the only road to better, more informed policy decisions.
5. Outline of the book 
The book is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we characterize the framework in 
which changes in female labor force participation have been taking place. These 
include economy-wide changes in the labor markets, trends in the educational 
structure of the population, and demographic changes. This initial chapter is 
descriptive and does not take into account the likely interactions between these 
phenomena and the changing role of women in the labor markets. 
Chapter 3 is aimed at documenting the main trends in female labor market 
participation and employment in Latin America. It provides evidence on patterns 
and trends in female labor market participation by country and by period. In 
particular, we look for signs of a recent reduction in the speed of female entry 
into the labor markets. 
Chapter 4 makes the first step toward the understanding of the changes in 
female labor force participation by analyzing whether the recent patterns are 
mainly accounted for by changes in some direct determinants of the labor supply 
decision, such as education, fertility, location or type of job, or instead they are 
chiefly related to some more profound transformation in behavior.
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In Chapter 5 we explore the argument that female LFP may be reaching a 
ceiling, and then analyze the potential link between the economic expansion 
in the 2000s and the deceleration in female LFP, and explore the movements of 
female LFP along the business cycle. 
Chapter 6 is focused more on the long-run determinants of female labor force 
participation than in the more recent developments. The chapter starts by 
carefully discussing the theoretical links between female LFP and a large set 
of covariates, and then reviews the empirical literature, carrying out a meta-
analysis. Chapter 6 also offers a statistical exploration of the relationship between 
several covariates and female LFP in Latin America. Some of these covariates are 
jointly determined with labor supply (education, marriage and fertility choices), 
while others are virtually outside the control of the individual: returns to work at 
home, returns to work outside home for a wage, technologies (health, home, and 
work), preferences, and decision making setups.
Changes in female labor market participation are likely to have profound labor 
and social consequences. The aim of chapter 7 is to discuss and provide evidence 
on some of these potential effects. By applying microeconometric decompositions 
we provide estimates of the implications in terms of income poverty and 
inequality of the observed changes in female labor force participation over the 
last two decades. We also look at the future by projecting rates of female LFP 
based on the observed patterns in the past, and assessing the impact on income 
poverty and inequality. The chapter includes an examination of the potential 
distributive impact of another phenomenon closely linked to female labor force 
participation: fertility. 
Finally, chapter 8 reviews public policies implemented in the region that are 
aimed at dealing with gender issues in the labor market. The chapter identifies 
and analyzes policies in the region that address obstacles that women face as 
they attempt to exercise power in the economic dimension, and in particular, 
obstacles that they face when making labor market choices.
39
References
Amador, D., Bernal, R. and Peña, X. (2013). The rise in female participation in 
Colombia: fertility, marital status or education? Documento CEDE 11, febrero. 
Blau, F. and Kahn, L. (2013). Female Labor Supply: Why Is the United States Falling 
Behind? American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2013, 103(3): 
251–256.
Chioda, L. (2011). Work and family: Latin American and Caribbean women in search of 
a new balance. The World Bank. 
Elías, J., and Ñopo, H. (2010). “The Increase in Female Labor Force Participation in 
Latin America 1990-2004: Decomposing the Changes.” Washington, DC, 
United States: Inter-American Development Bank. Mimeographed document.
Fields, G., Cruces, G., Jaume, D. and Viollaz, M. (2015). “The Growth-Employment-
Poverty Nexus in Latin America”, WIDER, forthcoming.
Goldin, C. (2014). A grand gender convergence: its last chapter. American Economic 
Review 104 (4). 
ILO (2011). ILO estimates and projections of the economically active population: 1990-2020. 
ILO. 
Olivetti, C. (2013). The female labor force and long-run development: the American 
experience in comparative perspective. NBER working paper series 19131.
Piras, C. (ed.) (2004). Women at Work. Challenges for Latin America. Washington D.C: 
Inter-American Development Bank. 
SEDLAC (2014). Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
CEDLAS-World Bank. 
World Bank (2012 a). Women’s Economic Empowerment in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Policy Lessons from the World Bank Gender Action Plan. 
Washington D.C: The World Bank.
World Bank (2012 b). Gender equality and development. World Development Report 2012.
World Economic Forum (2014). “The Global Gender Gap Report 2014”, Insight 
Report, World Economic Forum.
40
Bridging gender gaps? The rise and deceleration of female  
labor force participation in Latin America
Table 1.1: National household surveys used in this study
 Name of survey Acronym Surveys used
Argentina
 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
Puntual
EPH 1992-2003
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
Continua
EPH-C 2003-2012
Bolivia
 
 
 
 
Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 1992, 1993
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo ENE 1997
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 1999, 2000
Encuesta de Hogares
 
EH 
 
2001, 2002, 2005,  
2007-2009, 2011, 2012
Brazil
 
Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domicilios
PNAD
 
1992, 1993, 1995-1999, 
2001-2009, 2011, 2012
Chile
 
Encuesta de Caracterización 
Socioeconómica Nacional
 
CASEN
 
1992, 1994 ,1996, 1998, 
2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 
2011
Colombia
 
Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 2001-2005
Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares GEIH 2008-2012
Costa Rica
 
Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos 
Múltiples
EHPM 1992-2009
Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 2010, 2012
Dominican
Republic
Encuesta Nacional de Fuerza de Trabajo ENFT 2011
Ecuador
 
Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida ECV 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999
Encuesta de Empleo, Desempleo y 
Subempleo
ENEMDU 2003-2012
El Salvador Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos 
Múltiples
EHPM 1995, 1996, 1998-2012
Guatemala Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de 
Vida
ENCOVI 2011
Honduras Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de 
Propósitos Múltiples
EPHPM 1992-1999, 2001-2011
Mexico
 
Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos 
de los Hogares
 
ENIGH
 
1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004-2006, 
2008, 2010, 2012
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 Name of survey Acronym Surveys used
Nicaragua Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre 
Medición de Nivel de Vida
EMNV 1993, 1998, 2001, 2005, 
2009
Panama Encuesta de Hogares EH 1995, 1997-2012
Paraguay Encuesta Integrada de Hogares EIH 1997, 2001
 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares EPH 1999, 2002-2011
Peru Encuesta Nacional de Hogares ENAHO 1997-2012
Uruguay Encuesta Continua de Hogares ECH 1992, 1995-1998,  
2000-2012
Venezuela Encuesta de Hogares Por Muestreo EHM 1992, 1995, 1997-2012
Source: own elaboration.
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Chapter 2
A changing scenario: 
education, family, and 
economic environment
Mariana Marchionni
1. Introduction
This chapter describes the context in which female labor market decisions took 
place over the last two decades in Latin America. The chapter documents trends 
in the evolution of education, fertility, family formation, and labor market 
conditions. In particular, we intend to link these stylized facts with the rapid 
growth and subsequent slowdown of female labor force participation in the region.
It is difficult to disentangle which factors caused—and which were caused by—
changes in women’s attitudes towards the labor market. In fact, most of the 
variables that we consider (e.g. education, fertility) are likely to be determined 
jointly with labor participation and employment decisions. A causal analysis 
is beyond the scope of this work. Our goal is simply to provide a framework, 
based on stylized facts, to better understand the circumstances (not necessarily 
exogenous) in which female labor changes took place, without delving into a 
discussion of causality.
We focus our analysis on the past two decades (the period from 1992-2012) 
and exploit annual information drawn from national household surveys, which 
are part of the SEDLAC database (CEDLAS and The World Bank).1 Much of 
this analysis relies on comparisons that highlight the gender dimension or that 
showcase differences between women from different socioeconomic backgrounds 
and geographic locations. The overall picture for the region is described using 
cross-country averages, although in some cases heterogeneity across countries 
1 See Chapter 1 for details on this database and the surveys used. 
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warrants discussion. As in most of the rest of the book, the analysis is restricted 
to people aged 25 to 54. 
We conclude that the observed changes in education, fertility, and family 
structure over the last two decades are consistent with increasing female labor 
force participation. The impressive growth in women’s formal education in all 
Latin American countries is likely a significant factor behind the rise in female 
LFP, particularly given that educated women are more prone to be active in 
the labor market. The drop in fertility rates and the transformations in family 
arrangements and household structure are also factors that might potentially 
explain the increase in female LFP in the region. 
Changes in the economic environment could also be significant determinants 
of changes in female labor supply. In this section, we mainly highlight two 
factors: the high growth rates experienced by most Latin American economies, 
especially in the 2000s, and the changes in the sectoral structure of production. 
High economic growth has an ambiguous relationship with female LFP: while 
growth may increase wages and the perspectives of better jobs and hence 
stimulate women’s labor supply, higher household incomes may discourage the 
entry of women into the labor market by reducing the need of an additional 
earner in the family. The change in the structure of production seems to have a 
more straightforward effect, as observed changes in the region mostly favored 
sectors with relatively high female-to-male ratios, hence potentially fostering 
women’s employment. 
2. Changes in education 
Education affects (and is affected by) the wages and positions to which women 
can aspire, the attitudes of women towards work, career, and family, and social 
norms that shape the roles of women inside and outside the household (Goldin, 
2006; Chioda, 2011). Evidence from both cross-country and individual level 
data suggests that women’s education is an important determinant of female 
labor market decisions, and that women’s education increases with economic 
development (Mammen and Paxson, 2000).
In Latin America, female educational attainment has increased over the years, 
along with improvements in other development indicators.2 Between 1992 and 
2012, years of schooling for women aged 25-54 rose from 7.2 to 9.4. In other 
2 More on this in section 2.5.
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words, twenty years ago, an average prime-age woman would have left school 
right after completing primary education, while in the late 2000s, the same 
woman would continue halfway through secondary school (Figure 2.1, also 
Table 2.1 in the Appendix). This increase in years of schooling is likely to be 
significant in terms of skills and knowledge, and therefore have a positive effect 
on job prospects. For instance, evidence from the Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) indicates that individual tests scores significantly rise 
between the 7th and the 9th school year, even after controlling for individual, 
family, classmates, and school characteristics.3
As Figure 2.2 shows, progress in female education is not restricted to Latin 
America. For all developing regions, years of schooling for the youngest women 
exceed those of women aged 50-54 by over two school years. Progress in North 
America, and Europe and Central Asia, where educational attainment for 
the oldest group was already high decades ago, has been much more modest. 
If this trend continues, the gap in women’s education between developed and 
developing regions will be substantially reduced in the future. 
3 Marchionni, Pinto and Vazquez (2013) provide estimations of this effect for Argentina using 
PISA 2009 results.
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Figure 2.1: Female years of schooling
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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Figure 2.2: Female years of schooling 
Regions of the world, circa 2010. Women aged 25-29 and 50-54.
Source: own calculations based on Barro-Lee data (version April 2013).
Note: unweighted means.
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Figure 2.3: Female years of schooling by country 
Latin American countries, circa 1992 and 2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Latin America: unweighted means.
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Female educational progress in Latin America is common to all countries in the 
region (Figure 2.3) from the least to the most advanced, although the differences 
across countries are still important. In 2012, years of schooling for prime-age 
women varied from less than 5 years in Guatemala to 12 years in Argentina, i.e. 
from incomplete primary to complete secondary. Although several countries that 
exhibited relatively low female years of schooling in 1992 showed great progress over 
the next two decades (El Salvador, Brazil, and Mexico) others did not (Guatemala 
and Honduras). Thus, convergence in the near future remains unlikely.
Although men’s educational attainment has also improved in Latin America, 
progress has been faster for women. Thus, the gap (which initially favored men) 
narrowed over the years, and recently, it even reversed (Figure 2.4 and Table 2.1). 
Despite the fact that most countries in the region exhibit similar patterns 
concerning educational gender gaps, there are peculiarities that are worth noting. 
In Panama, Uruguay, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica, years of 
education were already higher for women than for men in the early 1990s, and 
the gap continued to widen over the following years. In contrast, in Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Peru, El Salvador, and Mexico, years of education remain higher for 
men than for women, and the gap is rather large in some cases, e.g. more than 
one school year for the first two countries (Figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.5: Gender gap (women-men) in years of schooling
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Figure 2.6: Gender gap in years of schooling by age group  
(women minus men)
Latin America, 2012 or last year available.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
The gender gap (women minus men) in years of schooling decreases with age, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.6. By 2012, in a typical Latin American country, women 
between the ages of 25-34 had spent almost 4 more months at school than men 
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from the same age group. For adults aged 45-54 (who are likely to be the parents of 
individuals in the former group), the gender gap is of the same order of magnitude 
but with the opposite sign. This pattern suggests that the gender gap in years of 
schooling will continue to widen at a considerable pace in the coming years.
School life expectancy estimates reinforce this conclusion. The gap in total years 
of schooling between Latin American girls and boys who started school in the 
late 2000s is expected to be eight months by the time they reach adulthood, i.e. 
twice as large than the present gap for young adults. Panel A in Figure 2.7 shows 
the gender gap in school life expectancy for children who entered school in 2010 
for all countries in Latin America. Venezuela, Uruguay, and Argentina lead the 
ranking: in these countries, a girl’s school life expectancy is more than 2 years 
higher than a boy’s. In contrast, boys who recently entered school in Bolivia and 
Guatemala will spend more time at school than girls.
Panel B in Figure 2.7 compares the gap in school life expectancy between girls 
and boys across regions of the world. North America leads the ranking with a 
gender gap of 1.4 school years, followed by the Caribbean. The gender gap in 
Latin America is similar to that of Europe and Central Asia, even though the 
expected years of schooling are higher for the latter (14.7 compared to 13 for the 
former). Meanwhile, in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia the considerable lag 
in women’s educational attainment is expected to persist. 
Behind the expansion of women’s years of schooling is the increasing share of 
women reaching higher educational levels. Between 1992 and 2012 the proportion 
of women with secondary or tertiary education rose from 26% to 45% at the 
expense of low educational levels (less than complete secondary). Figure 2.8 
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Figure 2.7: Gender gap (girls-boys) in school life expectancy (in years)
Children entering school in 2010 or last year available. 
Source: own calculations based on UNESCO eAtlas of Gender Equality on Education.
Note: Latin America in Panel A and regions in Panel B: unweighted means.
50
Bridging gender gaps? The rise and deceleration of female  
labor force participation in Latin America
shows the trends for both medium (complete secondary or incomplete tertiary) 
and high (complete tertiary) educational levels. It is worth noting that in the late 
2000s, the share of women with a tertiary or university degree exceeded that of 
men in a typical Latin American country (see also Table 2.2 in the Appendix). 
The increasing proportion of women with a secondary or tertiary degree is partly 
explained by increased access to secondary and tertiary education (Panel A in 
Figure 2.9). Net enrollment rates in primary education, which already exceeded 
90% in the early 1990s, continued to rise over the following twenty years, reaching 
98% for both men and women in a typical Latin American country. But the 
most significant advances occurred in the middle and upper educational levels. 
Female net enrollment rates rose from 50% in 1992 to 76% in 2012 in secondary 
education, and from 12% to 29% in tertiary education. Throughout the period, 
net enrollment rates were higher for women than for men for all educational levels, 
but the gap was widest for secondary and tertiary education. In particular, the gap 
in tertiary education has widened considerably in recent years, which is related to 
the behavior of the gender gap in educational attainment described earlier.
Another interesting fact is the strong upward trend in enrollment rates at early 
ages, illustrated in panel B in Figure 2.9. Preschool attendance for children aged 
3-5 rose 20 percentage points on average in the region (from 33% to 53%). Beyond 
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the benefits of early education on cognitive development and future educational 
attainment, the availability of educational facilities for young children promotes 
labor participation among mothers (Faur, 2011).4
Women’s educational progress varies not only across countries but also by area of 
residence within each country. Even though female years of schooling increased 
among both rural and urban women, the former are still far behind (Figure 2.10 and 
Table 2.1). In Latin American urban areas, women’s education increased markedly, 
rising from an average of 8.4 in 1992 to 10.4 years in 2012. Women’s education 
improved at a similar pace in rural areas, going from an average of 4.6 to almost 7 
years of schooling (from incomplete to complete primary education, on average). 
Despite noticeable progress, women’s education in rural areas of Latin America is 
still low, and the rural-urban gap has not changed over the last twenty years.
The increase in female years of schooling in both rural and urban areas was 
generalized across Latin American countries, even though the pace of change 
differs between areas and countries (Figure 2.11). Between 1992 and 2012, 
the urban-rural gap in years of education for women decreased in El Salvador, 
Ecuador, Costa Rica, and especially in Mexico, while it increased in the rest of 
the countries in the region. As a result, the urban-rural gap remained practically 
unchanged on average for the region.5
4 Chapter 8 elaborates on these policy issues.
5 For more on educational attainment in Latin American rural areas see Cicowiez et al. (2006).
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3. Changes in fertility
The drop in fertility is at the center of the explanation of the increase in female 
labor force participation during the twentieth century. The strong negative 
correlation between fertility rates and female participation in the labor market 
is a stylized fact in the world, and Latin America is no exception. Moreover, 
in some more restricted settings, the causal effect of fertility on female labor 
participation has been addressed (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Cruces and Galiani, 
2007; Agüero and Marks, 2008; Tortarolo, 2014). 
In this section, we document patterns and trends that describe the sharp drop in 
fertility in Latin America and the concomitant decrease in the number of young 
children per household.
Fertility in Latin America, 1950-2010
As the second half of the twentieth century began, fertility in Latin America 
was higher than the world’s average. Total fertility rate (TFR) in the region was 
about 6 children per woman during the 1950s and 1960s.6 Fertility rates began 
their downward trend only in the mid-1960s, reaching an average of 2.5 children 
per woman in 2005-2010. This significant reduction in TFR implies a clear 
convergence towards the levels of the most advanced regions of the world (Figure 
2.12 and Table 2.3).7
Even though all countries in the region have already entered the fertility transition, 
experiences have been very heterogeneous. Figure 2.13 shows the TFR for each 
Latin American country during the periods 1950-1955 and 2005-2010. While 
most countries were in the high-fertility group at the middle of the last century, 
none was in that group in 2005-2010. Bolivia and Guatemala went from high to 
medium-high fertility; Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
and Venezuela went from high to medium fertility; and Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Mexico went from high to low fertility. Fertility 
had started to decline earlier in Argentina and Uruguay, which were the only 
6 Total Fertility Rate is the average number of children a hypothetical cohort of women would 
have at the end of their reproductive period if, during their whole lives, they were subject to 
the fertility rates of a given period and if they were not subject to mortality. It is expressed 
as children per woman (United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, 
definition available at http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Data/fertility.htm).
7 For further analysis on fertility changes in Latin America see Chackiel (2004) and ECLAC 
(2008, 2011).
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two Latin American countries with medium TFR during the 1950-1955 period. 
The downward trend continued over the years and by 2005-2010 Argentina and 
Uruguay belonged to the low-fertility group.
Figure 2.13 also shows the percentage reduction in TFR during the last 60 years 
for each country in parenthesis. In general, high initial fertility rates are associated 
with rapid declines in fertility. In Costa Rica, for instance, the decline in fertility 
was sharp, falling from 6.7 children per woman in 1950-1955 to 1.9 children per 
woman in 2005-2010, i.e. TFR fell by 71.4%. Conversely, in countries such as 
Argentina and Uruguay, which made the transition earlier, TFR fell by 28.5% 
and 22.6%, respectively, in the same period. The fact that adjustment was faster 
in high-fertility countries has led to a convergence in fertility levels in the region, 
but there are still differences. Fertility rates in Brazil, Chile and Costa Rica, for 
example, are already below the replacement level, while in Guatemala we still 
observe more than 4 children per woman.
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The pace of the decline did not only differ across countries, but also over the 
course of the period analyzed. While the 1960s saw the sharpest drop in fertility 
rates, the first decade of the twenty first century was characterized by low fertility 
rates and a low rate of decline for most of the countries in the region.
Despite the steep decline in fertility rates, age at first birth remained fairly stable 
in Latin America since the 1970s (Rosero-Bixby, 1996 and 2004; Mensch, 
Singh, and Casterline, 2005). The stability in the onset of childbearing is 
also closely related to the stable timing of union formation, which we further 
analyze in section 2.4. There is evidence, however, that suggests that Latin 
America may have entered a new stage of fertility decline in the 2000s. Census 
data from the last decade indicates that the proportion of childless women in 
their twenties and early thirties increased in many Latin American countries, 
which may reflect an increasing trend in the starting age of childbearing, an 
increase in permanent childlessness in the region, or both (Rosero-Bixby et 
al., 2009). However, there are still marked differences between socioeconomic 
groups, as illustrated in the Box. 
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Number of children per household, 1992-2012
Clearly, the number of young children at home is an imperfect measure of 
fertility, but it seems an appropriate approach when describing the context in 
which women make their labor decisions. It also has the advantage of being 
easily computed from household survey data, which allows one to take into 
account a wider variety of social and economic variables related to both fertility 
and female labor decisions. This is not possible when using population censuses 
or other specific household surveys (e.g. demographic and health surveys), from 
which fertility statistics are usually derived. Moreover, household surveys are 
readily available for every country in the region for every year. 
Box: Proportion of women with children by age and education
Demographic and Health Surveys for Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, and Peru reveal that while most women in their thirties have at least 
one child regardless of their socioeconomic status, the situation of women in 
their early twenties is very different: while more than 70% of those with low 
education have at least one child, around 20% of those with high education 
are mothers at that age. 
Source: Own calculations based on Demographic and Health Surveys. The years 
considered are: 1994, 1998, 2003, and 2008 for Bolivia; 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 
and 2010 for Colombia; 1991, 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2007 for Dominican Republic; 
1991, 1996, 2000, 2004, and the period 2008-2012 for Peru.
Note: Figures represent the average percentage across years. Low education: less than 
secondary complete; medium education: secondary complete or tertiary incomplete; 
high education: tertiary complete.
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The number of children per household has been falling during the last decades 
in Latin America as a result of the decline in fertility rates (Figure 2.14 and Table 
2.4).8 In 1992, there were 1.6 children under 12 years of age per household in a 
typical Latin American country. This figure fell to just one child over the next 
two decades.
As noted earlier, the variety of experiences across countries is evident. The selected 
countries in panel B in Figure 2.14 represent three broad groups with distinct 
characteristics. The first group (Argentina and Chile) had few children per 
household in 1992, and the rate of decline afterwards was low. The second group 
(Honduras and Nicaragua) is on the opposite end: there were many children per 
household and high rates of change. The third group (Brazil and Costa Rica) 
presents an interesting pattern: the number of children per household in 1992 
is similar to the regional average, but the adjustment occurs at such a high rate 
that by 2012 it converges with the number of children per household of early-
transition countries, i.e. countries in the first group. 
8 Since we are interested in labor decisions of women aged 25-54, the number of children 
per household is computed over the sample of households for which the “mother” belongs 
to that age-group. Usually, it is not possible to identify the mother of the children within a 
household from household surveys data. In such cases we define the “mother” as the female 
head of household or the female spouse of the household head.
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Figure 2.14: Number of children under 12 per household
Households with mother aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Panel A: unweighted means.
58
Bridging gender gaps? The rise and deceleration of female  
labor force participation in Latin America
It is well known that in high and medium socioeconomic sectors where the 
fertility rate is relatively low, fertility transition began earlier (Schkolnik and 
Chackiel, 2004; ECLAC, 2011). Poor and less-educated population, in rural 
areas or in marginal urban neighborhoods, face cultural and even linguistic 
barriers to family planning information. These barriers prevent fertility from 
falling to the desired levels.9 However, despite these limitations, fertility has also 
started to fall among the least advanced groups. 
The average number of children per household decreased across all population 
groups, but the gap between the most and least advanced groups is still very wide 
(Figure 2.15 and Table 2.4). For instance, the gap in the number of children 
by mother’s education (panel A) appears to have remained relatively stable on 
average for the region, although there is some convergence towards the end of the 
period owing to a sharper decline in the number of children living with a low-
educated mother.10 The gap between extreme quintiles of the parental income 
distribution (panel B) behaves similarly, as does the gap between rural and urban 
areas (panel C). In the latter case, the sharper decline in the number of children 
in rural households suggests a trend towards convergence between areas, but the 
gap is still significant. 
9 The desired number of children per woman is well below the actual number, especially in 
high-fertility countries such as Guatemala and Bolivia (Chackiel, 2004).
10 Education is held to be a key determinant of fertility, and even though a causal assessment 
is not always possible, there is ample evidence that suggests a strong association between the 
two phenomena (Strauss and Thomas, 1995; Castro Martin and Juarez, 1995).
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Figure 2.15: Number of children under 12 per household
Latin America, 1992-2012. Households with mother aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: low education: less than secondary complete; medium education: secondary 
complete or tertiary incomplete; high education: tertiary complete. Quintiles in panel 
B are defined over households with more than one member, based on parental income 
by income earner. Panel C excludes Argentina, where household surveys only cover the 
urban population. Unweighted means.
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The convergence in the number of young children per household between 
population groups is likely driven by low fertility countries, while the gap has 
risen or remained stable in countries where the fertility transition is the least 
advanced (Schkolnik and Chackiel, 2004). While some low fertility countries 
such as Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica exhibit the smallest fertility gaps between 
population groups, countries like Bolivia and Honduras are on the other extreme 
in both dimensions (panel D in Figure 2.16). In fact, the cross-country correlation 
coefficient between the TFR in 2005-2010 and the gap in the number of children 
between low and highly-educated mothers is 0.80 and highly significant.11 
Chapter 7 in the book examines the poverty and inequality implications of these 
changes in fertility patterns.
11 The correlation between the TFR and the gap rural-urban is 0.74, and between the TFR and 
the gap quintile 1 –quintile 5 is 0.52, both significant at a 5% level. 
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Figure 2.16: Gap in the number of children under 12 per household
Latin American countries, 2012. Households with mother aged 25-54. 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: year 2012 or latest year available. Latin America: unweighted means. Definition 
of educational levels in Panel A: low education: less than secondary complete; medium 
education: secondary complete or tertiary incomplete; high education: tertiary complete. 
Quintiles in panel B are defined over households with more than one member, based 
on parental income by income earner. Panel C excludes Argentina, where household 
surveys only cover urban population, and Venezuela, where the rural-urban identifier is 
not available since 2004.
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4. Changes in family formation and 
household structure
Marriages, both formal and consensual, organize reproduction and rearing 
but also delineate social and economic roles by gender. That is why changes in 
family formation and household structure are linked to social and economic 
changes, such as improvements in women’s educational attainment and labor 
force participation.12
An interesting fact about family formation in Latin America is that the dramatic 
decline in fertility occurred without significant changes in the timing or 
prevalence of marriages, either formal or consensual. The percentage of married 
12 For an analysis of major trends affecting families in Latin America during the 1980s and the 
1990s see Jelin and Díaz-Muñoz (2003).
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Figure 2.17: Percentage of currently married women and age at first 
marriage (formal and consensual unions)
Latin America, 1992-2012. 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys and 
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 
(2013), World Marriage Data 2012 (POP/DB/Marr/Rev2012).
Note: Percentage of married women computed among women aged 25-54. Age at first 
marriage is the singulate mean age at first marriage (SMAM), which approximates the 
median age at first marriage among those women who eventually marry. Unweighted means.
62
Bridging gender gaps? The rise and deceleration of female  
labor force participation in Latin America
women has remained high over the years despite a decreasing trend, while the 
age at first marriage rose slightly but continues to be relatively low compared to 
developed regions (see Figure 2.17 and Table 2.5 in the Appendix). 
Women in rural areas in Latin America are more likely to be married than their 
urban counterparts (75 percent and 63 percent, respectively, in 2012 for women 
aged 25-54). Rural women rely mostly on family networks as a means of supporting 
themselves and to reproduce their communities, and marriage is one way to build 
these networks. Nevertheless, the slightly decreasing trend in the percentage of 
married women is observed in both rural and urban areas. Indeed, the urban-rural 
gap has remained fairly stable around 10 percentage points (see Figure 2.18). 
In countries with higher prevalence of consensual unions, age at first marriage 
tends to be lower, as suggested by Figure 2.19, where the correlation across 
countries for a year close to 2010 is -0.49 and statistically significant. As pointed 
out by Fussell and Palloni (2004), if prerequisites for formal marriage include 
educational attainment and economic independence, a higher prevalence of 
formal unions is likely to be associated with a delayed entrance to marriage. The 
percentage of consensual unions has been increasing over the years, especially 
in countries where it used to be relatively low (e.g. Argentina and Uruguay), 
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while it has remained high for the countries with a historically high prevalence 
of consensual unions (e.g. Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Panama). In most cases, the rise in consensual unions explains the decline in the 
proportion of formally married couples (Esteve et al., 2012).
If the change in social norms that led to the sharp decline in fertility did not 
significantly affect the prevalence or timing of marriage in Latin America, it 
may have changed the family arrangements and household structure instead 
(Fussell and Palloni, 2004). Over the last several decades, female headship has 
risen markedly in the region. The proportion of women aged 25-54 who are 
the single household head, i.e. no formal spouse or partner in their households, 
climbed from 12.6% in 1992 to 17% in 2012 in a typical Latin American 
country (panel A in Figure 2.20 and Table 2.6 in the Appendix). But the growth 
of the female-headship phenomenon goes beyond the increase in the prevalence 
of single-parent households. Figure 2.20 shows that the percentage of female 
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Figure 2.19: Correlation across countries between the percentage of 
women in consensual unions and age at first marriage
Latin American countries, circa 2010. Women aged 25-29.
Source: own calculations based on United Nations, Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division (2013), World Marriage Data 2012 (POP/DB/Marr/
Rev2012). 
Note: Brazil, Guatemala, and Venezuela are excluded since data circa 2010 is not 
available. The Singulate Mean Age at Marriage (SMAM) is the average length of 
single life expressed in years among those who marry before age 50as (United Nations 
Population Division/Fertility and Family Planning Section, http://www.un.org/esa/
population/publications/WMD2008/Metadata/SMAM.html).
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heads among prime-age women, regardless of whether they are married or single, 
grew at an even higher rate, from 14% to almost 23.8% over those two decades, 
which possibly reflects the transformation of roles and the empowerment of 
women within households. Moreover, during the 1990s, female headship 
appears closely linked to female economic headship, i.e. women who earn at least 
50% of household income (World Bank, 2012). The story changed dramatically 
since the early 2000s: the percentage of self-reported female heads continued to 
grow despite the marked slow-down in the rate of increase of female economic 
headship. We will return to this point in Chapter 7.
The percentage of female heads exhibits the same increasing pattern in both 
rural and urban areas, and characterizes all educational groups, though the levels 
differ (panels B and C in Figure 2.20). Female headship is less frequent among 
rural and mid-educated women, and the gap has widened somewhat over the 
years. Strikingly, prevalence of female headship does not decrease monotonically 
with education: during most of the period, women with a tertiary education 
degree were as prone as women with just primary education to be the single head 
in their households.13 Interestingly, the break in the high-education series (panel 
C) coincides approximately with that of the prevalence of female economic heads 
(panel A), suggesting that there is a link between economic headship and the 
self-perception of women regarding their status as household heads, which is 
noticeable only for highly educated women.
The strong increase in the prevalence of female household heads over the 1990s 
and 2000s is common to all the countries in the region (Figure 2.21). The 
proportion of prime-age women being the (self-reported) household head ranges 
from 15% in Peru to 33% in Uruguay around the year 2012. On average, the 
proportion of female heads grew by 10 percentage points between 1992 and 
2012, but in countries like Uruguay, Chile and Brazil the increases were well 
above the average (22, 17 and 16 points, respectively).14
13 The patterns of differences between groups are robust to the three definitions of female 
headship, with the exception that the percentage of female economic heads strongly increases 
with education.
14 The rise in female-headed households is in part explained by the increase in divorce rates, 
particularly in urban areas. There is a growing literature on the links between divorce and 
female labor participation in developed countries (Fernández and Wong, 2014; Stevenson, 
2008). It is argued that women enter the labor force as a means of getting insurance against 
divorce and greater bargaining power within marriage. Unfortunately, data on divorce are 
relatively scarce in Latin America. 
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Figure 2.20: Percentage of female heads of household
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Definitions in panel A: Female head is self-reported in any kind of household; 
Female single head in single headed households (also self-reported); Economic female 
head if women earns at least 50% of total family income. Panels B and C are based on 
the first definition. In panel C: Low education: less than secondary complete; medium 
education: secondary complete or tertiary incomplete; high education: tertiary complete. 
*Argentina is not included in rural statistics. Unweighted means.
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Extended and composite households, i.e. those including nonnuclear family 
members or non-kin members, respectively, are more common in Latin America 
than in other developing regions (Bongaarts, 2001). Such living arrangements may 
arise as a means to alleviate the effects of economic shocks, or as a result of family 
solidarity (for instance when single mothers need to enter the labor market).15 In fact, 
the percentage of young women living in extended or composite families is high in 
Latin America, and this is especially so among single mothers (Esteve et al., 2012). 
In Latin America, the proportion of women living in extended or composite 
households fell in the early 1990s, from 36.7% in 1992 to 34.9% in 1998, then 
increased slightly in the early 2000s, and then slightly decreased again since the mid-
2000s (panel A in Figure 2.22 and Table 2.7 in the Appendix). The same pattern, but 
much more pronounced, is observed only for certain groups of women, particularly 
in urban areas and with medium and high educational levels (panels B and C in 
Figure 2.22). These changes in living arrangements may respond to the economic ups 
and downs over the years: economic growth in the early 1990s, the effects of the crises 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and economic prosperity since the mid-2000s.16
15 De Vos (1995) points out that the higher prevalence of consensual unions is associated with 
the higher prevalence of extended and compound households in Latin America.
16 The next section documents changes in the economic conditions in Latin America in the 
period 1992-2012. 
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Figure 2.21: Percentage of female heads of household by country
Latin American countries, circa 1992 and 2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Latin America: unweighted means.
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Figure 2.22: Percentage of women living in extended or composite households
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
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The percentage of prime-age women living in extended or composite households 
varies greatly across Latin American countries (Figure 2.23). In 2012, numbers 
ranged from 18.6% in Brazil to 50.3% in El Salvador. Most of the countries 
experienced a fall in the proportion of such households between 1992 and 2012, 
with the biggest negative changes in Uruguay, Paraguay, and Peru (-9.9, -8.4, and 
-7.6 points, respectively), and the biggest positive changes in El Salvador (+11.2 
points) and Honduras (+4.2 points). 
5. Changes in the economic environment
The macroeconomic environment of countries shapes the employment decisions 
of individuals to a significant extent. Decisions regarding labor participation 
are likely to change depending on whether the context is highly volatile and 
uncertain or stable and exhibiting high levels of income growth. In the latter 
case, the planning horizon is typically longer. Female labor participation is 
particularly sensitive to the macroeconomic environment. Changes in economic 
conditions and employment opportunities affect female LFP directly, but also 
indirectly, through a strong interdependence with the employment status of 
other household members, particularly husbands.
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Figure 2.23: Percentage of women living in extended or composite 
households by country
Latin American countries, circa 1992 and 2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Latin America: unweighted means.
69
A changing scenario: education, family, 
and economic environment Mariana Marchionni 
The accumulated growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the region 
between 1992 and 2012 was 82.3%, while the average annual growth rate was 3.9% 
(Figure 2.24). It is useful to distinguish three broad stages that summarize the large 
variability over time that is hidden behind that average. Between 1992 and 1998, 
GDP grew 4.4% per year on average. The next five years were marked by several 
crises with a strong negative impact on economic growth: the GDP grew only 1.6% 
per year on average during this period.17 Finally, recovery resulted in high growth 
rates over the following years. Between 2004 and 2012, the annual GDP growth rate 
was 4.8%, slightly above the 4.4% exhibited during the 1992-1998 period. Despite 
this apparent similarity, the latter period is characterized by less variability across 
countries and over time, especially if we ignore the year 2009.18 Average GDP growth 
rate in 2004-2012 was 5.4% if we exclude 2009, with a coefficient of variation (across 
countries and years) of 0.52, which is 25% lower than the 0.69 in 1992-1998. 
17 The crises of global reach were the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the Russian financial 
crisis of 1998. Specific crises in some countries of the region were Mexico’s economic crisis 
in 1994, the Argentinean crisis of 2001, the banking crisis of Uruguay in 2002 and the 
Dominican financial crisis of 2003. Later, a new global financial crisis occurred in 2008.
18 Half of the Latin American countries experienced negative growth rates in 2009.
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For simplicity, in some sections of this study we divide the period under analysis 
into two decades: 1992-2002 and 2002-2012. In terms of economic growth, the 
second period was characterized by a higher growth rate (4.6% vs. 3.3%) and 
a lower variation of the GDP growth rate across countries and time (0.72 vs 
1.09). Interestingly, the higher growth in the last decade was also accompanied 
by greater nominal stability, with an average (median) rate of inflation of 7.8% 
(5.6%), compared to 39.7% (9.9%) in 1992-2002.
Figure 2.25 shows that the regional average hides very different growth prospects 
across countries: from a minimum of 2.6% in Venezuela to a maximum of 
5.9% in Panama. Interestingly, and despite the effects of numerous global and 
internal crises, all countries exhibited positive average growth rates for both 
decades. Unlike what happens at the aggregate level in the region, in 5 of the 
18 countries, average annual growth was higher in the first decade (El Salvador, 
Chile, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Mexico, in that order). 
Output growth brought changes in employment levels, mostly driven by female 
employment, as we further document in Chapter 3. The proportion of working 
women aged 25-54 increased by 12 percentage points between 1992 and 2012, 
while male employment remained high but rather stable around 91% (Figure 2.26).
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As we further analyze in Chapter 4, the structure of employment by sector also 
experienced some changes over this period (Figure 2.27). The share of employment 
in primary activities and manufacturing fell during both decades, while the share 
of employment in commerce, domestic services, and skilled services increased. 
Other sectors expanded in one decade but contracted in the other. Such is the 
case of education and health, which expanded in the 1990s, and construction, 
utilities and transportation, and public administration, which expanded in the 
2000s. It is worth noting that several sectors in which the majority of workers are 
women—namely commerce and domestic services, and health and education—
are also those that expanded during this period.
A final point to consider is the rise in the proportion of the urban population, 
which coincides with the above-mentioned contraction of the primary sector. 
The proportion of the population concentrated in urban areas rose from 63.8% 
to 69% in 1992-2002. By 2012, nearly three out of every four Latin Americans 
(73.3%) lived in cities (Figure 2.28). This process of urbanization is common to 
all the countries in the region, from Uruguay, which had the lowest share of rural 
population (7.4% in 2012), to Guatemala, where half of the population still lived 
in rural areas in 2012.
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Figure 2.26: Employment rates by gender
Latin America 1992, 2002 and 2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and the World Bank).
Note: unweighted means.
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Figure 2.27: Structure of employment by sector (in %)
Latin America 1992, 2002 and 2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
Note: unweighted means.
Figure 2.28: Rural and urban population (in % of total population)
Latin America, 1992-2012.
Source: own calculations based on World Development Indicators.
Note: unweighted means.
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6. Concluding remarks
This chapter has documented some of the changes that took place in Latin 
America over the period 1992-2012 that are likely related to the changes in female 
labor participation presented in the rest of this book. The evolution of education, 
fertility, and economic conditions over the last two decades are consistent with 
higher female participation rates. 
Women’s educational attainment has notably improved in Latin America over the 
last two decades. Women’s years of schooling increased faster than men’s, causing the 
male to female schooling gap to reverse in the late 2000s, on average for the region. 
Despite this common trend, there are countries in which women’s educational level 
is still too low, both in absolute terms and with respect to men’s. Moreover, women 
in rural areas suffer from an even greater educational disadvantage, not only in 
relation to men but also with respect to urban women, and the rural-urban gap in 
women’s years of schooling has not changed over the last twenty years.
The drop in fertility is central to explaining the increase in female labor force 
participation during the twentieth century. In Latin America, fertility started 
to fall in the mid-1960s. Today, some countries and population groups already 
exhibit low fertility, but others, particularly the poor, the less educated and rural 
populations, still lag far behind in the transition. 
This dramatic decline in fertility occurred without significant changes in the 
timing or prevalence of marriages, either formal or consensual. The percentage 
of married women has remained high over the years despite a slight decreasing 
trend, while the age at first marriage and first birth continues to be relatively 
low compared to developed regions. Instead, there have been profound 
transformations in family arrangements and household structure. Female 
headship has risen markedly in the region, despite the marked slow-down of the 
increasing trend of female economic heads. It is very likely that both phenomena 
are closely related to changes in female LFP. The fall in the proportion of women 
living in extended or composite households has been particularly marked among 
medium and highly educated groups in urban areas, and the variations mimic 
the economic ups and downs over the years. 
The region has experienced substantial economic transformations that are bound 
to have implications for female LFP. High economic growth, especially during 
the 2000s, may have affected labor supply through different channels, while 
changes in the structure of the economy favoring sectors where women are more 
intensively employed may have fostered female labor participation. 
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Changes in the policy environment are also crucial to understand changes 
in female LFP. In particular, over the last decades, Latin American countries 
have substantially expanded their social security systems, mainly through the 
extension of conditional cash transfer programs and non-contributory pensions. 
In addition, several initiatives were introduced to protect and foster female 
employment. We will discuss these policy changes in chapters 3, 5, 6 and 8.
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Appendix
Table 2.1: Average years of schooling
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Men Women
Women by area
Rural Urban
1992 7.6 7.2 4.6 8.4
1993 7.6 7.3 4.7 8.5
1994 7.7 7.3 4.8 8.5
1995 7.8 7.5 4.9 8.6
1996 7.9 7.5 5.0 8.7
1997 8.0 7.7 5.1 8.8
1998 8.1 7.8 5.2 9.0
1999 8.2 7.9 5.2 9.0
2000 8.2 8.0 5.3 9.1
2001 8.3 8.1 5.4 9.1
2002 8.3 8.2 5.4 9.2
2003 8.5 8.3 5.5 9.3
2004 8.6 8.4 5.7 9.4
2005 8.7 8.6 5.8 9.5
2006 8.8 8.7 5.9 9.6
2007 8.9 8.8 6.1 9.8
2008 9.0 8.9 6.2 9.9
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Men Women
Women by area
Rural Urban
2009 9.0 9.1 6.3 10.0
2010 9.1 9.1 6.4 10.1
2011 9.2 9.3 6.5 10.3
2012 9.4 9.4 6.7 10.4
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
Table 2.2: Educational structure by gender (in %)
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Women Men
prii pric seci secc supi supc prii pric seci secc supi supc
1992 38.5 20.2 15.4 13.2 5.2 7.4 35.0 21.2 16.9 12.9 5.8 8.1
1993 37.8 19.9 15.3 13.8 5.4 7.8 34.1 21.3 17.0 13.2 6.0 8.5
1994 36.8 20.0 15.2 14.4 5.4 8.3 33.1 21.4 16.9 13.8 6.0 8.8
1995 35.8 19.7 15.4 14.8 5.7 8.6 32.3 21.0 17.1 14.0 6.3 9.2
1996 34.9 19.5 15.7 15.2 5.7 9.0 31.4 20.5 17.7 14.7 6.3 9.5
1997 33.9 19.4 16.1 15.4 5.8 9.5 30.6 20.5 18.0 14.8 6.4 9.8
1998 32.8 19.6 16.2 15.3 6.1 9.9 29.5 20.7 18.5 14.7 6.6 9.9
1999 32.2 19.5 16.2 15.6 6.4 10.2 28.8 20.7 18.4 15.0 7.0 10.1
2000 31.3 19.6 16.1 15.9 6.8 10.3 28.5 20.5 18.5 15.6 6.7 10.3
2001 31.0 18.9 15.6 16.7 7.1 10.6 28.4 20.1 17.8 16.1 7.4 10.3
2002 30.5 18.7 16.0 16.8 7.5 10.6 28.2 20.0 18.0 16.1 7.5 10.2
2003 29.5 18.4 16.2 16.9 7.9 11.0 27.1 19.8 18.1 16.6 7.8 10.5
2004 28.4 18.5 16.5 17.0 8.4 11.3 26.1 19.8 18.3 17.0 8.0 10.8
2005 27.4 18.1 16.5 17.4 8.1 12.5 25.2 19.3 18.3 17.7 7.9 11.6
2006 26.5 18.3 16.6 17.9 8.0 12.8 24.4 19.5 18.4 18.3 7.7 11.7
2007 25.6 17.9 16.7 18.3 8.3 13.3 23.4 19.2 18.5 18.8 7.8 12.3
2008 24.8 17.5 16.7 18.8 8.4 13.8 22.9 19.0 18.5 19.4 7.9 12.3
2009 24.0 17.5 16.5 18.9 8.9 14.2 22.4 18.6 18.2 19.9 8.4 12.6
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Women Men
prii pric seci secc supi supc prii pric seci secc supi supc
2010 23.3 17.3 16.8 19.0 9.3 14.3 21.7 18.5 18.6 19.9 8.8 12.4
2011 22.3 16.8 16.6 19.6 9.1 15.6 20.7 18.0 18.8 20.6 8.8 13.1
2012 21.9 16.5 16.4 20.0 9.1 16.1 20.3 17.7 18.4 21.1 9.0 13.5
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Highest level attended prii: incomplete primary; pric: complete primary; seci: 
incomplete secondary; secc: complete secondary; supi: incomplete tertiary; supc: 
complete tertiary. Unweighted means.
Table 2.3: Total fertility rate (children per woman)
Regions of the world, 1950-2010.
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World 5.02 4.96 4.98 4.90 4.47 3.92 3.58 3.38 3.05 2.80 2.65 2.55
Developed regions 2.84 2.82 2.69 2.37 2.13 1.91 1.85 1.83 1.68 1.55 1.56 1.60
Developing 
regions
6.15 6.01 6.04 6.00 5.41 4.65 4.15 3.84 3.42 3.11 2.90 2.75
East Asia & Pacific 5.82 5.95 5.85 5.43 4.99 4.32 4.04 3.69 3.36 3.03 2.76 2.63
Europe & Central 
Asia
3.33 3.31 3.26 3.01 2.78 2.49 2.31 2.22 2.00 1.74 1.65 1.72
Middle East & 
North Africa
6.70 6.65 6.73 6.65 6.40 6.16 5.81 5.09 4.26 3.58 3.05 2.78
Latin America & 
Caribbean
5.82 5.92 5.85 5.35 4.80 4.25 3.82 3.46 3.16 2.85 2.59 2.42
North America 3.49 3.78 3.54 2.59 2.00 1.75 1.72 1.77 1.86 1.78 1.78 1.84
South Asia 6.38 6.51 6.49 6.43 6.28 6.09 5.88 5.50 4.85 4.29 3.64 3.16
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
6.37 6.45 6.59 6.64 6.72 6.67 6.53 6.29 5.94 5.63 5.34 5.03
Latin America 6.08 6.12 6.08 5.67 5.15 4.61 4.09 3.68 3.36 3.04 2.77 2.55
The Caribbean 5.32 5.54 5.39 4.75 4.13 3.56 3.32 3.05 2.78 2.48 2.25 2.19
High income: 
OECD
2.98 3.06 3.04 2.73 2.42 2.09 1.91 1.81 1.75 1.64 1.61 1.70
High income: 
nonOECD
4.98 4.96 4.82 4.28 3.94 3.48 3.27 3.02 2.67 2.36 2.11 2.02
Low income 6.41 6.51 6.59 6.64 6.72 6.60 6.57 6.36 6.01 5.71 5.37 5.03
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Lower middle 
income
6.21 6.31 6.33 6.25 6.08 5.83 5.51 5.11 4.65 4.18 3.79 3.55
Upper middle 
income
5.74 5.76 5.77 5.44 4.98 4.51 4.10 3.69 3.21 2.79 2.52 2.38
Source: own calculations based on United Nations, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, Population Division (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, 
DVD Edition.
Table 2.4: Number of children under 12 per household
Latin America, 1992-2012. Households with mother aged 25-54.
All 
households 
with mother 
25-54 
Mothers’ education Parental income quintile
Area of 
residence
Low Medium High 1 2 3 4 5 Rural Urban
1992 1.60 1.68 1.35 1.23 1.70 1.85 1.72 1.56 1.33 2.00 1.39
1993 1.57 1.65 1.31 1.22 1.68 1.82 1.71 1.52 1.30 1.97 1.36
1994 1.55 1.63 1.31 1.16 1.68 1.81 1.67 1.49 1.26 1.94 1.34
1995 1.52 1.61 1.29 1.11 1.67 1.77 1.65 1.46 1.23 1.92 1.32
1996 1.49 1.58 1.28 1.12 1.65 1.76 1.63 1.42 1.21 1.89 1.30
1997 1.47 1.55 1.27 1.10 1.64 1.72 1.57 1.40 1.20 1.85 1.28
1998 1.44 1.53 1.24 1.06 1.61 1.72 1.54 1.37 1.17 1.81 1.26
1999 1.41 1.50 1.22 1.01 1.60 1.69 1.52 1.34 1.12 1.79 1.23
2000 1.39 1.48 1.18 1.00 1.59 1.66 1.48 1.30 1.08 1.76 1.20
2001 1.36 1.46 1.15 0.98 1.58 1.62 1.47 1.27 1.07 1.73 1.20
2002 1.34 1.44 1.12 0.94 1.52 1.60 1.45 1.25 1.05 1.70 1.17
2003 1.30 1.41 1.09 0.94 1.47 1.55 1.42 1.23 1.02 1.65 1.15
2004 1.26 1.36 1.06 0.92 1.40 1.51 1.37 1.19 1.01 1.61 1.11
2005 1.23 1.33 1.03 0.90 1.39 1.45 1.33 1.15 0.98 1.57 1.07
2006 1.19 1.30 1.02 0.86 1.36 1.43 1.30 1.12 0.95 1.51 1.05
2007 1.16 1.27 1.01 0.84 1.33 1.39 1.25 1.09 0.92 1.47 1.02
2008 1.13 1.22 0.99 0.82 1.26 1.36 1.21 1.06 0.91 1.42 0.99
2009 1.09 1.18 0.96 0.80 1.22 1.29 1.18 1.03 0.88 1.35 0.97
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All 
households 
with mother 
25-54 
Mothers’ education Parental income quintile
Area of 
residence
Low Medium High 1 2 3 4 5 Rural Urban
2010 1.06 1.15 0.94 0.77 1.19 1.26 1.15 1.01 0.86 1.33 0.94
2011 1.03 1.11 0.94 0.76 1.14 1.23 1.11 0.97 0.86 1.28 0.92
2012 1.01 1.10 0.93 0.77 1.13 1.20 1.09 0.96 0.84 1.26 0.90
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: low education: less than secondary complete; medium education: secondary 
complete or tertiary incomplete; high education: tertiary complete. Unweighted means.
Table 2.5: Percentage of women by marital status (in %)
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Married (legal or 
consensual unions)
Single
Divorced and 
Widowed
1992 71.7 15.7 12.6
1993 71.7 15.5 12.8
1994 71.8 15.1 13.0
1995 71.6 14.9 13.5
1996 71.2 14.9 13.9
1997 71.0 14.6 14.4
1998 71.0 14.5 14.5
1999 70.8 14.4 14.8
2000 70.2 14.7 15.1
2001 69.7 14.8 15.5
2002 69.7 15.4 15.0
2003 69.0 16.2 14.8
2004 68.9 16.1 15.0
2005 68.2 16.5 15.3
2006 67.7 17.0 15.3
2007 67.7 17.1 15.2
2008 67.4 17.3 15.3
2009 66.9 17.6 15.6
2010 66.6 18.1 15.3
2011 66.2 18.4 15.4
2012 65.8 18.7 15.5
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Statistics exclude Brazil. Unweighted means.
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Table 2.7: Percentage of women living in extended or composite households
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
All Low eduation Medium education High education Rural Urban
1992 36.7 35.1 40.8 40.2 32.4 40.5
1993 36.8 35.3 40.4 40.5 32.6 40.5
1994 36.4 35.0 39.7 38.9 32.3 39.9
1995 35.8 34.8 38.7 37.9 32.5 39.0
1996 35.9 34.9 38.7 37.7 32.9 39.0
1997 35.4 34.4 37.8 37.1 32.3 38.3
1998 34.9 33.9 37.0 36.9 32.1 37.6
1999 35.3 34.6 37.2 36.4 32.7 38.0
2000 35.4 34.8 37.5 36.0 32.6 38.3
2001 35.7 35.1 38.1 35.7 32.7 38.4
2002 35.6 34.9 38.0 37.6 32.3 38.3
2003 35.6 35.2 37.5 36.0 32.4 38.2
2004 35.8 35.5 37.0 36.7 32.6 38.4
2005 35.8 35.5 36.9 37.2 32.7 38.5
2006 35.4 35.1 36.8 35.2 32.5 37.9
2007 35.3 35.1 36.4 35.3 32.5 37.7
2008 35.2 35.1 36.5 33.9 32.4 37.4
2009 35.2 35.0 36.2 34.9 32.5 37.5
2010 35.2 35.0 36.4 34.1 32.5 37.4
2011 35.0 34.8 36.6 33.8 32.6 37.3
2012 35.4 35.2 37.0 34.0 32.9 37.5
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: low education: less than secondary complete; medium education: secondary 
complete or tertiary incomplete; high education: tertiary complete. Unweighted means.
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1. Introduction 
Women’s increased participation in the labor market stands as one of the most 
salient global economic and social transformations of the last fifty years. Latin 
America has not been an exception: on average, while in the 1960s only two 
out of ten prime-age women in the region were either working or looking for a 
job, that proportion climbed to more than six out of ten at the beginning of the 
2010s. The rise in female labor force participation has been remarkably steep 
and uninterrupted, and it contrasts against the turbulent economic and social 
dynamics that have characterized Latin America in the last half-century. 
In this chapter we focus our analysis of female labor force participation on the 
last two decades (1992-2012) by exploiting a rich database of microdata from 
national household surveys. We find that although the levels of female labor 
supply are lower in Latin America than in several regions of the world, the gaps 
have substantially shrunk over time due to the strong increase in the engagement 
of Latin American women in labor market activities. The chapter highlights, 
however, a fact that has so far been overlooked by the literature: there are signs of 
a widespread and significant deceleration in female entry into the labor market.1 
This deceleration seems to have been taking place since the early-2000s, and 
it applies to all groups of women, but particularly to those women who live 
with a spouse and in more vulnerable households. This new piece of evidence 
adds an additional interesting question to the research agenda: we need to better 
1 There are some contributions documenting this fact at the country level (e.g. Beccaria, 
Maurizio and Vázquez, 2014).
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understand the determinants and implications of both the strong rise in female 
labor force participation in the last half-century and its recent deceleration. 
While the following chapters are aimed at identifying the determinants of 
labor force participation, understanding their consequences, and discussing 
their policy implications, in this chapter we provide a detailed characterization 
of the basic facts. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 
we discuss some issues regarding the measurement of labor force participation 
and employment in Latin America, including data sources and definition of 
variables. Section 3 documents the levels of female participation across countries 
and groups using the latest household survey data. Section 4 is the core of the 
chapter: it presents the main patterns of female labor force participation in Latin 
America over time and in comparison with other regions of the world. In section 
5 we characterize patterns in labor participation over time by groups defined by 
key variables. These variables, which include education, age, marital status, and 
the number of children, strongly influence preferences and opportunities in the 
labor market. In section 6 we document changes in the structure of women’s 
employment by sector and type of job vis-a-vis the pattern experienced by males. 
Section 7 concludes with some final remarks. 
2. Some measurement issues 
As discussed in Chapter 1 of the book, the precise definition of labor force 
participation implies some conceptual and practical challenges. It is conventional 
to consider a person in the labor force if she is either employed or actively seeking 
a job. Typically, a person is classified as employed if she is regularly engaged in 
an economic activity. However, some activities, such as housework and child 
rearing, are not counted as employment by statistical agencies if they are not 
performed for a wage or salary, as is often the case for housewives. In this chapter 
and in the rest of the book, we follow the usual practice of including only market 
economic activities as employment.2 The concept of “actively seeking a job” is 
also ambiguous and it is difficult to capture with precision in surveys or censuses, 
as it requires a detailed inquiry into all the activities that a person carries out with 
the aim of finding a job. 
As in the rest of the book, this chapter mainly draws on microdata from 
household surveys, rather than on census data. National household surveys allow 
2 In some cases the absence of a clear distinction between market and home activities blurs the 
measurement of labor force participation, especially for women in certain activities (e.g. in 
rural areas).
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for a more precise estimate of labor force participation and for a much closer and 
frequent monitoring of the developments in the labor markets, because most 
surveys are collected on a yearly basis. They also permit a richer analysis, as 
surveys include a wider set of potential covariates of LFP. Most statistics in the 
chapter are obtained by processing microdata from household surveys following 
the standardized protocol of the Socioeconomic Database for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (SEDLAC) (see Chapter 1 for details on this database and the 
surveys used).
It is important to recognize that despite the fact that (i) the national statistical 
offices in Latin American countries typically measure employment using the 
same ILO general methodology, and that (ii) we apply consistent methods of 
processing the data, perfect comparability across countries/years is never assured. 
However, being aware of these comparability problems does not mean dismissing 
the use of data altogether. With all of their limitations, surveys and censuses still 
provide valuable information and are the best sources available to generate useful 
statistics of labor force participation and its covariates.
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Figure 3.1: Labor force participation by age and gender
Latin America, 2012.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means of country rates.
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Most of the analysis on labor supply in this chapter is limited to people aged 
25 to 54 years old in order to isolate our analysis from issues of education and 
youth labor market participation, and issues of elderly employment and pension 
systems. Figure 3.1 supports the choice of the sample by showing the unweighted 
mean of labor force participation by age. The inverted-U shape of the curve reveals 
low but increasing participation among youths, a plateau for those around the 
25-54 bracket, and a fall afterwards. The decline in LFP among women in their 
50s coincides with the retirement age in some labor activities (e.g. education). 
In the next section we start the analysis of the evidence by focusing on the levels 
of female labor force participation in the Latin American economies, deferring 
the documentation of trends to the next sections. 
3. Levels of female participation 
Despite the long and sustained pattern of increasing female labor force participation 
that has characterized Latin America labor markets over the last half century, the 
rates are still significantly lower for women as compared to men. Information 
from national household surveys reveals that the gap is considerable. In a typical 
Latin American country, around 65 out of 100 adult women (ages 25 to 54) 
participate in the labor force by either working or actively seeking employment. 
By contrast, the proportion for men is 95 out of 100. While the figure for men is 
quite similar across Latin American economies, there is appreciable cross-country 
heterogeneity in the rate of female labor force participation (Figure 3.2).3 In 2012 
that rate ranged from 51% in Honduras to 80% in Uruguay.4 In this section we 
further document the levels of female LFP in Latin America and explore some 
factors that are correlated with the differences across countries. 
The gender gaps are generalized across different age groups. Although the rates 
of participation are substantially lower for youths and for the elderly, the gaps 
between females and males in those age groups remain large (Table 3.1 in the 
Appendix). The difference is somewhat smaller among youths but they are still 
considerable: on average 24 points instead of 30 for prime-age adults (Figure 3.3). 
3 Other authors have previously documented and discussed the large cross-country 
heterogeneity (e.g. Paz, 2008). 
4 It is unlikely that these differences are mainly driven by methodological differences in 
capturing labor participation: the rate of LFP for males is similar in Honduras and Uruguay.
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Figure 3.2: Labor force participation by gender
Latin American countries, 2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: year 2012 or closest year with available survey. Latin America: unweighted mean.
The differences in employment between adult females and males are quite similar 
to the gaps in labor force participation (Table 3.2 in the Appendix). This similarity 
is mainly driven by the relatively low unemployment rates for both groups: 5.2% 
for women and 3.4% for males, on average for the region in 2012. With the 
exceptions of El Salvador, Mexico, and Nicaragua, the unemployment rates are 
significantly higher for females than for males. The unemployment duration is 
also longer for females: more than two months, on average. 
The overall level of work activity can be split into the number of individuals in 
work (the extensive margin of labor supply) and the intensity of work supplied 
by those employed (the intensive margin). This reflects the distinction between 
whether to work and how much to work, at the individual level. The differences 
between females and males are substantial in both margins. On average, a 
typical woman works 40 hours per week, while a man works 48 hours. The 
size of this gap varies across countries, but in all countries the difference is 
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Figure 3.4: Hours of work per week
Latin American countries, 2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: year 2012 or closest year with available survey. Hours of work per week. Latin 
America: unweighted means.
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Figure 3.3: Labor force participation by age and gender
Latin America, 2012.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: year 2012 or closest year with available survey. Unweighted means.
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statistically significant (Figure 3.4 and Table 3.3 in the Appendix). Accordingly, 
the proportion of part-time workers (less than 30 hours per week) is significantly 
higher for women in all countries (Table 3.4 in the Appendix). On average, the 
gap is 16 points: 24% of female workers have part-time employment, while the 
corresponding share is just 8% for men. 
Figure 3.5 summarizes the current situation in terms of female participation 
in the labor market by showing the share of women in the labor force, in total 
employment and in hours of work. The correlation between the three shares 
across countries is high, suggesting that the degree to which women take part in 
the labor market is similar when alternatively considering the three variables.5 
5 The linear correlation coefficient between LFP and employment is 0.98, and between LFP 
and hours is 0.86. 
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Figure 3.5: Share of women in labor force, employment, and total hours 
of work per week
Latin American countries, 2012. Women aged 25-54. 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: year 2012 or closest year with available survey. Hours of work per week. Latin 
America: unweighted means.
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The order of the countries in terms of female labor participation does not follow 
an obvious pattern. The group of economies where female participation is 
more widespread includes countries from different regions, income levels, and 
economic structures. This heterogeneity poses a challenge for the explanation 
of the differences in female labor participation across Latin American countries. 
Table 3.5 highlights some differences in the employment profile of women and 
men in the region.6 The share of prime-age, highly educated, urban workers, is 
significantly higher among females than males. The proportions of wage earners 
and self-employed are similar for both gender groups; in contrast, the share of 
entrepreneurs is substantially lower among females, and the share of zero-income 
family-workers is significantly higher. These results, to be further explored in the 
next sections, apply to all countries, although with varying intensities. The only 
relevant difference involves the distribution of workers between salaried work and 
self-employment. Although on average this distribution is similar between women 
and men, there are differences across countries. In those economies with more 
developed labor markets (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay), the share 
of wage earners is substantially higher among females than males. For instance, in 
Brazil, 74% of female workers are wage earners, as opposed to 67% of men. 
Table 3.5: Structure of employment for each gender group
Latin America, 2012. 
Female Male Difference
By age
(15-24) 16.7 20.3 -3.6
(25-40) 40.7 37.2 3.6
(41-54) 28.3 25.5 2.8
(55 +) 14.2 17.0 -2.8
Total 100.0 100.0
By education
Low 40.2 47.9 -7.7
Medium 36.5 36.9 -0.4
High 23.3 15.3 8.1
Total 100.0 100.0
By area
Rural 24.5 33.6 -9.0
Urban 75.5 66.4 9.0
Total 100.0 100.0
6 The tables with the information for each country are available upon request. 
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Female Male Difference
By labor relationship
Entrepreneurs 3.0 6.2 -3.2
Wage earners 61.4 62.3 -0.9
Self-employed 29.2 29.5 -0.3
Zero income 6.4 2.0 4.4
Total 100.0 100.0
By informality (productive definition)
Formal 49.5 56.3 -6.8
Informal 50.5 43.7 6.8
Total 100.0 100.0
By informality (social protection definition)
Formal 46.6 48.3 -1.7
Informal 53.4 51.7 1.7
Total 100.0 100.0
By economic sector
Primary activities 9.1 22.3 -13.1
Industry low tech 9.1 5.7 3.4
Industry high tech 2.8 7.2 -4.4
Construction 0.7 12.0 -11.3
Commerce 30.0 19.6 10.4
Utilities & transportation 2.3 10.8 -8.6
Skilled services 6.9 7.2 -0.3
Public administration 5.9 6.2 -0.3
Health & education 22.3 8.3 13.9
Domestic servants 10.9 0.7 10.3
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: year 2012 or closest year with available survey. Education: low=less than secondary 
complete, medium=secondary complete and superior incomplete, high=tertiary complete. 
Informality (productive definition): Formal=entrepreneurs, salaried workers in large 
firms and the public sector, and self-employed with college education. Informality (social 
protection definition): Formal=with rights to social and labor benefits linked to the job. 
Unweighted means.
We implement two definitions of informality. Under the first definition, informal 
workers are those working in small firms or those who are self-employed without a 
college degree; the second definition classifies a worker as informal if she does not 
have access to social protection. In both cases informality is more common among 
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females than among males. Country statistics reveal that in some economies the 
difference in informality rates (social protection definition) is not statistically 
significant. Brazil and Mexico are two examples of countries where the coverage of 
the social protection system linked to employment is similar across gender groups. 
The last panel in Table 3.5 shows the structure of employment by economic 
sector. The share of workers in commerce, education/health, and domestic service 
is particularly high among females as compared to males. 
The main results discussed so far are confirmed when using census data instead of 
household survey data. Naturally, there are some differences in the actual figures 
as questionnaires differ, but the main patterns remain unchanged. In particular, 
labor force participation is substantially lower for females than for males. On 
average, for Latin America and for the age group 15-65, the censuses reveal 
that while 78% of men participate in the labor market, the share falls to 43% 
for women.7 The correlation between both sources (census and surveys) across 
countries for female labor participation rates is positive and statistically significant 
(0.625). The results are also consistent for other labor variables; for instance, census 
data confirms that the employment rates are higher for males than for females in 
all countries (on average the gap is around 30 points), while unemployment rates 
are somewhat higher for females, although not in all countries.
Latin America in the world 
There are large differences across countries in the role played by women in the 
labor markets. In some regions cultural and religious reasons mainly account for 
low female participation. While in the world the female participation rate for 
ages 15-65 is 55%, that rate falls to around 30% in South Asia and just 25% in 
Middle East and North Africa (Figure 3.6). The rate in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (58%) is close to the global mean, but it lies below the rate of most 
regions of the world, including Sub-Saharan Africa (62%), Europe and Central 
Asia (63%), East Asia and Pacific (67%), and North America (67%).
Although in all societies women’s participation in the labor market is lower 
than that of men, the extent of the gender gap varies widely across countries 
(Figure 3.7). The ratio of females/males in Latin America and the Caribbean is 
0.69, which is greater than in the Middle East and South Asia, but lower than in 
the remaining regions, where the ratio exceeds 0.8. 
7 Note that these figures refer to the 15-65 age group which is typically used to report census 
statistics, instead of the 25-54 group that is used in this chapter. 
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Figure 3.6: Female labor force participation rate 
Regions of the world, 2012. Women aged 15-64.
Source: own calculations based on World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Note: unweighted means.
Figure 3.7: Labor force participation rate, ratio females/males
Regions of the world, 2012. Ages 15-64.
Source: own calculations based on WDI.
Note: unweighted means.
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The OECD Employment Database has recently added information on some 
developing countries, allowing comparisons for various age brackets, including 
the one used in this study (25-54). Latin American societies still lag behind in 
female labor participation as compared to the industrialized economies of the 
OECD and those in Eastern Europe. With the exception of Turkey and India, 
where female employment is infrequent, the four Latin American countries 
included in the database rank among those with the lowest female LFP.8 
Explaining the differences in female labor participation across countries is 
a difficult research question, mined by data limitations and methodological 
problems. Part of the literature has focused on the development level as a potential 
relevant factor for female participation.9 In a series of papers, Goldin (1995, 2006 
and 2014) establishes the existence of a U-shaped labor supply of women across 
the process of economic development. At the early stages of development, when 
agriculture is the main activity, women have relative high levels of participation, 
8 Notice that Colombia, included in the OECD database, is one of the Latin American 
countries with the highest female LFP (fourth position in Figure 3.2). 
9 This literature is further revised in chapter 6. 
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Figure 3.8: Female labor force participation rate
Countries of the world, 2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: OECD Online Employment Database. Countries included (from smallest to 
largest female LFP): India, Turkey, Mexico, Korea, South Africa, Chile, Italy, Brazil, 
Ireland, Japan, Colombia, Greece, USA, Australia, Hungary, Israel, New Zealand, UK, 
Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Slovak R., China, Czech R., Spain, Germany, Canada, 
Netherlands, Estonia, France, Norway, Switzerland, Finland, Austria, Denmark, 
Portugal, Iceland, Russia, Sweden and Slovenia.
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frequently laboring as unpaid family workers. As development and urbanization 
advance, women participation is reduced due to men s´ higher incomes, still low 
women education, and social barriers against women in paid urban jobs. The third 
stage includes significant increases in women s´ education and the emergence of a 
white-collar sector, which foster the paid employment of married women.10 The 
evidence from Figure 3.9 confirms a U-shaped relationship between female labor 
force participation and (log) GDP per capita in a cross-section of countries.11 
However, the relationship is weak: the R-squared associated with the regressions 
is lower than 0.10.12 Development alone fails to account for a large part of the 
differences of female LFP across countries. 
The curve is upward sloping in the range relevant to the Latin American 
countries. Higher levels of GDP per capita are associated with higher rates 
of female participation (in absolute terms and relative to men). This positive 
relationship is confirmed with data from our database (Figure 3.10). The link, 
10 Goldin (1995), Mammen and Paxson (2000).
11 There are other dimensions regarding women’s status that may not follow this pattern, such 
as female participation in politics and entrepreneurial activities (Alesina, Giuliano and 
Nunn, 2013). 
12 The U-shaped relationship becomes somewhat stronger when one restricts the analysis 
to women past their childbearing age (Olivetti, 2013). Since fertility is higher in poorer 
countries and it is inversely related to female labor force participation, the restriction helps 
to minimize the confounding effect that cross-country differences in fertility might have on 
the correlation between female labor force participation and GDP per capita. 
Figure 3.9: Female labor force participation and development 
Countries of the world, 2010. Women aged 15-64.
Source: own calculations based on WDI.
A. Female LFP B. Female/Male ratio of LFP
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however, remains weak; the R2 is 0.17. While Guatemala and Honduras, two of 
the poorest countries in the region, have low levels of female LFP, Bolivia, also 
a poor country, ranks third according to this variable. Mexico, Panama, and 
Uruguay have similar levels of GDP per capita but very different levels of female 
LFP: 61.5, 63.9, and 79.5, respectively. In sum, Latin American countries are in a 
stage for which higher development implies on average higher female labor force 
participation; however, the relation is mediated by a host of factors that turn the 
empirical link weak.
4. Trends 
The strong increase in female LFP is arguably one of the central stylized facts 
about the dynamics of Latin American labor markets in the second half of the 
twentieth century. The evidence drawn from census data suggests that this 
increasing pattern was steep and uninterrupted over that period (Chioda and 
Demombynes, 2010). Based on census data, Chioda (2011) reports that the 
LFP of married women increased from 11% in 1960 to 40% in the early 2000s. 
The growth was significant but slowed down in the 1960s, and then sped up 
again in the following decades. The remarkable rise in female LFP over the last 
half century was achieved by both married and unmarried women, following a 
pattern initiated some decades before in the developed world (Chioda, 2011). 
In contrast to other more historical accounts, in this study we focus our analysis 
on the last two decades (the period from 1992 to 2012) by exploiting annual 
information drawn from national household surveys. This allows us a closer and 
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Figure 3.10: Female labor force participation and development
Latin American countries, 2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. GDP 
taken from WDI. 
Note: year 2012 or closest year with available survey. GDP per capita adjusted for PPP 
(constant 2005 international dollars).
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more detailed view of labor market dynamics in Latin America.13 One of our main 
findings is that while the process of increasing female labor force participation 
continued at high speeds in the 1990s, it substantially lost pace in the 2000s, 
particularly during the second half of that decade (Figure 3.11). While female 
LFP rose at a rate of 0.81 percentage points per year between 1992 and 2005, 
that rate went down to 0.20 percentage points between 2005 and 2012. The 
contrast between a strong increase in female labor market participation during 
the 1990s and a substantial deceleration in the 2000s is one of the main facts to 
be explored in this study. 
Males are a natural group of comparison to evaluate changes for women. If 
the patterns in women’s indicators mimic men’s, the drivers of those patterns 
are likely not closely related to gender issues. The labor market participation of 
prime-age males in Latin America is typically very high and relatively stable: rates 
fluctuated around 95.7 from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s, and then slowly 
decreased to 95.2 in 2012 (Figure 3.12). This pattern suggests that the increase in 
female LFP in the 1990s and part of the 2000s is a fully gendered phenomenon, 
13 In the rest of the section we restrict the sample to 15 countries, excluding Colombia, 
Guatemala, and Dominican Republic, due to difficulties in constructing consistent series of 
labor force participation and other covariates spanning over the two decades.
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Figure 3.11: Female labor force participation 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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while the stagnation in the second half of the 2000s may be partly—though only 
partly—traced to some negative general forces in labor market participation. 
Given the differences in trends, the male-female gap in LFP plunged from 42.5 in 
the early 1990s to 34 in the early 2000s, and then more slowly fell to reach a value of 
30 in 2012. Naturally, the patterns described above are not representative of all Latin 
40
50
70
90
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
60
80
100
Male
Female
Figure 3.12: Female and male labor force participation
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American countries, but are sufficiently generalized to drive the mean: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
and Venezuela have experienced a deceleration in the growth of female LFP in the 
early-to-mid-2000s after at least more than one decade of strong growth (Figure 3.13 
in the Appendix). The contrasting patterns of the last two decades are also evident 
when dividing countries by sub-region (South America and Central America) 
(Figure 3.14). The figure also suggests that the deceleration in the 2000s took place 
in economies with both relatively high and relatively low initial levels of female LFP. 
Labor-force surveys allow a closer look at the labor markets, as information is 
collected more frequently, although in some countries samples are restricted to 
certain areas and questionnaires are more limited. The project LABLAC carried 
out by CEDLAS and The World Bank draws information from Latin American 
labor-force surveys to compute a wide set of labor variables with a quarterly 
frequency, including labor force participation. Information from LABLAC 
starting in 2007 confirms a slow growth in female LFP, at 0.2 points per year for 
a sample of seven countries (Figure 3.15).14
14 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Data is available from the 
LABLAC website.
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Figure 3.15: Female and male labor force participation
Latin America, 2007-2012. Adults aged 25-64.
Source: own calculations based on labor-force surveys, LABLAC project (CEDLAS 
and The World Bank).
Note: unweighted means for seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay).
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This source of information allows us a more updated monitoring of labor 
variables (at the cost of a smaller sample of countries, shorter time series, and 
lower comparability). At the time of writing, a subsample of five countries (Brazil, 
Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru) published data for 2014. According to Figure 
3.16, female LFP has remained almost unchanged between 2011 and 2014 (62.3 
in 2011 and 62.5 in the first half of 2014). 
ILO and census data confirm the deceleration 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) develops the economically active 
population EAPEP Database (ILO, 2011), a collection of country-reported 
and ILO estimated LFP rates. Data from the latest edition of this dataset 
confirms the deceleration in female labor force participation in Latin America. 
According to these estimates, the rate of female LFP strongly increased in the 
1990s (1992-2002) from 50 to 60.2, and then reduced its rate of growth in the 
2000s (2002-2012), rising from 60.2 to 65.9.
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The deceleration in female LFP is also registered by census data. Based 
on microdata from IPUMS we could compute female LFP in a sample of 
5 countries with observations around years 1990, 2000, and 2010. In this 
sample, the share of prime-age females in the labor force climbed from 45.8% 
to 57.4% in the 1990s and continued increasing, but at a slower pace, in the 
2000s, from 57.4% to 63.9%. The deceleration takes place in Brazil, Mexico, 
Panama, and Uruguay. The exception is Argentina, where the increase is 
similar in both decades, a result that contrasts with the evidence from other 
sources, and that could be rooted in some methodological changes.
Female labor force participation – Census data
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Source: own estimates from microdata from the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series, International. Minnesota Population Center.
Note: Sample of 5 countries; women aged 25-54.
There are substantial differences in the level of labor supply by age group 
(Figure 3.17 and Table 3.6 in the Appendix). The LFP of women aged 15 to 
24 is significantly lower than that of their prime-age counterparts. Patterns for 
these younger women also differ by decade: the rate of LFP stayed unchanged 
in the 1990s and declined since the mid-2000s. On average for the region, 
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the share of young females participating in the labor force fell by two points 
between 2002 and 2012. The increase in schooling rates is likely one of the 
main drivers of the decreasing participation of young women in Latin American 
labor markets (Chioda, 2011). It is interesting to note that the change from 
stable to decreasing LFP for young females occurred at the same time as the 
change from rapid to slow increase of prime-age women’s LFP, which may 
call for a factor that affects both groups similarly. Participation among older 
women (+55) is lower (below 30%) and followed a similar pattern as that of 
their prime-age counterparts.
In the early 1990s the world’s leaders adopted the UN Millennium Declaration, 
which defined a precise set of goals, known as the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). One of the MDGs is to “promote gender equality and empower women.” 
Among the three indicators used to monitor that target is the share of women in 
wage employment in the non-agricultural sector. In Latin America, that share 
increased four percentage points in the decade following the MDGs declaration 
and just one additional point since 2002 (Figure 3.18). While in the early 1990s 
the share of women in a typical Latin American economy in non-agricultural 
wage employment was 40%, today that share amounts to 45%. The slower growth 
in that variable during the last decade casts doubts on the likelihood of reaching 
gender equality, as measured by this indicator, in the near future.
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Figure 3.17: Female labor force participation by age
Latin America, 1992-2012.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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The difference in patterns between males and females documented for labor 
participation also applies to employment (Figure 3.19). The share of prime-age 
women holding a job increased in the 1990s from 49.7% to 56.1%, and in the 
2000s to 61.8%. Interestingly, the speed in female employment growth was 
somewhat reduced in the 2000s despite much stronger labor markets in the 
region: the reason seems to be related to the sluggish increase in female labor 
force participation, documented above. In fact, male employment, which fell a 
bit in the 1990s, increased two percentage points in the 2000s. 
Unemployment rates are higher for women than for men. On average, that gap 
widened from 1 to 3 points in the 1990s and shrunk to 1.5 points by 2012. 
Again, this more robust fall in prime-age female unemployment is partly driven 
by the slower entry of women into the labor market. 
In summary, the more turbulent labor markets of the 1990s were characterized by 
a strong increase in female LFP and employment, and a surge in unemployment. 
Instead, the stronger labor situation of the 2000s was associated with a slower 
increase in female LFP, slower entry of women into jobs, and declining 
unemployment levels.
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Figure 3.18: Share of women in wage employment in non-agricultural 
employment
Latin America, 1992-2012.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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So far we have focused our analysis on the binary variable of participation (the 
“extensive margin”): women are either in or out of the labor market. However, 
A. Employment B. Unemployment
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Figure 3.19: Employment and unemployment rates by gender
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means for Latin American countries.
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Figure 3.20: Female and male hours of work per week
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: sample of employed workers. Hours of work per week. Unweighted means.
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participation may take different forms, from a short and sporadic labor activity 
to a full attachment to a permanent job. Figure 3.20 takes a preliminary look at 
this issue by depicting mean weekly hours of work (the “intensive margin”) by 
gender. A typical Latin American prime-age female worker works 40 hours per 
week, while a typical man works around 48 hours (i.e. about a day more). That 
gap has not significantly changed over the last few decades: it widened modestly 
in the 1990s, when women’s hours of work fell somewhat more strongly than 
men’s, and it narrowed in the 2000s, when the decline was more intense for men. 
On average, both female and male workers now devote two fewer hours per week 
to labor market activities as compared to two decades ago.
The analysis of hours of work does not reveal substantial divergent patterns by 
gender. The same is true when considering the share of workers in full-time jobs 
(more than 30 hours per week). The gap between males and females in that 
indicator increased in the 1990s and was reduced in the 2000s, but the changes 
were minor (Figure 3.21). We conclude that the main labor variable for which 
there is a strong pattern over time with clear gender differences is labor force 
participation, so the rest of this chapter is focused on the extensive margin. 
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Figure 3.21: Workers in full-time jobs by gender (in %)
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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Female LFP, development and the economic cycle 
The labor force participation of women in Latin America strongly increased in 
the second half of the twentieth century, and continued increasing up until the 
present, although at a slower rate. Explaining this pattern is not an easy task 
as a number of factors surely interplay to generate the labor market outcomes 
observed in the data. The following three chapters of this book take a deeper 
look at these potential driving factors. In this section, we begin looking at some 
of these arguments. 
The steep and uninterrupted surge of female LFP in Latin America over the last 
decades fits into the story of increasing labor supply of women across the process 
of economic development, where education and the emergence of a white-collar 
sector fostered paid employment of married women. In fact, some patterns of 
this process resemble those that took place in developed countries around three 
decades ago (Chioda, 2011). As documented in the previous chapter, Latin 
America experienced a strong increase in women’s education such that the gap 
with men completely vanished in some countries. At the same time, various 
demographic changes took place: the fertility rate fell markedly, and even though 
the prevalence of marriage (formal and consensual) and the timing of first 
marriage and first birth remained fairly stable, there were changes in household 
structure, such as the significant increase in the proportion of households headed 
by women.15 In addition, economic transformations increased the demand for 
workers in sectors where the female participation was higher, typically white-
collar activities. These demographic, social and economic transformations, 
which are typical of a development process, took place in Latin America over the 
last few decades, although with heterogeneities across countries. Although we 
are suggesting here that the persistent increase in female labor force participation 
is probably mainly a consequence of the development process, we do not ignore 
that causalities may be much more complicated. An autonomous surge in female 
LFP (e.g. for cultural transformations) may be the driving force of some of the 
changes that we listed above (e.g. the fall in fertility). We will return to these 
issues in the following chapters.
The remarkable growth in female LFP over the last half century has recently 
debilitated. The increase in female labor supply was slower in the 2000s than in 
previous decades. One possible explanation for this pattern is that female LFP 
is approaching a ceiling that is mainly determined by cultural factors. As any 
share, LFP has a ceiling that, in the case of women in Latin America, could be 
15 See Chioda (2011) and Chapter 2 of this book.
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lower than for other regions, for various cultural and economic reasons. In this 
scenario, the LFP will not continue to increase, or it will increase very slowly, 
even as the region continues to grow (more on this in the following chapters). 
A second alternative is that this deceleration is just temporary and responds to 
some transitory circumstances. The strong economic growth that the region 
experienced in the 2000s allowed for a surge in earnings and social protection 
benefits that may have retarded the entry of women into the labor market. 
Without a more pressing need to search for a job, given the higher earnings 
of their spouses or the protection of new social programs, some women may 
have delayed their decision to participate in the labor market.16 The fact that 
the deceleration of the increase in female LFP occurred in coincidence with a 
strong rise in GDP growth rates is consistent with this story (Figure 3.22). In the 
sections that follow, we continue to document the patterns of female LFP in the 
region, and will return to the issue of driving factors in the next chapters. 
16 This argument is related to the “additional worker effect” in the labor literature. See Chapters 
5 and 6.
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Figure 3.22: Female LFP and per capita GDP 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. GDP 
per capita (in PPP adjusted US$) from WDI. 
Note: unweighted means.
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Latin America in the world 
When placed in international perspective, the increase in female labor force 
participation in the Latin American economies over the last two decades has been 
strong. Latin America’s position in the ranking of female LFP has not changed 
but the gap with the top-ranked regions has shrunk substantially (Figure 3.23 
and 3.24).17 For example, in 1992, the gap between Latin America and Europe 
and Central Asia was 14 percentage points; by 2012 it had narrowed to 5. Even 
when the rise in female LFP in Latin America slowed in the 2000s, the growth 
rate was still higher than in most of the rest of the world. 
These figures, however, should be taken with prudence, since a host of 
methodological issues hinder the comparison across countries and over time. 
Notice also that the figures refer to the age range 15-64, and hence include 
changes in labor participation in youths and older adults, groups that we do not 
consider in our analysis.
17 See also Table 3.8 in the Appendix. Chioda (2011) also highlights the increase in female LFP 
in the region since the 1980s compared to other regions in the world.
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Figure 3.23: Female labor force participation rate
Regions of the world, 1992-2012. Women aged 15-64.
Source: World Development Indicators.
Note: unweighted means.
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In the next two sections we characterize changes in female labor force 
participation; first we examine women in terms of their characteristics and those 
of their families, while in the next section we look at the sectors and types of jobs 
where they work.
5. Characterizing changes in  
female participation
Working women are not a random sample of the female population: the decision 
to participate in the labor market is determined by preferences and opportunities 
that are strongly dependent on personal and family factors, such as education, 
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age, marital status, or number of children. In this section, we characterize female 
workers in terms of these variables, with a particular focus on changes over time.
 
Education is one of the main determinants of labor force participation. On 
average, the probability that a Latin American prime-age woman with low 
education (without a secondary school degree) is labor active is 57%; this number 
rises to 88% for a woman with higher education (a tertiary degree). This gap of 
about 30 percentage points has not changed in the last decade after a reduction 
of 7 points in the 1990s (Figure 3.25). 
The evidence suggests some similarities and some significant differences in 
the patterns of entry into the labor market across education groups. First, LFP 
increased over the two decades for all groups, although the increase was slower in 
the 2000s. The contrast between decades is much more marked for those women 
without a tertiary degree. While in the 1990s the LFP increased 8 points for 
women with low education and 2.4 points for women with tertiary education, in 
the 2000s the rates were similar: 1.7 and 1.3, respectively. In fact, the contrast is 
more striking when one examines the last 5 years: while LFP increased 0.9 points 
in the high-education group it went down 0.2 points in the low-education group. 
In sum, although the nature of these changes were similar across education 
groups, most of the action took place for women with low (and to a lesser extent, 
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Figure 3.25: Female labor force participation by education
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Education: low=less than secondary complete, medium=secondary complete and 
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medium) education, which are also the majority in the Latin American prime-
age female population, as documented in the previous chapter. Women without a 
tertiary degree strongly entered the labor markets in the 1990s, but substantially 
slowed down this behavior in the early to mid-2000s. 
Interestingly, the pattern is different in the intensive margin. While weekly 
hours of work did not change much for the rest of the female workers, the low 
education group experienced a decline of 3 hours in the 1990s and almost one 
hour in the 2000s. This pattern is consistent with what we already observed in 
Figure 3.19: female labor force participation strongly increased in the 1990s, but 
the share of full-time jobs and the hours of work decreased. What Figure 3.26 
suggests is that this global pattern is mainly driven by the behavior of unskilled 
female workers. Two phenomena are consistent with this observation: first, the 
intense entry into the labor market may have mostly occurred in part-time jobs; 
and second, there may have been a more generalized reduction of hours for all 
working women (not only the new entrants). 
The typical inverted U-shape age profile of labor supply is present within the 
group of prime-age women, although the differences across age groups are rather 
small. On average for the region, in 2012 the LFP was 65.4% for women aged 
25 to 34, 67.6% for those aged 35 to 44, and 62.7% for those aged 45 to 54. The 
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Figure 3.26: Female hours of work per week by education
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
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gap between these groups shrank in the last decades due to a stronger increase 
in the older group. There is a clear difference between the steep increase in LFP 
in the 1990s and a slower pattern in the 2000s for all age groups (Figure 3.27). 
The analysis of female LFP by age cohorts provides some interesting results. 
Figure 3.28 suggests a typical inverse-U shape for the LFP-age profile: female 
participation is decreasing over time for the older cohorts (those born between 
1938 and 1957), and increasing for the younger cohorts (those born between 
1958 and 1977). Notice that the height of these profiles is greater for the younger 
cohorts, revealing a long pattern of increasing female LFP.
A closer look at the figures in Table 3.12 in the Appendix unveils the recent 
deceleration in the growth of female LFP. Consider three cohorts: those born 
between 1948-1957; the younger cohort, born between 1958-1967; and the 
youngest cohort, born between 1968-1977. The female labor force participation 
rates of these cohorts when their members had an average age of 40 were 56.1%, 
65.5%, and 67.5%, respectively: they exhibit a large jump between the two first 
cohorts and a small one for the youngest cohort.
The increasing height of the participation profiles across the three cohorts suggests 
that the overall rate of female LFP is subject to inertia. The following example 
illustrates the point. In a given year, the pool of women aged 25-54 includes many 
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that belong to older cohorts. These older cohorts typically have lower education 
and other cultural factors that go against higher labor participation. Over the 
subsequent years, younger cohorts gradually replace older cohorts in the pool 
of women aged 25-54. These younger cohorts have higher levels of education. 
Other things equal, this replacement tends to increase the average rate of female 
labor force participation. Interestingly, the overall rate of female LFP in Latin 
America experienced a deceleration in the 2000s, despite this factor of inertia.
The deceleration could also be traced to cohort-specific patterns in the LFP 
age profiles. For example, note the difference in the rates of growth of LFP of 
the second cohort over the 1990s and the third cohort over the 2000s. When 
women in the second cohort went from 30 to 40 years old (on average), their 
labor participation grew by 10 percentage points, while LFP increased only by 5 
points for women in the youngest cohort at the same age.
Women’s decision to participate in the labor market has been closely linked 
to the presence of a male spouse in the household. Women living with a male 
breadwinner are substantially less likely to engage in labor market activities. 
In Figure 3.29 and Table 3.13 in the Appendix we divide prime-age women 
according to whether they live with a partner or not, either legally married or in 
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Figure 3.28: Female labor force participation by cohort 
Latin America, 1992-2012.
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a consensual union. Not surprisingly, labor force participation for the “single” 
category, which includes women who are the breadwinners of their households, 
is much higher than for the “married” category. On average for Latin America, 
in 2012 the difference was more than 20 points (78.7% for single and 58.3% for 
married women). That gap was significantly reduced in the 1990s, and remained 
stable over the last decade. In summary, similar to developments in other regions 
of the world, the increase in female labor force participation was especially marked 
among married women in Latin America. LFP among unmarried women was 
already high and it increased at lower rates. For both groups, the rapid increase 
came to a halt in the early 2000s; that stop is particularly evident among the 
married, since it contrasts with the dramatic growth in the previous decade.
The patterns for hours of work were significantly different: for both groups they 
fell in the 1990s and stayed roughly unchanged in the 2000s (Figure 3.30).
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Figure 3.29: Female labor force participation by marital status 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Married=living with a partner (legally married or not). Unweighted means.
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The presence of children and their ages are relevant determinants of female labor 
market decisions. In Latin American societies, mothers are usually the primary 
child caregivers, which compromises their ability to actively engage in work 
activities. The evidence is consistent with this assertion: on average while 67% 
of prime-age women with no children under 18 participate in the labor market, 
that share falls to 56% for those with at least a child under 5 years-old (Figure 
3.31). The patterns are similar for the three groups over time, although more 
marked for those women with children ages 6 to 17. The male-female gap for 
that group shrank more than 10 points in the 1990s, and only less than 2 points 
in the following decade. 
As discussed before, the nature of a labor market activity is not always well defined. 
A typical ambiguous case is that of a household member who helps in a family 
productive undertaking, but does not have a formal payment or even a regular 
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Figure 3.30: Female hours of work per week by marital status 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Working women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Married=living with a partner (legally married or not). Hours of work per week. 
Unweighted means.
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assignment in that activity. Those sorts of arrangements are more common on 
small farms, and particularly among women and youth. Aware of that situation, 
household surveys typically include a question aimed at capturing these work 
situations. However, a person in this condition does not always declare herself 
to be employed. This failure could be a factor behind the large gap in rural and 
urban female LFP as estimated from household survey data (Figure 3.32). The 
contrast in the pattern in labor supply between the two last decades is evident 
in both areas, although it is more marked for women in rural areas: female LFP 
grew 8.5 points in the 1990s and just 2.5 in the 2000s. This slowdown also 
affected men’s labor supply in rural areas, but with less intensity, so that the gap 
between male LFP and female LFP reduced at a much lower rate than it had over 
the previous decade (Table 3.15 in the Appendix).
Labor decisions are usually made within a family framework. We have seen that 
married women tend to work less than unmarried women, and women with 
children are less likely to participate in the labor market. The spouse’s income is 
also correlated with female labor decisions. The relationship is complex, however. 
Women married to higher-income partners are not pressed by an economic need 
to get a paid job, but at the same time, they tend to have some characteristics 
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Figure 3.31: Female labor force participation by age of children 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
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(e.g. higher education, less children) that make them more prone to participate 
in the labor market. The evidence suggests that in Latin America, women 
married to higher-income partners tend to work more than other women (Figure 
3.33). Interestingly, female labor force participation increased more strongly for 
women married to low-income partners in the 1990s, but experienced a larger 
deceleration in this process in the 2000s (Table 3.16 in the Appendix). 
Similar patterns arise when grouping women according to their household 
per capita income (Figure 3.34). Poorer women tend to participate much less 
than their wealthier counterparts. While on average, 46.3% of Latin American 
women in the first decile of the household per capita income distribution are 
in the labor market, that share climbs to 83.5% for those in the top decile. Of 
course, there is circularity here, since household income depends on female 
earnings, so the decision of not working by an adult woman likely sends the 
household to a lower decile. 
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Figure 3.32: Female labor force participation by area
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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The intensity of labor supply changes clearly differs across income groups. In the 
1990s low-income women entered the labor force at a higher rate than wealthier 
women.18 Instead, in the 2000s the increase was much slower, both in comparison 
with the previous decade, and in comparison with the higher-income groups 
(Table 3.17 in the Appendix). 
To sum up, the evidence suggests that the pattern of gradual convergence in labor 
force participation across groups of women that occurred in previous decades 
has come to a halt in recent years. Figure 3.35 summarizes this fact by showing 
gaps between different groups of women. The groups with lower levels of LFP 
(unskilled, married, with children, rural, poor) experienced the highest rates of 
growth in that variable in the 1990s, generating a substantial narrowing of the 
gaps. By contrast, in the 2000s the deceleration in female LFP was stronger 
among these groups, implying stable, or even increasing, gaps.
We close this section with comments on three issues that will be picked up later 
in the book. 
18 This pattern was highlighted by Espino (2005) and World Bank (2012). 
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Figure 3.33: Female labor force participation by income of spouse 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Married women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: National quintiles of individual income. Unweighted means.
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Typically, women who are less educated, rural, married, and have children have 
different preferences, opportunity costs and constraints from the rest, that make 
them more prone to enter or leave the labor market depending on the economic 
situation. The fact that the deceleration during the 2000s is especially evident 
among groups with lower and more elastic labor supply suggests that changes 
in the socioeconomic scenario may have played a role in accounting for changes 
in female LFP. The next three chapters more deeply analyze the determinants of 
labor supply. 
Second, the fact that the deceleration in female LFP has mainly occurred among 
more vulnerable groups (unskilled, rural, poor) may have significant social 
implications. In particular, lower female labor supply among vulnerable groups 
may have negative consequences in terms of poverty and inequality reduction. 
We will pick up this issue again in Chapter 7. 
Finally, if the patterns in the last few years continue, convergence in labor force 
participation across groups of women may be out of reach. Instead, a worrisome 
dual scenario of highly educated, urban, richer women converging to the rates 
of LFP of the developed countries, and a group of less-educated, poorer women 
trapped in low participation rates may be plausible. 
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Figure 3.34: Female labor force participation by household income 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: deciles of the distribution of household per capita income. Unweighted means.
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6. Characterizing changes in female 
employment 
Has the structure of female employment changed over the last decades in Latin 
America? This section tackles this question, stressing the comparison with the 
changes that have affected male employment. We are interested in documenting 
which sectors and types of jobs attracted female employment and, in particular, 
whether this pattern differed from the one experienced by males. 
Differences in preferences, as well as unequal de facto or de jure opportunities 
for men and women in the labor market, affect the allocation of workers of both 
genders across types of jobs. For instance, women may choose to work in sectors 
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Figure 3.35: Gaps in female labor force participation 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Unweighted means for Latin American countries. Education: high-low 
education. (low=less than secondary complete, high=tertiary complete). Marital status: 
single-married. Area: urban-rural. Children: no children-with children under 5. 
Husband s´ income: quintile 5-quintile 1.
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more conducive to flexible and/or part-time schedules and may face stronger 
informal barriers to entry in some jobs (e.g. construction). In this section we 
take a preliminary look at these issues by documenting the structure of female 
employment in the region. 
The evidence from household surveys suggests that the picture of female 
employment in the region has not changed much in terms of sector structure 
(Figure 3.36). The majority of Latin American women are still employed in 
commerce (30%), education/health (23%) and domestic services (11%). The 
share of these sectors accounts for more than 60% of total female employment; 
that share has not changed substantially over the last twenty years. As it was 
decades ago, most Latin American women work as street or shop vendors, 
teachers, nurses and domestic servants.
Sector changes in female employment were rather small in general, although 
there was some heterogeneity across countries. The most relevant widespread 
changes were the increase in participation in skilled services (from 4.3% to 
6.9%) and in public administration (from 5.1% to 6.3%) (Table 3.18). Instead, 
women moved away from primary activities (from 10.8% to 9%) and the 
manufacturing industry (from 14.8% to 11.1%), especially in the 2000s. It is 
also interesting to notice the reduction in women’s participation in domestic 
services in the 2000s. 
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Figure 3.36: Distribution of workers by economic sector 
Latin America, 2012. 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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Table 3.18: Distribution of female and male workers by economic sector 
Latin America, 1992, 2002 and 2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Females Changes Males Changes
1992 2002 2012 92-02 02-12 92-12 1992 2002 2012 92-02 02-12 92-12
Primary 
activities
10.8 10.2 9.0 -0.5 -1.3 -1.8 26.1 24.5 21.3 -1.6 -3.2 -4.9
Food and 
clothing 
11.6 10.4 8.5 -1.2 -1.8 -3.0 7.4 6.5 6.1 -0.9 -0.4 -1.3
Rest of 
industry 
3.2 2.6 2.6 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 8.1 7.2 6.9 -1.0 -0.3 -1.2
Construction 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.2 10.0 10.8 12.3 0.8 1.5 2.3
Commerce 28.0 29.1 30.0 1.1 0.9 2.0 18.8 19.2 19.4 0.4 0.2 0.6
Utilities & 
transportation
2.1 2.0 2.3 -0.2 0.3 0.1 9.6 9.9 10.7 0.2 0.9 1.1
Skilled services 4.3 5.3 6.9 1.0 1.6 2.6 4.7 6.1 7.5 1.4 1.3 2.8
Public 
administration
5.1 5.1 6.3 0.0 1.2 1.3 6.7 6.3 6.6 -0.5 0.4 -0.1
Education & 
health 
23.1 22.8 22.6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 7.8 8.8 8.6 1.0 -0.3 0.7
Domestic 
servants
11.3 11.9 11.0 0.7 -1.0 -0.3 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.1 -0.1 0.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
More than half of Latin America’s working women are salaried employees in a 
medium-to-large firm (more than 5 employees) or are unskilled self-employed 
(Figure 3.37). There is also a significant share of women working in small firms 
or in the public sector. Although the share of zero-income workers is not large 
(6.4%), it contrasts with the much smaller share for males (1.8%). Instead, the 
number of male entrepreneurs is more than twice the number of females. The 
small number of women in that group suggests that they may face gender-based 
structural difficulties.19 
Just for illustrative purposes, let us divide jobs into two groups according to their 
flexibility: self-employment, family jobs and salaried employment in very small 
firms tend to be more flexible jobs than salaried positions in larger firms, in the 
public sector, and as employers. According to this simple classification, on average 
52% of prime-age women work in more flexible jobs, as compared to 43% of 
19 Being an entrepreneur may signify an affirmation of gender identity for men, but a 
transgression for women (Espino, 2005; Gluzmann et al., 2012; Navarro and Gallo, 2013).
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men. Greater flexibility eases the compatibility between remunerated work and 
housework, the latter of which continues to mostly be women’s responsibility in 
Latin America. 
Changes in the structure of women’s jobs have not been large over recent decades 
(Table 3.19). The increase in the share of salaried workers in medium-to-large firms 
in the 2000s stands out, although that phenomenon was less intense for women 
than it was for men. The significant reduction in the share of more precarious jobs, 
such as family and self-employment, during that decade should also be highlighted. 
The massive entry of women into the labor market during the 1990s was 
disproportionally intense in part-time jobs (Figure 3.38). By contrast, in the 
2000s, the share of full-time jobs increased at the expense of the share of both 
part-time and over-time employment. 
Figure 3.39 is illustrative of the significant gains in terms of social protection 
and decent jobs that took place in the last decade as well as the magnitude of 
the challenges ahead. While, on average, the share of informal jobs (e.g. those 
without access to social protection) remained unchanged in the 1990s, it 
substantially fell in the 2000s. However, today, the majority of Latin American 
female workers are still unprotected by labor regulations and have no access to 
social benefits, such as pensions and health services, by way of employment. In 
fact, most Latin American women enter the labor market through the informal 
sector (Paz, 2009). In many cases this precarious insertion perpetuates and turns 
into a structural characteristic of female employment. 
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Figure 3.37: Distribution of female and male workers by type of work 
Latin America, 2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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Table 3.19: Distribution of female and male workers by type of work 
Latin America, 1992, 2002 and 2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Females Changes Males Changes
1992 2002 2012 92-02 02-12 92-12 1992 2002 2012 92-02 02-12 92-12
Entrepreneurs 3.1 3.1 3.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 8.7 7.4 6.9 -1.3 -0.5 -1.8
Salaried-Larger 
firms
23.3 22.5 27.7 -0.9 5.3 4.4 31.7 32.1 37.7 0.4 5.6 6.0
Salaried-Public 
sector
18.5 17.4 17.8 -1.1 0.4 -0.7 13.7 11.9 11.9 -1.9 0.0 -1.8
Self-employed 
professionals
1.5 1.8 2.5 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.1 0.3 0.6 0.9
Salaried-Smaller 
firms
16.5 18.1 17.9 1.6 -0.2 1.3 14.8 15.4 15.1 0.6 -0.4 0.3
Self-employed 
unskilled
27.8 28.3 24.6 0.4 -3.7 -3.3 28.0 29.5 24.5 1.5 -5.1 -3.6
Zero income 
workers
9.3 8.9 6.4 -0.3 -2.6 -2.9 1.7 2.0 1.8 0.3 -0.2 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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Figure 3.38: Distribution of female workers by hours of work per week
Latin America, 1992-2012. Working women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Part time: <30 hours; over time: >48 hours per week. Unweighted means.
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Figure 3.39: Distribution of female workers by job formality 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Working women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means. Formal job=with rights to social and labor benefits.
7. Concluding remarks 
This chapter has documented some facts about the levels and trends of female 
labor force participation in Latin America. Some interesting patterns emerge 
from the inspection of the empirical evidence. 
The long process of increasing female labor force participation that began in the 
last century has continued into the present, contributing to a sizeable reduction 
in the gap between men and women. Although the gender gap in Latin America 
has been dramatically reduced, it is far from being closed and it is still larger 
than in several other regions of the world, including some developing ones. The 
long-run increase in labor force participation has been strong for all groups of 
adult women.
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The chapter highlights, however, a fact that has thus far been largely overlooked: 
there are clear signs that gains in female labor force participation have decelerated 
since the early-mid 2000s. This phenomenon is widespread across the region, 
although not generalized to all economies. The deceleration has taken place 
in all demographic groups, but especially among groups for which LFP had 
increased more strongly in the previous decade—in particular among married, 
unskilled women. 
This deceleration has been particularly noticeable among the most vulnerable 
women: women with low education, living in rural areas, and married to low-
earning spouses. The gaps in LFP with more affluent women is growing in some 
countries, and ceasing to shrink in others. The slower entry of vulnerable women 
into the labor market calls for a serious discussion about its normative and 
positive implications. 
Interestingly, in the 2000s while the entry of women into the labor market was less 
intense than in the previous decade, it took place in better job positions. The share 
of women in full-time, salaried, formal jobs with social protection significantly 
increased in the last decade, which was characterized by stronger labor markets 
and economic growth. Instead, the sectoral structure of employment seems to 
have moved slowly. Changes in the speed of growth in female LFP do not appear 
to have been driven by changes in the productive structure of the economy.
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Figure 3.13: Labor force participation 
Latin American countries, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
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Figure 3.13: Labor force participation [cont.]
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Figure 3.13: Labor force participation [cont.]
Source: own calculations based on SEDLAC (CEDLAS and The World Bank).
Note: Female LFP in black and male LFP in grey. 
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Table 3.1: Labor force participation
Latin America, 2012.
Age 25-54 Age 15-24 Age +55 All
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Argentina 81.1 68.3 94.9 -26.6*** 41.4 31.8 50.7 -18.9*** 37.1 25.3 52.7 -27.4*** 60.9 48.7 74.5 -25.8***
Bolivia 84.8 73.4 97.2 -23.8*** 45.9 37.4 54.9 -17.5*** 64.8 53.0 78.1 -25.1*** 69.8 59.3 81.3 -22.0***
Brazil 80.4 69.4 92.3 -22.9*** 59.0 50.6 67.2 -16.5*** 36.9 25.0 51.4 -26.4*** 65.9 54.9 77.9 -23.0***
Chile 76.2 62.0 92.2 -30.2*** 35.6 28.7 42.3 -13.5*** 35.4 21.7 53.2 -31.5*** 55.9 43.5 70.1 -26.7***
Colombia 83.9 72.2 96.5 -24.3*** 54.4 44.5 64.1 -19.5*** 47.0 31.8 64.9 -33.1*** 69.1 56.9 82.0 -25.0***
Costa Rica 76.6 60.1 94.5 -34.4*** 46.2 35.5 56.3 -20.9*** 35.4 20.0 53.5 -33.4*** 60.1 45.2 76.0 -30.8***
Dominican R. 72.9 57.2 89.4 -32.1*** 39.8 27.9 51.1 -23.2*** 40.2 22.4 59.1 -36.7*** 57.0 42.2 72.1 -29.9***
Ecuador 78.2 62.7 95.5 -32.9*** 42.2 31.1 52.5 -21.4*** 50.4 34.8 67.9 -33.1*** 61.9 47.7 77.0 -29.2***
El Salvador 76.8 61.9 95.3 -33.4*** 47.1 31.8 62.3 -30.5*** 46.3 29.3 67.9 -38.6*** 61.8 46.8 79.5 -32.7***
Guatemala 72.4 53.1 95.0 -41.9*** 54.6 36.8 73.6 -36.8*** 51.0 31.1 73.1 -42.0*** 63.0 44.2 84.1 -39.8***
Honduras 70.6 51.0 94.8 -43.9*** 49.9 30.2 69.3 -39.1*** 51.1 30.1 74.9 -44.8*** 59.9 40.4 81.9 -41.4***
Mexico 77.9 61.5 95.8 -34.3*** 53.0 39.4 66.2 -26.8*** 47.9 32.5 65.5 -32.9*** 65.2 49.9 81.7 -31.8***
Nicaragua 75.5 57.5 96.0 -38.5*** 51.9 30.7 72.6 -41.9*** 47.7 27.1 71.8 -44.7*** 63.3 44.1 84.1 -40.1***
Panama 79.5 63.9 96.7 -32.8*** 46.1 31.7 60.4 -28.7*** 42.3 25.8 60.6 -34.7*** 63.3 48.1 79.9 -31.8***
Paraguay 81.1 67.1 96.0 -28.9*** 57.6 46.6 68.6 -22.0*** 52.2 37.6 67.6 -30.1*** 68.5 55.3 82.3 -27.0***
Peru 85.9 77.2 95.5 -18.4*** 58.6 52.0 65.0 -13.0*** 61.4 50.2 73.7 -23.5*** 73.0 64.5 82.2 -17.7***
Uruguay 87.3 79.5 96.0 -16.5*** 52.9 45.2 60.4 -15.2*** 36.8 28.2 48.0 -19.8*** 65.0 56.4 74.7 -18.4***
Venezuela 81.7 68.0 95.4 -27.4*** 42.6 30.1 54.7 -24.6*** 44.5 28.3 62.2 -33.9*** 64.7 50.8 78.8 -28.0***
Average 79.0 64.8 95.0 -30.2 48.8 36.8 60.7 -23.9 46.0 30.8 63.7 -32.9 63.8 49.9 78.9 -29.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: year 2012 or closest year with available survey. *** significant at 1% level, 
** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3.2: Employment variables 
Latin America, 2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Employment Unemployment Duration Job dissatisfaction 
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Argentina 76.6 63.2 91.0 -27.7*** 5.6 7.5 4.2 3.3*** 10.1 11.7 7.8 3.9*** 18.6 19.0 18.3 0.7
Bolivia 82.0 70.2 95.0 -24.8*** 3.2 4.4 2.3 2.1*** 14.4 19.0 8.5 10.4*** 20.3 19.3 21.1 -1.8**
Brazil 76.8 65.1 89.4 -24.3*** 4.5 6.2 3.1 3.0*** 14.0 15.8 11.4 4.4***
Chile 71.6 57.3 87.8 -30.5*** 6.0 7.6 4.8 2.8*** 2.3 2.5 2.0 0.4*** 45.4 43.8 46.6 -2.8***
Colombia 77.4 64.9 90.7 -25.9*** 7.8 10.1 6.0 4.2*** 5.7 6.3 5.0 1.3*** 39.9 41.4 38.9 2.5***
Costa Rica 72.2 55.4 90.4 -35.0*** 5.7 7.8 4.3 3.5*** 5.8 6.9 4.3 2.6*** 48.8 44.0 52.0 -8.0***
Dominican R. 70.4 54.7 87.0 -32.3*** 3.3 4.4 2.6 1.8*** 5.9 6.1 5.8 0.3 38.1 34.2 40.7 -6.5***
Ecuador 75.5 59.9 92.9 -33.0*** 3.4 4.4 2.7 1.6*** 3.5 3.6 3.3 0.3 14.4 14.3 14.5 -0.2
El Salvador 73.5 59.9 90.2 -30.3*** 1.7 0.9 2.3 -1.4***
Guatemala 70.3 50.7 93.2 -42.5*** 2.9 4.4 1.9 2.5*** 2.8 4.3 1.9 2.3*** 20.5 17.4 22.5 -5.2***
Honduras 68.1 48.7 92.1 -43.5*** 3.5 4.5 2.8 1.6*** 6.2 7.0 5.4 1.6 33.6 32.0 34.6 -2.6**
Mexico 75.3 60.3 91.9 -31.7*** 3.2 2.1 4.1 -2.0***
Nicaragua 70.9 54.0 90.0 -35.9*** 6.2 6.0 6.3 -0.3
Panama 77.3 61.7 94.6 -32.8*** 2.7 3.4 2.2 1.2*** 4.1 4.5 3.5 1.0 16.5 14.2 18.2 -4.1***
Paraguay 78.4 63.9 93.8 -29.9*** 3.4 4.8 2.3 2.5*** 7.2 8.5 5.5 3.1** 10.9 9.5 11.9 -2.4***
Peru 83.9 75.0 93.8 -18.8*** 2.3 2.8 1.8 1.0*** 0.8 0.8 0.8 -0.0 20.2 19.3 21.0 -1.6***
Uruguay 83.5 74.8 93.2 -18.4*** 4.4 5.9 2.9 3.0*** 1.9 2.0 1.9 0.0 21.9 22.6 21.2 1.4***
Venezuela 76.5 63.0 90.0 -27.0*** 6.4 7.4 5.7 1.7*** 11.1 15.1 7.5 7.6***
Average 75.6 61.3 91.5 -30.2 4.2 5.2 3.5 1.8 6.4 7.6 5.0 2.6 26.9 25.5 27.8 -2.4
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: year 2012 or closest year with available survey. Duration=unemployment duration 
in months. Job dissatisfaction=willingness to change job; *** significant at 1% level, ** 
significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
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Table 3.3: Hours of work 
Latin America, 2012. Workers aged 25-54.
Age 25-54 Age 15-24 Age +55 All
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Argentina 41.6 35.5 46.2 -10.7*** 36.0 30.3 39.1 -8.9*** 39.2 33.2 42.9 -9.7*** 40.5 34.6 44.6 -10.1***
Bolivia 49.5 45.2 53.0 -7.7*** 41.5 39.2 43.1 -3.9*** 46.8 43.6 49.2 -5.6*** 47.5 43.9 50.4 -6.5***
Brazil 41.2 37.7 44.0 -6.3*** 38.5 36.5 39.8 -3.3*** 37.0 31.0 40.6 -9.5*** 40.2 36.7 42.7 -6.0***
Chile 43.7 40.7 45.8 -5.1*** 40.7 38.9 41.8 -3.0*** 42.7 39.4 44.5 -5.1*** 43.1 40.3 45.0 -4.7***
Colombia 48.5 42.4 53.2 -10.8*** 42.9 39.2 45.2 -6.0*** 43.9 36.8 48.0 -11.2*** 46.9 41.1 50.9 -9.8***
Costa Rica 45.8 39.3 49.9 -10.6*** 43.3 40.3 44.9 -4.6*** 39.9 30.9 43.8 -12.9*** 44.6 38.5 48.1 -9.6***
Dominican R. 42.1 38.7 44.3 -5.6*** 38.7 35.5 40.2 -4.7*** 38.7 32.8 41.1 -8.3*** 40.9 37.5 42.9 -5.4***
Ecuador 42.1 39.1 44.3 -5.2*** 38.4 36.0 39.6 -3.6*** 38.9 35.5 40.9 -5.4*** 40.8 37.9 42.7 -4.8***
El Salvador 44.4 42.4 46.0 -3.6*** 40.0 39.9 40.1 -0.2 40.6 39.6 41.2 -1.5*** 42.9 41.6 43.8 -2.2***
Guatemala 47.6 39.7 52.6 -13.0*** 43.9 38.9 46.4 -7.5*** 43.4 37.4 46.2 -8.8*** 46.0 39.2 49.8 -10.6***
Honduras 45.1 39.5 48.8 -9.3*** 41.6 39.8 42.3 -2.5*** 41.1 33.0 44.9 -11.8*** 43.5 38.6 46.1 -7.5***
Mexico 46.7 39.1 52.1 -12.9*** 43.1 38.1 46.1 -8.1*** 41.7 34.5 45.9 -11.3*** 45.2 38.3 49.8 -11.5***
Nicaragua 48.5 44.5 51.3 -6.9*** 44.2 43.3 44.6 -1.3* 47.3 43.1 49.2 -6.1*** 47.3 44.1 49.1 -5.0***
Panama 42.2 38.9 44.7 -5.8*** 37.3 36.0 37.9 -1.9*** 36.1 32.5 37.8 -5.3*** 40.5 37.7 42.3 -4.6***
Paraguay 49.3 44.5 52.8 -8.3*** 47.0 43.8 49.0 -5.2*** 44.3 39.9 46.9 -7.0*** 48.0 43.7 50.9 -7.2***
Peru 46.0 42.0 49.6 -7.6*** 39.6 38.8 40.2 -1.4*** 40.6 37.0 43.3 -6.3*** 43.7 40.4 46.3 -5.9***
Uruguay 42.4 37.7 46.5 -8.9*** 37.1 33.9 39.1 -5.1*** 37.7 33.3 41.1 -7.8*** 40.8 36.4 44.3 -7.9***
Venezuela 41.0 38.0 43.1 -5.1*** 39.7 37.3 40.9 -3.6*** 39.6 35.3 41.7 -6.4*** 40.6 37.6 42.5 -4.9***
Average 44.9 40.3 48.2 -8.0 40.8 38.1 42.2 -4.1 41.1 36.0 43.8 -7.8 43.5 39.3 46.2 -6.9
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: year 2012 or closest year with available survey. Weekly hours in all jobs. 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level.
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Table 3.4: Part-time and full-time work 
Latin America, 2012. Workers aged 25-54.
Part time Full time Overtime
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Argentina 19.5 32.4 9.9 22.5*** 55.0 52.9 56.5 -3.6*** 25.6 14.7 33.6 -19.0***
Bolivia 13.3 21.2 6.9 14.3*** 44.6 43.6 45.4 -1.9* 42.1 35.2 47.7 -12.5***
Brazil 12.5 20.7 6.1 14.7*** 71.0 67.7 73.7 -6.0*** 16.4 11.6 20.2 -8.6***
Chile 10.9 17.0 6.5 10.5*** 71.9 70.3 73.1 -2.8*** 17.2 12.7 20.4 -7.7***
Colombia 13.7 24.6 5.4 19.2*** 45.0 46.2 44.1 2.1*** 41.3 29.2 50.4 -21.2***
Costa Rica 15.4 26.5 8.4 18.1*** 47.3 50.0 45.5 4.5*** 37.3 23.5 46.1 -22.6***
Dominican R. 15.4 23.8 9.9 13.9*** 62.5 61.0 63.4 -2.4** 22.1 15.2 26.7 -11.5***
Ecuador 10.7 17.5 5.9 11.5*** 68.1 66.8 69.1 -2.3*** 21.1 15.7 25.0 -9.3***
El Salvador 13.7 21.1 7.6 13.5*** 53.5 46.0 59.6 -13.6*** 32.8 32.9 32.8 0.1
Guatemala 15.9 32.9 5.1 27.9*** 40.8 37.2 43.1 -5.9*** 43.3 29.9 51.8 -21.9***
Honduras 18.8 31.9 10.4 21.5*** 45.4 39.2 49.4 -10.2*** 35.7 28.9 40.2 -11.3***
Mexico 17.9 31.2 8.4 22.8*** 43.2 43.3 43.2 0.2 38.9 25.5 48.4 -23.0***
Nicaragua 11.7 20.7 5.5 15.1*** 48.5 45.4 50.7 -5.3*** 39.8 33.9 43.8 -9.8***
Panama 14.8 20.2 10.9 9.3*** 68.0 68.1 67.9 0.3 17.2 11.6 21.2 -9.6***
Paraguay 14.2 25.8 5.9 19.9*** 38.5 37.3 39.5 -2.2* 47.2 36.9 54.6 -17.7***
Peru 20.0 28.2 12.7 15.5*** 38.7 38.3 39.1 -0.7 41.3 33.5 48.2 -14.7***
Uruguay 14.8 23.4 7.1 16.3*** 61.9 61.2 62.5 -1.2** 23.4 15.4 30.5 -15.1***
Venezuela 8.9 14.9 4.7 10.2*** 82.5 79.5 84.6 -5.1*** 8.6 5.6 10.7 -5.1***
Average 14.6 24.1 7.6 16.5 54.8 53.0 56.1 -3.1 30.6 22.9 36.2 -13.4
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: year 2012 or closest year with available survey. Part-time: less than 30 hours per 
week. Weekly hours in all jobs. *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, 
* significant at 10% level.
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Table 3.6: Labor force participation by age
Latin America, 1992-2012.
Females Males Difference males-females
[25-54] [15-24] [+ 55] Total [25-54] [15-24] [+ 55] Total [25-54] [15-24] [+ 55] Total
1992 53.3 38.3 23.2 42.9 95.8 67.8 61.8 81.1 42.5 29.6 38.6 38.2
1993 54.1 38.6 23.6 43.5 95.8 68.2 61.7 81.2 41.7 29.6 38.1 37.7
1994 54.8 38.6 23.9 43.9 95.9 68.6 62.2 81.4 41.1 30.0 38.3 37.6
1995 56.0 38.8 25.0 44.8 96.1 68.7 63.5 81.8 40.0 29.9 38.4 37.0
1996 56.6 38.6 25.2 45.1 95.8 67.6 62.5 81.2 39.3 29.0 37.3 36.1
1997 57.6 39.2 26.1 45.9 95.8 67.8 63.2 81.3 38.2 28.6 37.1 35.4
1998 58.3 39.5 26.6 46.6 95.7 67.3 63.2 81.3 37.4 27.8 36.6 34.7
1999 59.5 39.7 27.9 47.6 95.6 66.4 63.6 81.0 36.1 26.7 35.7 33.5
2000 59.9 39.2 27.8 47.5 95.6 65.7 63.1 80.8 35.7 26.5 35.3 33.2
2001 61.7 40.2 29.1 49.0 95.6 65.8 63.3 80.8 34.0 25.5 34.2 31.7
2002 62.1 39.8 28.7 49.1 95.5 65.3 63.3 80.6 33.5 25.5 34.7 31.5
2003 63.0 40.2 29.0 49.7 95.3 64.3 62.5 80.1 32.3 24.1 33.5 30.3
2004 63.0 39.8 29.9 49.8 95.5 64.3 63.2 80.3 32.5 24.4 33.3 30.5
2005 63.9 39.6 30.5 50.2 95.7 63.5 63.3 80.0 31.8 23.8 32.8 29.8
2006 63.8 39.5 30.6 50.2 95.6 63.7 63.6 80.2 31.8 24.2 33.0 30.0
2007 64.3 39.0 30.9 50.4 95.6 63.4 63.9 80.2 31.3 24.5 33.0 29.8
2008 64.4 39.1 30.9 50.4 95.5 63.0 64.2 80.0 31.1 24.0 33.3 29.6
2009 65.0 38.6 31.5 50.7 95.5 62.5 63.7 79.7 30.5 23.9 32.3 29.0
2010 65.0 37.2 30.9 50.1 95.4 61.2 62.8 79.1 30.4 24.0 31.9 29.0
2011 65.0 36.9 30.6 50.2 95.3 60.4 63.0 79.0 30.3 23.6 32.3 28.8
2012 65.3 36.5 30.7 50.4 95.2 60.0 63.0 78.8 30.0 23.5 32.3 28.4
Changes
1992-2002 8.8 1.5 5.5 6.2 -0.3 -2.5 1.5 -0.4 -9.1 -4.1 -4.0 -6.7
2002-2012 3.2 -3.3 2.1 1.3 -0.3 -5.3 -0.3 -1.8 -3.5 -2.0 -2.4 -3.1
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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Table 3.7: Labor market indicators by gender 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Employment Unemployment Hours of work Full-time job
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1992 49.7 91.1 41.4 5.7 4.8 -0.9 42.3 49.8 7.5 78.2 92.1 13.9
1993 50.4 91.0 40.7 6.0 4.9 -1.1 42.3 49.8 7.5 77.6 91.8 14.2
1994 51.0 91.2 40.2 6.3 4.8 -1.5 42.0 49.8 7.8 76.9 92.0 15.1
1995 51.8 91.3 39.4 7.6 5.0 -2.6 42.1 49.7 7.6 76.8 92.0 15.3
1996 52.3 90.9 38.7 7.7 5.1 -2.5 42.0 49.6 7.6 76.0 91.3 15.3
1997 53.4 91.3 37.9 7.3 4.8 -2.4 42.0 49.8 7.9 75.9 91.2 15.3
1998 54.1 91.2 37.1 6.9 4.8 -2.1 42.0 49.8 7.8 75.7 90.8 15.1
1999 55.0 90.7 35.7 7.3 5.1 -2.2 41.3 49.3 8.0 74.2 90.1 15.9
2000 55.2 90.5 35.3 7.6 5.3 -2.3 41.6 49.3 7.8 74.9 90.5 15.6
2001 56.2 90.0 33.8 8.6 5.8 -2.8 40.7 49.0 8.3 73.1 90.3 17.2
2002 56.1 89.7 33.6 9.3 6.1 -3.2 40.7 48.9 8.3 72.7 89.8 17.1
2003 57.0 89.7 32.7 9.1 5.9 -3.2 40.5 48.7 8.2 73.1 89.4 16.3
2004 57.9 90.6 32.7 7.9 5.1 -2.8 40.8 49.2 8.4 73.4 89.9 16.5
2005 59.0 91.2 32.2 7.3 4.6 -2.7 40.6 48.9 8.3 73.1 89.9 16.8
2006 59.6 91.7 32.1 6.4 4.1 -2.3 40.8 49.0 8.2 73.9 91.2 17.3
2007 60.5 92.0 31.5 5.8 3.7 -2.1 40.8 49.0 8.2 74.7 91.8 17.1
2008 60.8 92.1 31.3 5.4 3.6 -1.8 41.0 49.0 8.1 75.5 92.2 16.7
2009 61.1 91.4 30.3 6.1 4.3 -1.7 40.3 48.3 8.0 74.2 91.1 16.9
2010 61.3 91.6 30.3 5.7 4.0 -1.7 40.2 48.1 7.9 74.3 90.9 16.6
2011 61.6 91.8 30.1 5.2 3.7 -1.5 40.4 48.2 7.8 75.3 91.5 16.3
2012 61.8 91.7 29.9 5.1 3.5 -1.6 40.4 47.8 7.4 75.5 91.3 15.8
Changes
1992-2002 6.4 -1.4 -7.8 3.6 1.3 -2.3 -1.7 -0.9 0.8 -5.5 -2.3 3.2
2002-2012 5.7 2.0 -3.7 -4.2 -2.5 1.6 -0.3 -1.1 -0.8 2.8 1.5 -1.3
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: hours of work in hours per week; full-time=more than 30 hours per week. 
Unweighted means.
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Table 3.8: Female labor market participation
Regions of the world, 1992-2012. Women aged 15-64.
Female labor force participation Change in female LFP
1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 1992-1997 1997-2002 2002-2007 2007-2012
East Asia & Pacific 72.3 71.9 70.1 67.9 67.5 -0.4 -1.8 -2.2 -0.4
Europe & Central 
Asia
59.9 58.6 59.7 61.0 62.6 -1.3 1.1 1.3 1.6
Latin America & 
Caribbean
46.2 49.8 53.2 55.9 57.9 3.6 3.4 2.7 2.1
Middle East & 
North Africa
21.0 21.5 22.6 24.4 24.9 0.5 1.0 1.9 0.4
North America 67.6 69.7 69.4 68.6 67.3 2.2 -0.3 -0.8 -1.3
South Asia 37.2 36.5 36.9 36.3 33.0 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 -3.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 59.2 60.4 62.0 62.8 63.4 1.2 1.5 0.8 0.6
World 57.3 57.0 56.8 56.2 55.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.8
Source: own calculations based on WDI.
Note: unweighted means by region. 
Table 3.9: Labor force participation by education
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Females Males Difference males-females
Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total
1992 47.2 64.9 83.9 53.3 95.9 94.5 97.5 95.8 48.7 29.7 13.6 42.5
1993 47.8 65.4 84.2 54.1 95.9 94.7 97.2 95.8 48.1 29.3 13.0 41.7
1994 48.2 65.8 85.0 54.8 96.0 94.8 97.4 95.9 47.8 29.0 12.3 41.1
1995 49.5 66.5 84.8 56.0 96.1 95.4 97.2 96.1 46.6 28.9 12.4 40.0
1996 49.9 66.6 85.6 56.6 95.8 95.2 97.6 95.8 45.9 28.6 12.0 39.3
1997 50.8 67.4 86.1 57.6 95.9 95.0 97.5 95.8 45.0 27.6 11.4 38.2
1998 51.7 67.5 85.9 58.3 95.6 95.0 97.4 95.7 44.0 27.5 11.5 37.4
1999 53.0 68.1 86.0 59.5 95.7 94.7 97.4 95.6 42.7 26.6 11.4 36.1
2000 53.3 68.9 84.0 59.9 95.6 94.8 97.1 95.6 42.3 26.0 13.1 35.7
2001 54.9 69.9 85.7 61.7 95.6 95.0 97.2 95.6 40.7 25.0 11.5 34.0
2002 55.3 70.2 86.3 62.1 95.5 94.9 96.7 95.5 40.2 24.7 10.4 33.5
2003 56.2 70.4 86.6 63.0 95.1 95.2 97.3 95.3 38.9 24.7 10.8 32.3
2004 56.2 70.2 86.7 63.0 95.4 95.2 97.4 95.5 39.2 25.1 10.7 32.5
2005 56.8 70.3 87.3 63.9 95.5 95.4 97.8 95.7 38.6 25.1 10.4 31.8
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Females Males Difference males-females
Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total
2006 56.9 69.5 87.1 63.8 95.5 95.3 97.7 95.6 38.6 25.8 10.5 31.8
2007 57.2 69.8 86.8 64.3 95.4 95.2 97.5 95.6 38.1 25.3 10.7 31.3
2008 57.1 69.8 87.3 64.4 95.1 95.2 97.9 95.5 38.1 25.4 10.6 31.1
2009 57.5 70.4 87.8 65.0 95.1 95.3 97.6 95.5 37.7 24.9 9.8 30.5
2010 57.2 70.3 87.6 65.0 95.0 95.2 97.5 95.4 37.8 24.9 9.9 30.4
2011 57.0 69.6 87.3 65.0 94.9 95.1 97.5 95.3 37.9 25.5 10.2 30.3
2012 57.0 69.7 87.6 65.3 94.8 95.0 97.6 95.2 37.8 25.3 9.9 30.0
Changes
1992-2002 8.0 5.3 2.4 8.8 -0.4 0.4 -0.8 -0.3 -8.5 -4.9 -3.2 -9.1
2002-2012 1.7 -0.5 1.3 3.2 -0.7 0.1 0.8 -0.3 -2.4 0.6 -0.5 -3.5
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Education: low=less than secondary complete, medium=secondary complete and 
superior incomplete, high=tertiary complete. Unweighted means.
Table 3.10: Hours of work by education
Latin America, 1992-2012. Workers aged 25-54.
Females Males Difference males-females
Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total
1992 43.2 41.3 40.1 42.3 50.3 48.9 47.8 49.8 7.0 7.6 7.8 7.5
1993 43.1 41.5 40.1 42.3 50.2 49.2 48.1 49.8 7.1 7.6 8.0 7.5
1994 42.4 41.8 40.2 42.0 50.2 49.1 48.1 49.8 7.7 7.3 7.9 7.8
1995 42.6 41.9 40.4 42.1 50.0 49.2 48.2 49.7 7.4 7.4 7.8 7.6
1996 42.3 42.0 40.1 42.0 49.9 49.2 48.0 49.6 7.6 7.2 7.9 7.6
1997 42.2 42.3 40.3 42.0 50.1 49.5 48.2 49.8 7.9 7.2 7.9 7.9
1998 42.1 42.3 40.7 42.0 49.9 49.5 48.5 49.8 7.8 7.2 7.8 7.8
1999 41.2 41.8 40.4 41.3 49.3 49.2 48.2 49.3 8.1 7.4 7.8 8.0
2000 41.4 42.1 41.0 41.6 49.5 49.3 47.9 49.3 8.1 7.3 6.9 7.8
2001 40.3 41.5 40.7 40.7 49.0 49.2 48.1 49.0 8.8 7.7 7.4 8.3
2002 40.0 41.8 40.7 40.7 48.9 49.3 47.5 48.9 8.9 7.6 6.9 8.3
2003 39.8 41.5 40.4 40.5 48.7 49.0 47.7 48.7 8.9 7.6 7.2 8.2
2004 40.1 42.0 40.9 40.8 49.3 49.2 48.0 49.2 9.2 7.3 7.1 8.4
2005 39.6 42.0 41.0 40.6 48.9 49.1 47.6 48.9 9.3 7.2 6.6 8.3
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Females Males Difference males-females
Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total
2006 39.8 42.2 40.7 40.8 49.1 49.2 47.4 49.0 9.2 7.0 6.7 8.2
2007 39.8 42.3 41.0 40.8 49.1 49.2 47.6 49.0 9.3 6.9 6.6 8.2
2008 40.1 41.8 41.3 41.0 49.1 49.4 47.4 49.0 9.0 7.6 6.1 8.1
2009 39.3 41.5 40.9 40.3 48.5 48.7 46.7 48.3 9.2 7.2 5.8 8.0
2010 39.3 41.4 40.6 40.2 48.3 48.4 46.2 48.1 9.1 6.9 5.6 7.9
2011 39.4 41.5 40.9 40.4 48.3 48.3 46.5 48.2 8.9 6.8 5.6 7.7
2012 39.3 41.4 40.9 40.4 47.9 48.0 46.3 47.8 8.6 6.6 5.4 7.4
Changes
1992-2002 -3.2 0.4 0.6 -1.7 -1.3 0.4 -0.3 -0.9 1.9 0.0 -0.9 0.8
2002-2012 -0.7 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 -1.0 -1.3 -1.2 -1.1 -0.3 -1.0 -1.5 -0.8
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Education: low=less than secondary complete, medium=secondary complete and 
superior incomplete, high=tertiary complete. Hours of work per week. Unweighted means.
Table 3.11: Labor force participation by age
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Females Males Difference males-females
[25,34] [35,44] [45,54] Total [25,34] [35,44] [45,54] Total [25,34] [35,44] [45,54] Total
1992 53.9 56.2 48.0 53.3 95.6 97.2 94.1 95.8 41.7 41.0 46.1 42.5
1993 54.7 57.0 48.8 54.1 95.6 97.3 94.1 95.8 40.9 40.3 45.3 41.7
1994 55.4 57.7 49.6 54.8 95.7 97.2 94.3 95.9 40.3 39.5 44.6 41.1
1995 56.6 59.1 51.0 56.0 95.8 97.3 94.6 96.1 39.2 38.3 43.6 40.0
1996 56.8 59.6 52.0 56.6 95.7 97.1 94.3 95.8 38.9 37.5 42.3 39.3
1997 58.0 60.4 53.2 57.6 95.6 97.2 94.3 95.8 37.6 36.7 41.2 38.2
1998 58.6 61.1 54.0 58.3 95.4 96.9 94.4 95.7 36.8 35.8 40.4 37.4
1999 59.8 62.1 55.6 59.5 95.4 96.8 94.3 95.6 35.6 34.7 38.7 36.1
2000 60.1 62.6 55.9 59.9 95.2 96.9 94.3 95.6 35.2 34.3 38.4 35.7
2001 61.7 64.3 58.2 61.7 95.3 96.8 94.6 95.6 33.6 32.6 36.4 34.0
2002 62.1 64.7 58.7 62.1 95.1 96.9 94.3 95.5 33.0 32.2 35.6 33.5
2003 62.7 65.8 59.8 63.0 95.1 96.6 93.9 95.3 32.4 30.8 34.1 32.3
2004 62.9 65.6 59.8 63.0 95.1 96.9 94.3 95.5 32.1 31.3 34.5 32.5
2005 63.4 66.7 60.9 63.9 95.2 96.9 94.7 95.7 31.8 30.2 33.8 31.8
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Females Males Difference males-females
[25,34] [35,44] [45,54] Total [25,34] [35,44] [45,54] Total [25,34] [35,44] [45,54] Total
2006 63.5 66.4 61.1 63.8 95.3 96.9 94.5 95.6 31.8 30.5 33.4 31.8
2007 64.0 66.9 61.6 64.3 95.1 96.9 94.6 95.6 31.1 30.0 33.0 31.3
2008 64.1 66.9 61.9 64.4 94.8 96.8 94.7 95.5 30.8 29.9 32.8 31.1
2009 65.1 67.3 62.6 65.0 94.9 96.7 94.8 95.5 29.9 29.5 32.2 30.5
2010 64.8 67.5 62.4 65.0 94.7 96.7 94.7 95.4 29.9 29.2 32.3 30.4
2011 64.9 67.5 62.5 65.0 94.7 96.7 94.5 95.3 29.8 29.2 32.1 30.3
2012 65.4 67.6 62.7 65.3 94.5 96.7 94.5 95.2 29.2 29.1 31.7 30.0
Changes
1992-2002 8.2 8.5 10.6 8.8 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 -8.7 -8.8 -10.5 -9.1
2002-2012 3.3 2.9 4.1 3.2 -0.6 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 -3.9 -3.1 -3.9 -3.5
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means. 
Table 3.12: Labor force participation by cohort
Latin America, 1992-2012.
Females born between Males born between Difference males-females
1938-
1947
1948-
1957
1958-
1967
1968-
1977
1938-
1947
1948-
1957
1958-
1967
1968-
1977
1938-
1947
1948-
1957
1958-
1967
1968-
1977
1992 47.8 55.8 53.8 39.5 93.5 97.2 95.7 69.5 45.7 41.4 41.9 30.0
1993 47.7 56.1 54.9 42.4 92.9 97.2 96.0 73.9 45.2 41.1 41.1 31.5
1994 47.0 56.5 55.9 45.3 92.5 97.0 96.4 78.7 45.4 40.5 40.5 33.4
1995 46.9 57.3 57.5 48.7 92.0 97.1 96.8 83.2 45.1 39.7 39.3 34.5
1996 45.4 57.7 58.1 50.9 90.8 96.5 96.9 86.1 45.4 38.9 38.7 35.2
1997 45.2 57.7 59.7 53.5 89.7 96.3 97.0 89.4 44.5 38.6 37.3 35.8
1998 44.3 57.9 60.6 55.6 89.3 95.9 96.9 91.2 45.1 38.0 36.3 35.6
1999 44.6 58.6 61.8 57.7 87.9 95.5 97.0 92.1 43.3 36.9 35.2 34.4
2000 42.9 58.1 62.7 58.6 85.9 95.2 96.9 93.6 42.9 37.1 34.2 35.0
2001 42.8 59.3 64.2 60.9 84.3 94.9 96.9 94.5 41.5 35.6 32.7 33.6
2002 40.5 58.7 64.5 62.0 82.6 94.4 96.9 95.1 42.1 35.7 32.4 33.1
2003 39.4 58.3 65.5 63.4 79.1 93.4 96.5 95.6 39.7 35.1 31.0 32.2
2004 38.6 56.9 65.5 63.9 77.0 93.2 96.7 96.1 38.4 36.2 31.2 32.3
2005 37.3 56.8 66.0 65.0 74.7 92.9 96.6 96.5 37.4 36.1 30.5 31.5
2006 35.3 55.5 65.6 65.3 72.3 92.0 96.4 96.9 37.0 36.6 30.8 31.6
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Females born between Males born between Difference males-females
1938-
1947
1948-
1957
1958-
1967
1968-
1977
1938-
1947
1948-
1957
1958-
1967
1968-
1977
1938-
1947
1948-
1957
1958-
1967
1968-
1977
2007 34.2 54.4 65.5 66.2 69.8 91.2 96.2 96.9 35.6 36.8 30.7 30.6
2008 31.8 52.8 65.2 66.4 67.7 90.4 96.0 96.7 35.9 37.6 30.8 30.3
2009 30.1 52.7 64.8 67.0 63.8 89.3 95.7 96.8 33.7 36.6 30.9 29.8
2010 28.1 50.4 64.3 67.1 60.5 87.5 95.4 96.7 32.5 37.1 31.0 29.7
2011 25.6 47.9 63.5 67.4 57.3 85.4 95.0 96.8 31.7 37.4 31.5 29.4
2012 24.4 46.7 63.3 67.5 55.7 84.2 94.7 96.8 31.3 37.5 31.4 29.3
Changes
1992-2002 -7.3 2.9 10.7 22.6 -11.0 -2.8 1.2 25.6 -3.6 -5.7 -9.5 3.1
2002-2012 -16.1 -12.0 -1.2 5.5 -26.9 -10.1 -2.2 1.7 -10.8 1.8 -1.0 -3.7
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: unweighted means.
Table 3.13: Labor force participation by marital status 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Females Males Difference males-females
Single Married Total Single Married Total Single Married Total
1992 73.6 46.5 53.3 90.2 97.7 95.8 16.6 51.2 42.5
1993 73.7 47.2 54.1 90.3 97.7 95.8 16.6 50.4 41.7
1994 73.7 47.9 54.8 90.6 97.7 95.9 16.9 49.8 41.1
1995 74.3 48.9 56.0 90.9 97.8 96.1 16.6 48.9 40.0
1996 74.3 49.3 56.6 90.4 97.7 95.8 16.0 48.4 39.3
1997 74.8 50.5 57.6 90.6 97.6 95.8 15.9 47.2 38.2
1998 74.8 51.3 58.3 90.3 97.5 95.7 15.4 46.3 37.4
1999 76.3 52.4 59.5 89.5 97.6 95.6 13.2 45.2 36.1
2000 76.0 52.9 59.9 89.7 97.7 95.6 13.7 44.7 35.7
2001 77.1 54.6 61.7 89.8 97.7 95.6 12.7 43.1 34.0
2002 76.9 55.2 62.1 89.9 97.6 95.5 13.0 42.4 33.5
2003 77.1 56.1 63.0 89.6 97.4 95.3 12.5 41.3 32.3
2004 76.6 56.3 63.0 90.1 97.6 95.5 13.6 41.4 32.5
2005 77.1 57.2 63.9 90.2 97.9 95.7 13.0 40.6 31.8
2006 77.7 57.2 63.8 90.1 97.9 95.6 12.4 40.6 31.8
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Females Males Difference males-females
Single Married Total Single Married Total Single Married Total
2007 78.3 57.6 64.3 89.7 97.9 95.6 11.4 40.4 31.3
2008 78.6 57.5 64.4 89.8 97.8 95.5 11.2 40.3 31.1
2009 78.5 58.3 65.0 90.0 97.9 95.5 11.5 39.5 30.5
2010 78.7 58.1 65.0 89.7 97.9 95.4 11.1 39.8 30.4
2011 78.4 58.1 65.0 89.7 97.8 95.3 11.3 39.7 30.3
2012 78.7 58.3 65.3 89.7 97.8 95.2 11.1 39.5 30.0
Changes
1992-2002 3.2 8.7 8.8 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -3.6 -8.8 -9.1
2002-2012 1.8 3.1 3.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 -1.9 -2.8 -3.5
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Married=living with a partner (legally married or not). Unweighted means.
Table 3.14: Labor force participation by age of children 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Females Males Difference males-females
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total
1992 53.9 45.3 52.5 49.9 94.9 98.7 97.3 97.5 41.0 53.3 44.8 47.6
1993 55.3 45.8 53.4 50.8 94.9 98.7 97.3 97.5 39.6 52.9 43.9 46.7
1994 56.2 46.4 54.5 51.7 95.0 98.7 97.4 97.5 38.8 52.3 42.9 45.9
1995 57.3 47.8 55.7 53.0 95.6 98.8 97.5 97.7 38.3 51.0 41.8 44.7
1996 58.3 48.0 56.5 53.6 95.7 98.7 97.4 97.6 37.4 50.7 40.9 44.1
1997 59.5 48.8 58.0 54.9 95.5 98.7 97.3 97.5 36.0 49.9 39.3 42.7
1998 60.0 49.7 58.7 55.6 95.2 98.6 97.3 97.4 35.1 48.8 38.7 41.8
1999 60.8 51.1 59.8 56.9 95.4 98.8 97.2 97.5 34.6 47.7 37.4 40.6
2000 61.3 51.3 60.1 57.3 95.3 98.7 97.4 97.5 34.0 47.4 37.3 40.2
2001 63.9 53.3 61.9 59.3 95.5 98.8 97.5 97.6 31.6 45.4 35.6 38.3
2002 63.7 53.5 63.0 59.8 95.2 98.8 97.4 97.5 31.5 45.3 34.5 37.6
2003 64.3 54.6 63.8 60.8 94.9 98.4 97.4 97.2 30.6 43.8 33.6 36.4
2004 63.7 54.8 63.8 60.9 95.6 98.6 97.6 97.5 31.8 43.8 33.8 36.6
2005 65.7 55.3 64.3 61.8 96.0 98.8 97.8 97.7 30.4 43.5 33.6 36.0
2006 65.4 55.0 64.5 61.8 95.8 98.8 97.8 97.7 30.4 43.8 33.3 35.9
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Females Males Difference males-females
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Total
2007 65.9 55.5 64.9 62.3 95.8 98.9 97.9 97.7 29.9 43.4 33.0 35.5
2008 66.1 55.1 65.2 62.3 95.7 98.7 97.8 97.6 29.6 43.6 32.7 35.3
2009 67.3 56.4 65.1 63.1 95.8 98.9 98.0 97.7 28.6 42.4 32.9 34.6
2010 67.1 56.1 65.3 63.1 95.9 98.8 97.9 97.7 28.8 42.7 32.7 34.6
2011 66.9 56.1 65.1 63.0 96.0 98.7 97.9 97.6 29.1 42.6 32.7 34.6
2012 67.2 56.0 65.2 63.1 95.7 98.8 97.9 97.6 28.5 42.8 32.7 34.5
Changes
1992-2002 9.8 8.1 10.5 9.9 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 -9.5 -8.0 -10.3 -10.0
2002-2012 3.5 2.5 2.2 3.3 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.1 -3.0 -2.5 -1.7 -3.2
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Group 1=no children under 18, Group 2=youngest child is 0-5, Group 
3=youngest child is 6-17. Unweighted means.
Table 3.15: Labor force participation by area (urban-rural) 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Females Males Difference males-females
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total
1992 57.9 44.6 52.9 95.3 96.8 95.8 37.3 52.2 42.9
1993 58.6 45.6 53.6 95.3 96.9 95.8 36.6 51.3 42.2
1994 59.3 46.6 54.4 95.2 97.0 95.8 35.9 50.5 41.4
1995 60.5 47.8 55.6 95.5 97.2 96.1 35.0 49.4 40.4
1996 61.5 47.9 56.3 95.3 96.9 95.8 33.9 48.9 39.5
1997 62.6 49.1 57.4 95.3 96.9 95.8 32.7 47.7 38.4
1998 62.8 49.9 58.0 95.1 96.7 95.6 32.3 46.8 37.6
1999 63.7 51.5 59.2 95.0 96.7 95.6 31.4 45.2 36.3
2000 64.1 51.6 59.6 95.1 96.7 95.6 30.9 45.0 36.0
2001 65.1 53.4 61.5 95.1 96.7 95.6 30.0 43.4 34.1
2002 66.1 53.1 61.7 95.0 96.6 95.5 28.9 43.5 33.9
2003 66.7 54.3 62.7 95.0 96.2 95.3 28.3 41.9 32.6
2004 66.4 55.2 62.7 95.1 96.4 95.5 28.8 41.3 32.8
2005 67.1 56.4 63.6 95.3 96.4 95.7 28.2 40.1 32.1
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Females Males Difference males-females
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total
2006 66.9 56.6 63.5 95.2 96.7 95.7 28.3 40.1 32.2
2007 67.4 56.7 64.0 95.1 96.6 95.6 27.6 39.9 31.6
2008 67.9 55.6 64.1 95.3 96.1 95.5 27.4 40.5 31.4
2009 68.5 56.6 64.8 95.2 96.2 95.6 26.8 39.6 30.8
2010 68.6 56.0 64.8 95.0 96.2 95.4 26.4 40.2 30.6
2011 68.6 55.7 64.7 94.9 96.1 95.3 26.3 40.3 30.6
2012 69.1 55.6 65.0 94.9 96.0 95.3 25.8 40.3 30.2
Changes
1992-2002 8.1 8.5 8.8 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -8.4 -8.7 -9.0
2002-2012 3.0 2.5 3.4 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 -3.2 -3.1 -3.6
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
Table 3.16: Labor force participation by income of spouse 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Females Males
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 Total q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 Total
1992 40.4 42.4 43.4 46.0 49.7 44.3 97.5 96.5 97.1 96.5 97.3 97.0
1993 41.3 42.8 44.2 46.9 51.0 45.2 97.7 96.8 97.1 97.0 96.9 97.1
1994 42.5 43.9 44.5 47.9 52.1 46.1 97.5 96.8 97.1 96.9 97.0 97.1
1995 43.9 45.3 46.1 48.8 53.3 47.4 97.6 96.8 97.1 97.2 97.3 97.2
1996 44.4 45.1 46.6 49.5 53.9 47.9 97.1 96.7 97.0 97.3 97.4 97.1
1997 45.6 46.6 47.7 51.1 55.2 49.2 96.9 96.5 97.0 97.4 97.3 97.0
1998 47.4 48.0 49.2 50.8 56.4 50.3 96.6 96.9 97.1 97.0 97.3 97.0
1999 50.1 49.4 50.8 52.0 57.3 51.9 97.4 97.4 97.1 96.8 97.2 97.2
2000 49.4 50.7 51.0 52.5 57.4 52.2 97.2 97.1 97.3 97.2 97.1 97.2
2001 51.6 51.3 52.3 55.7 59.5 54.1 97.4 97.2 97.4 97.4 97.5 97.4
2002 53.1 52.3 52.9 55.1 59.4 54.5 97.7 97.4 97.2 96.9 97.3 97.3
2003 54.4 53.4 53.6 56.7 59.8 55.6 97.5 97.1 97.1 97.1 97.2 97.2
2004 54.5 53.4 53.7 56.3 60.2 55.6 98.2 97.2 97.0 97.2 97.1 97.4
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Females Males
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 Total q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 Total
2005 54.7 54.2 55.5 57.1 60.8 56.5 98.2 97.1 97.7 97.6 97.4 97.6
2006 56.0 54.0 54.8 56.3 60.2 56.2 98.2 97.4 97.1 97.2 97.4 97.5
2007 56.4 55.0 55.0 56.9 60.9 56.8 98.1 97.5 97.5 97.6 97.3 97.6
2008 55.0 54.2 55.3 57.8 61.2 56.7 97.8 97.3 97.4 97.5 97.4 97.5
2009 55.8 55.0 56.8 58.6 61.2 57.5 98.2 97.3 97.8 97.4 97.4 97.6
2010 55.4 54.9 56.5 58.1 61.6 57.3 98.1 97.6 97.5 97.4 97.4 97.6
2011 55.0 55.7 55.5 57.9 61.6 57.1 98.3 97.4 97.4 97.5 97.5 97.6
2012 55.3 55.1 56.4 58.0 61.3 57.2 98.2 97.3 97.0 97.7 97.6 97.6
Changes
1992-2002 12.7 9.9 9.5 9.1 9.7 10.2 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3
2002-2012 2.2 2.8 3.5 2.9 1.9 2.7 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.8 0.3 0.3
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: National quintiles of individual income. Quintile 1 includes spouses with no 
income. Unweighted means. 
Table 3.17: Labor force participation by household per capita income 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Females Males
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 Total d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 Total
1992 35.9 38.8 40.3 43.4 47.9 50.2 55.7 61.3 66.1 71.8 52.7 92.5 95.1 95.1 96.3 95.4 96.3 95.8 96.5 96.5 96.8 95.8
1993 36.9 39.3 40.8 44.3 47.9 50.8 57.2 61.7 68.0 72.1 53.5 92.4 95.2 94.8 96.0 95.5 96.1 96.0 96.4 96.6 96.9 95.8
1994 36.8 40.7 40.8 45.2 48.7 51.8 58.6 62.7 68.8 73.4 54.4 93.1 95.5 94.7 96.4 95.4 96.2 96.1 96.7 96.3 97.0 95.9
1995 38.5 42.6 42.6 46.6 49.1 53.5 60.5 64.1 69.8 74.4 55.8 93.7 95.6 94.8 96.4 95.8 96.1 96.4 96.8 96.7 97.1 96.1
1996 38.9 42.2 43.4 46.7 50.5 54.2 60.8 64.2 70.1 75.4 56.2 93.3 95.2 94.4 95.8 96.0 95.7 95.9 96.4 96.7 97.3 95.9
1997 39.8 42.8 44.6 47.7 51.7 55.5 60.4 66.1 72.0 76.6 57.3 92.7 95.5 94.8 95.9 95.7 95.7 96.2 96.3 96.7 97.1 95.9
1998 39.6 43.8 46.0 49.2 51.8 56.9 62.5 65.9 71.9 76.0 58.0 92.0 95.0 94.8 95.8 95.7 95.6 95.9 96.2 96.8 96.6 95.7
1999 41.4 46.7 48.3 49.7 53.9 58.7 63.1 67.8 72.5 76.4 59.4 92.7 94.8 95.1 95.7 95.6 95.8 96.1 96.4 96.2 96.1 95.6
2000 41.8 46.3 49.4 51.9 53.2 58.6 62.6 68.4 73.5 76.7 59.7 92.3 95.3 94.8 95.6 95.4 95.4 95.9 96.3 96.4 96.5 95.6
2001 44.4 48.5 51.2 52.3 56.7 60.1 64.9 69.3 74.1 78.7 61.5 93.0 95.5 95.3 95.7 95.2 95.6 95.4 96.4 96.3 96.3 95.6
2002 44.4 49.3 51.6 52.8 56.9 61.0 64.5 69.3 74.0 78.7 61.7 93.6 95.4 95.3 95.3 95.3 95.4 95.5 96.1 96.2 96.2 95.5
2003 46.3 50.3 52.1 54.1 58.5 61.6 65.8 70.6 74.4 78.9 62.6 92.9 95.1 95.2 95.2 95.5 95.5 95.8 96.2 96.2 96.3 95.5
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Females Males
d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 Total d1 d2 d3 d4 d5 d6 d7 d8 d9 d10 Total
2004 46.3 49.7 51.4 54.0 58.6 61.7 66.4 70.4 75.0 79.4 62.7 92.0 95.7 94.9 95.2 95.5 95.5 95.7 96.2 96.6 96.4 95.5
2005 47.3 49.3 52.7 55.2 59.8 63.3 67.4 71.1 76.1 80.3 63.6 92.5 95.2 95.2 95.1 95.5 95.7 95.7 96.4 96.6 97.1 95.7
2006 48.6 49.8 51.6 55.2 58.7 63.0 67.1 70.9 75.8 80.4 63.5 92.5 95.3 95.1 95.3 95.3 95.7 95.8 96.3 96.4 97.0 95.7
2007 48.2 49.7 52.2 56.3 60.2 64.2 67.0 71.7 76.8 81.2 64.0 92.2 95.0 95.1 94.9 95.3 95.7 95.7 96.5 96.5 96.7 95.6
2008 46.8 49.0 51.2 55.9 60.1 63.6 69.1 73.0 77.8 81.5 64.1 91.6 94.5 94.9 94.9 95.7 95.7 95.7 96.7 96.6 97.1 95.6
2009 45.9 50.1 52.7 57.3 60.6 64.8 69.3 74.3 78.2 82.6 64.8 91.8 94.3 94.5 95.4 95.6 95.6 96.1 96.3 96.3 97.1 95.5
2010 46.0 49.8 51.4 57.0 61.0 64.9 69.6 73.7 78.3 83.3 64.8 91.8 93.8 94.5 94.5 95.2 95.7 96.1 96.4 96.4 97.1 95.4
2011 46.2 48.5 51.9 56.7 60.8 65.6 70.0 74.5 78.5 83.4 64.9 91.5 93.6 94.2 94.3 95.2 95.7 96.3 96.4 96.6 96.9 95.3
2012 46.3 48.2 52.1 56.2 61.0 66.0 70.7 74.8 79.3 83.5 65.1 91.2 93.6 94.4 94.3 95.0 95.7 96.1 96.5 96.5 96.9 95.3
Changes
1992-2002 8.5 10.5 11.3 9.4 9.0 10.8 8.8 8.0 7.9 7.0 9.0 1.1 0.3 0.2 -1.1 -0.1 -0.9 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3
2002-2012 1.9 -1.1 0.6 3.5 4.1 4.9 6.2 5.5 5.3 4.8 3.4 -2.4 -1.8 -0.9 -1.0 -0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.6 -0.3
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decades the Latin American economies have experienced substantial 
changes in their labor markets. The steep increase in female labor force 
participation stands out as one of the main transformations. Latin American 
women have been increasingly taking part in the labor force: on average for the 
region, the share of adult women who are employed or looking for a job climbed 
from around 50% in the early 1990s to 65% two decades later. As documented 
in the previous chapter, this remarkable increase has not been smooth: while 
growth was steep in the 1990s, it significantly decelerated in the next decade. 
Disentangling all the factors that may account for the observed pattern in female 
labor supply is not an easy task, since several potential driving factors were 
simultaneously at play during the period under study. Endogeneity issues and 
lack of data are among the serious obstacles for the empirical identification of the 
causal links between female participation and its covariates.
Since a comprehensive general equilibrium assessment of all of the driving factors 
is not feasible, we take a more modest approach in this book: we deploy several 
empirical strategies that contribute with pieces of evidence to the assessment of 
the relevance of different plausible factors behind the observed patterns in female 
labor supply. Although certainly imperfect and incomplete, we expect that this 
patchwork of evidence will shed some light on the processes that have shaped 
female LFP in Latin America. 
This chapter makes a first step toward that goal by analyzing whether the 
patterns in female LFP are mainly accounted for by changes in the distribution 
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of some direct determinants of the labor supply decision, or if they are chiefly the 
consequence of some more profound transformation in behavior. 
To illustrate this point, assume that individuals can have either high or low 
education, and that they can work in one of two sectors, white or blue-collar. 
There are theoretical reasons and empirical evidence supporting the fact that 
high-educated people tend to participate more in the labor market, while white-
collar jobs tend to have a larger than average female-to-male employment ratio. 
In this framework, an exogenous increase in women’s education and a change 
in the productive structure of the economy toward white-collar jobs may foster 
female labor force participation. Notice that this would be the case even with no 
changes in the individual propensity to participate in the labor market conditional 
on education, and with no changes in the propensity to employ female workers 
in each sector. The increase in female LFP would be the “natural” consequence 
of a change in the distribution of two of its main determinants. 
In this chapter we carry out a set of decompositions that try to isolate the 
direct effect of some of these changes on female labor force participation. The 
methodology is applied to household survey microdata for the Latin American 
countries during the period 1992-2012, exploiting a dataset that includes 
homogeneous definitions for the education, demographic and labor variables 
involved in the analysis. 
The results of the decompositions suggest that changes in education, marriage, 
fertility, and location all favored a more intense labor market involvement 
among women. Adult females are now more educated, have fewer children and 
are more likely to be single than they were two decades ago. In this scenario, 
even with the same conditional propensity to participate, the overall female 
LFP should increase. 
The contribution of this composition effect to the observed increase in female LFP 
was significant, and remained roughly of the same size over the last two decades. 
However, the relative impact was higher in the 2000s: without the observed 
educational and demographic changes in the female population, the deceleration 
in the growth of female LFP in Latin America in the 2000s (documented in the 
last chapter) would have been even more marked. 
The chapter provides some evidence that suggests that changes in the structure of 
employment toward tasks more frequently performed by women may have also 
contributed to an increase in female LFP in the region. By contrast, changes in the 
sectoral structure of the economy may have operated in direction of the observed 
deceleration in female LFP, although that impact was probably rather small. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we explain the 
methodology and introduce the data, whereas in section 3 we present and discuss 
the main results. Section 4 is devoted to the assessment of the impact of changes 
in the sectoral structure of the economy on female employment. Section 5 closes 
with some concluding remarks. 
2. Data and methodology 
In order to assess the impact of changes in the distribution of some variables 
on the aggregate rate of female labor force participation, we implement a 
decomposition in which the population of potential female workers (in our case, 
those aged 25 to 54) are divided according to some potential covariate of labor 
participation, like educational levels. The change in the aggregate rate of female 
LFP over time could be decomposed into two terms: a weighted average of the 
changes in LFP within groups (the within effect) and a weighted average of the 
changes in the share of women in each group (the composition effect).1 If changes 
in the distribution of the variable used to define the groups are the main drivers 
of changes in LFP, the second term will be relatively large. 
Analytically, the overall rate of female labor force participation Pt can be expressed 
as a weighted average of the LFP rates of all the groups k
where Pkt is the participation rate for group k at time t and ωkt is the fraction of 
women in group k at time t. The change in female LFP over time can then be 
decomposed into a change in participation rates within groups, and changes in 
the structure of the female population across groups. 
Rearranging, 
1 See Elías and Ñopo (2010) and Amador et al. (2013), among others who implement this 
decomposition. 
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where  and , and ∆ stands for changes 
between time t and t+1. We implement this methodology dividing the population 
alternatively by education, age, marital status, number/age of children, and area 
of residence (urban-rural). 
Identifying all the causal links between labor participation and its covariates is 
extremely difficult and typically requires a structural general equilibrium model. 
Carrying out this analysis for one country would be extremely arduous; it would 
be impossible for the whole region. Here, we take a more modest approach by 
performing a set of simple decompositions, which implies assuming that the 
main determinants of the changes in education (or other covariates) are mostly 
determined by factors that are not affected by LFP issues, and that the propensity 
to participate in the margin will be similar than that of the mean. At least for 
education, we believe that these are not very strong assumptions.
As in the rest of the study, the main source of data for this chapter is the 
Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), 
jointly developed by the CEDLAS and the World Bank. This database contains 
information on more than 300 national household surveys conducted in all 
Latin American countries. All variables in SEDLAC are constructed using 
consistent criteria across countries and years, and identical programming 
routines. In this paper we use microdata for 15 Latin American countries, 
covering the period 1992-2012.
3. Results for labor force participation 
The decompositions require dividing the female population into groups 
according to variables that are potentially relevant determinants of the labor 
supply outcome. To motivate the selection of this set of variables we present the 
results of a probit model for female labor force participation at the individual 
level, estimated with microdata from the latest national household survey in 
each Latin American country. The dependent variable is equal to one if a given 
woman (aged 25 to 54) participates in the labor market and zero otherwise. 
The main regressors are variables that indicate the individual’s marital status, 
education, children, age, location, and income from other non-labor sources 
and other family members. These variables are chosen because they belong to 
the intercept between the set of variables identified by the economic theory as 
relevant determinants of the female labor supply (Killingsworth and Heckman, 
1986), and the set of variables commonly included in the Latin American 
household surveys (SEDLAC, 2015). 
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Although there are heterogeneities, the main results of the probit regressions hold 
in all countries (Table 4.1 in the Appendix). Marital status is strongly associated 
with the participation decision: on average, being married/cohabiting decreases 
the probability of labor force participation by around 22 percentage points, as 
compared to not living with a partner. Except for the case of Nicaragua, in all 
Latin American countries the coefficients for this variable are negative and highly 
significant, ranging from around 15 pp in Brazil, Dominican Republic, Uruguay 
and Venezuela, to more than 30 pp in Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Guatemala. The 
median estimate is similar to the mean: 22 points. 
As expected, the effect of education is also very relevant. On average, having 
a primary education degree is associated with an increase in the probability 
of participating of 3 pp when compared to women who have not completed 
that basic educational level (the median is 4 pp). The increase associated with a 
secondary school degree is on average 10 pp, while it rises to 29 pp for a college 
degree. The median values are 13 and 26, respectively. In almost all countries 
female labor force participation is monotonically increasing in education (Figure 
4.1 in the Appendix). 
Women’s fertility appears somewhat less tightly related to participation: according 
to the probit models, on average, having children under the age of 5 is associated 
with a reduction of 7 pp in the probability of participating, as compared to 
childless women. The estimates range from a non-significant effect in several 
countries to 21 pp in Costa Rica. Countries are more heterogeneous regarding 
the sign and the size of the coefficient of the dummy for having children. In most 
cases it is positive, although small. 
The urban dummy is positive and significant in most countries, suggesting 
higher female participation in urban labor markets conditional on other factors, 
although the result is not general for all Latin American economies. The last rows 
in Table 4.1 indicate that labor force participation for adult women is decreasing 
in non-earned income. Keeping all other factors constant, a higher non-labor 
income reduces the probability of participating in the labor market. The same 
seems true for incomes from other family members, although there is more 
variability across countries.   
This characterization illustrates the relevance of some factors—education, 
marriage, children, age, area of residence—in accounting for the labor force 
participation decision. Changes in the distribution of these variables may affect the 
aggregate level of female LFP in each country. In order to explore that possibility, 
we apply the decomposition methodology explained in the previous section. 
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We begin our discussion of the results by focusing on one of the main determinants 
of female labor force participation: education. In chapter 2 we highlighted the 
remarkable increase in education in all Latin America countries over the last 
decades, particularly among women. Figure 4.2 illustrates this phenomenon by 
dividing the population of adult women (aged 25 to 54) into six groups according 
to their attained educational levels. The progress is undeniable: while on average 
in 1992 more than a third of Latin American adult women had not finished 
primary school, in 2012 that share fell to around one fifth. On the other hand, 
the share of adult women with a tertiary degree increased from 8% to 10% in the 
1990s, and then strongly climbed to 17% in the following decade. 
As was discussed above, female labor force participation is strongly linked to 
formal education. While, on average, roughly half of Latin American women 
with incomplete primary school are active in the labor market, that share climbs 
to almost 90% for those with a tertiary education degree (Table 4.2).
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Figure 4.2: Changes in composition of women by educational level 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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Table 4.2: Female LFP by education 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
Female LFP Shares
1992 2002 2012  1992 2002 2012
Primary incomplete 43.5 50.7 51.7 36.4 29.5 21.0
Primary complete 47.8 56.0 58.0 19.9 18.6 16.4
Secondary incomplete 54.2 61.1 62.3 16.3 16.2 16.5
Secondary complete 63.7 68.2 68.0 13.8 17.1 20.3
Superior incomplete 68.5 75.7 73.9 5.7 7.9 9.3
Superior complete 83.9 86.5 87.8 7.8 10.7 16.5
Total 53.0 62.1 65.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
If more women have access to higher levels of education, which are linked to 
higher labor participation, then the process of education expansion could be the 
main driver of the global increase in female LFP. The results of the decomposition, 
presented in Table 4.3, help to assess this hypothesis. On average, female LFP 
increased 9.1 points in the 1990s.2 The within effect accounts for 6.6 points, 
meaning that if no changes in education had occurred in that decade, female 
LFP would have nonetheless increased by that amount. The composition effect 
suggests that if the propensity to participate in the labor market had not changed 
within groups over the decade, female LFP would have nonetheless increased 2.5 
points due to a more educated composition of the female population. 
Table 4.3: Decomposition of changes in female LFP by education 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012
Difference 9.1 3.6 12.7
Effects
Within 6.6 0.9 7.4
Composition 2.5 2.7 5.3
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
2 There are some small differences between the figures in these exercises and those reported in 
chapter 3 due to some methodological issues in implementing the decompositions. 
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Interestingly, while the within effect is dominant in the 1990s, it substantially 
shrinks in the 2000s and becomes dominated by the composition effect. In fact, 
the latter effect remains stable over time: the education expansion was smooth, 
implying a stable impact over female labor market participation. The small 
within effect in the 2000s is the result of the negligible increase in female LFP in 
most education groups, documented in the first panel of Table 4.2. 
In summary, the increase in female LFP in the 2000s was not only modest 
compared to that of the 1990s, but also mostly driven by the enhanced education 
structure of the female population, as opposed to an autonomous increase in 
participation within education groups. 
As can be seen from the equations in section 2, the within and composition 
effects can be decomposed into the contributions of each educational level. The 
large relevance of the within effect in the 1990s is mostly accounted for by a 
strong increase in LFP among women without a secondary degree (Table 4.4). 
The dramatic fall in the relevance of the within effect in the 2000s is explained 
by the reduction in the rate of increase of LFP in all educational levels but, again, 
the change in behavior among less-educated women seems to have been crucial. 
As for the composition effect, Table 4.4 reveals that while in the 1990s the 
increase in the shares of both the secondary complete and the tertiary complete 
groups were equally important in pushing female LFP up, the role of the latter 
group was crucial in the 2000s. This is consistent with the acceleration in the 
growth of female college graduates during that decade. 
Table 4.4: Within and composition effects by education levels 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
Within Composition
1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012 1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012
Primary incomplete 2.1 0.3 2.1 -3.0 -4.6 -7.3
Primary complete 1.7 0.3 1.9 -0.6 -1.3 -1.8
Secondary incomplete 1.2 0.3 1.5 -0.2 0.2 0.0
Secondary complete 0.8 0.1 1.0 2.4 2.2 4.5
Superior incomplete 0.5 -0.1 0.4 1.6 1.0 2.6
Superior complete 0.3 0.1 0.5 2.4 5.1 7.4
Total 6.6 0.9 7.4 2.5 2.7 5.3
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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This general story for the region applies to several countries when taken 
individually, such as Argentina, Honduras, and Paraguay (Table 4.5). In some 
economies, the within effect in the 2000s is even negative: such is the case in 
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. For others, the within effect 
in the 2000s remains larger than the composition effect, but it is smaller than 
it was the previous decade; Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay belong to 
that group. Finally, in a few countries, the story seems to have been different: in 
El Salvador the composition effect dominated in the 1990s but not in the 2000s, 
while in Peru the within effect picked up in the latter decade. 
Table 4.5: Decomposition of changes in female LFP by education
Latin American countries. Women aged 25-54.
1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012
Argentina
Total change 11.9 4.0 15.9
Within 8.8 1.3 9.7
Composition 3.1 2.7 6.1
Bolivia
Total change 10.9 1.4 12.3
Within 11.2 -0.1 10.8
Composition -0.3 1.5 1.5
Brazil
Total change 6.4 2.6 8.9
Within 4.4 -1.7 2.6
Composition 2.0 4.2 6.4
Chile
Total change 13.9 6.4 20.4
Within 8.2 4.5 13.1
Composition 5.7 2.0 7.3
Costa Rica
Total change 13.0 8.2 21.2
Within 9.7 6.3 15.8
Composition 3.3 2.0 5.4
Ecuador
Total change 8.3 -7.6 0.7
Within 7.3 -10.4 -3.4
Composition 1.0 2.8 4.1
El Salvador
Total change 8.2 3.5 11.8
Within 1.7 2.6 4.1
Composition 6.6 1.0 7.7
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1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012
Honduras
Total change 5.6 3.7 9.3
Within 4.1 0.9 5.3
Composition 1.5 2.7 3.9
Mexico
Total change 14.9 9.0 23.9
Within 12.1 6.9 19.3
Composition 2.8 2.1 4.6
Nicaragua
Total change 4.7 -2.4 2.3
Within 2.7 -5.1 -2.5
Composition 2.1 2.6 4.7
Panama
Total change 8.9 9.1 18.0
Within 5.7 4.6 10.3
Composition 3.2 4.5 7.7
Paraguay
Total change 3.4 5.3 8.7
Within 5.6 0.6 6.0
Composition -1.6 4.7 3.2
Peru
Total change -0.5 6.3 5.8
Within -0.9 5.9 4.8
Composition 0.4 0.3 1.0
Uruguay
Total change 7.9 5.2 13.2
Within 3.4 3.1 6.6
Composition 4.5 2.1 6.6
Venezuela
Total change 18.8 -0.6 18.1
Within 15.1 -5.5 8.4
Composition 3.7 4.9 9.7
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
We should pause here to offer a word of caution regarding these interpretations. 
The decomposition suggests that, for some autonomous reason, there was an 
expansion in education in Latin America, and almost mechanically, a more 
educated pool of women implied a higher LFP. In this light, the results of the 
decompositions indicate, for instance, that the policies that were successful in 
fostering labor participation in the 2000s were mainly the education policies 
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that allowed for the expansion of schooling during the previous decades. Of 
course, the real world could be more complicated. It could be for instance that 
in the past the government encouraged employment in a sector that requires 
skilled labor intensively, and that the increased demand stimulated women to 
attend high school or college in order to get a job in that sector. In this case, it 
is the sector/employment policy what is triggering the reaction in the rest of the 
variables. In stressing the results of the decompositions, we implicitly assume 
that these more complicated channels are of a second order of importance. At 
least in the case of education, we do not believe this to be a strong assumption. 
We now consider changes in the age structure of the population. A demographic 
transition is underway in Latin America, implying an aging process of the female 
population (Figure 4.3). While in the early 1990s 43.4% of that population was 
in the [25-34] age group, in the early 2010s that share fell to 37.7%. By contrast, 
the share in the older age bracket [45-54] climbed from 22.9% to 28.9% over 
the two decades. 
Younger women have a stronger attachment to the labor market than their older 
counterparts. The gaps, however, have been reduced over time, as women in their 
forties and fifties strongly increased their labor force participation over the last 
two decades (Table 4.6). On average, in 2012 LFP was 63% for women aged 45 
to 54; 66% for those aged 25 to 34; and 68% for females aged 35 to 44.
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Figure 4.3: Changes in composition of women by age groups
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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Table 4.6: Female LFP by age 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
Female LFP Shares
1992 2002 2012  1992 2002 2012
25-34 53.7 62.2 65.9 43.4 39.8 37.7
35-44 56.4 64.9 67.9 33.7 34.8 33.4
45-54 47.9 58.5 63.0 22.9 25.4 28.9
Total 53.2 62.1 65.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
Given the lower labor market participation of older women, the demographic 
transition could have implied a decrease in the overall rate of female LFP. The 
results of the decomposition presented in Table 4.7 help to assess this hypothesis. 
As expected, the composition effect is negative: the aging of the female labor 
force is associated with a fall in participation. However, the size of the effect is 
small, just 0.1 points, and stable over time. 
Table 4.7: Decomposition of changes in female LFP by age 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012
Difference 8.9 3.5 12.4
Effects
Within 9.0 3.7 12.7
Composition -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
Marital status is a key covariate of female labor decisions. In particular, single 
women (in our definition, those not living with a spouse) are much more prone 
to work than married women, even when controlling for other observable factors. 
Unlike in other regions of the world where the fertility decline was accompanied 
by a sharp drop in the prevalence of marriages, the percentage of married women 
(both in legal and consensual unions) in Latin America has experienced only a 
slight decreasing trend, remaining relatively high over the years.3 On average, 
3 For instance, Fussell and Palloni (2004) point out the presence of persistent marriage 
regimes in Latin America.
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the share of single adult women increased from 27.9% in 1992 to 29.8% in 2002 
and accelerated to 33.7% in 2012 (Figure 4.4). That pattern may be associated 
with increasing female LFP, given the higher LFP of single women (Table 4.8). 
Table 4.8: Female LFP by marital status 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
Female LFP Shares
1992 2002 2012  1992 2002 2012
Single 74.5 77.2 78.8 27.9 29.8 33.7
Married 47.1 54.7 58.7 72.1 70.2 66.3
Total 54.8 61.5 65.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means. Married women: both in legal and consensual unions.
That conjecture is confirmed in Table 4.9: the growth in the share of single 
women is associated with the increase in female LFP over these two decades. 
The impact was 0.4 points in the 1990s and 0.8 in the 2000s, when the pattern 
against marriage picked up. The contribution of the two groups to the change in 
the two effects was similar in sign, but different in size (Table 4.10). In fact, it is 
the change in behavior among married women what drives the marked contrast 
between the strong within effect in the 1990s and the milder effect in the 2000s. 
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Figure 4.4: Changes in composition of women by marital status
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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Table 4.9: Decomposition of changes in female LFP by marital status 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012
Difference 8.5 4.3 11.2
Effects
Within 8.1 3.5 9.7
Composition 0.4 0.8 1.5
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
Table 4.10: Within and composition effects by marital status 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
Within Composition
1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012  1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012
Single 1.0 0.2 1.3 1.4 3.2 4.5
Married 7.1 2.4 9.3 -1.0 -2.3 -3.1
Total 8.1 2.7 10.6 0.4 0.9 1.4
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means. Married women: both in legal and consensual unions.
Our next covariate is the number of children. There have been strong changes in 
fertility in Latin America; the share of adult women without children substantially 
rose from 17.6% in 1992 to 21.5% in 2002 and 27.2% in 2012 (Figure 4.5 and 
Table 4.11). Given that women with no children are more prone to participate 
than women with children, these changes in fertility may be associated with an 
increase in LFP. 
Table 4.11: Female LFP by number of children 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
Female LFP Shares
1992 2002 2012  1992 2002 2012
No children under 18 53.3 63.6 67.4 17.6 21.5 27.2
Youngest child is 0-5 45.4 53.6 56.6 40.6 34.8 28.2
Youngest child is 6-17 52.6 63.0 65.6 41.8 43.7 44.6
Total 49.8 59.8 63.5 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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The results in Table 4.12 confirm this presumption, while making it clear that 
there is a difference in the relative relevance of this effect for the two decades under 
analysis. The fertility factor was smaller in the 1990s, especially as compared to 
the strong increase in LFP for each category of women. By contrast, in the 2000s 
the change in fertility patterns was stronger, while the within-group increases in 
LFP were weaker, combining for a more sizeable relative impact: around a fourth 
of the increase in the aggregate LFP rate in the region is accounted for by changes 
in fertility, mainly by the sharp increase in the share of adult women without 
children. Naturally, the link between fertility and labor decisions is strong, and 
the causal relationships may be intricate, so these results should be taken merely 
as a suggestion that fertility changes, for whatever reasons that they took place, 
may be one relevant determinant of changes in female LFP. We will return to 
these issues in the next chapters.
Two facts suggest that a decomposition by area (urban-rural) may be worthwhile. 
On the one hand, women living in urban areas tend to participate more in the 
labor markets than their rural counterparts (Table 4.13); on the other hand, the 
share of women living in cities has increased over the last two decades (Figure 4.6). 
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Table 4.12: Decomposition of changes in female LFP by number of children 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012
Difference 10.0 3.7 13.7
Effects
Within 9.5 3.0 12.6
Composition 0.5 0.7 1.1
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
Table 4.13: Female LFP by area (urban-rural) 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
Female LFP Shares
1992 2002 2012  1992 2002 2012
Rural 42.2 50.8 53.0 36.0 34.0 28.2
Urban 57.2 65.0 67.7 64.0 66.0 71.8
Total 51.3 60.0 63.5 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
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The interpretation of the decomposition is a bit trickier in this case. If, for instance, 
the increase in the share of urban population is only related to exogenous urban-
rural differences in birth rates, then the result in Table 4.14 reflects a causal link. 
In this case, the spatial gap in population growth is responsible for 0.5 points in 
the increase in female LFP in the 1990s and 0.1 points in the 2000s. Rather, if 
the increase in the share of the urban population is mainly the result of inactive 
or unemployed people moving from rural areas to cities to seek employment, 
then the results are more difficult to interpret. 
Table 4.14: Decomposition of changes in female LFP by area (urban-rural) 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012
Difference 7.7 3.9 11.6
Effects
Within 7.2 3.8 10.9
Composition 0.5 0.1 0.7
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
To close this section, we divide the population of adult women into 18 groups 
formed by the intersection of three of the main determinants of female LFP 
identified above: marriage, education, and children (Table 4.15). For almost all 
groups, female LFP increases strongly in the 1990s and decelerates in the 2000s; 
in some cases, it even falls (the exception is the group of females with a college 
degree and no children). 
Table 4.15: Female LFP by groups of education, marital status and children
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
Female LFP Shares
1992 2002 2012  1992 2002 2012
Married
Low
No children under 18 41.9 53.0 54.7 9.5 9.6 10.4
Youngest child is 0-5 37.5 44.3 45.3 27.9 21.9 14.1
Youngest child is 6-17 44.8 54.6 56.2 26.5 25.0 21.9
Medium
No children under 18 58.7 65.9 67.3 2.2 3.3 4.8
Youngest child is 0-5 54.6 61.2 59.3 7.0 6.6 7.3
Youngest child is 6-17 60.5 64.7 66.2 5.6 7.4 8.9
High
No children under 18 75.4 82.1 89.3 1.0 1.8 3.1
Youngest child is 0-5 77.8 81.8 81.1 2.5 3.1 3.8
Youngest child is 6-17 80.3 85.3 86.1 2.2 3.1 4.3
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Female LFP Shares
1992 2002 2012  1992 2002 2012
Single
Low
No children under 18 69.0 71.6 73.9 3.5 3.7 4.2
Youngest child is 0-5 75.5 78.6 75.5 2.7 2.5 2.0
Youngest child is 6-17 76.3 81.2 81.7 5.7 5.9 5.9
Medium
No children under 18 81.2 84.2 86.8 1.0 1.6 2.4
Youngest child is 0-5 89.3 87.0 83.5 0.6 0.6 1.0
Youngest child is 6-17 85.3 90.5 86.9 1.0 1.7 2.5
High
No children under 18 95.0 91.9 93.4 0.6 1.1 1.8
Youngest child is 0-5 95.5 94.7 96.3 0.2 0.2 0.4
Youngest child is 6-17 92.7 96.0 94.6 0.5 0.8 1.2
Total 50.5 60.5 64.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means. Married women: both in legal and consensual unions. 
Education: low=less than secondary complete, medium=secondary complete and 
superior incomplete, high=tertiary complete.
The results of the decomposition using this grouping confirm the contrast 
between a strong within effect that dominates the changes in female LFP 
in the 1990s, and a milder effect in the 2000s that becomes dominated by 
the composition effect (Table 4.16). It should be noted that most of the 
composition effect comes from changes in the educational structure of the 
female population. 
Table 4.16: Decomposition of changes in female LFP by groups of 
education, marital status and children 
Latin America. Women aged 25-54.
1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012
Difference 10.0 4.0 14.0
Effects
Within 7.2 1.1 8.1
Composition 2.8 2.9 5.9
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
4. Exploring changes in employment 
As discussed in the introduction, a change in the structure of employment may 
foster female labor force participation. Autonomous expansions in sectors or tasks 
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more friendly to female employment may lead to a surge in the aggregate rate 
of female LFP even with unchanged propensity to employ women within jobs.
Implementing the same decomposition as in the previous sections is unfeasible, 
since unlike education, age, or marital status, job characteristics are only 
defined for employed women. Instead, we carry out a decomposition that 
accounts for changes in the share of women in total employment. As discussed 
in chapter 3, the strong entry of women into the labor force was translated 
into a substantial increase in the participation of females in total employment. 
When the sample was restricted to workers aged 25 to 54, the proportion of 
women increased strongly from 36.5% in 1992 to 40.5% in 2002, and then 
more slowly to 42.4% in 2012. 
This change may be driven by two forces. On the one hand, the female-to-male 
ratio may be increasing in all sectors. On the other hand, the distribution of jobs 
may be shifting toward those with a higher female-to-male ratio. Formally, the 
change in the share of female workers in total employment can be written as:
where E is the number of people employed, f stands for women, t is time, s labels 
the economic sector, and ∆ stands for changes between time t and t +1. Hence, 
for instance, Efst is the total number of women employed in sector s at time 
t. The first term in the decomposition captures the impact of changes in the 
propensity to employ women within sectors (the within effect), while the second 
one captures the impact of changes in the structure of employment across sectors 
(the composition effect).
We first implement this decomposition by dividing workers according to their 
main jobs into 10 economic sectors: primary activities, low-tech industry (food, 
clothing), rest of industries, construction, commerce, utilities and transportation, 
skilled services (finance, business services), public administration, education and 
health, and domestic services.
Table 4.17 reflects an increasing share of women in all sectors over time. The pace 
of that increase was heterogeneous over time. In particular, on average it was a 
bit slower in the 2000s as compared to the previous decade. That deceleration 
was particularly evident for more unskilled sectors, including primary activities, 
low-tech industries, commerce, and domestic services.
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Table 4.17: Share of women in each sector and employment structure by 
sector 
Latin America. Workers aged 25-54.
Sector
Share of women in employment Sectoral structure
1992 2002 2012  1992 2002 2012
Primary activities 16.3 20.3 22.8 17.3 16.9 14.6
Food & clothing 47.5 51.0 49.0 9.4 8.3 7.6
Rest of manufacturing 18.5 20.0 21.9 6.7 5.5 4.8
Construction 2.6 3.3 4.3 7.0 6.8 7.7
Commerce 46.3 50.7 53.4 22.7 23.8 24.7
Utilities & transportation 10.6 11.4 13.3 7.3 6.9 7.4
Skilled services 33.8 36.3 40.5 4.7 5.9 7.4
Public administration 29.8 34.9 40.5 6.3 5.9 6.6
Education & health 60.8 62.8 65.3 14.3 15.0 14.2
Domestic services 87.6 91.2 93.0 4.5 5.0 4.9
Total 36.7 40.5 42.7 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: the first panel shows the participation of female workers in total employment 
by sector, while the second panel presents the sectoral structure of employment for all 
workers. Unweighted means.
The structure of employment experienced some changes over time (second panel 
in Table 4.17). While the share of employment in primary activities and the 
manufacturing industry continued a decreasing path initiated decades ago, some 
sectors gained participation. Interestingly, while education and health, and domestic 
services–two sectors with a high female-to-male ratio—expanded during the 1990s, 
in the 2000s construction, utilities and transportation, and public administration 
–three sectors with lower than average female-to-male ratios–expanded. 
The results of the decompositions capture these patterns (Table 4.18). While 
the composition effect was positive in the 1990s (i.e. it helped the increase in 
the female share in total employment), it became negative, although virtually 
null in the 2000s.4 This piece of evidence adds another possible explanation 
to the deceleration in the growth in female LFP in the 2000s. The change in 
the structure of employment may have benefited less the entry of women into 
the labor market, as compared to changes in the previous decade. The evidence 
suggests however that this effect has probably been small. 
4 The within effect is positive in both decades, although somewhat higher in the 1990s.
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Table 4.18: Decomposition of changes in share of women in employment 
by sector of activity 
Latin America. Adults aged 25-54.
1992-2002 2002-2012 1992-2012
Difference 3.8 2.2 6.1
Effects
Within 2.9 2.5 5.3
Composition 0.9 -0.2 0.9
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: unweighted means.
Naturally, relevant changes in production and employment can also occur without 
changes in the sectoral structure of the economy. Technological innovations, 
for instance, can transform the demand for tasks performed by workers within 
sectors and across the economy. New production processes that require more 
women-friendly tasks would imply a boost to female employment.
The fact that tasks are not usually coded in Latin American household surveys 
makes the analysis at the regional level more difficult. Here we just illustrate 
some results for two countries, Brazil and Chile, during the 2000s. The results, 
however, are illustrative: the share of women increased in most task categories in 
both countries, while the structure of employment slowly shifted towards tasks in 
which women are over-represented (Table 4.19). The decompositions capture these 
changes: the within effect is positive, but it becomes very small at the end of the 
decade, while the composition effect is positive and significant in size (Table 4.20). 
Table 4.19: Share of women in each task and employment structure by task
Brazil and Chile. Women aged 25-54.
Brazil
Task
Share of women in employment Tasks structure
1999 2004 2009  1999 2004 2009
Managers 30.0 34.7 36.5 6.3 6.1 6.0
Professionals 52.1 60.8 62.5 5.3 7.4 9.0
Technicians and associate professionals 51.2 47.8 45.4 6.9 8.0 8.0
Clerical support workers 58.3 59.9 61.7 7.6 7.7 8.6
Service and sales workers 61.6 63.4 64.9 30.6 30.7 30.6
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 37.2 34.4 32.6 18.4 15.5 13.0
Craft and related trades workers 16.2 16.6 15.7 20.9 20.3 20.2
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 31.6 29.5 29.3 2.3 2.2 2.3
Elementary occupations 0.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.2
Total 42.4 43.9 44.8 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Chile
Task
Share of women in employment Tasks structure
2000 2003 2009  2000 2003 2009
Managers 37.4 46.2 36.4 5.8 5.6 2.5
Professionals 50.9 49.0 53.9 11.6 11.7 13.0
Technicians and associate professionals 55.0 55.6 52.4 11.0 11.5 12.0
Clerical support workers 42.9 41.0 54.6 5.8 6.1 5.8
Service and sales workers 58.0 57.0 54.7 13.7 13.2 17.2
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery 
workers 12.4 12.4 13.0 6.9 6.3 3.8
Craft and related trades workers 13.5 13.2 13.0 14.8 15.9 13.9
Plant and machine operators, and assemblers 7.8 8.5 8.9 9.7 9.7 9.3
Elementary occupations 44.0 48.6 48.1 20.7 20.1 22.6
Total 37.3 38.2 40.8 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from PNAD and CASEN. 
Note: the first panel shows the participation of female workers in total employment by 
task, while the second panel presents the structure of employment. 
Table 4.20: Decomposition of changes in share of women in employment 
by task 
Brazil and Chile. Women aged 25-54.
Brazil
 1999-2004 2004-2009 1999-2009
Difference 1.5 0.9 2.3
Effects
Within 0.9 0.2 1.2
Composition 0.6 0.6 1.2
Chile
 2000-2003 2003-2009 2000-2009
Difference 0.9 2.6 3.5
Effects
Within 1.1 0.2 1.2
Composition -0.1 2.3 2.3
Source: own calculations based on microdata from PNAD and CASEN. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
This chapter proposes some simple decompositions as a way to assess whether 
changes in the distribution of some variables may have affected the rates of 
female labor force participation in Latin America over the last two decades. We 
conclude that changes in education, marriage, fertility, and location all favored 
a more intense labor market involvement among women. Women now are more 
educated, have fewer children and are more likely to be single than they were 
two decades ago. In this scenario, even with the same conditional propensity to 
participate, the overall female LFP should increase. 
The contribution of these factors to the observed increase in female LFP in the 
1990s was significant but not dominant; rather, the role played in the 2000s 
seems to have been decisive. Without the changes in the structure of the female 
population (in particular, in terms of education), the deceleration in female LFP 
growth in Latin America in the 2000s documented in the last chapter would 
have probably been more marked. 
There is also some evidence that suggests that changes in the structure of 
employment toward tasks more frequently performed by women may have also 
contributed to the increase in labor force participation. Instead, changes in 
the sectoral structure of the economy may have operated in the direction of 
the observed deceleration in female LFP, although that impact was probably 
rather small.
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Figure 4.1: Predicted probability of participating in labor force
Latin American countries. Women aged 25 to 54
0.6
prii pric seci
Argentina
secc supi supc
0.5
0.9
0.7
0.8
0.6
prii pric seci
Bolivia
secc supi supc
0.9
0.7
0.8
0.80
prii pric seci
Brazil
secc supi supc
0.75
0.95
0.85
0.90
0.5
0.6
prii pric seci
Chile
secc supi supc
1.0
0.9
0.7
0.8
0.6
prii pric seci
Colombia
secc supi supc
0.9
0.7
0.8
0.4
prii pric seci
Costa Rica
secc supi supc
0.9
0.6
0.8
176
Bridging gender gaps? The rise and deceleration of female  
labor force participation in Latin America
Figure 4.1: Predicted probability of participating in labor force [cont.]
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Figure 4.1: Predicted probability of participating in labor force [cont.]
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Note: Educational levels: prii: incomplete primary; pric: complete primary; seci: incomplete 
secondary; secc: complete secondary; supi: incomplete tertiary; supc: complete tertiary. 
Observations for year 2012 or closest year with available survey.
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1. Introduction 
As documented in previous chapters, after nearly half a century of sustained growth 
in female labor force participation (LFP), the evidence suggests a widespread and 
significant deceleration in the rate of female entry into the Latin American labor 
markets. In previous chapters, we characterized changes in female labor force 
participation and found that the deceleration took place in most, although not 
all, Latin American countries since the early 2000s, and that it occurred among 
all groups of women, but particularly among those who were married and in 
more vulnerable households. The deceleration occurred despite some forces 
that facilitated female LFP growth, such as the increase in education, and some 
demographic changes. The unweighted mean of the LFP rate for prime-age women 
(25-54) across Latin American economies rose 9 points in the 1990s (from 53 in 
1992 to 62 in 2003), and then just 3 points the following decade (to 65 in 2012). 
One possible explanation for this deceleration is that female LFP in Latin America 
is approaching a ceiling that is determined by cultural and policy factors. In this 
scenario the LFP will not continue increasing, or will continue to rise but at an 
extremely slow pace even as the region continues on a path of economic growth 
and demographic changes. An alternative interpretation is that the deceleration 
in female LFP is just temporary and responds to some transitory circumstances. 
In particular, the strong and rather unusual economic growth that the region 
experienced in the 2000s allowed for a surge in earnings and social protection 
benefits that may have retarded the entry of women into the labor market. 
Without a more pressing need to seek for a job, given the higher earnings of their 
spouses or the protection of new social programs, some women may have delayed 
their decision to participate in the labor market. 
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In this chapter we elaborate on these two arguments. Section 2 discusses the 
possibility of a ceiling to female labor force participation in Latin America, and 
compares the situation with other regions of the world. In section 3 we discuss the 
potential link between the economic expansion and the deceleration in female 
LFP, while section 4 explores the movements of female LFP along the business 
cycle. The chapter closes in section 5 with some final remarks. 
In this chapter we put forward some arguments in favor of the hypothesis 
that the recent deceleration in female LFP could be related to the economic 
expansion of the 2000s, and present some evidence consistent with this story. 
However, the evidence is only suggestive and far from conclusive. Moreover, a 
single factor can hardly account for a complex phenomenon, like the dynamics of 
female labor force participation in a vast region. In this chapter we focus on the 
economic cycle, while in chapter 6 we take a closer look to several other potential 
determinants of female labor supply in Latin America. 
2. Approaching a ceiling? 
The labor force participation rate, like any share, has a ceiling. In fact, the rate 
for prime-age males seems to have reached a ceiling in Latin America, as in most 
regions of the world. The unweighted mean of the rate for males aged 25 to 54 
across Latin American countries has been around 95.5% at least for the last two 
decades.1 
Despite the large increase in the last half-century, women’s labor force 
participation rates are still much lower than men’s. The mean rate for prime-age 
women in Latin America is around 65%, still 30 points lower than that of their 
male counterparts. Yet, the evidence suggests that, unlike previous decades, this 
gap has been shrinking very slowly over the last few years. In fact, female LFP 
appears to be reaching a plateau in some economies of the region. One possible 
explanation for this deceleration is that female LFP is approaching a ceiling. 
This should be considered a “conditional” ceiling: female LFP will not trespass 
a certain level (or will grow only very slowly) if some cultural and policy factors 
remain stable. In that sense, the women’s ceiling is “softer” than the men’s, but 
it is still relevant as only cultural transformations or strong policy interventions 
may substantially alter its level. If the interpretation of the recent deceleration as 
approaching a ceiling is correct, and no major cultural or policy changes occur, 
1 Of course, the only “hard” ceiling is 100%, but a host of reasons (frictions, cultural factors, 
individual preferences, economic factors) usually make it unattainable.
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then we should expect female LFP in Latin America to reach a plateau, and the 
wide gap with men to persist. 
A plateau in female participation has emerged in the United States since around 
the 1990s (Blau and Kahn, 2013; Goldin, 2014). Goldin (2006) reports that 
participation rates for women of almost all ages, education levels and marital 
statuses have leveled off in the US. The LFP rate for females aged 25 to 54 grew 
slowly from 74.6% to 75.9% between 1992 and 2002, and descended to 74.5% 
by 2012. This fact has led many to wonder whether the economy has reached 
some sort of natural rate of female labor force participation. That situation may 
also apply to Latin America, although the ceiling would be lower. 
Interestingly, although a similar pattern has emerged in some Nordic economies 
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland), the stagnation in female labor force participation 
is not a widespread phenomenon among developed economies. The female LFP 
rate in the wealthiest 20 western economies grew at 0.6 points a year in the 1990s 
and at 0.5 points a year in the following decade (from 70% in 1992 to 75.9% 
in 2002, to 80.4% in 2012). Although there are some signs of deceleration, 
female labor force participation still continues to grow at healthy rates in most 
developed economies. The stagnation in the United States has been linked to 
weaker “family-friendly” policies, including parental leave and part-time work 
entitlements (Blau and Kahn, 2013).
Figure 5.1 illustrates LFP rates for women aged 25 to 54 for groups of developed 
OECD countries. The plateau is only visible for the US, at a level 10 points higher 
than in Latin America. The comparison with Japan and Korea is interesting: the 
gap in female LFP with Latin America vanished in the 1990s, but grew again in 
the 2000s, due to the deceleration in Latin America and the stable rates in the 
East Asian countries. 
Data from the World Development Indicators reveal signs of stagnating (or 
even decreasing) female labor force participation in some East and South Asian 
countries, but not in Africa, Middle East, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
where rates remained similar or even rose in the 2000s, as compared to previous 
decades. A similar assessment emerges from the EAPEP Database (ILO, 2011). 
This database allows for a comparison of different regions of the world with a 
focus on our age group of interest: women between 25 and 54 years of age. 
The mean rates of female LFP in Central America are among the lowest in the 
world (Figure 5.2); in fact, they only exceed the rates in the Islamic countries 
of Northern Africa and the Middle East, for which the inclusion of women 
in the labor market is limited, due mostly to cultural factors. On average, the 
182
Bridging gender gaps? The rise and deceleration of female  
labor force participation in Latin America
Figure 5.1: Female labor force participation
Regions of the world, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: OECD Online Employment Database and own calculations for Latin America 
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/onlineoecdemploymentdatabase.htm#unr.
Note: Latin America and rich western countries: unweighted means.
Figure 5.2: Female labor force participation rate 
Regions of the world, 2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on EAPEP Database (ILO, 2011). 
Note: unweighted means.
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participation of South American women is higher than in some areas of Africa 
and South Asia, but lower than in Europe, Eastern Asia, and most of the non-
Muslim Africa. 
So, are we reaching a ceiling? Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell whether 
the recent deceleration in female LFP in Latin America is a natural pattern 
of convergence to a nearby ceiling. However, although we could not rule out 
this possibility, we consider it unlikely. With a few exceptions, even the most 
developed countries have not reached a female LFP ceiling, as rates continue to 
grow. Developed countries and several developing countries have female LFP 
rates well above those in Latin America and are still increasing, so it is difficult 
to believe that the natural rate in our region will rest at levels substantially 
lower than in most of the world. If Latin America were indeed reaching a 
ceiling, the permanent gap with more developed countries, and even with 
other developing countries, would be large, growing, and difficult to explain. 
For instance, the rates of Spain (81.1%) and Portugal (85.5%), the European 
countries that are culturally the closest to Latin America, are much higher 
than those for our region. 
Another argument against the existence of a ceiling is that the deceleration 
occurred in most countries, regardless of the initial level of female LFP. We would 
expect that only countries with already relatively high levels of LFP experience 
a reduction in the rate of growth starting a pattern of convergence to a long-run 
level. However, as Figure 5.3 documents, the deceleration also took place in 
countries with a relatively low rate of female LFP, and hence, in principle, with a 
longer way to go toward the equilibrium long-run level. 
If despite these arguments Latin America is indeed converging to a plateau, then 
the issue of female labor force participation will become even more relevant to 
the policy agenda. It would be necessary to further investigate the gender-based 
constraints, institutions, rules, customs, beliefs and values that prevent female 
labor force participation in Latin America to reach the levels of other regions. 
In fact, the potential problem may be limited to certain groups and countries. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the rates of female labor force participation 
for skilled urban women in middle-high income Latin American countries are 
not far from those in the developed economies, and they have not experienced 
a strong deceleration in the last decade. Instead, participation among more 
vulnerable women remains very low, and has suffered a more intense deceleration 
over the last few years. Efforts should be directed at this target group, especially 
if the evidence confirms the existence of a plateau. 
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An alternative explanation to a ceiling is that the deceleration is the consequence 
of some transient phenomena, or the result of the short run response to some 
shocks, such as unusual economic growth and more ambitious social policies. 
We turn to this issue in the next section. 
3. Participation and economic growth 
We have extensively documented the contrast between the last two decades in 
terms of female labor force participation. The contrast also applies to many other 
economic variables, a fact that hinders the search for causal relationships. In this 
section we focus on economic growth. Female labor participation is particularly 
sensitive to the macroeconomic environment. Changes in economic conditions 
affect female LFP directly, but also indirectly through a strong interdependence 
with the employment status of other household members, particularly husbands.
Figure 5.3: Female labor force participation rate 
Latin American countries, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: High: countries with female LFP above the median (average 1992-1995). Low: 
countries with female LFP below the median (average 1992-1995). Unweighted means.
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The (unweighted) mean value of per capita GDP in Latin America grew at annual 
2.8% in the 1990s and almost duplicated that rate in the 2000s (5.7%). In 
particular, the economies in the region grew at the very fast rate of 8% between 
2003 and 2008. The 2000s were not only a decade of higher growth but also more 
macroeconomic stability with more stable growth rates, low inflation and absence 
of big crises, which were endemic to Latin America in the previous decades.2 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the fact that the deceleration in female LFP occurred in 
coincidence with a strong rise in GDP growth rates.3 Besides this temporal 
correlation, there are arguments that link the two patterns. The strong economic 
growth that the region experienced in the 2000s allowed for a surge in incomes 
that may have retarded the entry of women into the labor market. Without a 
more pressing need to look for a job, and given the higher earnings of their 
2 The coefficient of variation (across countries and years) was 25% lower in the 2000s than in 
the high-growth episode of the 1990s (1992-1998).
3 The linear correlation coefficient between changes in female LFP and per capita GDP is 
-0.50 (statistically significant). 
Figure 5.4: Female LFP and per capita GDP 
Latin America, 1992-2012. 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. GDP 
per capita (in PPP adjusted US$) from WDI. 
Note: Women aged 25-54. Unweighted means. 
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spouses or the cash transfers of new social programs, some women may have 
delayed their decision to participate in the labor market. 
This argument could be viewed as a variant of the added-worker effect.4 This 
effect is typically invoked to account for the increase in female LFP during 
recessions. As the main breadwinner becomes unemployed or faces a wage cut, 
secondary workers (typically female spouses) enter the workforce to compensate 
for the reduced household income, implying a counter-cyclical pattern of female 
LFP, i.e. a movement in a direction opposite to the business cycle.5 & 6
Conversely, during a period of strong expansion, as the male breadwinner 
improves his job conditions and household real income increases, female spouses 
may be less willing to join the workforce. In many cases, the adjustment in 
female behavior does not imply the extreme change of leaving a job, but rather 
it could imply retardation in the decision to enter into the labor market. In a 
more favorable economic environment in their households, women may not be 
compelled to accept any type of job, and instead they may wait longer for better 
job matches, or may delay their labor market participation a few years in order to 
spend more time with their children or older adults that require care. 
The argument views the family as a decision making unit and assumes that some 
women are secondary workers with a less permanent attachment to the labor 
market than their partners, a situation that is more frequent among less skilled 
women in the region. Under this framework, a married woman may choose to 
retard her entry into the labor market by taking advantage of the income gain of 
her husband. Since individual incomes in a family are pooled, an increase in one 
individual’s income may result in other family members gaining time to spend 
on other activities (i.e. taking care of the children) by working less in the labor 
market. Of course, for a counter-cyclical pattern to emerge, this income effect 
must outweigh the substitution effect: in a better economic scenario, workers 
– both men and women – face better opportunities and as the earning power 
increases they may be more attracted to the labor market. 
4 See Katz (1961), Mincer (1962), Lundberg (1985), Maloney (1991) and Mattingly and Smith 
(2010).
5 In practice, the added-worker effect may be outweighed by the discouraged-worker effect. 
Given the difficulties in finding jobs during a recession, workers may give up searching, 
causing a fall in labor force participation (i.e. a pro-cyclical pattern).
6 Paz (2009) finds for Argentina a sizeable impact of the labor status of husbands (employed or 
unemployed) on the probability of their spouses to enter the workforce (mostly as informal 
workers). Fernandes and Felício (2005) and Parker and Skoufias (2004) find similar results 
for Brazil and Mexico, respectively.
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The robust economic growth of the 2000s brought about a stronger fiscal 
situation that allowed for a substantial expansion in social spending. In 
particular, cash transfer programs dramatically increased their coverage in the 
region. Conditional cash transfer programs and non-contributory pensions were 
introduced or expanded in all countries, contributing to the reduction in poverty 
and inequality (Cruces and Gasparini, 2012). These transfers were another 
significant source of increased income for vulnerable households, and hence they 
add another channel to the added-worker argument, discussed above. 
It is important to notice that both channels are likely more relevant for women 
in vulnerable households. Unskilled poor women with children are more likely 
to act as secondary workers, having more sporadic and loose links with the 
labor market and hence, their labor behavior is more sensitive to the economic 
conditions. In addition, these are the women whose households benefited most 
from the improved economic scenario of the 2000s by way of three channels: a 
reduction in unemployment, a shrinkage of the wage gaps, and an increase in 
non-labor incomes. 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the first factor by showing unemployment rates for prime-
age men, i.e., those who are likely the husbands of prime-age women. While 
unemployment rates did not change much for skilled men, they plunged for 
unskilled men. On average, the unemployment rate descended from 6.5% in 
2002 to 3.5% in 2012. If the female labor participation decision is sensitive to 
the unemployment situation of the male spouse, Figure 5.5 suggests a potentially 
relevant added-worker effect, particularly among unskilled women (who are 
typically married to unskilled men). 
The economic expansion of the 2000s implied a generalized increase in real 
earnings. Interestingly, this increase was more intense among the unskilled. Figure 
5.6 shows that the hourly wage gap between skilled and unskilled male primer-
age workers substantially decreased in the 2000s. This fact not only suggests that 
household incomes increased for women in more vulnerable households, but also 
that the increase was higher than for the non-poor, a fact that again suggests a 
stronger added-worker effect for vulnerable women. 
Due to several reasons, poverty-alleviation programs have greatly expanded in 
the region. In particular, since the implementation of Bolsa Escola in Brazil 
and PROGRESA in Mexico in the mid-1990s, conditional cash transfers 
programs (CCTs) have continued to expand in the region, both in terms of 
coverage and spending. CCTs are programs that consist of cash transfers to 
poor households with children, conditional on households making certain 
investments on their children’s human capital – education, health and nutrition. 
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Figure 5.5: Unemployment rates for men 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Men aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: low=less than secondary complete, high=tertiary complete. Unweighted means.
Figure 5.6: Hourly wage gap between men with high and low education 
Latin America, 1992-2012. Men aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: low=less than secondary complete, high=tertiary complete. Unweighted means.
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Figure 5.7 shows the increase in the number of countries with national CCTs 
in the region over the last two decades. Today, virtually all countries in Latin 
America have a program of this type. The benefits of these programs are largely 
targeting the poor. Cruces and Gasparini (2012) estimate that on average 78% 
of the transfers of these programs accrue at the bottom two quintiles of the 
income distribution. CCTs have been identified as a relevant factor driving 
the increase in household real income in more vulnerable households, and 
hence are a significant determinant of the observed fall in income poverty and 
inequality in the region. Although they are typically the main pillar of the 
social protection system for the poor, CCTs are not the only policy instrument 
directed towards the most disadvantaged. Non-contributory pensions, for 
instance, have increasingly expanded in the region during the 2000s, adding 
another source of income for vulnerable households.
In sum, through several channels the strong economic expansion that Latin 
America experienced in the 2000s had a more intense positive impact on the 
incomes of vulnerable households, which in addition are those in which women 
are most prone to alter their labor force participation decisions based on the 
economic prospects of the household. It follows from this argument that we 
should observe a stronger deceleration in LFP for married, unskilled, more 
vulnerable women, a fact that is consistent with the evidence discussed in 
Chapter 3 at length. While in the 1990s, LFP rose 8 points for the low-education 
prime-age women and 2.4 for the high-education women, the increase plunged 
to around 1.5 for both groups in the 2000s. 
Of course, this is far from a conclusive piece of evidence supporting the added-
worker effect. However, it suggests that this factor may have played a relevant 
role in the recent deceleration of female LFP. The next section further elaborates 
Figure 5.7: Coverage of CCTs in Latin America 
Source: Stampini and Tornarolli (2013).
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on this issue by exploring labor force participation along the economic cycle in a 
regression framework. 
4. Participation and the economic cycle 
In this section we explore the movements of labor force participation over the 
business cycle within a simple econometric framework. In particular, we build a 
panel of countries from 1992 to 2012 and run fixed-effect regressions of female 
LFP and other labor variables. As right-hand-side variables we include the log 
of real per capita GDP (adjusted for PPP) taken from WDI and, alternatively, a 
decomposition into two terms: a cyclical and a trend component. To divide GDP 
into components we use the Hodrick–Prescott filter.7 
The results for LFP suggest that female labor supply is affected by the economic 
changes, and that the impact is much more intense than for males (Table 5.1). In 
particular, there is a highly significant effect of both the trend and the cyclical 
component, although with different signs. The trend component of growth is 
associated with an increase in female LFP; instead, the short-term movements are 
countercyclical: a short-run strong expansion in GDP is associated with a fall in 
female labor supply. This piece of evidence seems to support the hypothesis that 
the recent deceleration was driven by the exceptional growth rates of the 2000s.8 
As a consequence of the above results, the male-female gender gap in labor force 
participation has a negative relationship with the trend in GDP, but a positive 
relationship with the cyclical component. Along the development process, female 
labor force participation increases, cutting down the male-female gender gap. 
However, short-term expansions are associated with a reduction in the entry of 
women into the workforce, and hence a widening of the gender gap, possibly due 
to the reasons discussed in the previous section. 
In Table 5.2 (see Appendix) we divide the analysis by education into three 
groups: (1) women without a secondary degree, (2) those with a high school 
degree but without a college degree, and (2) those with a degree from a tertiary 
institution. Interestingly, the negative cyclical component is large and highly 
significant for those women with fewer years of formal education (less than 
complete secondary school), and smaller for the rest. This difference is consistent 
with the story discussed in the last section, in which less-skilled, more vulnerable 
7 See Hodrick and Prescott (1997).
8 Beccaria et al. (2015) analyze the case of Argentina, and find more mixed results.
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women are more prone to react to economic fluctuations. In particular, in the 
case of Latin America, the sudden and strong expansion of the economy in the 
2000s may have been associated with a larger deceleration in the labor supply for 
this group of women. 
Employment is also related to GDP growth, for both men and women (Table 
5.3). The trend component is particularly strong for women; instead, the cyclical 
component is not significant. Unemployment increases when GDP falls; both 
the trend and the cyclical components are significant for both genders. 
In the final table we explore the gender wage gap across the economic cycle 
(Table 5.4). We find that the relative hourly wage (male/female) increases with 
the cyclical component and falls with the trend, although the latter effect is not 
statistically significant. Over the development process, women have increased 
their participation in the labor market and reduced the wage gap with men. 
Short-run expansions, instead, seem to be associated with a retraction in female 
labor supply and smaller wage gains for women. 
Table 5.1: Models of labor force participation 
Latin American countries, panel 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Female Male Relative (male/female)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log per capita GDP
20.80 -1.30 -0.66
(12.93)*** (2.07)** (10.80)***
Cyclical component
-23.90 1.60 0.75
(4.04)*** (1.07) (4.32)***
Trend component
24.50 -1.50 -0.78
(16.23)*** (2.29)** (12.79)***
Constant
-127.80 -161.40 107.00 109.10 7.63 8.69
(8.73)*** (11.76)*** (18.98)*** (18.03)*** (13.64)*** (15.66)***
Observations 235 235 235 235 235 235
R-squared 0.89 0.91 0.72 0.73 0.83 0.86
Notes: Fixed effects (by country) estimations. Unbalanced panel of 17 countries. Labor 
force participation as percentage of adults (female or male) aged 25-54. Robust t statistics 
in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5.4: Models of hourly wages 
Latin American countries, panel 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Relative (male/female)
(1) (2)
Log per capita GDP
-0.03
(0.49)
Cyclical component
0.78
(2.14)**
Trend component
-0.10
(1.55)
Constant
1.39 2.00
(2.20)** (3.32)***
Observations 232 232
R-squared 0.15 0.16
Notes: Fixed effects (by country) estimations. Unbalanced panel of 17 countries. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
Table 5.3: Models of employment and unemployment 
Latin American countries, panel 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
Employment Unemployment 
Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log per 
capita GDP
24.20 3.00 -7.30 -4.50
(21.15)*** (3.27)*** (4.16)*** (5.73)***
Cyclical 
component
-2.20 21.50 -30.30 -20.70
(0.42) (7.97)*** (7.40)*** (8.91)***
Trend 
component
26.40 1.50 -5.40 -3.10
(23.82)*** (1.78)* (2.89)*** (4.38)***
Constant
-162.90 -182.80 63.60 77.50 72.50 55.20 45.10 32.90
(15.66)*** (18.15)*** (7.53)*** (10.04)*** (4.54)*** (3.26)*** (6.30)*** (5.03)***
Observations 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235
R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.68 0.74 0.61 0.65 0.69 0.74
Notes: Fixed effects (by country) estimations. Unbalanced panel of 17 countries. 
Employment as percentage of adults (female or male) aged 25-54. Unemployment 
as percentage of labor force (female or male) aged 25-54. Robust t statistics in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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5. Final remarks 
Latin America has experienced a significant deceleration in female labor force 
participation during the last decade. Unfortunately, it is still too early and 
the evidence is still too fragmentary to conclude whether this deceleration is a 
transitory phenomenon, or if it is a sign of convergence to some long-run levels. 
We have argued in this chapter that the latter possibility is more unlikely, 
although certainly not implausible. In fact, some advanced countries have already 
approached LFP ceilings that have proven difficult to trespass. The deceleration 
in female LFP could be instead just a transient phenomenon. The strong 
economic growth that the region experienced in the 2000s may have allowed a 
surge in earnings and social protection benefits that slowed women’s entry into 
the labor market. In fact, the evidence suggests that, on average, women who 
did decide to participate found more decent jobs than in the past. In this light, 
the deceleration in LFP may not be interpreted as a setback, since it would be 
the optimal response to a positive economic scenario. If the Latin American 
economies continue to grow, the availability of decent jobs continues to rise, and 
women’s education keeps expanding, female labor force participation is likely to 
resume its pace of growth in the near future. 
An alternative view is more worrisome. The short-term impact of an improved 
economic situation and more generous social programs on female labor supply 
may have long-term consequences. Women who prefer to stay out of the labor 
market given the new economic situation may be less prone to participate in the 
future, even in a scenario with an improved supply of decent jobs. Being out of 
the labor market for some time may imply loss of productivity, and may reinforce 
gender roles in the household, which may couple to reduce the probability of 
female labor force participation. 
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Appendix
Table 5.2: Models of labor force participation by education group 
Latin American countries, panel 1992-2012. Adults aged 25-54.
A. Less than secondary school
Female Male Relative (male/female)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log per capita 
GDP
17.70 -2.10 -1.04
(10.38)*** (3.18)*** (10.13)***
Cyclical 
component
-25.60 2.30 1.01
(3.91)*** (1.37) (3.56)***
Trend component
21.20 -2.40 -1.21
(13.33)*** (3.51)*** (11.89)***
Constant
-106.30 -138.90 114.00 117.30 11.36 12.90
(6.86)*** (9.59)*** (19.21)*** (18.58)*** (12.20)*** (13.97)***
Observations 235 235 235 235 235 235
R-squared 0.91 0.93 0.76 0.77 0.85 0.88
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B. Complete secondary school or incomplete college
Female Male Relative (male/female)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log per capita 
GDP
8.90 -0.60 -0.25
(4.80)*** (0.86) (1.74)*
Cyclical 
component
-13.90 -0.50 0.03
(2.17)** (0.25) (0.05)
Trend component
10.80 -0.70 -0.27
(5.56)*** (0.80) (1.71)*
Constant
-11.50 -28.60 100.80 100.90 3.25 3.46
(0.69) (1.63) (14.73)*** (13.40)*** (2.46)** (2.35)**
Observations 235 235 235 235 235 235
R-squared 0.82 0.83 0.69 0.69 0.81 0.81
C. Complete college 
Female Male Relative (male/female)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log per capita 
GDP
7.10 0.20 -0.35
(4.45)*** (0.28) (6.83)***
Cyclical 
component
-9.00 2.00 0.42
(2.48)** (1.05) (3.17)***
Trend component
8.40 0.10 -0.42
(4.68)*** (0.09) (7.78)***
Constant
22.10 10.10 95.00 96.40 4.73 5.31
(1.53) (0.62) (13.04)*** (12.11)*** (10.00)*** (10.84)***
Observations 235 235 235 235 235 235
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.46 0.46 0.82 0.84
Notes: Fixed effects (by country) estimations. Unbalanced panel of 17 countries. Labor 
force participation as percentage of adults (female or male) aged 25-54. Robust t statistics 
in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most dramatic changes experienced in Latin America in the past half-
century has been the annual increase in the proportion of women who decide to 
enter the labor force. The female labor supply in the region has increased by almost 
50% in the past three decades. The increase was likely caused by a combination of 
several factors, ranging from education and fertility to technological and cultural 
changes. Our goal and main contribution is to assess the relative importance of 
a large set of factors that can explain female labor force participation dynamics 
in Latin America.
Identifying the contributions of individual factors presents a complex task 
because an individual’s decision to work or not influences and is influenced 
by many events and conditions in that individual’s life. Section 2 discusses a 
set of basic stylized facts through the lens of a general and simple conceptual 
framework that allows us to classify the so-called determinants of female labor 
supply into three categories. The first category concerns a group of interrelated 
choices that influence and are influenced by past, present, and anticipated labor 
force participation. These choices include decisions about education, marriage, 
and fertility. The second group of possible determinants is largely exogenous 
* This chapter was written by Matias Busso and Darío Romero Fonseca (Research Department, 
Inter-American Development Bank). Rosa Vidarte and Joaquin Serrano provided excellent 
research assistance by computing many of the statistics used in this chapter. The views 
expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Inter-American 
Development Bank.
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and outside the control of the individual. These determinants are socioeconomic 
environmental variables that have a central role in shaping individual-level 
interrelated decisions. Included in this category are the expected returns to 
education and to home production, the cultural context, and existing technologies 
in reproductive health, home production, and production of goods and services 
in the economy. The third group of determinants is less tangible and consists of 
decision-making arrangements. In theory, decisions about labor supply can be 
made individually or jointly with a spouse or family.
Section 2 also presents a set of salient empirical regularities of female labor 
supply in Latin America. First, there was a long-term increase in female labor 
force participation for all demographic groups. Second, this increase seems to 
have slowed in recent years, converging at a lower level than the one observed 
in developed economies. Third, female labor force participation is converging 
between demographic groups. Specifically, women in poor households are 
now behaving more like women in rich households, and unskilled women are 
behaving more like skilled women. This convergence has, however, stopped in 
recent years.
To what extent can a variety of determinants explain these empirical regularities? 
In Section 3, we discuss the mechanisms that underlie the effects of a variety 
of determinants of female labor supply and, by doing so, we organize the 
results of a vast relevant empirical literature on the topic. The empirical studies 
provide credible strategies for identifying causal mechanisms and combine these 
elasticities with changes in the key variables to assess the extent to which they 
can account for the stylized facts. In Section 4, we apply some of these plausible 
theoretical and empirical explanations to the data. Using household surveys 
from 15 countries over a 30-year period, we build a panel of socio-economic and 
demographic indicators and estimate the correlation between female labor force 
participation and covariates that are linked to the explanations identified in the 
literature. Section 5 concludes by taking stock of the plausibility of the main 
long-run determinants of female labor supply in Latin America.
2. Empirical regularities
Section 2 begins with a summary of some basic facts about the female labor 
supply as viewed through the lens of a simple conceptual framework. In 6.1 of 
the Appendix, we provide a full set of statistics that characterize female labor 
force participation in Latin America. Here, we focus on a few simple stylized 
facts. Figure 6.1 shows long-term trends in the labor force participation of 
females aged 25–54 years.
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Figure 6.1: Female labor force participation
Latin America and the United States
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
The solid line shows the simple average (arithmetic mean) of female labor 
force participation in Latin America, and the light gray lines indicate the 
corresponding level of participation in individual countries. As a reference, 
the dashed line shows the female labor force participation in the United States. 
Three important facts can be derived from these data. First, female labor force 
participation in Latin America increased from 54% in 1990 to 65% in 2010. 
Second, there is some convergence among individual countries (gray lines) 
in that countries with initially lower participation experienced faster rates of 
growth. Third, the rate of growth in female labor force participation declined 
and almost stagnated after 2000. This plateau was achieved at a lower level 
than that in the United States. As the gray lines indicate, only a few countries 
have reached the U.S. level of participation, and in most countries, there is 
room for growth in participation.
Why did the female labor supply increase, and why has it stagnated? A broad 
conceptual framework can help one understand the determinants of these 
phenomena. The labor supply is related to many factors, some of which are 
individual-level decisions made before or during a person’s working age whereas 
other factors are outside the individual’s control. Figure 6.2 provides a schematic 
view of both types of factors.
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Figure 6.2: Interrelated decisions, choice mechanisms, and environment
At any given time, the decisions to participate in the labor market and the number 
of hours to work involve choices that depend on the relative returns earned in the 
labor market compared to home production and the value of leisure.1 Expected 
wages (earnings) depend on the individual’s productivity, whereas the value of 
home production is a function of the values of providing child care and elderly 
1 The term “returns” has been broadly defined in this analysis. Moreover, it assumes the value 
of leisure is the same for men and women.
Education Decisions
[years of education, effort, 
field of specialization]
Labor Supply Decisions
[work or not, how many 
hours to work]
Family Decisions
[marriage/divorce, 
fertility]
Choice mechanisms
- Jointly with spouse or not
- Unitary or non-unitary model (non/cooperative)
Environment
Relative (spouses) returns (prices and costs): 
- Returns to education/labor (wages, probability 
of employment, discrimination, regulations, 
taxes, macroeconomic environment)
- Return to home production (cost of house 
chores, cost of child-care, cost of elderly care)
Technology:
- Home technologies
- Work technologies
- Health technologies
Preferences:
- Culture 
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care services, housework (e.g., cooking or cleaning), and other home-based 
activities, such as home administration and shopping. Taking preferences as 
given, individuals facing a higher relative return from work in the labor market 
will be more likely to participate in it. 
What do people in Latin America do when they are not working? Figure 6.3 
shows the average number of hours per day used in different work activities for 
persons aged between 30 and 50 years in Mexico.2 
Women tend to work 12 hours a day, which is about 1 hour more than men. 
Women tend to work more hours at home (8.8 hours) than in the labor market 
(3.6 hours). The vast majority of women’s working hours are spent on housework, 
child care, and caring for the elderly and their spouses. Thus, it is important 
to examine how technological changes can facilitate home production (e.g., 
home appliances) and how types of policy changes subsidizing child care may 
influence the labor supply. This prima facie simple static decision is much more 
complex when viewed through the lens of the life course. From that perspective, 
labor market participation is associated with several important choices. Figure 
6.2 shows that these decisions relate to educational investments and family 
formations.
2 To the best of our knowledge, Mexico is the only country in Latin America that has collected 
time use data for a representative sample of men and women.
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Individuals’ choices regarding educational investments are typically made before 
they can fully enter the labor market, and they concern the quantity, quality, and 
type of education that individuals obtain. In theory, higher and better quality 
education should lead to more productivity and thus to higher returns in the 
labor market, increasing the labor supply. Some of the increase in educational 
levels could be exogenously due to governmental policies that reduce the cost 
of education and would be, therefore, unrelated to the (future) labor supply. 
However, a part of the increase in education could be the endogenous result 
of a larger proportion of women aspiring to work in the future and therefore, 
obtaining higher education today.
Choices about family formation are made before and during labor force 
participation. Decisions made during labor force participation include whether and 
when to marry/get divorced, whether and when to have children, and the number 
of children to have. Getting married somewhat changes the way that decisions are 
made (from personal when single to joint when married) and can lower the labor 
supply of one partner if the relative wages of the spouses differ widely. Similarly, 
bearing children directly influences women’s labor supply during the first few 
months after the birth of the child. Moreover, it indirectly influences labor supply 
because it increases the opportunity cost of working outside the home, and in a 
context of different relative wage returns of partners in the household, it decreases 
the labor supply of the partner with the lower potential wage, usually the woman. 
Similar to education, observed changes in marriage and fertility rates could partly 
be due to exogenous changes in the environment, which are outside a woman’s 
control (e.g., contraception). However, they might reflect women’s endogenous 
decisions to participate in the labor force.
It is useful to compare the ways in which women in different demographic 
groups (by education, marriage, and fertility) supply labor. Between 1990 and 
2005, the participation rates of women in disadvantaged groups caught up to 
those of women with relatively more advantages. However, the trend apparently 
abated in 2005, suggesting that some aspect changed for the more disadvantaged 
women, resulting in the plateau illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.4 compares these two groups of women. Each panel in Figure 6.4 shows 
the ratio of female labor force participation between two groups with respect to 
a specific factor. 
The graph on the top left-hand side looks at education. Between 1990 and 
2000, the participation rates of the group that received less education become 
increasingly similar to those that received more education. However, around 
the year 2000, the gap stopped closing; women with higher (tertiary) education 
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showed increased participation, by 40%, in the labor force than those with less 
than a secondary education. Similarly, women whose husbands earned income 
was in the first 2 deciles of the distribution participated less than those whose 
husbands earned income was in the top 9-10 deciles (graph on the top right-
hand side). Similar to the convergence in education, convergence with respect to 
husbands’ incomes stalled in 2005. The bottom left graph shows that women in 
single-mother households participated more than women in nuclear households 
(i.e., married mothers). The labor force participations of these two groups seemed 
to converge until 2005. Last, the bottom right graph presents a different pattern 
regarding women with school-age children; women with children aged 0–5 years 
tended to participate less than women with older school-age children. This gap 
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is the only gap that increased during the period, suggesting that returns to home 
production actually increased.
The interrelated decisions concerning education, family formation, and labor 
supply are influenced by two important factors: the arrangement in which the 
decision-making occurs and the environmental or social context in which the 
decisions are made. Choice mechanisms, or decision-making arrangements, 
differ in two respects. First, a decision about labor supply can either be made 
by the household as a unit (referred to as the unitary model) or by the spouses 
independently. However, scholars have rejected the unitary model (e.g., Lundber, 
Pollak, and Wales, 1997) in favor of models of intra-household bargaining. 
Second, decisions can be made cooperatively or non-cooperatively. For example, 
in some models, the wife decides about her labor supply after the husband has 
decided about his labor supply, whereas in other models, the partners bargain in 
a non-cooperative fashion. These different arrangements have implications for 
labor supply decisions. Heath and Tan (2014) found that, generally, all else being 
equal, decision-making arrangements that empower women more are more likely 
to yield higher levels of labor supply.
In addition, there are contextual aspects of the environment, largely out of 
the individual’s control, that can influence labor supply, such as changes in 
returns to work for a wage, changes in returns to work at home, labor and 
health technologies, and preferences influenced by culture and religion. The 
environment influencing the labor supply tends to change slowly over time. To 
assess how changes in labor supply relate to changes in the environment, the first 
approach would be to examine the behavior of women born in different decades 
(i.e., different cohorts have different environments). Figure 6.5 presents seven 
graphs for three cohorts: (1) women born in the 1950s (dotted line), women born 
in the 1960s (solid line), and women born in the 1970s (dashed line). Each line 
represents an (smoothed) average of all countries in Latin America. The x-axis 
plots age, and the y-axis plots a different variable in each sub-figure. Given that 
data is only available for 1990 through 2010, different age ranges are observed 
for each cohort. 
The graph on the top left-hand side shows that younger cohorts tend to participate 
more in the labor force, and their participation seems to peak at younger ages. 
Interestingly, the action seems to be on the extensive margin (participation, 
shown in the graph on the top left) rather than on the intensive margin (hours 
worked) or on employment rates. The graph in the top middle panel indicates 
that there is not much difference in the number of hours worked per week by 
women of different cohorts at the same ages. The labor market incentives do not 
seem to differ either. Clearly, the probabilities of employment and wages increase 
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with age, but at any given age, women in different cohorts experience the same 
incentives. These results justify further investigation of the extensive, as opposed 
to the intensive, margins. 
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The three central sub-figures and the sub-figure on the lower left show that 
women in younger cohorts are more educated than those in older cohorts, tend 
to have fewer young children living with them, and tend to marry at older ages. 
In fact, the average number of years of education for females aged 20–60 years 
has increased over the past 25 years in Latin America, from about 6.4 years, on 
average, in 1986 to about 9.4 years, on average, in 2012. Overall, the long-term 
changes in labor supply were accompanied by changes in education, marriage, 
and fertility. These changes were likely generated by changes in the environment.
3. Determinants and mechanisms
Section 3 describes the specific mechanisms through which various determinants, 
both endogenous (education and family formation) and exogenous (returns, 
technology, and preferences) influence labor supply. This is achieved by a 
review of the relevant literature and by providing, where possible, quantitative 
estimates of the effects of these determinants on female labor supply, to assess 
their relative effects.
3.1. Education
The first level of education—kindergarten or primary school—reflects decisions 
made by an individual’s parents. These decisions depend on a number of factors, 
including culture, the availability of resources and infrastructure, policies in place 
regarding mandatory years of schooling, and conditional cash transfer programs, 
among others. In many cultures, families invest less in their daughters’ educations 
than in their sons’. Glick (2008) argues that, holding other factors constant, 
daughters will receive less schooling than sons when: (1) parents expect to receive 
more money in the future from their sons than their daughters, (2) the marginal 
returns to schooling in the labor market are always higher for boys than for girls, 
or (3) the marginal cost of schooling is always higher for girls. In addition, it is 
reasonable that providing more schooling to sons than daughters can arise from 
parents’ preferences of valuing their sons’ more than their daughters’ human 
capital or of placing relatively more value on the future wealth of their sons. 
Attaining an education beyond the mandatory level is believed to be mainly a result 
of women’s decisions influenced primarily by expected higher returns, although 
the decision is also constrained by factors such as culture, resources, family 
support or opposition, and expectations. In recent decades, women’s increased 
investments in education have been so dramatic that the education gender gap was 
reversed in Latin America as well as in many developed countries (Chioda, 2011). 
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Because returns to education are positive, this increase in educational attainment 
induced an increase in expected wages, and therefore, in the opportunity cost 
of not working. In other words, it is expected that these increases in educational 
attainment will be accompanied by increases in female labor supply. However, 
causality can work in both directions: women may be more likely to work because 
they are more highly educated or, alternatively, they may advance their education 
because they aspire to work in better positions or for higher pay.
Indeed, many studies have found that higher expected returns in the labor 
market may drive schooling decisions. Foster and Rozensweig (1996) examined 
the green revolution in India, which generated an increase in the returns to 
primary school during a period of rapid technological progress, which, in turn, 
induced private investment in primary schooling. Similarly, using experimental 
evidence, Jensen (2012) assessed an intervention, also in India, that changed 
employment opportunities for women. He provided three years of recruiting 
services in randomly selected rural Indian villages to help young women obtain 
jobs. Young women in villages who received the service were significantly less 
likely to get married or have children, choosing instead to enter the labor market, 
attain higher education, or attend post-degree training.3
There are many reasons, not directly related to labor force incentives, for women 
to be more educated than men. First, some scholars have proposed that women 
increase their education because they want to improve their marriage prospects 
(Greenwood et al., 2012). Second, in a labor market that discriminates against 
women, women get more education precisely to avoid that discrimination because 
the extent of discrimination is negatively related to educational attainment 
(Chiappori et al., 2009). Third, women may increase their educational attainment 
because of recent changes in identity and a weakening of traditional values and 
norms. That is, women invest in education because of aspirations and changes in 
role expectations (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). 
Have changes in educational attainment caused changes in the labor supply? 
Unfortunately, there is limited evidence to answer that question because labor 
3 A growing literature argues that expected (perceived or subjective) returns influence schooling 
decisions. Kaufmann (2009) used a survey of perceived returns among high school graduates 
in Mexico to study the determinants of college attendance. She concluded that although 
expected returns and perceived risks from human capital investment were important 
determinants, lower returns or higher risks were insufficient to explain poor people’s low 
rates of attendance. Using the same data, Attanasio and Kaufman (2012) investigated the 
relationship between subjective expectations and schooling decisions. The authors found that 
individuals’ subjective expectations about their future incomes and employment influenced 
their decisions regarding higher education.
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supply and education are generally considered to be a joint decision, making it 
difficult to separate their effects. 
3.2. Marriage
Marriage can influence the labor supply by changing the relative returns of 
working within the home versus working outside the home. Married women 
with children tend to participate in the labor market less than single women 
because the former have an alternative source of income (which raises their 
reservation wage) and a higher opportunity cost of working outside the home. 
In fact, married women’s labor supply elasticity is greater than that of married 
men (Blau and Kahn, 2005). In the United States, McClelland and Mok (2012) 
found a substantial reduction in the labor supply elasticities of married women 
over the past three decades, although they were still higher than the elasticities 
of men or unmarried women.
Who women marry may also influence differences in their labor supply at 
different levels of the income distribution. Studies have extensively analyzed 
the higher likelihood of marrying, or more generally, forming a family, with 
another person who has similar educational and income characteristics. This 
phenomenon is termed “assortative mating,” and these studies often focus on 
women’s labor patterns according to their husbands’ incomes. 
There are two extreme cases of mating: random mating, in which all the members 
of the population marry at random, and perfect sorting, in which all the members 
of the population marry someone from their income decile). In random mating, 
women’s wages relative to men’s are, on average, lowest for the wives of top-wage 
husbands. Therefore, these wives work the fewest hours, and the relationship 
of wives’ hours worked and husbands’ wages is negative. In the case of perfect 
sorting, with the presence of a gender wage gap that favors men, wives’ wages 
are increasing and concave4 relative to the husbands’ wages, as are wives’ hours 
worked. Between these two extremes, some marry at random and some marry 
someone from their decile, and in this case, we can expect the observed inverse-U 
relationship between wives’ hours worked and husbands’ wages decile that was 
seen in the 1990s. Bredemeier and Juessen (2013) performed a quantitative 
analysis of this model and found that the growth in women’s wages and the 
decline in fertility were the main drivers of the overall increase in wives’ hours 
worked, since the 1970s. Specifically, they argued that the largest increase in 
wives’ hours worked was among those women who were married to high-wage 
4 This scenario assumes a constant gender wage gap.
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men and, therefore, labor supply increases were a consequence of the positive 
trends observed in assortative mating since the 1970s.
Legal divorce also may provide an incentive for women to increase their labor 
force participation. When women are faced with the possibility of losing their 
source of income to divorce, they have an incentive to generate income on their 
own by participating in the labor market. Hence, the legalization of divorce 
has been observed as a natural experiment to find a causal link between the 
likelihood of divorce and female labor force participation. Bargain et al. (2012) 
employed the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996 as a natural experiment 
to analyze the effects of an exogenous increase in the perceived risk of marital 
dissolution on female labor supply. Using a control group of families with a low 
risk of dissolution, the authors estimated via a difference-in-difference model that 
the legalization of divorce significantly increased labor supply in the extensive 
margin, although it was not increased in the intensive margin. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that women want an external option when faced with 
the risk of divorce. Having a job, whether part-time or full-time, gives women 
access to social networks and a potential remarriage market while helping them 
to maintain human capital levels. Bargain et al. (2012) found that a 1% increase 
in the risk of marital breakdown increased labor supply by about 0.20 hours per 
week and female labor force participation by 0.50–0.80 percentage points. 
3.3. Fertility
Having children naturally influences mothers’ ability to work, at least during the 
period of childbirth and recovery, which can last from a couple of days to a few 
weeks. After recovery, babies and small children require a substantial amount of 
care, which influences parents’ labor supply. How do parents decide how much 
to work when they have children compared to people who do not have children? 
Lundberg (1988) found that there are strong interactions in the labor supply 
decisions of each parent when couples have preschool-aged children. That is, 
the hours that the parents work are jointly determined. However, when there 
are no young children, the hours worked by husband and wife are apparently 
independently decided.5 
Joint modeling of individuals’ decisions about fertility and employment requires 
complicated techniques. Francesconi (2002) used data on married women in 
5 For a couple with children younger than 6, an increase in the husband’s earnings tends to 
reduce the labor supply of the wife; if the husband’s monthly earnings increase by USD 100, 
the wife’s hours fall by 6–9 hours per month.
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the US to estimate fertility and labor supply decisions. The study found that 
women that interrupted their fulltime employment for 5 years experienced a 
utility loss of about 1.5% per year over a 20-year period, provided that they 
reentered into full time employment after the interruption. Shorter interruptions 
were associated with smaller losses.
The literature has tried to quantify the impact of childbearing on female labor 
supply. Angrist and Evans (1998) used parents’ preferences for a mixed sibling-
sex composition as a source of exogenous variation in fertility and found that 
the effect of the change from a two-child to a larger family reduced women’s 
labor supply by about 10.4%, on average, in the US in 1980. In 1990, the change 
to a larger family reduced it by 8.4%, and the labor market consequences of 
childbearing were likely to be more severe for poor and less educated women. 
However, having fewer children does not necessarily mean an increase in 
women’s labor force participation. Priebe (2010) employed the same instrument 
as Angrist and Evans (1998) in an Indonesian sample and found that having 
fewer children does not relate to an increase in labor supply because Indonesian 
women work primarily to cover child costs and fewer children means they need 
to work less.
Cruces and Galiani (2007) also built on the work of Angrist and Evans (1998) and 
used the preference of parents for a mixed sibling–sex composition to study two 
middle-income Latin American countries: Argentina and Mexico. They found a 
statistically significant negative effect of more than two children on the mother’s 
labor supply. In Argentina, the reduction was about 8.1–9.6 percentage points 
(for married women); in Mexico, the reduction was about 6.3–8.6 percentage 
points (for married women). Tortarolo (2014) tested the same instrument as 
Angrist and Evans (1998) using a large sample of census data spanning three 
decades from 14 Latin American countries and the United States (1980s, 1990s, 
and 2000s). Using 39 censuses, they applied ordinary least squares estimations 
and found a statistically significant negative relationship between fertility and 
mothers’ labor supply in each of the 14 Latin American countries.6 
Another set of studies used fertility shocks, such as infertility and miscarriage, 
as exogenous sources of variation to find the causal effect of childbearing on 
6 In Sweden, Angelov et al. (2013) compared women’s incomes and wage trajectories to those 
of their male partners before and after parenthood. Focusing on the within-couple gap, the 
study found that 15 years after entering parenthood, the gender gap in income had increased 
by 18 percentage points, and the gender gap in wages had increased by 10 percentage points, 
compared to the pre-child levels. Parenthood influenced men and women differently, causing 
persistent gaps in labor market returns within households.
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women’s labor supply. Cristia (2008) found that when the first child was less 
than a year old, those mothers who had sought medical intervention to conceive 
had reduced employment by 26 percentage points compared to mothers who 
had not sought medical intervention. Agüero and Marks (2011) used self-
report infertility shocks among women in 26 developing countries as a source 
of exogenous variation in the number of children. They found that the effect 
of having children on labor force participation was not significant for mothers’ 
overall labor force participation, but it did decrease the likelihood of paid work, 
particularly among younger women and in relatively poorer countries. Among 
younger women, an additional child reduced paid employment by almost 2 
percentage points, and in low-income countries, an additional child reduced 
women’s paid employment by 2.1 percentage points.7 
The timing of childbearing also seems to affect labor supply. Having children 
in the later stages of a career may make it easier for women to return to their 
previous employment positions. Using the exogenous variation in birth timing 
induced by miscarriage and other negative fertility shocks before the first birth, 
Miller (2011) found positive effects of delayed motherhood on earnings and 
wages. Specifically, there was a substantial increase in earnings of 9% for each 
year of delay, an increase in wages of 3%, and an increase in work hours of 6%, 
with college-educated women and those in professional and managerial positions 
reaping the largest advantage. Postponing motherhood may reduce the career 
costs of children because later interruptions imply that the foregone investments 
are accrued over a shorter time horizon. 
Fitzenberger et al. (2013) calculated the amount of employment lost for bearing 
children now instead of later in Germany, a country that provides a lengthy 
maternity leave. They found that, in terms of cumulative employment losses 
measured in person-months, during the first five years after birth, an average of 
about two years (23 months or 38.5% of the total time) in employment is “lost” 
as a result of the birth of a child now instead of later. The employment loss is 
reduced over the first five years after childbirth, but it does not level off to zero 
at the end of that period.
7 They found no significant effects for middle-income countries, a finding that differs from 
that of Cruces and Galiani (2007), who showed that women in Mexico and Argentina with 
more than two children borne out of a preference for a balanced sex mix were less likely 
to participate in the labor force. This difference was mainly due to the differences among 
subpopulations.
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3.4. Technology
Health Technologies. The introduction of the hormonal contraceptive (birth 
control) pill is a technological advancement that enabled women to control the 
quantity and timing of their children. Goldin and Katz (2002) argued that the 
direct effect of the pill was a decrease in the cost of remaining unmarried to 
women while they were investing in their professional careers. The pill reduced 
the cost of career investment for women by increasing age at first marriage. Bailey 
(2006) used the variation in U.S. state laws allowing women under the age of 
21 to obtain oral contraception without parental consent to estimate the impact 
of pill access on female labor force participation. She found that, from 1970–
1990, early access to the pill can account for about three of the 20 percentage 
point increase (14%) in labor force participation rates and 15% of the increase in 
annual hours worked by women aged 16–30 years.
Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) studied the effects of technological progress in 
health and nutrition on reductions in the cost of childbearing. They found that, 
in the early 1900s, women spent more than 60% of their prime childbearing 
years either pregnant or nursing. However, between 1920 and 1960, there were 
advancements in medical knowledge and obstetric practices that, together with 
the introduction of infant formula, reduced the time cost of raising children and 
led to an increase in the labor supply of young married women with children. 
Better maternal health decreased the adverse effects of pregnancy and childbirth 
on women’s abilities to work, and the introduction of infant formula reduced the 
comparative advantage of mothers in infant feeding. 
Abortion laws are another example of the availability of a health technology that 
allows women to decide if and when to bear children. Kalist (2004) examined 
whether the liberalization of U.S. state abortion laws influenced female labor 
force participation with several probit participation equations. The results 
indicated that by reducing unwanted pregnancies and thus reducing fertility 
rates, abortion increased female labor force participation rates, particularly 
among single black women. Other studies have explored the effects of fertility on 
female labor supply using the legalization of abortion as an instrument. Angrist 
and Evans (1996) studied the effects of teenage and out-of-wedlock childbearing 
on the schooling and employment statuses of black women using measures 
of exposure to the 1970s’ abortion reform in U.S. states as instruments. They 
found that black women who were exposed to abortion reforms experienced 
large reductions in teenage fertility and teenage out-of-wedlock fertility that 
apparently increased educational attainment and employment rates; there was 
no statistically significant effect for white women. 
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Most studies on the effects of abortion focus on the United States because several 
laws have legalized abortion since the 1970s, providing data both before and after 
the laws were enacted. The situation in Latin America is somewhat different. In 
this region, the only country that has fully legalized abortion is Uruguay, where 
women have been able to legally obtain an abortion on request since 2012.8 For 
most of the remaining Latin American countries, abortion is legal only when it 
is necessary to protect the health of the mother. Some countries, such as Chile, 
El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, prohibit abortion under any condition, 
and persons performing the procedure are penalized.
Home Technologies. Traditionally, women are primarily responsible for household 
chores, which reduces their time available for working outside the home. In this 
context, technological progress in household production frees up women’s time 
and could drive an increase in the female labor supply. Studies have found that 
the female labor supply is influenced by technological progress in the home, as 
well as advancements in the health and nutrition sectors. Thanks to technological 
progress, women are able to perform their traditional housekeeping and childcare 
duties in less time. Moreover, these technologies reduce women’s comparative 
advantage for fulfilling these traditional roles.
Using household appliances reduces the time required to perform many household 
chores such as cooking, washing clothes, and cleaning. Greenwood et al. (2005) and 
Greenwood and Seshadri (2005) have argued that the introduction of household 
appliances, including the refrigerator, vacuum cleaner, washing machine, dryer, 
microwave oven, and dishwasher, liberated women from the home because they 
allowed women to spend less time in home production and this, in turn, enabled 
them to enter the labor market. Greenwood et al. (2005) found an important 
decrease in the time that women spend performing housework tasks, from 58 hours 
per week in 1900 to 18 hours per week in 1975, which helped married women 
with children enter the work force. The authors found that in 1900, about 5% of 
married women worked in the labor force. By 1980, this number had increased 
to about 50%, and more than half of that increase was due to the technological 
advancements in the household sector. Similarly, Coen-Pirani et al. (2010) tested 
the hypothesis that the diffusion of household appliances in the 1960s increased 
the labor force participation of married women. Using U.S. census data, they 
found that owning three household appliances (specifically, a washer, dryer, and 
freezer) increased the likelihood that married women would participate in the labor 
force by about 27 percentage points between 1960 and 1970. Dinkelman (2011) 
8 Since the policy change is so recent there is, to the extent of our knowledge, no available 
study that estimates the impact of this change on demographics or economics outcomes. 
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found that five years after rural electrification in South Africa, female employment 
had increased by 9 percentage points (almost 30% from the baseline), freeing up 
women from activities associated with home production.
Besides the advent of household appliances, their prices may determine whether 
they are actually purchased, thereby influencing the female labor supply. 
Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) found that decreases in the prices of home 
appliances significantly increased female labor force participation. A 20% 
decrease in the relative price of appliances (i.e., the ratio of the price of the 
appliances to the consumer price index) increased labor force participation by 
2%–3%, on average. In the case of the United Kingdom, between 1975 and 
1999, the decrease in the relative price of home appliances accounted for about a 
10%–15% increase in female labor force participation. Similarly, Cubas (2010) 
studied the differences in female labor force participation in Latin America and 
the United States between 1990 and 2005. The results showed that prices of 
household appliances and access to infrastructure were important for explaining 
cross-country labor supply differences.
Work Technologies. Goldin (2014) proposed that convergence between men and 
women in the labor force requires job flexibility; that is, changes in the labor 
market determine how jobs are structured to enhance temporal flexibility. The 
gender gap in pay would be reduced if employers did not disproportionately 
reward employees who work long (or specific) hours. In fact, the diffusion of 
work technologies could influence female labor participation because these 
technologies allow for “telework” (working from home via the Internet) and 
flexible schedules. Dettling (2014) examined the ways in which Internet use 
influenced the labor force participation of married women and found that high-
speed Internet use increased their labor force participation by an average of 4.6 
percentage points, with larger increases among women with higher educational 
attainment and children. The primary connection between Internet use and 
labor market outcomes is telework; Internet use, through telework opportunities 
and flexible scheduling, has particularly benefited highly educated women’s 
participation in the labor force. 
3.5. Labor market returns: discrimination
Female labor force participation is influenced by the prospects of earnings in the 
labor market. A key factor that affects the relative returns of males and females 
is discrimination. If a woman perceives that her wage will not be high enough 
to compensate her for what she expects to give up to perform that job, or if she 
perceives that she is being paid less than a man for equivalent work, she might 
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decide to not participate in the labor market. In addition, because discrimination 
affects women’s wages relative to men’s, discrimination affects women’s decisions 
about specialization in home versus work production within the household.
What are the sources of this type of discrimination? Childbearing hinders 
women’s labor force participation, at least, during the childbirth and recovery 
period. When an employer considers hiring a woman or a man with equivalent 
qualifications, the assumption that the woman has relatively greater potential for 
absences from the job can be detrimental to the woman’s job prospects. Similarly, 
if an employer must invest in workers’ training and believes that women are more 
likely than men to terminate employment, he may prefer to hire men (Neumark 
et al., 1996). Correll et al. (2007) found biases against mothers that influence 
the evaluations of their competence and commitment and whether they are 
hired, promoted, or receive a raise. These evaluative biases are mostly unjustified 
because, according to Correll et al. (2007), the majority of studies found no 
significant differences between mothers and non-mothers in the extent of their 
commitment, and the discrimination arises from perceptions.
Two main approaches are used to quantitatively assess the existence and 
magnitude of wage discrimination: decomposition of wage gaps (combined with 
regression analysis) and field experiments. 
Decomposition of Wage Gaps. The most commonly used decomposition method is 
the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition method, which statistically differentiates the 
portion of the wage gap corresponding to each observable factor (e.g., education, 
job experience, age, or race, and so on). The portion left unexplained by these 
observable factors is associated with discrimination.
To study the gender wage gap around the world, Weichselbaumer and Winter-
Ebmer (2005) performed a quantitative systematic review (meta-analysis) of 
more than 260 published papers covering 63 countries from the 1960s through 
the 1990s. They found that, during the study period, the raw wage differentials 
decreased significantly, from about 65% to about 30%, with most of the decline 
attributed to women’s labor market endowments (higher educational attainment, 
training, and work attachment). The authors specified a standardized gender wage 
gap with the standardizing data selection and econometric method, and they 
found that the ratio of what women would earn if there were no discrimination 
relative to their actual wages decreased by approximately 0.17% annually, 
indicating that moderate gender equalization between wages was occurring.
Additionally, Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005) stressed the importance 
of statistically controlling for certain observable characteristics to reduce the 
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bias in the calculation of the discrimination component of the gap. Missing or 
imprecise data on human capital factors, such as work experience, on-the-job 
training, or job tenure with the actual employer can result in important biases in 
the calculation of the unexplained component. For example, the researchers found 
that studies that did not account for work experience had greatly overestimated 
the unexplained portion of the gender wage gap. 
For 18 countries in Latin America,9 Hoyos and Ñopo (2010) calculated the 
gender earnings gaps between 1992 and 2007, using a different decomposition 
method. During that 15-year span, the overall wage gap declined from 16.32%–
8.85% of average female wages, which represented a significant decrease of 
about 7 percentage points. The unexplained component decreased about 
3–4% (a statistically significant result), depending on the characteristics for 
which the authors conducted the statistical adjustment. They found important 
heterogeneities across countries; for instance, Brazil showed the widest gap but 
was also closing the gap the fastest.10 
Field Experiments. There are substantial differences favoring men over women in 
pay and promotion. Even after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, women earn significantly less and are less likely to be promoted 
to top-ranking positions. One potentially important reason for these differences 
is that men and women may respond differently to competitive environments. 
Antonovics et al. (2004) used data from a competitive television game show to 
mimic some competitive aspects between men and women in the labor force and 
assessed whether men and women of similar skill levels perform equally well in 
competitive environments. They found that in situations of direct competition, 
men outperformed their female opponents more than 72% of the time, and ability 
explained no more than about 27% of this differential. Even after controlling for 
ability, men outperformed women in competitive settings.
9 The countries examined were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, 
Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
10 Much of the relevant literature associates the unexplained portion of the wage gap with 
discrimination. However, some authors have pointed out that “residual discrimination” 
would only measure the extent to which the gap is caused by unobservable factors 
besides discrimination. Therefore, these measures of discrimination using these types of 
decompositions are biased because of the lack of relevant controls. The estimations of the 
gender gaps do not include many control variables that measure characteristics such as 
abilities, educational attainment, and family environments, or factors such as preferences for 
non-market activities, which could be a determinant unobservable factor of the female labor 
supply in Chile (Bravo et al., 2008).
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Experiments have also been used to test for the presence of gender discrimination 
in hiring. The most popular experiments are the audit experiments, where 
resumés presenting equivalent qualifications but changed genders and names are 
used to apply for jobs. When the names alone are changed, the results provide an 
unbiased estimate of discrimination at the hiring stage (Booth and Leigh, 2010). 
In Latin America, Bravo et al. (2008) implemented an experiment to determine 
the presence of gender discrimination in hiring. The experiment used fictitious 
resumés to apply for real jobs. The resumés presented equivalent qualifications 
and job experience, but they differed in terms of the fictitious applicant’s gender. 
The researchers found that men and women apparently have the same probability 
of being called for a job interview because the callback rates in response to the 
resumés were 14.9% for the male names and 14.6% for the female names, and 
the difference was not statistically significant. The lack of a significant difference 
in callback rates differs from the findings of previous studies, perhaps because 
these findings are limited to the first step in the hiring process, the callback. 
Discrimination in hiring may occur at the second or third callback, or when the 
final hiring decision is made.
3.6. Labor market returns: macroeconomic crises
The two likely changes in the labor market during a macroeconomic crisis are 
an outward shift of the aggregate labor supply curve and an inward shift of the 
aggregate labor demand curve, which would result in a decline in real wages. 
However, the net effect on employment is theoretically ambiguous because it 
would depend on the relative size of the shifts and the elasticities of both curves.
Economic crises affect employment and labor market returns for both genders. 
Stotsky (2006) found evidence suggesting that women’s employment is more 
resilient than men’s during a recession in many countries. There could be many 
factors underlying this phenomenon. For example, male-dominated occupations, 
such as the construction industry, are more cyclical and more responsive to 
recessions. Furthermore, women are relatively more likely to work in fast-growing 
industries, such as the service sector, that may be relatively more resistant to 
recessions. Additionally, Stotsky (2006) pointed out that these differences might 
reflect differences in participation rates by gender, particularly if women are more 
likely than men to leave and re-enter the labor force as working conditions change.
What exactly is the influence of a crisis on labor force participation? Using 
a panel of 86 countries and data for the period 1980–2005, Signorelli, 
Choudhry, and Marelli (2012) found that financial crises are related to small 
but statistically significant reductions (0.829 percentage points) in female labor 
220
Bridging gender gaps? The rise and deceleration of female  
labor force participation in Latin America
force participation. Analysis of a sample of 10 upper-middle-income economies11 
that included 6 Latin American countries showed that financial crises led to 
a reduction of 2.5 percentage points in female labor force participation. In a 
sample of 20 lower-middle-income economies12 that included 9 Latin American 
countries, they found no statistically significant effects of financial crises on 
female labor force participation. 
An economic crisis causes a resulting reduction in household income. In 
response, households want to increase their labor force participation and hours 
worked despite the labor demand constraints induced by the crisis. For example, 
the 2002 Argentine financial crises primarily caused a considerable fall in real 
wages, which was accompanied by little increase in labor supply due to weak 
labor demands (McKenzie, 2003a). There was no statistically significant effect on 
female labor participation. Regarding the 1995 Mexican peso crisis, McKenzie 
(2003b) found that households used reductions in fertility and primary health 
care investments as financial coping mechanisms instead of adding workers to 
the labor force or increasing existing workers’ hours because during this aggregate 
shock, there were labor demand constraints.
During a recession, if the husband is the primary earner and loses his job, the 
wife can enter the labor force and then later exit it when the primary earner 
is reemployed. This is referred to as the “added worker effect,” and it can be 
interpreted as a household strategy against unemployment shocks during 
economic crises. Cerruti (2000) found evidence of the added worker effect in 
Argentina, where the increase in female labor force participation is not due 
to improvements in the conditions of the labor supply or the broadening of 
opportunities available to women. Instead, it is mostly a response to increasing 
instability and unemployment among male primary earners associated with the 
implementation of structural adjustment policies since 1991. Cerruti’s (2000) 
main contention is that women decide to participate in the labor market to 
reduce the economic uncertainty of the household.
The 2008 global economic crisis was similarly associated with an increase in 
female labor force participation and a decrease in male labor force participation. 
This crisis induced a negative income shock to households, and labor supply had 
to be adjusted accordingly, with the possibility of the emergence of the added 
11 The countries were: Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, 
Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
12 The countries were: Algeria, Bolivia, Cameroon, China, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.
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worker effect. Khitarishvili’s (2013) study of a sample of 28 Central and Eastern 
European and former Soviet Union countries provides evidence of the added-
worker effect in 2010 because married women whose husbands lost their jobs 
increased their labor force participation by 10.5 percentage points. 
 
3.7. Policies: labor market regulations and taxes
When discussing the effects of labor market regulations, it is important to 
remember that most studies on labor laws are set in developed countries, which 
likely have higher enforcement powers than developing countries. 
Minimum Wage. Governments mandate minimum wages, targeted at low-wage 
earners, to assure these workers a basic standard of living. A higher minimum 
wage potentially creates incentives for women to participate in the labor market 
because it could make working for a wage relatively more attractive than home 
production (Boeri et al., 2008). Since women tend to populate low-earning 
occupations, the regulations that affect minimum wages are particularly 
important to women. Moreover, minimum wage laws improve women’s wages 
relative to those of men’s because there are more women at the bottom of the 
wage distribution (Jaumotte, 2003).
The literature on the minimum wage has focused on its effects on employment; 
scant attention has been paid to its impact on labor force participation (Boeri 
et al., 2008). Another limitation in the literature is that studies rarely consider 
employers’ possible substitution of non-cash for cash compensation as a way of 
avoiding the minimum wage requirements (Boeri et al., 2008). Regarding the 
effects of minimum wage on employment, Neumark and Wascher (2007) reviewed 
more than 100 empirical studies. Focusing on the most methodologically robust 
studies (85% of the total), they found a small negative effect of minimum wage 
on employment level. These results suggest that the minimum wage apparently 
has been set at a level modest enough to not have an important influence on 
female employment (Jaumotte, 2003).
Parental Leave. Maternity leave is a benefit provided by all the Latin American 
countries in our sample. In the majority of the countries, maternity leave benefits 
paid to the worker are financed mostly by governmental social security. In our 
sample, the countries that provided the longest maternity leave were Venezuela 
and Chile (18 weeks), while Honduras provided the shortest leave (10 weeks). 
In addition, paternity leave is provided by 8 of the 15 countries in our sample. 
Venezuela provides the longest paternity leave (14 days). Even when parental 
leave is funded by general tax revenue, the asymmetry between the lengths of 
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paid maternity and paternity leave generates a differential cost to employers when 
hiring men and women. This difference arises because with respect to the birth 
of a child, women are absent from their jobs longer than men, which means that 
the cost of hiring women is higher than the cost of hiring men.
A review of empirical studies on the effects of maternity leave in Europe, the 
United States, and Canada found that, over time, there has been an increase in 
women’s labor force participation before childbirth, an increase in the probability 
that a woman returns to the same employer after maternity leave, and some 
negative effects on wages (Boeri et al., 2008). 
Blau and Kahn (2013) found that so-called family-friendly policies in OECD 
countries (e.g., parental leave, part-time work entitlements, and childcare policies) 
increase female labor force participation and reduce the gender gap in labor 
force participation. The expansion of these policies explained about 28% of the 
decrease in U.S. women’s labor force participation relative to the corresponding 
values in other OECD countries (Blau and Kahn, 2013). However, the types of 
jobs at which American women work differ from women’s jobs in other OECD 
countries. Those polices seem to incentivize women to work part time and at 
lower level jobs compared to women in the United States (Blau and Kahn, 2013).
Taxes. Scholars generally agree that payroll taxes reduce formal employment in 
developing countries. In theory, the extent to which employment is influenced 
depends on how much of the amount (or proportion) of payroll tax can be passed 
on to the workers in the form of lower wages (Kugler and Kugler, 2009). The 
bulk of the empirical evidence concerns the effects of taxes on employment and 
wages; studies about the effects on labor force participation are rare and mostly 
set in developed countries. 
Heckman and Pagés (2003) found that payroll taxation in Latin America tended 
to reduce employment and increase unemployment rates. In Colombia, for 
instance, a 10% increase in payroll taxes in 1993 reduced formal employment by 
between 4% and 5% (Kugler and Kugler, 2009).
Some countries, such as the United States, offer a lower effective income tax rate 
to married couples (compared to single individuals), which is linked to the joint 
taxation of the couple. However, most countries tax individuals’ incomes. Guner 
et al. (2012) found through simulation exercises with U.S. data that a reform 
that changes taxation from joint filing by married couples (the current system) to 
separate filing (individual taxation) influences the labor supply. A transition from 
the current system to separate filing would increase the labor force participation 
of married women by about 10.4%, and it would increase by 18.1% for married 
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women with children. In the intensive margin, the aggregate hours worked by 
married women would increase by about 11.4%. The authors proposed that such 
a big change would occur because separate filing would greatly reduce the tax 
burden associated with female labor force participation (Guner et al., 2012). 
Using U.S.-based data, Eissa (2002) found that, after the Tax Reform Act of 
1986, which reduced the marginal tax rate paid by high-income married women 
by about 40%, the labor supply of this category of women increased by about 90 
hours per year. The hours worked elasticity of high-income women with respect 
to the after-tax wage was estimated to range from 0.6–0.8, with almost half of 
the total elasticity attributed to labor force participation (Eissa, 2002). 
Similarly, van Soest and Stancanelli (2010) found that a transition from joint 
to separate taxation for married couples would increase women’s labor force 
participation by 0.20 percentage points and their hours worked by 3.21%. 
3.8. Policies: Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) are intended to help children build human 
capital through educational enrollment, consistent school attendance, and 
periodic health checkups. CCT programs target the poorest households, which 
are geographically located mostly in rural areas. The household member who 
receives the cash transfer tends to be the mother of the target child because 
policymakers generally believe that mothers are more likely than fathers to 
promote children’s wellbeing based on their different preferences and priorities. 
Mexico’s Progresa (now Oportunidades) program is one of the first CCT programs 
in the world. It was launched in the 1990s, and there is evidence of its success 
at reducing poverty and increasing children’s schooling. Since then, many other 
Latin American countries, such as Brazil, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, the 
Dominican Republic, Peru, and others, have implemented CCTs as part of their 
poverty reduction strategies.
Economic theory does not predict an unequivocal effect of CCTs on labor 
force participation. On the one hand, there might be a negative effect on labor 
force participation, which can be explained by three reasons. First, when people 
receive unearned income, they have less incentive to work (due to disincentives 
to work through an income effect). Second, compliance with the conditionalities 
that require school attendance and periodic health examinations may be time-
consuming, which may reduce the amount of time available for work or leisure, 
particularly for women. For example, Parker and Skoufias (2000) found that 
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many women in the Progresa program reported spending their time transporting 
children to schools and clinics. Third, there may be a price effect: CCT 
beneficiaries may believe (correctly or incorrectly) that to remain eligible for a 
means-tested CCT program they need to work less to remain poor (Fiszbein et 
al., 2009). On the other hand, CCTs can have a positive impact on labor force 
participation. First, as the program conditionalities require children to attend 
school, time that their mothers had previously allocated to child care becomes 
available for work outside the home. Second, when children attend school, they 
cannot work as much; this decreases household income and increases the demand 
for income (generated by work) from adult household members. However, the 
strength of this relationship depends on the children’s unearned income relative 
to total household income. 
This review focuses on the adult female labor supply, but it is important to describe 
the ways in which CCTs influence child labor because they have implications 
for human capital accumulation, and thus, future labor market outcomes. The 
condition of the CCT mandating school attendance reduces households’ costs of 
schooling, which tends to increase the likelihood of schooling and the reduction 
of child labor (Parker and Skoufias, 2000). Moreover, mandating schooling as a 
condition may encourage parents to assign more value to education, and hence, 
decrease their children’s labor. The fact that the CCT increases households’ 
incomes necessarily lessens households’ dependence on children’s income from 
work and decreases the children’s labor (Fiszbein et al., 2009).
Empirically, most studies have found a reduction of child labor caused by 
CCT payments. Edmonds and Schady (2012) found that, in Ecuador’s Bono 
de Desarrollo Humano program, a cash transfer of less than 20% of the median 
child labor earnings significantly reduced child labor activities. The children in 
households that were induced to participate in the program experienced reduced 
paid employment by about 78% and unpaid economic activities inside their 
home by about 32%. 
Parker and Skoufias (2000) found that Mexico’s Progresa program reduced 
child labor among older children, particularly boys. Overall work participation, 
including household work (chores), farm activities, and market activities, among 
boys aged 12–17 years significantly decreased by 4 percentage points from a pre-
program level of 55%. This reduction in work participation correlates with the 
increase in school participation, providing positive evidence of the substitution 
of school for work in this setting. The Progresa program reduced 8–17-year-old 
girls’ labor force participation by 1.3 percentage points from a pre-treatment level 
of 8.6% and reduced boys’ labor force participation by 3.1 percentage points 
from a pre-treatment level of 22.4%. The largest reduction in girls’ labor activities 
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was in the extent of their domestic work, which was about a 10% reduction in 
participation, although there was no a significant reduction in the number of 
hours spent doing domestic work. Similarly, an evaluation of the Progresa program 
conducted by Sadoulet et al. (2004)13 found that, for children aged 12–14 years, 
participation in Progresa reduced the probability that boys worked by 7 percentage 
points, on average, which represents a 23% decrease. For girls, the reduction was 6 
percentage points, on average, which represented a 50% decrease.
Skoufias and Parker (2001) presented interesting findings about girls’ schooling: 
the increase in school attendance due to participation in the Progresa program 
was much greater for girls than for boys, which is similar to the findings of 
other studies (e.g., Sadoulet et al., 2004). For 8–17 year olds, the average effect of 
participation in the Progresa program on school attendance for girls was almost 
twice that of boys (a 4 percentage point increase for girls versus a 2.2 percentage 
point increase for boys). For girls aged 12–17, the Progresa program increased 
school attendance by 7 percentage points (about a 14% increase), up from the 
pre-program level of 51%.
3.9. Policies: subsidies to child care
Many countries around the world, including those in Latin America, have 
increased provisions of subsidized child care. The evidence regarding the 
effects of these programs on labor supply is usually positive but heterogeneous. 
Childcare facilities can be provided through childcare subsidies, as in Sweden 
(Lundin, Mörk, and Öckert, 2008) and Norway (Havnes and Mogstad, 2011); 
by building new childcare centers, as in Argentina (Berlinski and Galiani, 2007) 
and Chile (Medrano, 2009); or by providing after-school care, as in Switzerland 
(Felfe, Lecher, and Thielman, 2013). 
Subsidized childcare services have positive effects on labor supply, but these 
results are difficult to generalize. Akgunduz and Plantenga (2011) argued that the 
elasticity of childcare prices has an inverted U-shape that depends on the initial 
characteristics of each country. They theorized that a reduction in childcare 
costs might not have significant effects in countries with low female labor force 
participation or in countries already having high female labor force participation 
rates. Countries having high rates of female labor force participation before 
13 Sadoulet et al. (2004) pointed out that their coefficients are consistent with the findings of 
Skoufias and Parker (2001), although they are slightly larger. The reasons for the difference 
are that Sadoulet et al.’s (2004) analysis controlled for child fixed-effects, estimated Progresa’s 
impact in each round instead of for each year, and estimated the impact on the round in 
2000 after the control group was incorporated.
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implementation of a childcare program do not have much room for improvement. 
Lundin et al. (2008) found that, in Sweden, a considerable reduction in public 
childcare prices did not translate into an increase in female paid labor, mainly 
because Sweden has been a frontrunner in providing public child care since the 
1960s and has had consistently high levels of mothers’ labor supply. However, 
countries with low labor force participation may have some characteristics that 
prevent significant changes related to these policies. These countries tend to have 
traditional norms and/or rigid institutions that would prevent the program from 
generating a large effect. Del Boca and Vuri (2006) emphasized that, in Italy, 
the presence of a high-quality childcare system did not translate into a higher 
probability of employment. They argued that Italy’s rigid labor market, with 
most of its employment being full-time, is incompatible with a childcare system 
that offers partial coverage during the day. 
Childcare programs should have a greater effect in countries with relatively low 
labor force participation and with labor markets that are somewhat flexible. 
Childcare subsidies can liberate mothers to enter the labor market. The provision 
of less expensive child care has been found to positively influence female labor 
force participation in Canada (Lefebvre, Merrigan, and Verstraete 2009), France 
(Goux and Maurin, 2010), Argentina (Berlinski and Galiani, 2007; Berlinski, 
Galiani, and McEwan, 2011), and Germany (Bauernschuster and Schilotter, 
2013). Childcare policies also are associated with long-term effects in countries 
such as Canada (Lefebvre et al., 2009) and Spain (Nollemberg and Rodrigues-
Planas, 2011). The reduction of time spent outside the labor force leads to better 
opportunities to find a job and better long-term prospects for the mother. 
Scholars believe that the main driver of these positive results is the behavior 
of some subgroups of women, particularly women with children, who, in the 
absence of the program, would face much higher childcare costs. Cascio (2006) 
found a positive effect of public schooling on maternal labor supply among single 
mothers with young children but not on married mothers. In general, studies on 
countries like Canada (Lefebvre et al., 2009) and France (Goux and Maurin, 
2010) have found that the specific targets of childcare subsidies are vulnerable 
population groups, including single and relatively less-educated mothers.
3.10. Preferences: culture and religion
A society’s prevailing values and its ideas about women’s roles are influenced by 
culture (and sometimes by religion). These factors can shape women’s preferences 
and aspirations, thereby influencing their decisions regarding labor force 
participation.
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Culture. Culture can be defined as a set of preferences and beliefs. Economists have 
worked to rationalize the ways that culture and gender roles influence women’s labor 
force participation. The economics of identity aim to study culture and preferences in 
an economic theory framework, specifically the ways that identity, or a person’s sense 
of self, influences economic outcomes. For example, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) 
argued that women tend to dominate jobs that match female gender characteristics, 
and they avoid male professions because of male gender associations. Similarly, men 
tend to avoid so-called women’s professions. These scholars propose that the U.S. 
women’s movement of the 1960s and 1970s included goals to deconstruct societal 
notions of femininity and disengage gender from tasks, both in the home and the 
workplace. The social changes resulting from that movement lessened women’s 
gains in identity from homemaking and lessened their identity loss from working 
at a so-called man’s job, both of which increased female labor force participation 
and decreased occupational gender segregation. In this identity theory of gender in 
the workplace, the decrease in occupational gender segregation between 1970 and 
199 in the United States can be interpreted as primarily having been caused by the 
widespread changes in social norms related to gender.
Social attitudes toward working women influence married women’s labor force 
participation. Fernández (2013) studied the function of cultural changes generating 
the sharp increase in married women’s labor force participation in the United States 
during the twentieth century. She modeled the changes in culture as emerging from 
a learning process, in which married women compared the benefits of increased 
consumption from labor earnings with the anticipated utility cost of working. Her 
model generated a time-based trend of married women’s labor force participation 
that correlates with the historical path observed in the US over the past 120 years.
Studying the descendants of immigrants helps isolate the effects of other factors 
while examining culture’s particular role in decisions about participation in the 
labor market. For example, second-generation Americans share economic and 
institutional characteristics with their fellow Americans; however, they do not 
necessarily share the mainstream culture because they are likely influenced by their 
parents’ cultural preferences and beliefs from the country of origin. Fernández 
and Fogli (2009) exploited this idea by exploring culture’s role in determining the 
work outcomes of second-generation American women. The authors employed 
the 1970 U.S. census and used the female labor force participation rates for 
1950 and the total fertility rates of the parents’ countries as proxy measures of 
cultural preferences and beliefs about women’s roles. The results indicated that 
women whose parents were born in countries where women had relatively higher 
participation in the workforce tended to work more. A one standard deviation 
increase in labor force participation in 1950 was associated with a nearly 7.5% 
increase in the numbers of hours women worked per week in 1970.
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A married woman’s decision to work may be influenced by her husband’s preferences 
and belies gender roles. Fernández et al. (2004) found that the probability that a 
man’s wife was in the labor force was correlated with whether his mother had 
worked, controlling for background characteristics. They further found that the 
probability that a married woman was in the labor force full-time was about 24–32 
percentage points higher when her husband’s mother had worked for at least one 
year when he was a child. In addition, they found an intergenerational channel 
such that a one-week increase in the average female labor supply led to an increase 
of 1.67 weeks worked by females in the next generation. Similarly, Del Boca et al. 
(2000) found that when the husband became unemployed, the wife’s employment 
response was mediated by her attitudes toward work, which were proxied by 
whether the wife’s mother had worked or her mother-in-law had worked at her age. 
From this perspective, cultural norms present an obstacle to overcoming poverty. 
If the cultural beliefs that women should not work outside the home are strong and 
the household is poor, their effects are likely to make it difficult for the household 
to overcome poverty. Notwithstanding the type of economic shock that may hit a 
poor household, the wife would remain unlikely to enter the labor force.
Religion. Religion carries its own set of preferences and beliefs that potentially 
influence women’s decisions about participation in the labor force. Religion is of 
particular interest in Latin America because it is a traditionally Catholic region 
where the church has an important and strong influence on daily life. Considering 
the 15 countries in our sample, on average, about 72% of the population of each 
country is reportedly Catholic. Guiso et al. (2003) analyzed data from 66 countries 
and found that religious people tended to have less favorable attitudes toward 
working women. In Latin America, there is a slightly negative relationship between 
labor force participation and the size of the practicing Catholic proportion of the 
population. Indeed, the highest rate of female labor force participation exists in the 
country with the lowest proportion of practicing Catholics.
Women’s Labor Participation Differs by Faith. Studies have found that Protestants 
tend to work more hours, on average, than people of other religions. Pastore and 
Tenaglia (2013) used data from European countries and found that active Catholic 
women tended to work fewer hours than the average, and non-active Protestant 
women tend to work more hours than the average. They further found a strong 
negative association between the proportion of individuals belonging to the 
Catholic Church and the proportion of women participating in the labor force. 
Feldmann (2007) examined data from 80 countries to investigate whether 
the Protestant religion influenced labor market outcomes and found that the 
countries in which the majority of the population practiced Protestantism had 
significantly higher labor force participation rates, particularly among women. 
Compared to countries dominated by other religions, labor participation rates 
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in Protestant-dominated countries were between 11 and 12.8 percentage points 
higher, adjusting for other factors that influence labor market outcomes, such as 
labor laws, GDP growth, and so on. The Protestant virtue of hard and diligent 
work seems to have become part of national culture in places where Protestantism 
dominates (Feldman, 2007).
Ultimately, the decision to participate in the labor market is influenced by 
both culture and religion, among other factors in the social environment. It 
is challenging to disentangle the effects of one from the others because they 
are deeply interrelated in people’s lives. The dominant religion of a country, 
particularly religions with historical traditions, can shape the national culture 
and influence even those who practice minority religions. Religious values are 
transmitted from generation to generation—not always in the form of deep 
convictions but rather as a force of habit (Guiso et al., 2003).
4. An assessment of the relative importance 
of the determinants
To assess the relative merits of the various explanations for female labor force 
participation, two independent strategies were undertaken. First, portions of 
the literature were summarized and analyzed with measures of changes in some 
determinants of the labor supply. Second, household data were analyzed with policy 
variables to reveal correlates between the determinants of these explanatory variables.
4.1. Meta-analysis
A literature search was conducted between September 2014 and March 2015. To 
avoid publication bias, published and unpublished papers were searched in several 
databases14 using a predefined set of keywords.15 The criteria that determined study 
inclusion were as follows: (1) Papers that provided estimations of causal effects of 
a given determinant on the extensive or intensive margins of labor supply were 
included, and (2) the chosen studies were required to provide sufficient information 
to compute effect sizes. Studies were excluded when (1) they were unrelated to 
labor force participation and instead examined employment or unemployment 
14 These included Econlit, JStor, Repec, SSRN, NBER, AEA, Google Scholar, the Inter-
American Development Bank working papers series, and the World Bank databases.
15 The keywords included “female” (“labor supply,” “labor force participation,” or “hours 
worked”) and a set of words (listed in Figure 6.1) related to the determinants of labor supply.
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status outcomes, (2) they were theoretical papers, (3) the estimation methods 
employed therein did not distinguish among the effects of the covariates on the 
outcome, (4) they were book reviews, policy recommendation reports, or strictly 
descriptive analyses, and (5) they were non-quantitative research reports. These 
restrictions meant that some topics were excluded from the meta-analysis (such 
as education, discrimination, and preferences), and some of the papers discussed 
in the previous section were excluded.16
Figure 6.6 shows the evolution of the average female labor force participation in 
Latin America, educational attainment (years of education), marriage rates (the 
proportion of women living with a spouse or partner in the total population), 
and fertility (total number of children), between 1992 and 2012. All the series 
are normalized to one in 1992. Education increased in tandem with labor force 
participation, marriage generally remained constant, and fertility declined. 
Tables 6.2a and 6.2b in the Appendix provide a set of disaggregated statistics on 
these possible determinants of labor force participation.
16 These include, for example, Aguero and Marks (2011), Berlinski and Galiani (2007), Cristia 
(2008), Cruces and Galiani (2007), Del Boca (2015), Dinkelman (2011), Galiani and McEwan 
(2013), Grogan and Sadanand (2012), Klonner and Nolen (2010), and Lehman (2014).
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Figure 6.6: Labor supply and joint decisions variables
Latin America, 1992-2012
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: All index series are normalized in terms of the first year (1992).
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The analysis did not estimate causal effects of educational attainment on labor 
supply. However, it should be noted that, in Latin America, countries have 
continually and substantially expanded access to basic education since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. A large part of that expansion has been 
driven by policies related to education per se and not the female labor supply 
(Bassi, Busso, and Muñoz, 2015). Accordingly, it is likely that improved access to 
education is one of the drivers of higher rates of female labor force participation.
Figure 6.7 presents the effect sizes of the meta-analysis of the marriage-related 
variables on labor supply. Each data point (the diamond shapes within the figure) 
shows an effect size; that is, it illustrates the percentage change in labor supply 
divided by the percentage change in the dependent variable. Figure 6.7 shows a 
95% confidence interval for each effect size. The legend on the right-hand side 
of the graph in Figure 6.7 provides information about the country in which the 
study was conducted, the identity of the independent or dependent variable that 
underwent a change, and a number within parentheses associated with Table 6.3 
in the Appendix, indicating details of additional studies as references. 
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Figure 6.7: Effect sizes of marriage on female labor supply
Source: own calculations based on literature analysis.
Note: * Semi-elasticity, ** Because of scale the lower IC of paper number 98 is not shown.
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Spousal wages and healthcare coverage were negatively related to labor outcomes, 
and an increase in the risk of divorce was associated with an increase in female 
labor force participation. Those results are consistent with the analyses of the 
mechanisms described in Section 3, where we noted that the research literature 
tends to find small or weak effects of changes in marriage rates on female labor 
supply and positive associations of divorce on female labor force participation. 
These facts, together with the observation that marriage rates have changed little 
in the region, suggest that marriage-related variables cannot completely explain 
the long-term observed trends in female labor supply in Latin America.
Figure 6.8 presents the evolution of female labor force participation with three 
selected technology variables: prevalence of contraception (health technology), 
use of appliances in the home (home technology), and availability of electricity 
(home technologies). Access to health and home technologies has increased in 
Latin America. The reasons previous studies found a negative effect of childbearing 
and a positive effect of delaying childbearing on the female labor supply were 
discussed in the literature review (see Section 3.4). It was concluded that the 
studies found significant effects of health technologies on the labor supply. In 
particular, access to and use of contraceptive methods (i.e., the pill) has likely 
had a positive effect; access to technologies that save time during a child’s infancy 
(i.e., formula) has likely also had a positive effect on the labor supply. Access to 
abortion, however, is an unlikely explanation in the Latin American context 
because it is illegal in most Latin American countries.
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Figure 6.8: Labor supply and technology variables 
Latin America, 1992-2012
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: All index series are normalized in terms of the first year (1992).
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Figure 6.9 presents the effect sizes of changes in fertility and health technology 
variables on the female labor supply. The figure illustrates that, generally, there 
apparently is a negative relationship between the total fertility rate and the female 
labor supply with, sometimes, very large effect sizes. Additionally, access to health 
technology apparently has a positive effect on labor outcomes. These findings, 
together with the observations that fertility rates have declined and access to 
health technology has increased in Latin America, suggest that these two causal 
variables might explain an important part of the increase in labor supply.
Figure 6.10 presents the effect sizes of changes in home and work technology 
variables on the female labor supply. Generally, the effects are small and vary 
in direction. As pointed out by Goldin (2014), work technologies that allow for 
flexible working hours have not yet changed significantly in developed countries, 
and it is very likely that they have not changed in Latin America. Thus, we give 
little credibility to that explanation. However, the use of home technologies has 
dramatically changed. Even so, the effect sizes appear to be on the lower side of the 
distribution. Therefore, these factors probably do not explain much of the increase 
in the female labor supply since 1990. Some studies have found positive changes 
in women’s labor activities after increased access to specific time-saving home 
-1.2-1.4
3
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2
Effect size
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Labor Force Participation 
97 countries | Total fertility rate (72)
97 countries | Total fertility rate (71)
97 countries | Total fertility rate (65)
97 countries | Total fertility rate (69)
97 countries | Total fertility rate (70)
97 countries | Total fertility rate (68)
97 countries | Total fertility rate (66)
97 countries | Total fertility rate (64)
97 countries | Total fertility rate (67)
97 countries | Total fertility rate (63)
U.S. | Contraceptive pill access* (59)
U.S. | Contraceptive pill access* (60)
U.S. | Contraceptive pill access* (59)
U.S. | Contraceptive pill access* (59)
U.S. | Contraceptive pill access* (61)
U.S. | Contraceptive pill access* (62)
U.S. | Contraceptive pill access* (58)
U.S. | Contraceptive pill access* (58)
U.S. | Contraceptive pill access* (62)
U.S. | Contraceptive pill access* (61)
Denmark | Having children (10 years)* (73)
Denmark | Having children (current year)* (74)
U.S. | having more than two children* (57)
U.S. | having more than two children* (55)
U.S. | having more than two children* (54)
U.S. | having more than two children* (58)
Hours Worked
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
Figure 6.9: Effect sizes of fertility and health technologies
Source: own calculations based on literature analysis.
Note: * Semi-elasticity.
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appliances (washer, dryer, and freezer). Access to public services, such as electricity 
and in-home high-speed Internet, has been associated with increases in women’s 
labor force participation. Similarly, Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2007) found 
a negative relationship between commuting time in U.S. metropolitan areas and 
women’s labor force participation. Despite the small effect sizes, it is reasonable 
that access to home technologies might explain some portion of the increases in 
female labor force participation before the 1990s, when most of the innovations 
and expansions in electricity occurred in Latin America. It might also explain why 
the labor supply gap between poorer and richer households shrunk: the former are 
usually the last to incorporate technological advancements in their households.
Figure 6.11 shows the effect sizes of changes in macroeconomic conditions on 
the labor supply. The effects are generally small, and as the literature review 
revealed, macroeconomic conditions vary in the short term and are more likely 
explanations of cyclical changes than of long-term trends in the female labor 
supply. However, macroeconomic variables are positively related with female labor 
force outcomes. Olivetti (2013) found a positive relationship between GPD and 
labor force participation. Being in a financial crisis was associated with a decrease 
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Figure 6.10: Effect sizes of home and work technology
Source: own calculations based on literature analysis.
Note: * Semi-elasticity, ** Because of scale the upper IC of paper number 127 is not shown.
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in women’s labor force participation, and in developed countries, recovery from 
macroeconomic shocks was associated with an increase in female work hours.
Figure 6.12 describes the evolution of the female labor supply compared to the ratio 
of female to male wages (a crude measure of labor market discrimination). During 
the past 20 years, this type of discrimination has decreased, although the decline has 
stagnated recently. There are no studies estimating the extent to which a decrease in 
the wage gap influences the female labor supply. As the literature review suggested, 
the effects of discrimination on the female labor supply operate via a number of 
channels. The most obvious one is that discrimination changes the comparative 
advantage of men and women to work outside the home. Therefore, it is expected 
that changes in discrimination would increase female labor force participation.
Figure 6.13 describes the evolution of the female labor supply in contrast to a 
set of policy variables. Preschool enrollment has dramatically increased in the 
region. In addition, the number of CCT beneficiaries has tripled since the early 
2000s, and tax compliance has increased in the past decade.
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Figure 6.11: Effect size of changes in labor returns (macroeconomic 
conditions)
Source: own calculations based on literature analysis.
Note: * Semi-elasticity, ** Because of scale the upper IC of paper number 82 is not shown.
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Figure 6.12: Labor supply and labor returns (discrimination) 
Latin America, 1992-2012
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: All index series are normalized in terms of the first year (1992).
Figure 6.13: Labor supply and policy variables
Latin America, 1992-2012
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: All index series are normalized in terms of the first year: 1992 for Female Labor 
Participation and preschool enrolment rate, 2001 for CCT beneficiaries, and 2004 for 
tax compliance.
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Figure 6.14 shows the effect sizes of changes in labor laws on the female labor 
supply. The results of empirical studies suggest that the effects of labor laws are 
mixed, with some finding that maternal leave is associated with an increase in 
women’s labor force participation, and others finding that other policies, such as 
unemployment insurance or the minimum wage, are negatively associated with 
women’s labor force participation (see Section 3.7). Regardless, the effects appear 
to be small.
Figure 6.15 shows the effect sizes of changes in taxation on the female labor 
supply. There is a positive relationship between tax reduction and female labor 
supply across a wide range of studies. Countries where these changes have been 
implemented (e.g., the United States and Canada) have experienced an increase 
in female labor force participation (see Section 3.7).
As Figure 6.13 illustrates, CCTs have become very popular in Latin America. 
Figure 6.16 summarizes the effect sizes of CCTs on the female labor supply. 
The analysis of the literature on the effects of the programs showed that the 
actual effect of CCTs on labor force participation must be empirically tested. 
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Figure 6.14: Effect size of labor regulations on female labor supply
Source: own calculations based on literature analysis.
Note: * Semi-elasticity.
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In the United States, the potential disincentives were the main reasons for the 
so-called welfare reform (Fiszbein et al., 2009). In Latin America, one set of 
impact evaluations of CCTs on the female labor supply mostly found small 
and insignificant effects. Regarding Mexico’s Progresa program, there were no 
statistically significant effects on women’s labor force participation and hours 
worked (Alzúa et al., 2012; Parker and Skoufias, 2000; Skoufias and di Maro, 
2006). Nicaragua’s CCT program, Red de Protección Social, also had no effect 
on female labor force participation or number of hours worked (Maluccio and 
Flores, 2005). Another set of more recent evaluations found small negative effects. 
In Honduras, Novella et al. (2012) found a very small decrease in maternal labor 
participation (about 3 percentage points). Fernández and Saldarriaga (2014) 
found a negative effect on female labor force participation in Peru. Similarly, 
three studies on Nicaragua found negative impacts of CCTs on the number 
of hours worked. A similar negative effect was found in Uruguay. Gasparini et 
al. (2015) found that an income transfer program in Argentina created a small 
disincentive for female labor force participation. Finally, only one study found a 
small positive effect on the number of weekly hours worked (about 0.5 hours) by 
female beneficiaries of Progresa in Mexico (Alzúa et al., 2012).
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Figure 6.15: Effect size of taxes on female labor supply
Source: own calculations based on literature analysis. 
Note: * Semi-elasticity.
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Most of the effect sizes reported in Figure 6.16 cannot reject an effect of zero, 
although most of the estimates tend to be negative. Fiszbein et al. (2009) 
proposed that the very small or entire lack of effects of CCTs on the adult 
labor supply could be attributed to the very low-income elasticity of leisure 
among poor households (the recipients of CCTs). Another reason could be that 
fulfilling the conditionalities creates costs for the household that equal or are 
higher than the amount of the transfer. In addition, it may be that the transfers 
received by the households are perceived to be so temporary that the recipients 
do not believe there is a reason to change their labor supply behaviors. These 
mechanisms should operate differently over time. As CCT programs mature, 
program beneficiaries become accustomed to satisfy the conditionalities, and the 
cost of doing so decreases over time. Similarly, they start perceiving the transfer 
as permanent rather than temporary, allowing the income effect to dominate. 
In addition, Ribas and Veras (2011) found that a differential impact of receiving 
the transfer depended on place of residence. Although transfers negatively 
influenced women’s labor supply in urban areas, women’s labor supply in rural 
areas reacted positively. CCT programs typically start in rural areas and later 
expand into urban areas; with time, the negative effect on labor supply should 
dominate. In sum, it is likely that the expansion of CCTs in the region did not 
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Figure 6.16: Effect size of CCTs on female labor supply
Source: own calculations based on literature analysis. 
Note: * Semi-elasticity.
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cause a decrease in labor force participation when the programs were launched; 
however, the expansion seems to have halted the positive trend in female labor 
force participation in Latin America.
On the other hand, preschool expansion is likely to have increased women’s 
participation in the labor force. Figure 6.17 summarizes the effect sizes of access 
to child care on the female labor supply. 
The empirical studies tend to find a positive and relatively large effect on labor 
force participation or the number of weekly hours worked.17 Considering these 
results together with the expansion of the childcare provision in Latin America, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the expansion of these services has encouraged 
women to enter the labor force.
17 However, there are some exceptions. Contreras et al. (2010) found that extending the length 
of the school day reduced the number of hours worked by women in Chile. Using data for 
the United States, Cascio (2006) found that public preschools for 5–6 year old children 
did not affect the labor supply of mothers with eligible children. The only effect is on more 
vulnerable populations. 
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Figure 6.17: Effect sizes of child care on female labor supply
Source: own calculations based on literature analysis. 
Note: * Semi-elasticity. 
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4.2. Correlates of female labor supply
Examining correlations in the data is an alternative method for studying the 
relative importance of the determinants of female labor supply. To do so, a panel 
dataset of 15 countries was built for the period 1990–2010 and correlations were 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares in the following model:
where ∆Yct is the annual change in the outcome Yct of country c in year t, ∆Zct is 
the change in a plausible determinant of the female labor supply, Xct is a vector 
that includes indicator variables for extrapolation and methodological changes in 
the surveys, and εct is the error term. Two outcomes of Yct were examined: female 
labor force participation and average total numbers of hours worked by women. 
In addition, these measures were disaggregated by different characteristics 
(income, education, children in the household, and household structure).
The vector Zct includes: (1) the log of the average number of years of education, 
(2) the proportion of married women (or women living with a partner) aged 
between 18 and 55 years, (3) the log of the women’s average number of children, 
(4) the log of fulltime wages, (5) the ratio of female to male wages, (6) the average 
age of children in the household, (7) the percentage of women responsible for 
an elderly person, (8) an index of children attending school,18 (9) an index of 
appliances in the household,19 (10) the percentage of married women that use 
contraception, (11) the percentage of non-practicing Catholics in the country, 
(12) GDP growth, and (13) an indicator variable of the presence of any CCT 
program in the country. Table 6.4 of the Appendix provides complete detail 
on the loading factors of the variables that were built using factor models. The 
standard errors were clustered at the country level. Table 6.5 shows the results. 
Education is positively related to female labor force participation, particularly 
for women in higher income households, single women, and women with young 
children. Marriage is not significantly correlated with participation. An increase 
in fertility tends to reduce participation, on average. This negative effect is 
present in all groups of women, except those in the first quintile of the income 
18 This index is based on a factor model that included the percentage of households with 
children enrolled at school, the net enrollment rates at preprimary and primary schools, and 
the gross enrollment rate at secondary schools. Table 6.4 of the Appendix provides details on 
the estimations and properties of these indices.
19 This index was created using a factor model that includes the percentage of households with 
various appliances (e.g., washing machine, car, motorcycle, and electricity).
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distribution. An increase in wages and a reduction in discrimination apparently 
induce women to be in the labor force, although the effects are not statistically 
significant. When children attend school, women tend to work more than when 
children are not attending school, suggesting that the expansion of preschools 
and schools in Latin America may have played an important part in the increase 
of the female labor supply. Moreover, a higher prevalence of home appliances in 
the household is associated with higher participation rates. Similarly, a higher 
prevalence of modern contraceptive methods is positively correlated with the 
female labor supply. Neither culture nor the presence of a CCT program in 
the country is correlated with the labor supply. Finally, the effect of GDP is 
particularly important given how high GDP growth has been in the region since 
2003. There is an overall negative and significant correlation between GDP 
growth and female labor force participation. Moreover, this negative correlation 
is much stronger for women in the lower quintile of the income distribution 
(of their husbands) and for less educated women. It is, thus, very likely that 
the recent stagnation in the increase of female labor force participation in Latin 
America and the slower convergence between the participation of women in 
different groups can be partly explained by the higher rates of economic growth 
experienced in the region. 
5. Discussion and conclusion
Four major stylized facts of female labor supply were examined in this 
chapter. First, there has been a long-term positive trend in female labor force 
participation. Second, there was virtually no change in the intensive margin 
(hours worked). Third, the region recently experienced stagnation in female labor 
force participation, and fourth, there has been some convergence between the 
disadvantaged (poor, less educated, and rural) and the advantaged (rich, more 
educated, and urban) groups within countries. However, this convergence also 
seems to have stopped in recent years.
Using a general conceptual framework, a set of determinants was extracted that 
might influence female labor force participation, and the mechanisms that might 
explain those effects were analyzed. Some of these determinants are individual 
behaviors that are jointly determined (by the individuals) with labor supply, such 
as education, marriage, and fertility choices. Other determinants are outside the 
control of the individual, such as returns to work at home, returns to work outside 
the home for a wage, technologies (health, home, and work), preferences, and 
decision-making structures. Considering this framework, a meta-analysis and 
cross-country regression analysis were performed to assess each determinant’s 
relative importance to explaining the factors.
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Table 6.6 summarizes the results. The positive long-term trends that began in the 
1950s were likely driven by the expansion of health and home technologies and 
by cultural changes that operate over a long period. These two social changes, 
together with policies that expanded educational opportunities, increased 
educational attainment and reduced fertility, which had a positive feedback 
effect on female labor force participation.
Table 6.6: Summary of importance of determinants
Determinants
Change in 
Latin America 
between 1990 
and 2010
Contributor 
to long-term 
(1950-2010) 
female labor 
supply increase
Contributor 
to long-term 
(1990-2010) 
female labor 
supply increase
Contributor to 
convergence 
between 
advantage and 
disadvantaged 
group
Contributor 
to recent 
stagnation
Education Increased Likely Likely Likely Unlikely
Marriage Stable Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely
Fertility Decrease Likely Likely Likely Unlikely
Technology
Health 
(Contraceptives, 
Formula)
Increase Likely Likely Unknown Unlikely
Home (Appliances, 
electricity)
Increase Likely Unlikely Likely Unlikely
Work (telework) Probably stable Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely
Labor Returns
Gender 
Discrimination
Slight decrease, 
stagnated in 
2000s
Unlikely Likely Likely Likely
Macroeconomic 
conditions
-- Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Likely
Policies
Labor Regulations Stable Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely
Taxation
Stable (slight 
improvement in 
2000s)
Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely
CCTs
Large increase 
since mid-1990s
Unlikely Unlikely Unlikely Likely
Child care Large increase Likely Likely Likely Unlikely
Culture
Better for 
women
Likely Likely Likely Unlikely
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys and 
literature analysis.
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Generally, these long-term trends continued through the 1990s. However, over 
the past three decades, there have been significant increases in the provision 
of subsidized child care, which likely explain the increase in female labor 
force participation over that period and the convergence between the female 
labor supply of poor and/or rural households with that of richer and/or urban 
households. The recent stagnation is likely caused in part by the higher rates of 
economic growth experienced in the region, the expansion of CCT programs 
and continuing gender discrimination in the region.
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Table 6.1: Female labor force participation statistics
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Early 1990s
Argentina 57.52 44.86 55.95 48.25 60.08 83.01 42.09 49.81 58.97 51.72 80.70 18.42
Bolivia 66.53 76.48 49.54 65.71 55.96 85.91 63.55 65.07 64.68 62.92 88.80 40.75
Brazil 61.65 57.57 52.78 57.14 72.34 86.04 56.93 60.60 59.79 57.73 76.69 20.94
Chile 45.29 24.99 44.14 35.72 50.64 76.23 32.08 37.24 41.76 39.74 70.88 46.00
Costa Rica 40.80 21.13 39.95 32.06 55.95 74.86 30.38 35.53 36.94 33.92 68.58 40.69
Ecuador 59.39 40.82 60.79 53.22 65.51 87.29 56.56 57.55 55.45 55.72 78.96 40.44
El Salvador 53.12 32.19 55.20 48.70 77.07 89.02 42.67 49.42 50.40 46.86 69.89 24.01
Honduras 41.08 27.24 40.92 34.75 67.76 78.79 33.60 36.72 39.71 35.01 61.26 45.78
Mexico 42.61 31.65 38.18 36.72 58.09 76.81 34.50 37.63 39.47 36.96 68.78 37.86
Nicaragua 55.71 32.85 51.06 51.93 73.09 89.98 48.54 51.80 54.02 48.59 78.58 48.12
Panama 49.54 26.46 55.31 34.87 65.89 87.42 38.96 44.46 47.52 43.22 70.70 40.44
Paraguay 58.06 36.16 57.22 52.73 70.84 87.61 49.96 53.49 54.30 53.05 79.25 25.00
Peru 71.42 66.33 67.58 69.70 67.77 84.47 67.40 70.61 70.56 68.91 88.22 41.21
Uruguay 68.20 57.07 63.91 62.43 79.85 94.28 61.73 64.18 64.31 64.83 86.15 39.67
Venezuela 52.61 33.65 50.33 43.85 65.88 87.12 43.50 47.35 47.93 45.86 73.77 39.08
LAC Average 54.90 40.63 52.19 48.52 65.78 84.59 46.83 50.76 52.39 49.67 76.08 36.56
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Early 2010s
Argentina 68.10 50.98 70.07 55.17 67.54 88.85 57.26 62.00 70.56 62.88 85.97 21.73
Bolivia 74.73 73.27 63.71 74.29 68.61 86.29 66.59 73.51 77.21 70.65 90.22 45.03
Brazil 70.12 59.68 69.31 61.24 76.57 86.80 65.30 69.41 68.82 67.25 79.24 24.18
Chile 60.54 45.09 55.54 47.24 62.39 84.02 51.60 56.01 57.78 54.31 80.72 40.94
Costa Rica 58.61 39.68 58.34 48.14 68.32 86.78 47.30 52.25 56.43 51.92 77.24 40.00
Ecuador 63.01 47.57 57.22 55.30 65.74 88.20 54.14 59.41 60.90 57.18 85.26 39.35
El Salvador 60.94 41.14 57.70 54.99 72.33 88.73 48.86 58.48 60.47 55.17 74.95 43.01
Honduras 52.17 33.72 52.32 46.61 67.86 88.02 42.17 48.90 51.49 46.39 68.58 38.16
Mexico 55.67 41.72 49.63 49.43 62.14 79.22 42.97 50.92 54.63 50.33 76.68 39.87
Nicaragua 57.46 47.42 48.48 50.82 69.36 86.41 51.50 55.26 58.45 51.32 78.54 44.47
Panama 63.08 41.79 66.54 49.30 69.61 89.46 53.38 57.92 62.97 57.27 79.40 38.86
Paraguay 66.37 57.56 62.22 59.41 73.19 91.86 58.16 63.66 64.98 63.28 77.40 28.02
Peru 77.11 80.99 69.65 76.55 72.95 83.75 71.37 77.83 78.77 74.98 88.72 41.30
Uruguay 78.44 68.30 79.06 71.98 86.70 95.57 72.51 75.70 79.54 75.04 90.35 37.82
Venezuela 67.49 54.14 63.56 56.69 66.25 88.87 58.59 65.02 66.03 62.54 81.64 37.88
LAC Average 64.92 52.20 61.56 57.14 69.97 87.52 56.11 61.75 64.60 60.03 80.99 37.38
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Notes: CSA refers to children’s legal starting school age and CFA refers to legal 
children’s finishing school age, for more details see Bassi, Busso, and Muñoz (2015). 
Table 6.2.a: Possible determinants
Average 
years of 
Education 
Number of 
Children
Shared 
Married 
Women
Contraceptive 
Prevalence
Households 
with electricity
Ratio wage 
(women/men)
Preschool 
enrolment 
rate
Catholic 
non-practicing
Early 1990s
Argentina 10.70 1.89 93.08 52.06 99.61 0.99 48.82 57.66
Bolivia 6.60 2.91 73.25 19.30 71.86 0.78 34.23 56.52
Brazil 5.93 2.22 -- 67.48 92.13 0.77 54.61 47.35
Chile 9.40 2.05 63.54 51.82 96.17 0.77 89.75 49.62
Costa Rica 7.65 2.48 57.13 66.94 96.97 0.97 33.59 49.80
Ecuador 7.63 2.90 64.30 46.30 91.03 0.80 47.36 38.10
El Salvador 5.24 2.66 34.30 48.36 76.75 0.76 26.06 43.15
Honduras 5.45 3.19 57.40 38.78 70.09 0.91 13.75 37.33
Mexico 6.70 2.81 74.77 56.76 95.85 0.80 65.15 13.17
Nicaragua 4.96 3.31 60.35 50.26 76.21 0.86 16.45 34.02
Panama 9.36 2.33 39.22 52.44 -- 0.91 63.15 35.00
Paraguay 7.67 2.71 72.53 40.38 92.74 0.79 14.33 56.23
Peru 7.11 2.85 49.41 37.92 73.66 0.81 33.74 52.02
Uruguay 8.93 1.93 64.89 74.12 98.58 0.80 42.32 38.82
Venezuela 8.11 2.66 63.89 56.26 99.04 0.86 42.15 42.95
LAC Average 7.43 2.59 62.00 50.61 87.91 0.84 41.70 43.45
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Average 
years of 
Education 
Number of 
Children
Shared 
Married 
Women
Contraceptive 
Prevalence
Households 
with electricity
Ratio wage 
(women/men)
Preschool 
enrolment 
rate
Catholic 
non-practicing
Early 2010s
Argentina 11.64 1.84 60.78 63.28 99.67 0.99 73.85 54.69
Bolivia 8.79 2.45 68.61 36.08 90.27 0.82 48.62 46.68
Brazil 8.63 1.54 78.62 75.78 99.35 0.84 64.01 36.90
Chile 11.19 1.77 52.69 60.52 99.76 0.81 99.34 42.35
Costa Rica 9.01 1.91 52.41 77.04 99.53 0.99 71.69 33.66
Ecuador 9.45 2.13 64.16 59.88 97.87 0.89 128.95 41.36
El Salvador 7.37 2.11 58.61 63.88 93.65 0.97 61.33 17.42
Honduras 6.44 2.59 55.72 61.70 82.07 0.87 42.35 25.62
Mexico 8.89 2.09 66.36 67.12 99.44 0.89 99.22 47.63
Nicaragua 6.66 2.50 57.95 74.12 79.76 0.90 54.97 26.61
Panama 10.75 1.98 66.83 50.02 -- 1.02 63.62 38.55
Paraguay 8.73 2.36 64.48 67.90 98.49 0.83 35.02 40.63
Peru 9.22 2.27 63.21 50.64 90.63 0.76 76.54 47.35
Uruguay 10.21 1.62 63.21 73.96 99.50 0.87 88.08 33.19
Venezuela 10.61 2.04 61.50 63.34 99.64 0.91 73.04 50.01
LAC Average 9.17 2.08 61.43 63.02 94.97 0.89 72.04 38.84
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Notes: Interpolated variables. Appliances index includes data of washing machine, car, 
motorcycle, and electricity.
Table 6.2.b: Possible determinants
Maximum 
permitted work 
hours per week
Paternity 
leave 
(days)
Maternity 
leave 
(weeks)
Abortion law
Minimum 
percent 
overtime 
remuneration
Index hiring 
and wage 
regulations
CCT 
beneficiaries 
(Millions)
Year 2012
Argentina 52 2 13 To protect mother’s life, health & others 50 3.90 11.79
Bolivia 60 0 9 To protect mother’s life, health & others 100 2.23 5.69
Brazil 46 5 17 Just to save mother’s life 50 2.23 52.39
Chile 57 5 18 Not permitted 50 6.67 1.30
Costa Rica 72 0 17 To protect mother’s life, health & others 50 2.23 0.19
Ecuador 52 10 12 To protect mother’s life, health & others 50 5.57 6.13
El Salvador
No universal 
national limit
0 12 Not permitted 100 6.67 0.57
Honduras 60 0 10 Not permitted 25 0.00 1.07
Mexico 57 0 12 Just to save mother’s life 100 6.67 27.25
Nicaragua 57 0 12 Not permitted 100 6.67 --
Panama 57 0 14 Just to save mother’s life 25 2.23 0.36
Paraguay 57 2 12 Just to save mother’s life 50 5.57 0.55
Peru
No universal 
national limit
4 13 To protect mother’s life, health & others 25 3.90 2.59
Uruguay 56 3 12 To protect mother’s life, health & others 100 6.67 0.76
Venezuela 46 14 18 Just to save mother’s life 50 3.33 --
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Notes: CCT beneficiaries for 2010.
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Table 6.3: Literature review (in meta-analysis)
ID Topic Subtopic Period Authors Sample
1 CCT
Programa de Asignación Familiar 
(PRAF)
2000-2002 Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2012) Females (adult)
2 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2012) Females (adult). Rural. Round: 1998
3 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2012) Females (adult). Rural. Round: 1999
4 CCT Red de Protección Social (RPS) 2000-2002 Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2012) Females (adult). Rural. Round: 2001
5 CCT Red de Protección Social (RPS) 2000-2002 Alzúa, Cruces and Ripani (2012) Females (adult). Rural. Round: 2002
6 CCT Elderly transfers 1993 Bertrand et al (2003)
Females relatives in three generation 
households with elderly 16-50 
years old
7 CCT Ingreso Ciudadano 2006-2007 Borraz and Gonzales (2009)
Females (22-55) w/children aged 
6-14
8 CCT Ingreso Ciudadano 2006-2007 Borraz and Gonzales (2009)
Females (22-55) w/children aged 
6-14
9 CCT Juntos 2009
Fernandez and Saldarriaga 
(2014)
All Females recipient of CCT
10 CCT Juntos 2009
Fernandez and Saldarriaga 
(2014)
Married females recipient of CCT
11 CCT Juntos 2009
Fernandez and Saldarriaga 
(2014)
Mothers recipient of CCT with 
children aged <5
12 CCT Red de Protección Social (RPS) 2000-2002 Maluccio and Flores (2005) Females (15+)
13 CCT
Programa de Asignación Familiar 
(PRAF)
2000-2002
Novella, Ripani, Cruces and 
Alzúa (2012)
Mother’s in intact households
14 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999
Novella, Ripani, Cruces and 
Alzúa (2012)
Mother’s in intact households. Rural
15 CCT Red de Protección Social 2000-2001
Novella, Ripani, Cruces and 
Alzúa (2012)
Mother’s in intact households. Rural
16 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Parker and Skoufias (2000) Females (18-24)
17 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Parker and Skoufias (2000) Females (25-34)
18 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Parker and Skoufias (2000) Females (35-44)
19 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Parker and Skoufias (2000) Females (45-54)
20 CCT PROGRESA 1997-1999 Parker and Skoufias (2000) Females (55+)
21 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2004
22 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2004
23 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2004
24 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2006
25 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2006
26 CCT Bolsa Familia 2001-2006 Ribas and Veras (2011) Females. Round=2006
27 Child care Public child care provision 1991-2005
Bauernschuster and Schlotter 
(2013)
Mothers, youngest child born 
1992-2000
28 Child care Preschool entrance age 1995-2001
Berlinski, Galiani and McEwan 
(2011)
Mothers
29 Child care Public Preschool 1950-1990 Cascio (2006)
Single mother 5 or 6 years old, no 
younger children
30 Child care Public Preschool 1950-1990 Cascio (2006)
Single mother 5 or 6 years old, old 
and younger children
31 Child care Public Preschool 1950-1990 Cascio (2006)
married mother 5 or 6 years old, no 
younger children
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ID Topic Subtopic Period Authors Sample
32 Child care Public Preschool 1950-1990 Cascio (2006)
married mother 5 or 6 years old, old 
and younger children
33 Child care longer school day 1990-2006
Contreras, Sepúlveda and 
Cabrera (2010)
Females (20-29)
34 Child care longer school day 1990-2006
Contreras, Sepúlveda and 
Cabrera (2010)
Females (20-65)
35 Child care longer school day 1990-2006
Contreras, Sepúlveda and 
Cabrera (2010)
Females (30-39)
36 Child care longer school day 1990-2006
Contreras, Sepúlveda and 
Cabrera (2010)
Females (40-49)
37 Child care longer school day 1990-2006
Contreras, Sepúlveda and 
Cabrera (2010)
Females (50-65)
38 Child care Preschool enrolment 1999 Gaux and Maurin (2010)
Mother youngest child born Dec95-
Jan96 (Single mother families)
39 Child care Preschool enrolment 1999 Gaux and Maurin (2010)
Mother youngest child born Dec95-
Jan96 (two -parent families)
40 Child care Preschool enrolment 1999 Gaux and Maurin (2010)
Mother youngest child born or 
Dec96-Jan97 (Single mother families)
41 Child care Preschool enrolment 1999 Gaux and Maurin (2010)
Mother youngest child born or 
Dec96-Jan97 (two -parent families)
42 Child care subsidized childcare 1997–2004
Lefebvre, Merrigan and 
Verstraete (2009)
Mothers with at least one child 6–11 
and no children < 6
43 Child care public day care supply 2003-2008 Medrano (2009)
Poor females (15-45) with children at 
most two years old
44 Child care free publicly provided child care 1987-1997
Nollenberger and Rodriguez-
Planas (2011)
Mothers between 18 and 45 years. 
Excluded Pais Vasco and Navarra
45 Child care free publicly provided child care 1987-1997
Nollenberger and Rodriguez-
Planas (2011)
Mothers between 18 and 45 years. 
Excluded Pais Vasco and Navarra
46 Child care free publicly provided child care 2007-2008
Paes de Barros, Olinto, Lunde 
and Carvalho (2011)
Mothers with children 0-3
47 Child care Public Preschool 1998-2003 Schlosser (2011) Mothers of children aged 2-4
48 Child care Public Preschool 1998-2003 Schlosser (2011)
Mothers whose youngest child is 
aged 2-4
ID Topic Subtopic Period Authors Sample
50 Crisis Added worker effect 1998-2002 Martinoty (2013) Married women on working age
51 Crisis Added worker effect
1993, 1997, 
2000-2007
Posadas and Sinha (2010)
Female spouse, both couple 
members below 95 years of age. No 
split 1997-2007. Women working 
because husband lost his job
52 Culture Second-generation Americans 1970 Fernandez (2006)
Second-generation married females, 
30-40 years old
53 Culture Second-generation Americans 1970 Fernández and Fogli (2009) Married females, ages 30–40
54 Fertility More than 2 children 1990 Angrist and Evans (1998)
All mothers (21-35) with at least 
2 children
55 Fertility More than 2 children 1980 Angrist and Evans (1998)
All mothers (21-35) with at least 
2 children
56 Fertility More than 2 children 1980 Angrist and Evans (1998)
Married mothers (21-35) with at least 
2 children
57 Fertility More than 2 children 1990 Angrist and Evans (1998)
Married mothers (21-35) with at least 
2 children
58 Fertility Early access to the pill 1970-1990 Bailey (2006) Females (21-25)
59 Fertility Early access to the pill 1970-1990 Bailey (2006) Females (26-30)
60 Fertility Early access to the pill 1970-1990 Bailey (2006) Females (31-35)
61 Fertility Early access to the pill 1970-1990 Bailey (2006) Females (36-40)
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62 Fertility Early access to the pill 1970-1990 Bailey (2006) Females (41-44)
63 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 
(5 Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (15-19)
64 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 
(5 Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (20-24)
65 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 
(5 Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (25-29)
66 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 
(5 Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (30-34)
67 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 
(5 Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (35-39)
68 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 
(5 Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (40-44)
69 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 
(5 Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (45-49)
70 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 
(5 Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (50-54)
71 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 
(5 Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (55-59)
72 Fertility Abortion laws
1960-2000 
(5 Years)
Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 
(2007)
Females (60-64)
73 Fertility In vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment 1994-2005
Lundborg, Plug and Würtz 
Rasmussen (2014)
All Females who received at least one 
IVF treatment
74 Fertility In vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment 1994-2005
Lundborg, Plug and Würtz 
Rasmussen (2014)
All Females who received at least one 
IVF treatment
81 Macro Financial crisis 2001-2002 McKenzie (2003a)
Female (25-60) Participation Female 
(25-55) Hours
82 Macro Development/GDP 1890-2005 Olivety (2013) Female
84 Macro Financial crisis 1980–2005
Signorelli,Choudhry and Marelli 
(2012)
Female
85 Macro Financial crisis 1980–2005
Signorelli,Choudhry and Marelli 
(2012)
Female
86 Macro Financial crisis 1980–2005
Signorelli,Choudhry and Marelli 
(2012)
Female
88 Marriage Divorce laws 1994-2001 Bargain (2012) Married females
90 Marriage Added worker effect 1979-1981 Blau and Kahn (2004)
Married females age 24-54 with 
spouse with age 24 - 54
91 Marriage Added worker effect 1999-2001 Blau and Kahn (2004)
Married females age 24-54 with 
spouse with age 24 - 54
92 Marriage Added worker effect 1989-1991 Blau and Kahn (2004)
Married females age 24-54 with 
spouse with age 24 - 54
93 Marriage Spouse health coverage 1989-2000 Cebi (2013)
Married women with intact marriage 
1989-2000 her age and her husband 
age 25-64, health insurance info 
available not covered public health 
insurance
94 Marriage Health Insurance 1979-1985 Chou and Staiger (2001)
Married women ages 20-65 whose 
husbands are paid employees
95 Marriage Increase demand women work 1950 Goldin and Olilvetti (2013)
White women 25-34 with 12 or 
more years education, in their first 
marriage, no farming
96 Marriage Increase demand women work 1950 Goldin and Olilvetti (2013)
White women 25-34 with 12 or 
more years education, in their first 
marriage, no farming
97 Marriage Increase demand women work 1950 Goldin and Olilvetti (2013)
White women 25-34 with 12 or 
more years education, in their first 
marriage, no farming
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98 Marriage 1998-2002 Lee (2008) Women between 19 and 32
99 Policies minimum wage regulation 1970-2008 Addisson and Ozturk (2012) Females (25-54)
100 Policies Parental leave 1990-2010 Blau and Kahn (2013) Females (25-54)
107 Policies
Unemployment insurance during 
husband’s unemployment spell
1984-1992 Cullen and Gruber (2000)
Married females with unemployed 
husbands
108 Policies Added worker effect 1994-2009 Gaux (2014)
Married or cohabiting individual 
aged 18-65, spouse wage earner
109 Policies Maternal Leave 1985-1999 Jaumotte (2003) Women 25-54 years
110 Policies Tax reduction 1985-1999 Jaumotte (2003) Women 25-54 years
111 Policies Anti-discrimination law 1968-1979 Mukhopadhyay (2012) Pregnant women
112 Policies Maternal Leave 1999-2010 Rossin-Slater et al (2011)
Women with a youngest children in 
the households
113 Policies Maternal Leave 1999-2010 Rossin-Slater et al (2011)
Women with a youngest children in 
the households
ID Topic Subtopic Period Authors Sample
114 Policies Maternal Leave 1999-2010 Rossin-Slater et al (2011)
Women with a youngest children in 
the households
117 Taxes
Reform replaced a spousal tax 
exemption with a nonrefundable 
tax credit
1986-1991 Crossley and Jeon (2006)
Females married to higher income 
husbands
118 Taxes Tax reduction / Transfer 1985-1997 Eissa & Hoynes (2004)
Married wives couples residing in the 
same household 25-54 years old
119 Taxes Tax reduction 1984-1992 Eissa (2002) Married females, high-income
121 Taxes
reduction in effective marginal 
tax rate
1986-1991 Jeon (2004)
Females married to higher income 
husbands
122
Technology and 
Infrastructure
household appliances 1940-1950 Cardia (2010) Females
123
Technology and 
Infrastructure
household appliances 1940-1950 Cardia (2010) Females
124
Technology and 
Infrastructure
household appliances 1940-1950 Cardia (2010) Females
125
Technology and 
Infrastructure
household appliances 1960-1970 Coen-Priani et al (2010) Married females (18-55), white
126
Technology and 
Infrastructure
Internet 2000-2009 Dettling (2014) Married females (18-59)
127
Technology and 
Infrastructure
rural electrification 1998-2005 Grogan and Sadanand (2012) Female (20-55)
128
Technology and 
Infrastructure
Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007)
White married women with children 
none under 5 H School
129
Technology and 
Infrastructure
Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007)
White married women with children 
none under 5 H collage
130
Technology and 
Infrastructure
Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007)
White married women with children 
under 5 High School
131
Technology and 
Infrastructure
Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007)
White married women with children 
under 5 High collage
132
Technology and 
Infrastructure
Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007)
White married women, No children 
High School
133
Technology and 
Infrastructure
Commuting time
1980-1990-
2000
Kalesnikova (2007)
White married women, No children 
collage
Source: own calculations based on literature analysis.
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Table 6.4: Factor analysis
Variable Component Factor Loadings
Appliances in the household % women households with washing machine 0.891
% women households with car 0.978
Eigenvalue: 2.91390 % women households with motorcycle 0.650
Alpha: 0.7954 % women households with electricity 0.861
Children in the school % household children enrolled at school 0.934
Net enrolment rate. Pre-primary. Total 0.828
Eigenvalue: 3.28206 Net enrolment rate. Primary. Total 0.880
Alpha: 0.6576 Gross enrolment ratio. Secondary. Total 0.974
Constraints open business (Factor) Administrative requirements 0.832
Starting a business 0.785
Eigenvalue: 2.81410 Licensing restrictions 0.733
Alpha: 0.7206 Business regulations 0.984
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
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1. Introduction
In the previous chapters we have documented and explored the changing patterns 
of female labor force participation in Latin America. These changes are bound to 
have profound economic and social consequences. In principle, when a woman 
finds a paid job, a significant change in household income takes place that may 
affect the poverty status of the family. In fact, the entry of women into the labor 
market could be a relevant driver of the whole income distribution. 
The implications of increasing female labor participation (and its deceleration over 
the last several years) go beyond the income dimension. A host of adjustments 
in family behavior may take place as a consequence of women’s transition from 
inactivity to employment. Women’s empowerment, childcare, family violence, 
education, and fertility are just a few examples of areas in which female labor 
force participation may have a significant impact. 
This chapter is aimed at assessing some of the implications of the increasing 
pattern in female LFP experienced in Latin America and its recent deceleration. 
The first sections of the chapter focus on the income dimension. Was the increase 
in female employment a significant factor for the recent reduction in income 
poverty and inequality in the region? What are the prospects for the future, 
given the recent deceleration of this process? Section 2 tackles the first question. 
By applying microeconometric decompositions, we provide estimates of the 
implications in terms of income poverty and inequality of the observed changes in 
female labor force participation over the last two decades. The section concludes 
that, although not the main factor, increasing female LFP was a significant 
contributor to the fall in income poverty and inequality in Latin America. 
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Section 3 looks at the future by projecting rates of female LFP based on the 
observed patterns in the past, and assessing the impact on income poverty and 
inequality through microsimulations. If the deceleration in female LFP continues 
over the next decade, the contribution of this factor to the reduction in poverty 
and inequality will be meager in most countries. Instead, if the growth rates in 
female LFP revert to the values of the 1990s, a more sizeable impact is expected. 
The section provides estimates for income poverty and inequality under these 
alternative scenarios. 
Section 4 discusses other implications of female labor supply with an emphasis 
on female economic empowerment, control over household resources, investment 
on children, demand for childcare, and domestic violence. 
The chapter closes in section 5 with an examination of the potential distributive 
impact of fertility changes, a phenomenon closely linked to female labor force 
participation. After exploring the evidence for Latin America, we conclude that 
the unbalanced fall in fertility rates across socioeconomic groups had relevant 
implications on poverty and inequality in the past and are likely to remain 
relevant in the near future. To be sure, this demographic channel is not among 
the main explanations of the distributive developments of the last decades, but it 
is far from being negligible. 
2. Distributive implications of changing 
female employment1
The changing role of women in the labor market can have relevant implications 
in terms of household income, poverty and inequality. If a woman decides to 
participate in the labor market and finds a job, her household income will rise, 
reducing the vulnerability to poverty. The increase in female employment is 
also bound to affect inequality, since these changes are typically not uniform 
across the income distribution.2 Assessing the causal impact of changing female 
employment on poverty and inequality is a very challenging task that requires 
special circumstances that allow genuine exogenous sources of identification. In 
1 This section was written by Leonardo Gasparini, Cecilia Parada and Mariana Marchionni. 
2 Notice that in this section we focus on female employment and not labor force participation. 
The transition from labor inactivity to unemployment does not have any effect in the income 
distribution, since in both cases earnings are zero. It is the transition from inactivity or 
unemployment to employment that causes a change in earnings and, hence, an impact on 
poverty and inequality.
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this chapter we take a less ambitious but more practical path, and measure the 
impact of changing female employment on the income distribution by keeping 
all else constant. In particular, we take the observed changes in the labor market 
in each Latin American country as given, and compute the impact on income 
poverty and inequality that would have occurred after those changes, assuming 
no other adjustment in behavior takes place. Of course, this is not a very realistic 
assumption, but it is necessary to have a first approximation of the likely impact 
of changing female employment on the income distribution. 
We apply the decomposition methodology of Bourguignon et al. (2004) and 
Gasparini et al. (2004). Specifically, we take data from two years, t1 and t2, 
and carry out two microsimulations. In the first, we pretend that the only 
change that took place between t1 and t2 was the observed change in the female 
employment situation (employed or not), i.e. the extensive margin of the labor 
supply. By computing the change in poverty and inequality in this controlled 
setting we get a first-order approximation of the distributive impact of changes 
in female employment. If the only factor that changed between t1 and t2 had 
been the employment situation of women, by how much would poverty and 
inequality have changed? That is the question that this first microsimulation 
tries to answer. 
Alternatively, in the second microsimulation we assume that the only change 
that took place between t1 and t2 was the observed change in hours of work by 
employed women. What would have been the impact on poverty and inequality 
in this artificial setting with changes only in the intensive margin of the female 
labor supply? 
The simulations are somewhat more complex than simply copying the 
employment status (or hours of work) of a woman in time t1 into the dataset of 
t2 (or vice versa), as panel data is not available and, moreover, the characteristics 
of a woman change over time, altering her probability of becoming employed. 
Instead, we predict the employment status of a woman in t2 by considering her 
observable characteristics at that date and the parameters of a labor market model 
in t1. For many women, the prediction is similar to the observed employment 
outcome in year t2 so that the simulation is inconsequential. Instead, for some 
women the simulation implies a change in status. In particular, those women 
who move from inactivity (or unemployment) to employment in the simulation 
are assigned a labor income that corresponds to the prediction of a typical 
Mincerian wage equation. The counterfactual earnings are then use to re-
compute household incomes, which are in turn used to simulate poverty and 
inequality. Appendix 1 and a companion paper (Parada, 2014) provide technical 
details on this methodology. 
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The microsimulations have an obvious caveat that originates from the fact that 
they are not derived from a general equilibrium model. When simulating the 
impact of changes in employment, we keep all other elements constant in their 
values for the base year. Naturally, some of these factors may covariate with 
employment. For instance, the structure of wages may respond to changes in 
female labor supply. By ignoring this channel we may be biasing our estimate of 
the distributive impact of the changes in employment. Additionally, changes in 
female labor force participation and employment may not have been autonomous, 
but induced for instance by income changes, in which case the microsimulation 
only captures a round of effects (from female employment to incomes) of a more 
complicated process. 
Unfortunately, it is very hard to compute a credible general equilibrium model 
capable of tracing all of these effects, and therefore, the microsimulations may be 
viewed as a second-best methodological option. The results of these techniques 
provide rigorously-derived estimates of the direct distributional impact of a given 
change, keeping all other things constant. 
The results of the impact of changes in female employment on poverty (measured 
with the headcount ratio with the US$ 4 line) are shown in Table 7.1.3 Take the 
case of Chile to illustrate the interpretation of the figures in the table. Poverty 
in the urban areas of that country fell 28.3 points between 1990 and 2011. 
This successful poverty reduction was the result of multiple complex factors 
that are very difficult to disentangle. The increase in women’s employment was 
surely one of these factors. While 42% of adult women (between 25 and 54 
years old) in Chile were employed in 1990, that share climbed to 59% in 2011. 
Column (ii) in the table tells us that if the only change between those years 
had been the observed change in the employment state of women (employed or 
not), keeping all other factors constant, then poverty would have been reduced 
by 0.5 points. Instead, if employment had remained fixed and only women’s 
hours of work had changed, poverty would have fallen 1 point. The overall 
female employment effect contributed with 1.5 points to the fall in the poverty 
headcount ratio in Chile. 
Some interesting results emerge from the table. First, all of the estimates are 
negative: changes in female employment and hours of work contributed to the 
fall in income poverty in the region. The impact of these factors appears to be 
rather small, although far from negligible. While the poverty headcount ratio 
3 Results are restricted to urban areas, since modeling rural employment is more difficult with 
the typical available variables. 
265
Implications of female labor 
force participation
Leonardo Gasparini & 
Mariana Marchionni
fell more than 14 points on average in our sample over the two last decades, the 
estimated contribution of changes in female employment and hours of work was 
a bit more than 1 point. In some countries, such as Uruguay and El Salvador, the 
impact was larger in proportionate terms. 
Table 7.1: Impact of changes in female employment on poverty 
Changes in the poverty headcount ratio (US$ 4 line)
Observed change
Effects
Country Period Employment Hours
TotalExtensive margin Intensive margin
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Argentina 1992-2012 -10.9 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8
Brazil 1990-2012 -27.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5
Chile 1990-2011 -28.3 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5
El Salvador 1991-2012 -14.3 -1.8 -1.6 -3.6
Mexico 1992-2012 -3.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
Uruguay 1991-2012 -2.5 -0.4 -0.8 -1.0
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: The values of each effect are averages that result from taking alternatively each year 
in the comparison as the base year. The sample includes only households in urban areas.
According to Table 7.2 changes in female employment were also inequality-
reducing over the whole period under analysis. However, again, the effect was 
not large: on average about half a Gini point in the last two decades, which 
represents around 10% of the observed overall reduction in the Gini coefficient.
Table 7.2: Impact of changes in female employment on inequality 
Changes in the Gini coefficient 
Observed change
Effects
Country Period Employment Hours Total
Extensive margin Intensive margin
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Argentina 1992-2012 -3.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
Brazil 1990-2012 -6.9 0.0 -0.3 -0.3
Chile 1990-2011 -5.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4
El Salvador 1991-2012 -8.5 -0.6 -0.4 -1.1
Mexico 1992-2012 -3.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.5
Uruguay 1991-2012 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: The values of each effect are averages that result from taking alternatively each year 
in the comparison as the base year. The sample includes only households in urban areas. 
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In summary, the evidence suggests that changes experienced by Latin American 
women in terms of employment over the last two decades contributed to 
the observed fall in income poverty and inequality. The stronger insertion 
of vulnerable women in the labor market allowed some families to escape 
income poverty and reduced the income gaps with more affluent households. 
To be sure, this is not the main reason for the recent decline in poverty and 
inequality in Latin America, but its contribution to that pattern appears to be 
non-negligible.4 
Given the positive distributive implications of the increased female employment, 
there exists a natural concern regarding the social consequences of the recent 
deceleration in female labor force participation. The next section explores this issue. 
3. Projections5
The previous section provided estimates of the impact of the observed changes 
in female employment on poverty and inequality over the last two decades. In 
this section, we explore the likely distributive effects of the projected trends in 
female LFP for the next two decades. Naturally, the exercise is highly speculative, 
since a complex social phenomenon like labor supply is very difficult to predict. 
However, although imperfect, the estimates may be useful, as they provide us 
with some order of magnitude of the likely effect that the changes in female 
participation could have on poverty and inequality in the near future. 
The simulations require forecasts for changes in female labor force participation. 
We consider two scenarios. In the first one, LFP follows the growth rates 
observed in the 1990s; in the second one, the growth rates observed in the 2000s 
continue into the following decade. For most countries, the former represents the 
high-growth scenario of LFP that prevailed for much of the 20th century, while 
the latter is a low-growth scenario, like the one prevalent in the last decade. In 
previous chapters we have identified several factors that account for the fall in the 
growth rate of female LFP in Latin America in the 2000s, including economic 
growth and labor and social policies. The likelihood of the low-growth over the 
4 Other researchers have found significant poverty-reducing impacts of the increased female 
labor force participation. For instance, the World Bank (2012) reports that holding all else 
constant in the labor market, if female income had remained the same during the 2000s, 
extreme poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean would have been 30 percent higher 
in 2010. The gains in female income reflect increased labor earnings, expanded access to 
pensions and increased labor force participation.
5 This section was written by Javier Alejo and Leonardo Gasparini. 
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high-growth scenario depends on how these and other factors evolve and interact 
with female LFP, which is difficult to predict. 
We carry out the simulations for each country starting in the year 2012, dividing 
the adult female population into six groups based on education (low, middle and 
high) and marital status (single, married). For each group we project the level of 
female LFP for each year in the period 2012-2032, according to the growth rates 
prevailing between 1992 and 2002 (scenario 1), and alternatively in the period 
2002-2012 (scenario 2). These projections imply a given forecasted female LFP 
rate for each group in each country/year. 
We assume that no other change occurs in the economy, apart from changes in 
labor supply. Therefore, we take the microdata of the 2012 household survey,6 
and simulate the forecasted female LFP by randomly moving inactive women 
in a given group to the active status. Since we keep all other things constant, 
including the unemployment rate, some of these women will be unemployed. The 
change from inactivity to unemployment has no effect on monetary poverty and 
inequality, since in both cases earnings are zero. Instead, changes from inactivity 
to employment will have an impact on the income distribution. Women who 
experience that transition in our simulations are assigned a wage and hours of 
work according to their observable characteristics, based on the coefficients of 
a typical Mincer and hours of work equations, and their household per capita 
incomes are recomputed based on their new earnings, always keeping fixed the 
rest of the incomes in the household and the family composition. The household 
per capita income simulated through this process is used to forecast poverty and 
inequality in each country/year. 
Of course, this is a simple exercise that captures just the first-round impact 
of the increase in female labor force participation on the income distribution. 
However, we consider it useful as an approximation, especially as compared to 
the formidable challenges of the alternative approach of estimating a general 
equilibrium model. 
An illustration of the results is presented in Figure 7.1 for the case of Argentina. 
The poverty headcount ratio with the line of US$4 was 10.8% in 2012. Under 
the scenario in which the growth rate of female LFP returns to the high value of 
the 1990s, the poverty rate would fall to 10.2% in ten years (2022) and to 9.5% 
in two decades (2032). This reduction in poverty would vanish if the pattern for 
female LFP in the future were the one experienced in the 2000s in Argentina, 
6 We take a year close to 2012, if 2012 is not available. 
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when the increase in female labor supply came to a halt. In fact, poverty would 
increase slightly since scenario 2 implies that the small reduction in labor supply 
for the group of single women with low education that took place in the 2000s 
would continue in the following decade. 
The impact on income inequality is similar. In the first scenario the Gini 
coefficient in Argentina would fall from 42.3 to 41.4 in two decades. Although 
this is not a substantial fall over a twenty-year period, one Gini point is not a 
negligible effect coming from a single driving factor. 
The inequality-decreasing effect disappears in scenario 2, a fact that is mainly 
explained by the factor mentioned above and which has been discussed in 
previous sections: the larger contraction in female labor force participation in 
the low-education group. However, this effect is insignificant: the Gini would 
only increase from 42.3 to 42.4 in two decades. 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 (see Appendix 3) show the results for the rest of the Latin 
American economies, whereas Table 7.3 summarizes the results by showing the 
projected change in poverty and inequality in each country between 2012 and 
2032 under the two scenarios.
For nearly all countries poverty would fall in the next two decades under 
scenario 1 (the only exception is Peru). The reductions range from 4.9 percentage 
points in Venezuela to 0.5 percentage points in Brazil and Uruguay. In most 
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Figure 7.1: Poverty and inequality based on projections of female LFP 
Argentina, 2012-2032
Source: own calculations based on EPH (INDEC). 
Note: poverty is measured with the headcount ratio with a line fixed at USD 4 a day 
adjusted for PPP; inequality is measured with the Gini coefficient for household per 
capita income.
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countries poverty would also fall under the low-growth scenario, although in all 
cases the reduction would be smaller. In fact, as commented above for the case 
of Argentina, in some countries we project a small increase in poverty driven by 
a reduction in female labor force participation. On average, while the poverty 
headcount ratio would fall 1.6 percentage points in scenario 1, it would fall just 
0.3 points in scenario 2. 
Table 7.3: Changes in poverty and inequality based on projections of 
female LFP 
Latin American countries, 2012-2032
Change in poverty Change in inequality
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2
ARG -1.3 0.2 -0.8 0.1
BOL -2.5 -0.3 -0.8 -0.1
BRA -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 0.0
CHL -1.6 -0.4 -0.8 -0.2
CRI -2.8 -1.1 -1.7 -0.6
ECU -1.8 -0.6 -0.6 -0.1
HND -3.5 -0.4 -1.5 -0.3
MEX -0.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
NIC -1.1 0.0 -0.2 0.2
PAN -0.7 -1.2 -0.4 -0.4
PER 0.3 -0.3 0.0 -0.1
PRY -1.7 0.4 -0.7 0.1
SLV -1.0 -0.5 -0.3 0.1
URY -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
VEN -4.9 0.0 -1.1 0.0
Latin America -1.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.1
Source: own calculations based on national household surveys. 
Note: poverty is measured with the headcount ratio with a line fixed at USD 4 a day 
adjusted for PPP; inequality is measured with the Gini coefficient for household per 
capita income. Latin America: unweighted means.
Figure 7.4 shows the projected pattern in poverty for the whole period. Driven 
by changes in female labor force participation, poverty in Latin America would 
be cut by 3% in one decade and by 6% in two decades in scenario 1, but remain 
almost unchanged in scenario 2. In summary, if the observed deceleration of 
female labor force participation in the 2000s is not a transient phenomenon, and 
instead it is the beginning of a stage of low or even null growth in female labor 
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supply, then the contribution of female LFP to poverty reduction in the region 
would be negligible. This almost null effect contrasts with a significant, although 
not very large, poverty-reduction effect that would occur if the growth in female 
LFP observed in the 1990s and in most of the 20th century resumed. 
The results are similar for inequality. In most countries the deceleration in labor 
force participation in the 2000s was greater among women with low education. 
This implies a deceleration of the inequality-reducing impact of the patterns in 
female LFP. In almost all Latin American countries, the projected reduction 
in the Gini is smaller in scenario 2 than in scenario 1; in some countries it 
even becomes unequalizing. On average for the region, the Gini coefficient falls 
0.6 points in scenario 1 and 0.1 in scenario 2. 
4. Other implications 
Many of the transformations documented in previous chapters—falling fertility 
rates, rising female education, and labor participation—are associated with a 
higher degree of women’s empowerment. Along with education, female LFP is 
a primary path to women’s empowerment, at least in the economic dimension. 
Paid work has the potential to transform women’s lives, increasing their capacity 
to exercise choice and control in key areas. In turn, economic empowerment 
fosters female LFP while facilitating other forms of empowerment. 
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Latin America, 2012-2032
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In this section we discuss implications of higher female participation in the 
labor market other than the distributive changes analyzed in the first part of 
this chapter. We review the literature and present evidence relating female LFP 
to female economic empowerment, control over household resources, investment 
on children, demand for childcare, and domestic violence. 
Female LFP and women’s economic empowerment
The share of family income earned by women and the share of family resources 
potentially under women’s control have grown over time along with the expansion 
of female LFP in Latin America. Panel A in Figure 7.5 shows that the share of 
prime-age women earning more than half of the total family income, i.e. the 
incidence of female economic headship (World Bank, 2012), grew from 14% 
to 20% over the last two decades in Latin America. The pace of change mimics 
that of female LFP: rapid growth in the 1990s followed by a deceleration in the 
2000s. This pattern is robust to other definitions of economic headship, as we 
will see later. 
The fact that women’s contribution to the family budget has increased does 
not necessarily imply that women now control a larger share of that budget or 
that they have a greater say in family decisions. Although this is potentially the 
case, household survey data does not provide enough information to answer this 
question, at least not in a direct fashion. 
However, the self-report assessments on household headship coming from 
household surveys are likely to capture the perceptions of respondents on the 
roles and the division of tasks among household members. According to these 
reports on family roles, the proportion of female-headed households increased in 
tandem with the expansion of economic female headship (Panel A in Figure 7.5) 
over the 1990s and early 2000s, suggesting that economic headship is related 
to some sort of female empowerment process, at least within the family. It is 
interesting to note that in the 2000s, the share of self-reported female heads 
continues its rapid growth despite the female economic headship phenomenon 
decelerates, which could be taken as a sign of female empowerment beyond the 
economic dimension.
Of course, these results could be driven by many factors that are not strictly 
related to women’s empowerment, such as changes in family structure or even 
the income measure used to define economic headship. Concerning family 
structure, and as shown in chapter 2, the period is characterized by a sharp 
increase in the share of single female household heads, i.e. women living with 
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Figure 7.5: Percentage of female heads of household
Latin America, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Self-report: self-report assessments on household headship. Economic definitions 
of household headship in panels A and B are based on a woman’s income compared to her 
family’s income. In panel C, economic definition compares a woman’s income to her husband’s 
income. Married women: either in formal or consensual unions. Unweighted means.
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no formal spouse or partner. This alone can be the reason why self-reported 
female headship is increasing. But panel B in Figure 7.5 shows the same patterns 
when we focus only on married women—either in formal or consensual unions. 
Female headship was rare in two-parent households in the early 1990s, but it has 
become increasingly common over time. Based on the self-report assessment, 
the percentage of prime-age married women who were heads of household grew 
from 2% in 1992 to 5% in 2002, and then sped up to reach 11% by 2012. 
Among married women, self-reported headship is less common than economic 
headship, but the gap between the two definitions has shrunk markedly over time, 
and even disappeared over the last years due to the above mentioned acceleration in 
the rate of increase of the former, together with a deceleration of the latter. 
These conclusions are robust to other definitions of economic headship. For 
instance, we use labor income as an alternative to total family income (panel B 
in Figure 7.5), and also compare women’s income to their husbands’ to determine 
the economic head of household (panel C in Figure 7.5).7 
Although with different nuances, we find similar trends in most Latin American 
countries. The rapid increase in self-reported female headship after the mid-2000s 
is particularly marked in Uruguay, Chile, and Brazil. At the other end of the 
spectrum is Peru, where the proportion of self-reported female household heads 
has changed very little since 1992, reaching only 15 percent in 2012, the lowest in 
the region. Table 7.4 (see Appendix 3) presents the statistics for each country. 
In summary, although female labor participation contributes to the empowerment 
of women, at least in the economic sense, the evidence presented so far suggests a 
growing trend of female empowerment (as measured by self-assessment of female 
headship) that manifests even when LFP stagnates. It is likely that this inertial 
behavior is due to cultural changes that influence empowerment beyond the 
strictly economic dimensions.
Female economic empowerment, investment in children, 
and economic development
The evidence that money in the hands of mothers, as opposed to their husbands, 
increases the share of expenditures on children (clothing, food, education) 
7 Economic definitions based on total or labor income differ mostly due to the presence of 
transfers. Women earn relatively less non-labor income than other household members, 
especially the elderly, but relatively more than their husbands.
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provides a link between women’s empowerment and economic development 
to the extent that increased spending on children contributes to human capital 
accumulation (Doepke and Tertilt, 2011 and 2014). 
In traditional models, families are considered as single decision units, where 
intra-family behavior is ignored. In such settings, outcomes (consumption, labor 
participation, fertility, etc.) depend on the global pooling of resources within 
the household, i.e. the income pooling hypothesis (Becker, 1991). However, 
there is strong evidence against the income pooling hypothesis, as surveyed 
in Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman (1997) and Doepke and Tertilt (2011). 
Expenditure patterns differ significantly depending on whether the husband or 
the wife controls family resources. Therefore, the growing importance of women’s 
income that accompanies the expansion of female LFP may result in changes in 
household decisions, in particular an increase in children’s expenditures, such as 
food and clothing or on a child’s outcomes, such as health and education. 
Some early studies for Latin American countries found better nutrition 
outcomes (height for age, weight for age, and weight for height) in families 
with larger female income shares (Engle 1993 for the case of Guatemala, and 
Thomas 1990 and 1994 for the case of Brazil). While these results could be 
driven by unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. unobserved factors causing both better 
nutrition and higher female income shares, more recent studies have managed 
to isolate the causal effect of female income shares. For instance, the emergence 
and expansion of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in the region 
since the late 1990s opened the opportunity for evaluating the causal effect 
of changes in female income shares on child expenditures. In most of these 
programs, payments are made to a child’s mother, following the widespread 
belief, based on the above mentioned evidence, that mothers make better use 
of resources (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).8
Data from the Mexican Oportunidades program (formerly PROGRESA) are the 
basis for several studies aimed at measuring the effect of paying the transfers to 
mothers. Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) and Angelucci and Attanasio (2009) 
find that households receiving transfers increased their food expenditures and 
caloric acquisition compared to eligible households not receiving these benefits. 
Attanasio and Lechene (2002), Rubalcava, Teruel and Thomas (2009), and 
8 Identification of the causal effect is based on the random assignment of the program, but 
since it is always the woman who receives the payments, the results could be driven by an 
increase in the female budget share or just in total family income. Different strategies are used 
to deal with this shortcoming, but usually households receiving transfers are compared to 
other eligible households with similar income or consumption that do not receive transfers.
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Bobonis (2009) also find positive effects of Mexico’s Oportunidades on the 
expenditure share of children’s clothing.
Similar results are found for other Latin American CCT programs targeted to 
women: Attanasio, Battistin and Mesnard (2012) study Colombia’s Familias 
en Acción; Schady and Rosero (2008) analyze Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano; Maluccio (2010), and Gitter and Barham (2008) study Nicaragua’s Red 
de Protección Social, and Macours, Schady, and Vakis (2012) focus on Atención a 
Crisis, another Nicaraguan program. 
Decision-making within the household is influenced not only by income but also 
by other variables such as labor participation and education. For instance, Thomas 
(1994) uses mother’s education relative to father’s as a proxy for bargaining 
power. Using data from Brazil, he finds that mother’s education has a greater 
effect on girls’ nutritional status while father’s education has a bigger effect on 
boys’ nutrition. Another example is Atkin (2009), who, exploiting geographic 
variation in the opening of new factories in Mexico, finds improvements in 
child’s health (height for age) for mothers who enter the labor market.
Usually, differences in preferences are seen as the key determinants of differences 
in the observed expenditure patterns. According to this hypothesis, unlike 
men, women prioritize investments in children’s human capital because of 
their preferences. Croson and Gneezy (2009) review the experimental literature 
on gender differences on preferences and conclude that even though there are 
fundamental differences between men and women, it is not possible to tell 
whether women are more other-regarding than men based on this evidence 
alone. In particular, it is not clear whether the difference in preferences between 
men and women affects their behavior towards their children.
Also, as Doepke and Tertilt (2011, 2014) show, the observed expenditure 
patterns can emerge for reasons other than differences in the preferences of 
wives and husbands. For example, they present models in which differences in 
expenditure patterns by gender are endogenous and could disappear if other 
gender differences such as labor market discrimination were removed. Also, the 
authors draw attention to the importance of considering other children outputs 
beyond expenditures. An increase in current spending may come at the expense 
of other important public goods or may be accompanied by a fall in household 
savings, reducing future consumption possibilities.
In this sense, there is also evidence of a positive association between female income 
shares and children’s education. World Bank (2012) shows that in Latin America, 
higher rates of household dependency on female income are associated with higher 
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rates of school enrollment. This is particularly true at the pre-school and upper 
secondary levels, since primary and lower secondary education are compulsory in 
most countries in the region. Children in households highly dependent on female 
labor income are more likely to be enrolled in preschool and secondary school 
than children in households more dependent on male labor income or transfers. 
For instance, estimates of the marginal effects for the case of Brazil are 7 and 14 
percent for preschool (3 to 5 year-olds) and secondary school enrolment (16 to 19 
year-olds), respectively, after controlling for per capita income, the share of pensions 
and transfers in household income, household size, and single parenthood.
The link between empowerment and development also goes in the other 
direction, i.e. development can contribute to empowerment. Gender inequality 
is often greater among the poor, thus, when development reduces poverty levels, 
the situation of women might improve, both in absolute terms (everybody is 
better off), and relative to men. Duflo (2012) reviews the evidence on both sides 
of the empowerment-development link, and concludes that the relationship 
between the two are probably too weak to be self-sustaining, and that political 
commitment is required to reach equity between women and men.
In summary, the evidence suggests that female LFP and the consequent female 
economic empowerment can increase investment in children’s human capital. 
However, it is not clear to what extent these conclusions would hold in other 
contexts with less gender inequality, nor is it obvious that economic development 
by itself would lead to more gender equality.
Female LFP, demand for childcare and childcare quality
Care responsibilities that are traditionally assigned to women severely limit 
their chances of entering the labor market. As discussed earlier in this book, 
this is particularly the case for young mothers, who find it hard to reconcile the 
requirements of full-time formal jobs and the demands of caring for their children. 
Given this reality, many policies aimed at promoting women’s work have focused 
on providing childcare and early education services. In fact, causal evidence 
for Latin American countries shows that when childcare facilities are available, 
female participation in the labor market increases (Berlinski and Galiani, 2007; 
Contreras, Puentes and Bravo, 2012). Chapter 8 elaborates on these policies. 
In this section, we focus on the reverse channel, i.e. the implications of LFP of 
mothers on the demand for childcare. 
Public childcare services for children under 4 years old are far from universal in 
Latin America. The existing supply is fragmented and heterogeneous, affecting 
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care arrangements in households differently depending on geographic location, 
occupational status and socio-economic position. Private, usually expensive, 
childcare institutions typically satisfy the childcare demands of better-off 
households. There is also an employment-based supply of childcare services 
(workplace crèches) available for some formal workers, such as teachers and public 
employees. Of course, these benefits are beyond the reach of women from less 
advantaged households or those who work in the informal sector. For these women, 
families and communities continue to have a dominant role in childcare provision.
Faur (2011) points out that the fragmentation of childcare services in Argentina 
translates to a high level of privatization for better-off households, and a high level 
of familiarization for less advantaged households, which widens the gap between 
women from different socio-economic groups. Moreover, community-based childcare 
usually means less professionalized and cheaper services, lower staff/child ratios, and 
fewer facilities and materials, therefore poor children access to lower-quality childcare 
services than do children from higher-income groups (Razavi, 2012).9 
There is ample evidence on the effects of early childhood interventions on child 
development and subsequent success throughout life (Currie and Thomas 2001; 
Case and Paxson, 2008; Grantham-McGregor et al., 2007). If childcare quality 
translates into child development, children from low-income households would 
only gain access to low-quality care services, aggravating the already high levels 
of inequality of opportunity between children from different socioeconomic 
groups (Staab and Gerhard, 2010).
In summary, the increase in female LFP generates demands for childcare that are 
only partially met by the public sector, allowing a heterogeneous supply to bridge 
the gap. While children from high-income households can access high-quality 
private institutions, children from poorer households only have access to 
lower-quality services. This means fewer opportunities for the less advantaged. 
The situation worsens as labor participation of women from worse-off households 
(or in more precarious jobs) increases.
Female LFP, private schools and segregation 
Extended school hours also help to accommodate mothers’ full-time formal job 
responsibilities with the demands of childcare. Unfortunately, full-day schooling 
9 Also, some authors draw attention to the precarious working conditions of those running 
these community services, usually unpaid or poorly paid women (Staab and Gerhard, 2010; 
Faur, 2011).
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is not common in the public sector, and is more frequently found among private 
educational institutions. This situation “forces” many couples to choose a full-day 
private school for their children in order to allow a full-time job for the mother. 
In turn, earnings from that job can be used to pay for the higher costs of private 
education. 
According to our estimates based on household surveys, the share of children 
in primary private schools in Latin America (unweighted mean of 10 countries) 
grew at a similar pace over the last two decades (14.3% in 1990, 17.2% in 2000, 
and 20.6% in 2010). The rate of growth was also fast in the case of secondary 
education in the 1990s but much slower in the 2000s (19.6% in 1990, 23.7% in 
2000, and 25.1% in 2010), a fact that is consistent with the deceleration in female 
labor force participation, but that could also be the consequence of various other 
phenomena. 
Gasparini et al. (2015) link the growing migration of less economically 
disadvantaged groups from public to private schools to a sizeable increase in 
all measures of school segregation in Latin America. For instance, the mean 
dissimilarity index of segregation between public and private schools between 
the poor and the non-poor increased from 0.151 in 1992 to 0.162 in 2002 and 
0.167 in 2011. This pattern should be of public concern since a more inclusive 
and integrated education system that encourages the coexistence of students 
from different socioeconomic and cultural groups in the same classrooms is key 
to stimulate social cohesion. 
In sum, higher female LFP may be associated with greater school segregation if 
the women who enter the labor market come from better-off households (or if 
they access better-paid jobs) and possess the means to choose private schools, 
unlike their poorer counterparts. The situation worsens when the entry into the 
labor market is weaker in the latter group, which has been the case in the last 
decade in Latin America, as documented in previous chapters. Even though 
the previous argument is just speculative and more evidence is needed to better 
understand the dynamics at play, the implications are sufficiently relevant to 
be alert on this potential link between female labor force participation and 
segregation. 
Female LFP and domestic violence
Violence against women is increasingly recognized as an important social, health, 
and human rights problem (WHO, 2005). Domestic violence, i.e. violence by 
an intimate partner, is one of the most common forms of gender-based violence. 
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Domestic violence is widespread in Latin American societies. Peru is one of 
the countries with the highest prevalence of domestic violence in the world: 
69 percent of Peruvian women between 15 to 49 years old report they have 
suffered from physical or emotional violence from their male partners (García-
Moreno et al., 2006). In Colombia, according to the 2005 Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS), almost 40 percent of women between 13 and 49 years old 
report having suffered from physical violence, around 66 percent report that they 
have been emotionally abused, and 20 percent report that they have experienced 
both emotional and physical violence (Friedemann-Sánchez and Lovatón, 2012).
While there are many positive implications of increased female LFP, as discussed 
earlier in this chapter, some theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest 
that working can increase a woman’s risk of suffering from domestic violence. 
Some studies in the region find a positive association between women’s 
empowerment and domestic violence. In particular, women with greater say in 
their households tend to suffer more violence from their partners. Flake and 
Forste (2006) use data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHSs) for 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Peru to explore the 
link between domestic violence and family characteristics. They find that female-
dominant decision-making is positively associated with domestic violence. 
Friedemann-Sánchez and Lovatón (2012) also find that decision-making 
dominated by women is associated with a higher probability of intimate partner 
violence based on 2005 DHS for Colombia. Also, working for pay seems to put 
women at greater risk (as is the case of Ladina women in Guatemala according to 
Menjívar, 2011, and Mexican women according to Castro and Casique, 2009).10 
However, other studies find opposite results. For instance, in Friedemann-
Sánchez (2006), employment appears as a protective factor against intimate 
partner violence among formally employed agro-industrial workers in Colombia. 
Also, Villarreal (2007) finds that employed women in Mexico are less likely to 
suffer domestic violence. Despite these results, what all these studies have in 
common is that they only measure the association between empowerment and 
domestic violence; they do not determine a causal effect. Female LFP, women’s 
wages, or any other proxy of female empowerment, are endogenous in the sense 
that they depend on factors that also affect domestic violence. 
10 This negative side of empowerment is the typical prediction of socio-cultural models of 
“male backlash”, in which as women’s empowerment increases, men feel their traditional 
gender role threatened, reacting with violence against their female partners (Macmillan and 
Gartner, 1999).
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Causal evidence for Latin American countries is very scarce due to unavailable 
data and to the difficulty of controlling for endogeneity of woman’s wage or labor 
status.11 Hidrobo and Fernald (2013) explore how an exogenous increase in a 
woman’s income affects domestic violence by exploiting the randomized rollout 
of a cash transfer program in Ecuador. They find that the effect depends on a 
woman’s education and on her education relative to her partner’s. For women 
with more than primary education, a cash transfer reduces violence; but for 
other women, receiving a cash transfer increases violence if their educational 
level exceeds their male partners’. In a background paper for the case of Peru, 
Mendoza-Calderón (2014) finds that working women are more likely to suffer 
domestic violence as compared to non-working women. Clearly, further research 
is needed to better understand the ways in which women’s LFP impacts the risk 
of suffering from domestic violence, and whether the effect varies with other 
characteristics, such as education. 
5. Distributive implications of fertility changes12
Although this book is mainly concerned with female labor force participation, 
we have also documented other changes that affect women’s lives and that 
may have sizeable implications on their incomes and standards of living. In 
this final section, we focus on changes in fertility patterns. Fertility rates 
began their downward trend in Latin America in the mid-1960s, implying 
a clear convergence towards the levels of the most advanced regions of the 
world. In particular, as documented in chapter 2, the number of children per 
household (the proxy for fertility that can be implemented with household 
survey microdata) has been falling over the last two decades: in 1992, there 
were 2.3 children under 16 per household (for households with a woman aged 
25-45) in a typical Latin American country; that figure fell to 1.8 over the next 
two decades.
The average number of children decreased in households from all population 
groups, but the gap between the most and the least vulnerable groups shrank, 
11 Aizer (2010) was the first to estimate the negative causal effect of female bargaining power 
on domestic violence based on data for the United States. She exploited changes in the 
demand for labor in female-dominated industries relative to male-dominated ones to define 
an exogenous measure of women’s bargaining power. She found a causal negative effect of 
women’s bargaining power on domestic violence. Moreover, the entire decline in domestic 
violence caused by the decrease of men’s wages relative to women’s occurs during non-
working hours, which rules out explanations based on exposure reduction.
12 The section was written by Nicolás Badaracco, Mariana Marchionni and Leonardo Gasparini. 
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owing to a sharper decline in the number of children living in poor households. 
Figure 7.6 takes a sample of seven Latin American countries to show the average 
number of children under 16 per household in the poorest 20% and richest 
20% of the prime-age parents.13 In both groups, fertility went down over the 
two decades; the fall is somewhat more pronounced among the poorest couples. 
The gap in the number of children per household shrank from 0.67 in 1992 to 
0.47 in 2012. 
The distributive impact of these demographic changes could be sizeable. Ceteris 
paribus, a decrease in the number of children in poor households and in those 
marginally above the poverty line, lowers income poverty. Moreover, differential 
changes in family size across income strata, as in those mentioned above, could 
decrease inequality.
In this section we assess the extent to which changes in fertility in Latin America 
contributed to the observed reduction in income poverty and inequality during 
the 1990s and 2000s. To this aim, we simulate the household per capita income 
13 The sample includes countries in which we implement the microsimulations that follow in 
this section. 
1.0
1.2
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.4
2.2
2.0
2.8
2.6
Poorest 20%
Richest 20%
Figure 7.6: Number of children under 16 per household
Bottom and top quintiles of parental income distribution, 1992-2012. 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: Average of seven Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, 
Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. Households with head aged 25-45. Unweighted means.
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distribution that would emerge if fertility outcomes in a given year would have 
been determined as in another different year.14
Of course, changes in these outcomes are driven by various factors, including 
some of those affecting female labor force participation. Estimating a general 
equilibrium model or complex structural equations that take into account all the 
interactions is not feasible, even less when considering this task for many Latin 
American economies. Instead, in this section we compute the first-round partial-
equilibrium impact on the income distribution of changes in fertility, which 
could be taken as a useful approximation of the magnitude that these changes 
may have on poverty and inequality. 
We follow the methodology proposed in Marchionni and Gasparini (2007).15 
The main inputs to carry out the microsimulations are the estimates of the 
parameters that govern fertility decisions/outcomes16 and the response of labor 
market participation to changes in family size. We assume that the number of 
children in a household follows a Poisson process, and that its parameters can be 
consistently estimated using a Poisson regression model. Hourly wages and hours 
of work are assumed to be simultaneously determined in an equilibrium model 
of the labor market. 
After estimating the parameters, we carry out the simulations. Poverty and 
inequality indicators are computed over the counterfactual income distribution 
that arises in a given base year by assuming that the population in that year takes 
fertility decisions according to the parameters estimated for a different year. 
The resulting poverty and inequality measures are compared to those actually 
observed in the base year. The difference between the simulated value of an 
indicator of poverty or inequality and its actual value is interpreted as a measure 
of the direct impact of the change in fertility behavior. 
Some equations may clarify the methodology. The non-technical reader can skip 
them and go directly to the results. We measure poverty and inequality over the 
distribution of household per capita income, defined as 
14 The term fertility is used as a shortcut for the number of children in the household, which in 
most cases changes as the consequence of fertility decisions. 
15 The explanation of the methodology is taken from Marchionni and Gasparini (2007) and 
Badaracco (2014). See Appendix 2 for more details.
16 For simplicity we refer to fertility decisions, although fertility outcomes could be the result of 
free conscious choices, but also the consequence of various other circumstances. 
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Nht = Hht + Rht
Y L  + Y NL
Nht
yht = 
ht ht
Y NL = mht + g (Hht)ht
(1)      ih at time t
where i indexes individuals, h households and t time periods (years). YLht denotes 
total labor income of household h at time t, YNLht labels non-labor income, and 
Nht is the family size, which is the sum of the number of children Hht and the rest 
of the household members Rht.
(2) 
Labor incomes are determined in a model similar to the one discussed in 
Appendix 1. Non-labor incomes are determined by
(3) 
where mht is exogenous and g(Hht ) represents the part of non-labor incomes that 
depends on the number of children. Typically, the cash transfer in poverty-
alleviation programs vary with the number of children in the family. 
We label the parameters of the fertility decisions at time t as ηt, and those at 
time t’ as ηt’ . A key step in the methodology is to estimate the counterfactual 
number of children in a given year t if fertility outcomes were determined as 
in an alternative year t’. Once this term, labeled as Hht(ηt’), is estimated, three 
microsimulation exercises are carried out by replacing this estimate in the 
household per capita income equation. 
The first exercise implies replacing the simulated number of children into the 
denominator of the equation for household per capita income (1). 
(4) 
where Nht(ηt’) = Rht + Hht(ηt’). The change in the income distribution resulting as 
a consequence of this exercise is labeled as the direct-size effect. It is interpreted 
as the contribution of the change in fertility parameters η to the actual change 
in the income distribution through the direct channel – i. e. a change in the 
number of household members among whom total household income should be 
distributed. 
The second exercise involves using the simulated number of children Hht(ηt’) to 
re-compute the individual hours of work using equation (1). 
Y L  + Y NL
Nht(ηt’)
ht htYht  = 
D
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(5) 
With a different number of children in the household, some individuals may 
decide to work more or less hours, and that, in turn, will alter individual 
labor incomes, and thus total household income. The change in the income 
distribution as a consequence of this second exercise is named the hours-size 
effect. It is interpreted as the contribution of the change in fertility parameters η 
to the actual change in the income distribution through the indirect channel of 
affecting the hours of work decisions. 
We carry out a third exercise by simulating the counterfactual distribution arising 
from a change in non-labor income driven by changes in fertility decisions.
(6) 
The distributional impact of changes through this channel is labeled as the non-
labor income effect. 
The total effect adds the impact of changes in the fertility parameters through 
the three channels
(7) 
So far, we have assumed that year t is the base year from which we “import” 
the parameters of another year t’. Of course, we could instead have taken t’ as 
the base year and “imported” year t parameters. As is well established in the 
microsimulation literature, the decompositions are path-dependent: the results 
are not exactly the same when taking alternatively year t or year t’ as the base 
year. We perform both exercises and report the average value for each of the 
effects discussed above.
The methodology requires keeping all other things constant when simulating 
the impact of changes in fertility decisions. Naturally, as was stressed in previous 
sections, some of these factors may covariate with fertility. For instance, the 
structure of wages may respond to changes in the labor supply triggered by a 
change in fertility. Additionally, changes in reproductive behavior may have been 
Y L  (ηt’) + Y 
NL
Nht
Yht  = 
ht htH
Y L   + Y NL(ηt’)
Nht
Yht   = 
ht htNL
Y L  (ηt’) + Y 
NL(ηt’)
Nht(ηt’)
Yht   = 
ht htT
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induced by income changes, in which case the microsimulation only captures a 
single round of effects, from fertility to incomes, of a more complicated process. 
If we observe that family size declines for the poor more than for the rich, it is 
rather obvious that poverty and inequality measured over the distribution of 
household current income per capita will also decline. This section makes two 
contributions to this intuition. First, it provides estimates of the magnitude of 
the direct distributive impact of the changes in fertility; that is the extent to 
which the actual declines in poverty and inequality can be accounted for by only 
the change in the reproductive behavior. Second, the methodology allows tracing 
and measuring some not-so-obvious effects. The fall in the number of children 
in the bottom strata of the distribution may induce some low-income women to 
enter the labor market or to work more hours. In that case, the decline in poverty 
and inequality might be larger than expected if one only considers the direct 
impact of the decline in family size. 
Results 
The estimations of the fertility equations are carried out for a sample of households 
in which the family head is between 25 and 45 years old. Figure 7.7 illustrates 
the number of children under 16 years old per household for the bottom and top 
quintiles of the parental income distribution in seven Latin American countries. 
In all cases, the number of children falls over time for both income groups. In 
Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru, the reduction is more marked 
for the bottom quintile, implying a shrinking fertility gap with the top quintile. 
In Chile, by contrast, the gap remains rather constant, while there are some signs 
of a widening gap in Uruguay.
The results of the microsimulations regarding poverty are presented in Table 7.5. 
Column (i) displays the observed change in the headcount ratio, while the rest 
of the columns present the impact of the changes in fertility. Column (v) shows 
the sum of all effects explored (equation (7)). In order to better understand the 
information in the table, take the case of Brazil. Column (i) informs that between 
1990 and 2012 the poverty headcount ratio in that country (using the line of 
US$ 4 a day) fell 25 points.17 The value in the last column has the following 
interpretation: if fertility had been the only factor that changed during that 
period, then the poverty headcount ratio in Brazil would have fallen 3.92 points. 
17 The values in this column do not coincide with the corresponding ones in Table 7.1, since 
here we are restricting the sample to households in which the head is between 25 and 45 
years old. In addition, the analysis in Table 7.1 is limited to urban areas.
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Figure 7.7: Number of children under 16 per household
Bottom and top quintiles of parental income distribution.
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: Households with mother aged 25-45. Black line: bottom income quintile (poorest 
20%). Grey line: top income quintile (richest 20%).
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This change is statistically significant, although not very big compared to the 
actual fall in poverty in that period. The overall effect is the result of a significant 
direct effect (-3.74), and two smaller effects that go in different directions. On the 
one hand, the differential reduction in fertility implied a greater increase in hours 
of work among more disadvantaged households, which in turn contributed, 
although very slightly, to a further reduction in income poverty. On the other 
hand, the falling patterns in fertility among the poor ameliorated the poverty-
decreasing impact of the conditional cash transfer programs that are mainly 
targeted to families with children (mainly the Bolsa Familia in the 2000s). 
However, this effect was quantitatively almost insignificant. 
Changes in fertility patterns over the last two decades in Latin America have 
implied a reduction in income poverty. The impact is statistically significant and 
in some cases economically large. For instance, the estimated poverty-reduction 
effect was more than 4 points in Mexico and El Salvador. Most of the effect 
comes through the direct effect: a reduction in fertility rates among the most 
disadvantaged groups reduced family size and increased per capita income. The 
hours-of-work effect is in most cases poverty reducing and the non-labor-income 
effect is poverty increasing, but in both cases the estimated sizes are small.
Table 7.5: Impact of fertility changes on poverty 
Changes in the poverty headcount ratio (US$ 4 line)
Effects
Country Period Observed change Direct Hours NLI Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Argentina 1992-2012
-11.22 -1.39 0.04 0.39 -0.80
(0.08) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Brazil 1990-2012
-25.16 -3.74 -0.17 0.14 -3.92
(0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Chile 1990-2011
-33.24 -1.56 0.18 - -1.43
(0.05) (0.01) (0.00) - (0.01)
El Salvador 1991-2010
-14.12 -4.98 -0.34 - -5.31
(0.06) (0.04) (0.01) - (0.05)
Mexico 1992-2012
-3.50 -4.35 -0.30 0.25 -4.43
(0.10) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Peru 1997-2012
-23.20 -3.83 -0.19 - -3.94
(0.09) (0.03) (0.01) - (0.03)
Uruguay 1995-2012
-1.56 -0.08 0.00 0.02 -0.05
(0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: All effects are significant at the 1% level. The standard errors were calculated using 
bootstrap with 200 replications. The values of each effect are averages that result from 
taking alternatively each year in the comparison as the base year. The sample includes only 
households in which the head is between 25 and 45 years old. NLI=non-labor income.
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Table 7.6 shows the results of the simulations on income inequality, measured 
by the Gini coefficient. Inequality in Brazil, as measured by the Gini coefficient, 
fell 7.18 points between 1990 and 2012. If fertility had been the only factor that 
changed in that period, then the Gini coefficient would have fallen 1.32 points 
(column v). This change is statistically significant, representing around 18% of 
the actual reduction in inequality during that period. The differential reduction 
in fertility across socioeconomic groups in Brazil contributed to the observed 
decline in inequality in the last two decades, although it was not a decisive factor. 
The overall effect of -1.32 points in column (v) is the result of a significant direct 
effect (-1.30), and two smaller effects going in different directions. 
Some interesting general results emerge from Table 7.6. First, changes in fertility 
have implied a decline in income inequality. The differential pattern in fertility 
across groups experienced in most Latin American countries over the last decades 
translated into an equalizing impact on the income distribution. Second, this 
effect is small, although not negligible. To be sure, demographic changes are 
not the central reason behind changes in income inequality but they are not 
irrelevant. In principle, most of them are statistically significant. On average, 
fertility changes account for a fall of around a point in the Gini coefficient. In 
Peru the impact was almost two Gini points. 
Third, most of the effect comes from the direct effect. The differential fall in 
fertility rates among socioeconomic groups had a larger impact on the family 
size of poorer families, implying a proportionally larger increasing effect on their 
per capita incomes. 
Fourth, the effect of fertility changes on hours of work and, in turn, on incomes, 
is smaller and has different signs across countries. It is important to notice that 
a more intense reduction in fertility among the poor may be consistent with 
a positive sign (inequality-increasing) for this effect. This could happen if the 
elasticity of hours of work with respect to the number of children is higher 
among the non-poor, and if the extra-hours worked triggered by the fall in 
fertility imply a household income increase proportionally larger for the non-
poor. Anyway, with one exception the hours-of-work effect has a negative sign, 
implying that the asymmetric reduction in fertility contributed to a reduction in 
income inequality by fostering a higher participation in the labor market among 
the more disadvantaged parents (mostly mothers). 
Finally, the effect through non-labor incomes is always inequality-increasing but 
small. The fall in fertility among the poor implied a lower inequality-reducing 
impact of the conditional cash transfer programs that spread in the region, 
mainly during the 2000s. The effect, however, is in most cases very small. 
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Table 7.6: Impact of fertility changes on inequality 
Changes in the Gini coefficient
Effects
Country Period Observed change Direct Hours NLI Total
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Argentina 1992-2012
-5.44 -1.04 -0.01 0.13 -0.95
(0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Brazil 1990-2012
-7.18 -1.30 -0.06 0.06 -1.32
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Chile 1990-2011
-1.78 -0.75 0.04 - -0.73
(0.08) (0.01) (0.00) - (0.01)
El Salvador 1991-2010
-7.68 -1.30 -0.07 - -1.40
(0.06) (0.02) (0.00) - (0.02)
Mexico 1992-2012
-0.86 -1.68 -0.11 0.12 -1.69
(0.19) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Peru 1997-2012
-7.32 -1.92 -0.06 - -1.99
(0.13) (0.01) (0.00) - (0.01)
Uruguay 1995-2012
-2.03 -0.12 -0.01 0.02 -0.13
(0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Source: own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
Note: All effects are significant at the 1% level. The standard errors were calculated using 
bootstrap with 200 replications. The values of each effect are averages that result from 
taking alternatively each year in the comparison as the base year. The sample includes only 
households in which the head is between 25 and 45 years old. NLI=non-labor income.
In summary, we find that the changes in fertility decisions that took place over 
the last decades contributed to reductions in income inequality and poverty in 
all countries. The fall in fertility among the income-deprived contributed to the 
reduction in poverty, and as it was larger than the decline among the non-poor, 
it contributed to the fall in inequality, as well. The main channel was simple: 
lower fertility rates implied smaller families and, thus, larger per capita incomes 
that reduced the probability of falling into income poverty. Lower fertility also 
fostered labor force participation, especially among women, which contributed 
to a reduction of poverty in several countries and a reduction in inequality in 
most economies, although the size of this effect was generally small. 
Given the magnitude of the effects found, we conclude that demographic 
changes in general, and fertility outcomes in particular, do not seem to be trivial 
determinants of the income distribution, and deserve careful consideration. 
This section has focused on some simple yet central channels, and ignored some 
factors that could also be relevant. For instance, a reduction in the number of 
children per family could imply higher inheritances and higher family spending 
on education and health per child, and hence, better income perspectives. Also, 
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smaller families may be better positioned to take advantage of labor market 
opportunities, for instance, through migration. Moreover, lower fertility rates 
may be associated with a reduction in the relative supply of unskilled labor and 
hence, an increase in its relative wage. 
Although in the short and medium-run, lower fertility in more disadvantaged 
households may contribute to reducing poverty and inequality, in the long run 
the implications are more nuanced. When children become adults they may 
contribute to their parents’ incomes:18 a fall in fertility may reduce incomes 
for the elderly, especially in countries where the pension system is weak, and 
ultimately contribute to higher poverty through that intertemporal channel.
18 The contribution to household income may start earlier in life. Child labor is still an issue in 
most Latin American countries. 
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Appendix 1
In this appendix we describe the microeconometric decomposition methodology 
outlined in section 2 and discuss the estimation strategy. Total household income 
(Yht) is the sum of individual labor incomes (Yjt
L) and non-labor incomes (Yjt
NL) 
over all household members.
(A1.1)
It is assumed that non-labor incomes are exogenously determined. Individual i’s 
labor income is the product of the hourly wage rate (wit) and the number of hours 
of work (Lit). 
(A1.2)
We follow Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2004) in assuming that 
both wages and hours are determined in a reduced-form model of the labor 
market equilibrium:
(A1.3)
(A1.4)
   with wit = w
*
it and Lit=       if       > 0
   wit = 0 and Lit= 0 if       ≤ 0
Yht = o(Y L  + Y NL)jt jt
jh
Y L  = witLitit
ln w
*
  = X’1it t + 
W
it  it
it(
W, L)  N(0,0, 2  , 2 ,t )it  Wt  Lt
L*   = X’2it t + 
L
it  it
L* it L
*
 it
L* it
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where       and       are latent variables, unobservable by the analyst. The column 
vectors X1it and X2it include all observable factors affecting hourly wages and 
hours of work, respectively. t and t (vectors), are the parameters to be estimated 
in the model, along with  2W t ,
2
L t  and t . 
The specification of equations (A1.3) and (A1.4) corresponds to the Tobit Type III 
model in Amemiya’s (1985) classification. It is possible to consistently estimate 
the parameters of this model by:19 (i) estimating equation (A1.3) by Heckman’s 
maximum likelihood method, using a censored version of (A1.4) as a selection 
equation, where instead of hours of work a binary indicator that captures whether 
the individual works or not is used, and (ii) estimating equation (A1.4) using a 
Tobit model. We estimate this model for three groups: household heads, spouses, 
and others. 
In the framework of this model we carry out two simulations that arise from 
changing the parameter . In the first simulation, we consider only women that 
change their employment status and assign them a wage according to equation 
(A1.3), and an error term drawn from the bivariate distribution implicit in the 
model. In the second simulation, we consider only changes in hours of work 
among those women who were employed before the simulation.
19 This estimation strategy is consistent though not fully efficient. Gasparini et al. (2004) 
argue that (i) this alternative has certain computational advantages over a full information 
procedure, and that (ii) the efficiency loss is not necessarily significant for a given sample size.
w*it L
*
  it
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Appendix 2
The methodology for the microsimulations of section 4 is similar to that described 
in Appendix 1. Instead of simulating changes in female labor force participation, 
in this section we simulate changes in fertility outcomes. This appendix reports 
some of the methodological issues regarding this point.20 
According to economic theory, fertility outcomes are the result of a process 
affected by characteristics of each spouse and on household characteristics, among 
other factors. Fertility decisions can be represented by the following equation:
(A2.1)
where Hht is the number of children in household h at time t, Zht is a column 
vector of household observable characteristics and eht includes all unobservable 
characteristics that influence family reproductive behavior. For the estimation of 
this model, it is assumed that the number of children follows a Poisson process 
with parameter µht. Formally, 
(A2.2) Hht~Poisson(µht)   with   µht=E(Hht|Zht)=exp(Z’ht ηt )
Then,
(A2.3) Prob (Hht = Ho) =                 with Ho = 0, 1, 2, ... 
This is the Poisson regression model, from which it is possible to consistently 
estimate parameters ηt by the maximum likelihood procedure. It can be shown 
20 The section is taken from Marchionni and Gasparini (2007) and Badaracco (2014).
Hht = H(Z ht, e ht;ηt )
exp(-μht )( μht )
H0
H0!
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that consistency holds for the maximum likelihood estimators of ηt as long as 
the real distribution is any of the linear exponential family (to which the Poisson 
distribution belongs), provided that the conditional mean in (A2.2) is correctly 
specified. The estimators of η (which for simplicity are also denoted by η) are 
used to perform the microsimulations.
The simulated number of children in household h at year t, using the estimated 
fertility parameters for year t’, is given by: 
(A2.4)
where F (.) is the function that gives the relative ranking of its argument 
in year t distribution conditional to the observable characteristics Zht. In this 
particular case, F (.) is the cumulative probability function of a random 
variable that follows a Poisson distribution with exp(Z’ht ηt ) parameter.
The advantage of simulating the number of children through equation (A2.4) 
instead of predicting the expected number of children from the estimated model 
becomes evident when unobservable factors affecting fertility decisions are taken 
into account. Two households with the same observable characteristics Zht but a 
different number of children clearly differ in their unobservable characteristics 
eht, although the prediction of the expected number of children for both 
households would be the same and equal to exp(Z’ht ηt ). Since the objective is to 
simulate changes in the number of children as a consequence of changes only in 
the parameters η, it is necessary to keep unobservable factors fixed. Therefore, 
each household is characterized by the quantile it occupies in the distribution 
of children of year t. Let qht be the quantile for household h at time t, that is, 
F (Hht)=qht. The simulated number of children in household h will be the one 
that places it in the qht quantile of the distribution of children with the relevant 
parameters of time t’ (ηt’) conditional to the observable characteristics Zht.
Hht(ηt ) = F
-1     o   F    (Hht)ηt ’ |Zht ηt |Zht
ηt |Zht
ηt |Zht
ηt |Zht
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Figure 7.2: Poverty based on projections of female LFP 
Latin American countries, 2012-2032.
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Figure 7.2: Poverty based on projections of female LFP (cont.)
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Figure 7.2: Poverty based on projections of female LFP (cont.)
Source: own calculations based on national household surveys. 
Note: poverty is measured with the headcount ratio with a line fixed at USD 4 a day 
adjusted for PPP.
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Figure 7.3: Inequality based on projections of female LFP 
Latin American countries, 2012-2032
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Figure 7.3: Inequality based on projections of female LFP (cont.)
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Figure 7.3: Inequality based on projections of female LFP (cont.)
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Source: own calculations based on national household surveys. 
Note: Inequality is measured with the Gini coefficient for household per capita income.
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Table 7.4: Percentage of female heads of household
Latin American countries, 1992-2012. Women aged 25-54.
A. All women
Share of female household heads based on 
self-report assesment 
Gap between self-report and 
economic definitions of female 
household headship*
1992 
(in %)
change 
2002-1992
change 
2012-2002
change 
2012-1992
1992 2002 2012
Argentina 12.7 5.3 7.4 12.7 -4.2 -6.5 2.7
Bolivia 9.5 4.8 4.7 9.5 -2.1 -3.6 -0.9
Brazil 15.7 6.1 9.6 15.7 -1.0 0.8 8.9
Chile 16.8 4.2 12.6 16.8 0.0 0.0 5.7
Costa Rica 12.1 5.8 6.3 12.1 0.1 3.0 6.9
Ecuador 4.9 3.5 1.4 4.9 1.5 -2.4 -3.5
Honduras 3.9 1.2 2.7 3.9 2.9 0.4 2.5
Mexico 7.7 3.9 3.8 7.7 -0.7 -1.7 0.4
Nicaragua 2.7 -1.3 4.0 2.7 1.1 2.0 3.7
Panama 7.4 1.3 6.1 7.4 0.4 1.8 7.1
Peru 2.9 0.8 2.2 2.9 -1.9 -2.5 -0.1
Paraguay 11.1 8.1 3.0 11.1 -2.2 1.7 6.4
El Salvador 6.1 4.9 1.3 6.1 -0.4 -2.5 -0.8
Uruguay 22.3 7.8 14.5 22.3 0.6 -0.8 8.7
Venezuela 10.4 7.1 3.3 10.4 1.6 0.9 6.4
Latin America 9.8 4.2 5.5 9.8 -0.3 -0.6 3.6
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B. Married women
Share of female household heads based 
on self-report assesment 
Gap between self-report and 
economic definition of female 
household headship**
Total income Labor income
1992 
(in %)
change 
2002-1992
change 
2012-2002
change 
2012-1992
1992 2002 2012 1992 2002 2012
Argentina 2.3 1.9 9.8 11.7 -10.6 -18.0 -5.4 -12.7 -10.8 -3.3
Bolivia 0.5 1.2 3.5 4.7 -7.5 -11.1 -7.5 -7.9 -10.7 -7.6
Brazil 1.2 3.8 14.8 18.6 -9.3 -8.6 1.3 -9.7 -8.0 5.1
Chile 1.1 4.3 10.9 15.3 -6.3 -6.6 1.5 -6.4 -5.8 2.3
Costa Rica 1.5 2.8 7.5 10.3 -7.9 -7.6 -4.3 -7.7 -7.5 -3.6
Ecuador 2.5 0.3 0.3 0.6 -6.8 -12.1 -12.0 -6.3 -8.8 -9.7
Honduras 3.9 -0.7 6.1 5.4 -6.7 -8.7 -7.5 -6.7 -9.5 -4.9
Mexico 0.4 1.1 3.1 4.2 -5.4 -10.0 -12.1 -5.8 -8.8 -9.5
Nicaragua 7.4 -1.0 6.0 5.0 -9.5 -8.4 -7.1 -9.7 -10.4 -7.6
Panama 3.1 1.9 4.6 6.5 -11.2 -11.9 -6.2 -10.8 -10.8 -5.7
Peru 1.4 0.4 2.6 3.0 -11.5 -11.2 -6.6 -13.6 -13.9 -11.6
Paraguay 1.3 7.0 5.6 12.6 -7.9 -8.1 -1.7 -8.2 -7.4 -1.1
El Salvador 2.0 6.0 1.2 7.3 -11.0 -15.3 -12.2 -11.0 -13.1 -11.5
Uruguay 4.5 3.1 14.4 17.5 -10.3 -11.6 1.6 -10.1 -11.3 1.9
Venezuela 0.2 7.6 7.1 14.8 -9.6 -10.0 -1.7 -9.6 -9.7 -1.7
Latin America 2.2 2.6 6.5 9.2 -8.8 -10.6 -5.3 -9.1 -9.8 -4.6
Source: own calculations based on national household surveys. 
Note: *Economic definition based on total family income: share of prime age women 
earning more than half of total family income. **Economic definition based on both 
a woman and her husband’s income: share of prime age married women earning more 
than her husband. Married women: either in formal or consensual unions. Latin 
America: unweighted means.
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1. Introduction
A long process of economic and cultural change has generated progress in gender 
equality. Institutions have been restituting women rights and changing social 
attitudes have improved the gender components included in policy (Doeptke, 
Terlilt and Voena, 2012). However, evidence reveals that translating development 
into gender equality has been difficult; recent policies directed at women’s 
empowerment intend to close these gaps (Kabeer, 2012; Revenga and Shetty, 
2012; Duflo, 2012; and World Bank, 2011). 
The current picture reveals that reaching gender equality is a challenge 
worldwide. Figure 8.1 illustrates regional rankings according to the Global 
Gender Gap Index1, which measures countries’ performance in terms of 
gender equality. It shows the highest, lowest and average figures reached by 
the countries in the six regions, according to their index score. No country 
has been able to fully close the gender gap, not even Nordic countries like 
Iceland, where the gap has been closed up to 85%. North America, and 
Europe and Central Asia have obtained average indexes that are the closest to 
gender equality, despite significant dispersion among countries in the latter 
region. Latin America and the Caribbean ranks third, with lower intra-group 
dispersion. While the two regions, North America, and Europe and Central 
1 Introduced by the World Economic Forum in 2006, the Global Gender Gap Index measures 
gaps in gender equality based on a set of outcome variables for four categories or subindexes 
– health and survival, educational attainment, economic participation and opportunity, 
and political empowerment. See Hausman et al. in World Economic Forum (2014) for 
methodological details.
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Asia, have closed nearly 75% and 73% of their gender gap, Latin America and 
the Caribbean has closed around 71%.
Latin American and Caribbean countries have substantially reduced gender 
gaps in education attainment, but they have performed poorly in guaranteeing 
equality in the Economic Participation and Opportunity dimension. This latter 
sub index captures the gender gap in labor force participation rates, earned 
incomes, employment in top positions, and professional and technical workers. 
Figure 8.2 compares countries’ performance according to the Global Gender 
Gap Index and the Economic Participation and Opportunity sub index. While 
10 out of 26 countries pertain to the top fifty positions in the Global Index, only 
6 out of 26 are also ranked among the top fifty of the Economic Participation 
and Opportunity Sub index.
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At the same time, labor market analysis in the region highlights that women 
persistently obtain poorer outcomes than men. As has been extensively documented 
in previous chapters, on average, prime-age women remain at the margins of the 
labor market: while around 65% of women aged 25-54 join the labor force, labor 
force participation is over 95% for men in the same age group. Women in the 
labor force are 1.5 times more likely to be unemployed than men. The figures are 
discouraging even when women are employed: most employed women perform 
precarious jobs without access to social security benefits2, and the wage gap 
indicates that women earn 10% less than men (Ñopo, 2012). Moreover, current 
deprivations not only have a direct impact on women, but also on their dependents. 
The situation is expected to worsen as women age, as current labor conditions 
increase women’s barriers to social security entitlements (Barrientos, 2002). 
Gender inequalities also prevent women from making economic decisions 
freely and increase barriers to other forms of empowerment. Hence, economic 
empowerment could be considered an entry point to other dimensions of 
empowerment (Kabeer, 2009).
2 See chapter 4 for detailed statistics on women’s employment profile.
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The main aim of this chapter is to identify and analyze policies in the region that 
address the hindrances that women face when exercising power in the economic 
dimension, particularly when making labor market choices. Thus, the chapter 
reviews major interventions that took place in the region that were aimed at 
improving women’s labor market and economic participation, especially those 
that target prime-age women. It takes into consideration interventions that rule 
the outcomes themselves as well as those that affect the incentives that unlock 
women empowerment. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of 
policies that aim to empower women in the economic arena, proposes a taxonomy, 
and briefly depicts leading countries’ approaches. Section 3 describes the policy 
profile across countries in the region in terms of design and performance. Section 
4 discusses some of the challenges and pitfalls that these policies need to overcome 
and Section 5 provides some final comments.
2. What can be done to empower women in 
the economic dimension?
With ambiguous achievements in terms of the transition from wellbeing to 
empowerment, policies in diverse settings have enabled women to make their own 
decisions, and they have generated some visible results. Fostering empowerment 
in the economic arena requires policies that promote access to basic services, 
resources, employment, and social protections (Kabeer, 2012; World Bank, 2011). 
Labor market decisions are the result of a joint decision making process at the 
household level in which women may take different positions according to their 
bargaining power (Chioda, 2011). Inter-member relations at the household 
level result in allocations of paid and unpaid work for members that may affect 
women’s agency (Malhotra, 2003). Roles tied to gender, such as housework and 
caregiving, imply greater restrictions on female labor market participation; they 
also lower the threshold (in terms of wages and labor conditions) that women are 
willing to accept to reconcile work with home responsibilities.
Thus, economic empowerment policies seek to correct the imbalances that prevent 
women from making their own choices. These policies, which intervene during 
different stages of a woman’s lifespan, relax constraints and enhance her ability 
to decide about her own future. Deprivation of these sources of empowerment 
keeps women from obtaining desired outcomes and distances their achievements 
from those of men. 
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Policy designs adopt two approaches to correct these imbalances. On the one 
hand, they alter incentives by providing benefits or reducing costs. On the 
other hand, they set mandatory outcomes like gender quotas in occupations 
or positions.
This chapter focuses on the set of economic empowerment policies that take 
place during a woman’s active age. These policies are more closely related to 
labor market and economic sustainability than to formal education, which takes 
place during earlier stages of the lifecycle. Policies targeting women during their 
active age include: initiatives aimed at freeing up women’s time, supporting 
women’s participation and productivity in the workplace through Active 
Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) and labor regulations, social protection with a 
gender perspective, and efforts to eliminate institutional biases against women’s 
economic participation and entitlements. 
The following subsection proposes a taxonomy of policies that classifies them 
according to their main objectives and the imbalances they intend to correct. 
Then, it briefly discusses good practices employed in leading countries.
2.1. A taxonomy 
Multiple interventions are necessary to achieve women’s economic 
empowerment. Policy strategies can be classified according to three main 
objectives: relaxing the constraints on women’s time, improving women’s 
agency, and generating fair labor markets (Table 8.1). These objectives are 
connected to particular groups of women and depend on the hindrances they 
have to overcome. Although women appear to be a unique target population, 
they represent a heterogeneous set of needs. 
A key restriction to women’s economic empowerment is the time burden 
attached to their family responsibilities. Significant decisions concerning 
education, work, and fertility overlap during women’s active age. As a result, 
family decisions may crowd out human capital accumulation as well as labor 
market insertion for mothers and wives. The intrinsic gender roles related 
to maternity increase the costs of women’s entry into the labor market, and 
these costs are often reinforced by other caregiving and home-production 
responsibilities that usually fall to women.
As a response, co-responsibility and care policies seek to alter the households’ cost-
benefit equation by engaging women in paid work. Parenthood policies can 
counterbalance the incentives that an employer could have for hiring males instead 
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of females because of maternity breaks, balancing the support in child-related 
post-birth leave between working parents. The possibility to share parental care 
after childbearing ameliorates the gender-biased effects of child-breaks on career 
prospects, i.e. progress and earnings. Another way to increase the incentives for 
women’s employment is to diminish or neutralize the tax burden for the second-
earner in the household. When taxes on the second earner are higher than on the 
first (or single) earner, the forgone increases in disposable income at the household 
level may prevent women from participating in the labor market.
Table 8.1: A taxonomy of economic empowerment policies
Objective Issue Policy Tool
Relaxing constraints 
on women’s time
Competing roles at the 
household level
Co-responsibility  
at home
Parental leave
Family leave
Taxation on second earner
Care support Child and adult care services
Improving women 
agency
Unequal access to 
economic resources
Social protection
Conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs) targeting women
Motherhood compensation in 
social entitlements 
Social benefits
Regulatory environment Property rights
Getting fair labor 
markets for women
Barriers to labor market 
entry, discrimination, 
asymmetry of information, 
segmented labor markets
Active labor market 
policies (ALMPs)
Training
Employment services
Temporary employment
Entrepreneurship
Labor laws
Protective legislation
Part-time work arrangements
Reduced-hours schemes in full 
time jobs
Minimun wages
Advocacy
Representation in organizations
Campaigns and awareness 
activities
Source: own elaboration.
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International evidence suggests that parental leave has positive effects on women’s 
labor market participation. Ruhm (1998) identified a positive effect of short 
parental leave on employment for women of childbearing age based on data for 
OECD countries. In contrast, the author found that lengthy parental leave (more 
than 6 months) is associated with lower wages. Waldfogel, Higuchi and Abe 
(1998) found that family leave policies increase women’s attachment to the labor 
market after childbirth, based on panel data for Japan, Great Britain, and the 
United States. Schönberg and Ludsteck (2007) analyzed the case of Germany, 
where several parental leave expansions took place, and found a positive and 
small impact on female labor supply in the long-run and a delay in women’s 
return to work in the short-run. More recently, Thévenon and Solaz (2013) have 
pointed out that expansions in the leave period have had positive, though modest, 
impacts on female employment in OECD countries, provided that break periods 
are shorter than two years. 
Provision of care services also provides an incentive for mothers to engage in paid 
work. Supply of high-quality care services for children, such as early childhood 
education and daycare or nurseries, relaxes time-demands on mothers, allowing 
them to reconcile working hours and safe care for their children. Public or 
community care services represent a particularly important need for vulnerable 
women, whose potential labor earnings would not be enough to cover the high 
costs of private childcare services. Care for the elderly and the disabled is also a 
task traditionally assigned to women, who usually drop out of the labor market 
when circumstances require them to take on these responsibilities. 
Childcare subsidies have also shown to have a positive effect on women’s labor 
participation. For instance, Bettendorf et al. (2012) measured the childcare 
subsidy increase that took place in the Netherlands during 2005–09 and found 
that there was a moderate sized impact on female labor supply, and Lefebvre et al. 
(2009) found that a sub-national and universal subsidy in Canada that facilitates 
childcare also generated positive effects on female labor supply in the long run. 
The second objective in Table 8.1 relates to improving women’s agency. Women’s 
agency refers to a woman’s ability to exercise control over resources, something 
often denied by norms or as a result of economic-based gender inequality. Social 
protection and regulatory environment policies aim to correct unequal access to 
economic resource, seek to provide autonomy and self-worth to women, and 
empower them to participate on equal instead of subordinated terms. 
Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) usually direct payments to women, 
although they either target children in the household or the entire household. 
This potentially gives women control over resources as well as the responsibility to 
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comply with certain conditions, such as school enrollment and children’s health 
check-ups, which could increase their bargaining power within the household 
(Fizbein et al., 2009). 
The impact of CCTs on female labor supply appears to be uncertain. Although 
CCT impact evaluations mainly consider those variables related to childhood 
development—which figure as the primary goal of this type of program—some 
evaluations measure the program’s effects on labor supply. Most of these studies 
do not find that cash transfers have significant short-term effects on female 
labor force participation, although there are exceptions. Their long-run impact 
remains uncertain.3 
Another role assumes motherhood compensation in social protection 
entitlements as pensions and unemployment insurance. Maternity leave can 
limit a woman’s ability to accrue sufficient social security contributions, 
resulting in lower social benefits, like pensions. Compensation for motherhood 
or housework during active age contribution years serves as a means to restitute 
women’s control over economic resources at the time of retirement and facilitate 
economic autonomy.
Additionally, general regulations on property rights guarantee women the 
ability to exercise decisions over economic resources in equitable conditions. 
When a woman’s property rights are recognized, she obtains greater control 
over economic decisions, including productive uses, financial choices, and well-
being. Assuring women’s control over resources can be guaranteed through 
legislation. Laws can restitute agency by granting women social identity to 
manage properties and inheritances; laws should avoid discriminatory clauses 
that deny women’s access to land or housing titling, inheritance, and marital 
assets based on gender fundamentals. 
The third objective of many economic empowerment policies is to ease women’s 
access, permanence, and success in the labor market. Segregation by occupational 
type—in economic sectors and position levels—limits women’s mobility to 
better-paid and hierarchical positions, and to a stable employment trajectory. 
ALMPs, labor laws, and advocacy address the underlying factors that underpin 
labor market segmentation.
3 See Gasparini, Garganta and Marchionni (2015), Alzúa et al. (2010), Martorano and 
Sanfilippo (2012), Ferro and Nicollela (2007), MDS (2007), Foguel and Paes de Barros 
(2010), and Borraz and Gonzalez (2009) as examples of a growing literature. See also the 
discussions and the empirical evidence in the previous chapters of this volume.
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Most countries design ALMPs to include specific components for women, 
particularly the most vulnerable groups of women, to encourage their 
involvement in the labor market. ALMPs include a broad set of interventions 
such as training, employment services, incentives for small business 
development, and direct employment generation through public employment 
programs. They seek to overcome poor endowments in education, employment 
tenure, social networks and productive assets, in order to facilitate women’s 
transition from inactivity, unemployment, or precarious employment, to 
formal jobs and stable incomes.
Card et al. (2010) reviewed studies that evaluate the impact of ALMPs for 
the period 1995-2007 and underlined that no gender differences were found 
in this type of program. In-classroom and on-the-job training show positive 
effects, particularly in the medium term. Subsidies for jobs in the public sector 
yielded poorer outcomes than other ALMPs. Cho and Honorati (2013) reviewed 
entrepreneurship programs in developing countries, finding positive effects on 
women’s labor outcomes. They found that interventions that provided financing 
instead of training generated significant impacts. This suggests that credit 
constraints matter most among women in self-employment activities. Training 
programs appear to only affect women’s attitudes. 
Labor laws aimed at empowering women are subject to a lively debate concerning 
their actual effects. Some protective norms may create incentives that could 
make their aims inoperative or could even obtain adverse outcomes. Legislation 
that restricts women’s working hours and their participation in industries or 
certain types of jobs may deter incentives to hire women. Although they promote 
women’s participation in the labor market, part-time job schemes or reduced 
working hours for women could also favor precarious employment relationships 
in segmented markets. Other protective legislations like anti-discrimination 
regulations, guarantee equal treatment across genders (World Bank, 2012a). 
For instance, minimum salary policies may exert a substantive role on women’s 
earnings and the gender wage gap, as women are overrepresented among workers 
earning the minimum wage (Betcherman, 2012). 
Finally, policy advocacy pursues changes in social attitudes regarding discriminatory 
practices and female stereotypes, raising awareness of the importance of gender 
equality in the economy. Policy advocacy includes initiatives to disseminate 
information about public policies that could be imitated, promote transparency 
in recruitment and promotion practices, and encourage gender balance in top-
level boards, seniority positions, and political decision-making.
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2.2. The experience of leading countries
Nordic countries serve as examples of achievement in gender equality. They are 
ranked in the top five positions of the Global Gender Gap Index 2014 (Iceland, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark rank from 1st to 5th) and their successful 
policies on the subject are also widely acknowledged. Even though the Latin 
American context is very different in terms of socioeconomic and demographic 
variables, the region could learn some lessons from these countries’ experiences. 
The premise of the Nordic system is to promote equal conditions and 
opportunities to individuals no matter their gender condition, with the aim that 
such a policy would extend the freedom of choice on an individual basis. Since 
1987, the Nordic Council of Ministers for Gender Equality has led regional 
government cooperation in the area of gender equality. This council prioritizes 
gender equality in the labor market, and intends to become a model for gender 
policy innovations for other countries.
Initiatives like parental leave schemes and formal childcare are aimed at reducing 
the burden of care activities. They have a long tradition. Maternity leave schemes 
were first put in place in the 1950s, and paternity and parental leave began a 
bit later, during the 1970s and 1980s. While maternity and paternity leave are 
linked to the biological requirements of childbirth, parental leave benefits are 
allocated to parents to help with childcare. Maternity leave for the period before/
after birth are the longest in Finland and Denmark, with 18 and 17.5 weeks 
respectively; in Finland, maternity leave may be transferred to fathers for health 
reasons. Paid paternity leave periods are shorter, with 2 weeks in Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden; and 3 weeks in Finland. These lengths contrast with those 
observed for Latin American countries, as the following section shows.
In addition, fathers and mothers in these Nordic countries are permitted to take 
more weeks off using paid parental leave schemes. Evidence shows that men 
are in charge of around 40% of unpaid work at home, and there is a tendency 
towards equal shares of parental leave between marital partners (Gíslason and 
Eydal, 2011). “Father quotas” for parental leave—i.e. the required take-up rate 
of parental leave for men—were first implemented at the end of the 20th century 
to encourage co-responsibility. In Iceland, the father quota is 12 weeks and in 
Norway it is 10. There are also “mother quotas” in Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. 
These countries have legal instruments similar to maternity leave that provide 
leave from 9 to 11 weeks in duration. 
Countries also offer different models for entitlements to leave compensation. In 
Finland, paid leave is linked to living arrangements. Mothers should reside in 
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the country for at least 180 days before the estimated delivery date and fathers 
should live with the child’s mother. In Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland, 
however, leave compensation is connected to employment. Thus, the parent must 
meet some eligibility requirements to receive the benefit, including minimum 
working hours and duration of employment. 
Another distinguishing feature of the Nordic system relates to childcare, which 
is universal, services-oriented, and closely tied to education. Indeed, coverage 
of formal childcare services in Nordic countries is among the highest in the 
world (European Commission, 2013). The childcare system, which began in the 
1960s and 1970s, was initiated as a complement to family-friendly policies and 
was intended to encompass parents’ increasing labor market participation. In 
contrast to other European countries, where national governments are in charge 
of providing childcare services, these national policies are decentralized at the 
municipal level. 
Daycare centers, family daycare, and schools offer support in the form of 
non-parental care. Following parental leave, all children are entitled to public 
daycare, though in practice there are some supply constraints. Daycare can also 
be provided in the form of family daycare, where care services are delivered at the 
child’s home. The cost of care is directly related to family income, allowing the 
most vulnerable families to have access to high-quality services. 
Finland and Norway—and Denmark and Sweden, more recently—provide 
cash grants for care to promote equality and freedom of choice. These subsidies 
are targeted to children under the age of three. While access to these programs 
is universal in Finland and Norway, there are requirements based on parent’s 
income in Denmark and Sweden. 
There are additional incentives for women’s employment. In Nordic countries, 
taxing on second earners is lower than on single earners, and it has been 
decreasing over time (OECD, 2006). Flexible working hours is common in 
Sweden and Finland. In Finland, there are pension credits for women who 
interrupt their careers to raise children; these contributions are paid for by the 
State. Iceland offers a basic pension through the social assistance pillar of the 
social security system (OECD, 2012). Gender-balance in political decision-
making appears stronger in Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, where at least 40% 
of each gender was represented in the national parliament in 2012 (European 
Commission, 2013).
Nevertheless, there is some debate regarding the actual effects of this policy 
framework on gender equality. Some family-oriented policies that try to combine 
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familial and labor market responsibilities are suspected of encouraging gender 
role segregation at home and in the labor market. For example, extended 
maternity leave and child allowances may strengthen gender roles as they 
presume that women will be the primary caregivers and they detach women 
from the labor market for longer periods, which can erode their seniority and 
human capital accumulation. Moreover, part-time employment may reinforce 
women’s attachment to traditionally “female” occupations. Conversely, policies 
that offer all household members incentives to engage in care activities are subject 
to another fairness debate centered on financing and targeting. 
3. Policies in place
In Latin America, policies to promote women’s economic empowerment seem 
to lag behind increased female participation in the labor market. Some studies 
argue that policies in the region are built on a paradigm that centers on the whole 
household and do not weigh the gender-equality effects. These policies thus 
stand in contrast to the individual empowerment and gender-equality approach 
adopted by Nordic countries (ILO et al., 2013; Rossel, 2013; Arriagada, 2007). 
3.1. Relaxing constraints on women’s time
The growing trend in female labor force participation has not been accompanied 
by greater involvement of men in housework, causing an increasing burden on 
women (ILO et al., 2013; CEPAL, 2010; Arriagada, 2007). 
A remarkable feature of the initiatives in place is their close connection with 
employment. In fact, most tools to alleviate the burden of care activities carried 
out by women—like birth and post-birth leave—are attached to jobs in the 
formal sector, i.e. jobs with access to social security benefits. In addition, other 
public childcare services are scarce, while private options are expensive. As this 
type of intervention is offered to (or affordable for) women with high-quality 
employment, the lack of universal policies deepens the negative empowerment 
effects experienced by vulnerable women. 
Co-responsibility at home
For women, maternity leave is an extended intervention among family-friendly 
policies to reconcile home and work in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Paternity leave has been implemented several decades after maternity leave in 
some countries in the region; parental leave is far less frequent—it is only offered 
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in three countries. Maternity leave includes a mandatory break before and after 
birth (duration differs across countries), in which entitled women receive full 
salary. When the term ends, women in many countries also have the right to 
reduced and paid working hours for breastfeeding. 
Figure 8.3 reports the duration of maternity and paternity leave with 100% 
income replacement for 27 Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2014. All 
of these countries offer paid maternity leave, and the most frequent duration is 
about 12 weeks, which takes place for women with formal jobs in the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Suriname. The longest paid leave 
(18  eeks) corresponds to working mothers in Chile, Cuba, and Venezuela, while 
the lowest one (6 weeks) takes place in Honduras. 
Conversely, only 15 out of 27 countries offer full pay paternity leave and in 
most cases (12 countries) it is less than a week. Indeed, Paraguay, Guatemala, 
Dominican Republic, and Argentina offer only 2 days of paternity leave and 
Suriname, El Salvador, and Bolivia offer 3 days of paternity leave. Venezuela has 
the longest paternity leave (2 weeks), followed by Ecuador and Colombia (10 and 
8 days, respectively). 
Recently, many countries in the region have pushed to reform their birth leave 
schemes. Reforms have largely aimed to extend the duration of leave. In 2011, 
Chile increased the length of maternity leave from 12 to 18 weeks and Colombia 
increased its maternity leave from 12 to 14 weeks. Uruguay added two weeks (from 
12 to 14) to its maternity leave program in late 2013. Establishing or extending 
paternity leave is another recent phenomenon. As a new measure, Peru and 
Bolivia implemented paternity leave in 2010 and 2012, respectively. Meanwhile, 
Colombia extended its existing leave period for fathers from 4 to 8 days in 2010, 
and Uruguay established a progressive increase in its duration from 3 to 6 days by 
2015 and 10 days by 2016 for its reform, which took place in 2013.
One significant difference between maternal and paternal leave is the method of 
financing. While maternity leave is financed through a social security system in 
which employers, workers, and the public sector make contributions, paternity 
leave relies mainly on employer financing. This is the case in Argentina, Brazil, 
Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. In Uruguay, before the new reform, 
employers paid benefits for 3 days of paternity leave. Law No. 19.161, passed 
in 2013, charged the Treasury with the responsibility of financing 7 additional 
days; the reform will likely be implemented in the near future. By contrast, in 
Colombia and Venezuela, paternity leave is completely financed by the social 
security system.
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Some policies place constraints on the number of leave periods that an individual 
may take. Trinidad & Tobago and the Bahamas both established a limited 
number of leave terms for employed women—once every two years in Trinidad 
& Tobago and once every three years in the Bahamas. Both countries have also 
instated a tenure requirement to access these benefits. 
Three countries have emerged as exceptions by connecting parental leave to 
childcare rather than childbirth. Cuba, Chile, and Uruguay allow shared 
parental leave for childcare after birth leave. In Cuba, working mothers or 
fathers are able to request parental leave to care for children during the period 
between the end of the maternity leave until the child turns one. Additional 
Figure 8.3: Maternity and paternity leave with 100% income replacement
Latin America (27 countries), early 2015.
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Notes: data reflects the most general labor law and does not include special cases, i.e. 
it ignores leave schemes for employment in specific economic sectors (e.g. public sector 
employment usually provides a more generous leave).
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unpaid leave (for justifiable reasons) is also available for parents when children 
reach the age of one. In Chile, working mothers may request parental leave for 
childcare after their maternity leave ends. The period of leave is up to 12 weeks 
for full-time employment or 18 weeks for part-time. In addition, based on the 
reform that took place in Chile in 2011, mothers are entitled to transfer up to 
6 weeks of maternity leave to fathers. In Uruguay, mothers or fathers—parents 
are entitled to choose—have the right to parental leave for children aged up to 
five-months-old in 2015 and six-months-old by 2016.
For almost all countries shown in Figure 8.3, mothers and fathers employed in 
the formal sector are eligible for maternity or paternity leave. Given the high 
rates of informal employment in the region, these policies are less likely to affect 
the distribution of childcare responsibilities between mothers and fathers.4 
Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru offer a maternity leave entitlement for unemployed 
women. Women under the unemployment insurance regime are entitled to full paid 
childcare leave. However, these schemes are also biased to participants in formal 
labor markets. Indeed, women qualify for unemployment insurance if they are 
able to demonstrate a formal labor history—i.e. past social security contributions.
The only study examining of the effects of maternity leave on women’s labor 
outcomes in the region was conducted for Costa Rica. Gindling and Crummett 
(1995) studied how three maternity leave laws, initiated during the 1980s and 
1990s, affected labor outcomes for women. In 1980, leave duration increased from 
2 to 4 months in the public sector, and then the same increase took place in the 
private sector in 1986. Later, in 1990, the law sanctioned mechanisms to enforce 
mandatory maternity leave. While the increase in the length of leave in the 1980s 
did not have any effect on female employment and wages, the law sanctioned in 
1990 had a negative effect on women’s wages in the private sector and no effects in 
the public sector and self-employment, which were not addressed in the law. 
Care services
Public policies on care services are less relevant to the global set of women’s 
economic empowerment policies (Arriagada, 2007). Existing public supply may 
be grouped into two categories: those initiatives related to enrolling children in 
4 This is particularly relevant for some stereotyped female occupations like domestic service, 
and some job types like self-employment, which have the highest informality rates and 
reduced social protection schemes. Recently, some countries in the region set new legislation 
for domestic workers in order to formalize this activity (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica 
and Uruguay).
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formal education, and those covering children in vulnerable households through 
social assistance programs (ILO & UNDP, 2009). The public provision of 
care services that cover mothers with children under the mandatory education 
age is scarce and heterogeneous. Even though initiatives regarding the elderly 
and people with disabilities have a longer tradition in the region, the degree of 
coverage varies across countries.
In most of Latin America, pre-school education is not mandatory at early 
ages. Only one year of pre-primary education is mandatory in the majority 
of countries, mostly for 5 year olds. Figure 8.4 summarizes the age at which 
mandatory education begins in 18 Latin American countries in 2014. Pre-
primary education is mandatory earlier in Mexico and Peru, where the law 
requires three years of mandatory education (beginning at 3 years old) before 
children enter primary school. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay begin schooling 
at 4 years old. At the other extreme, El Salvador and Guatemala have the highest 
mandatory schooling entry age, 7 years old, and do not require compulsory pre-
primary school education.
In the 2010s, some countries in Figure 8.4 extended the years of compulsory 
education to include pre-primary education. Honduras made one year of pre-
primary education mandatory in 2012. Brazil established that 2 years of pre-
primary education would be mandatory in 2013 and determined that the 
Federal States and local governments should include children aged 4-5 in this 
education level by 2016. Similarly, Chile established one year of mandatory pre-
primary education in 2013. Most recently, Ecuador passed a law to require one 
mandatory year for pre-primary education and Argentina and Uruguay lowered 
the mandatory requirement to children aged 4 years old.
Although increasing the mandatory years of education at the primary or 
basic education levels tends to close attendance gaps, it does not guarantee 
universality. Coverage indicators reveal that enrollment reached wide 
coverage for children aged 5 years old in most countries, mainly through 
public providers (Figure 8.5). Average gross enrollment rate for the region 
(15 countries in the 2010s) is 77.4% among 5 year-old children. In Mexico, 
Uruguay, and Argentina, coverage is close to universal, with rates above 95%. 
In the case of Chile, the enrollment rate is around 94% despite enrollment not 
being mandatory at the time of the survey (2011). Among the countries with 
the lowest records are those where enrollment is not mandatory for this age 
group –Guatemala registers the lowest rate 47.3%. In Nicaragua and Paraguay, 
education is mandatory at age 5 and enrollment rates are below 70%. In all 
countries, most children are enrolled in the public system.
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Countries with lower enrollment rates for children aged 5 years old also show higher 
coverage gaps between the richest and poorest quintiles. Thus, the poorest women 
face economic barriers to addressing care demands in countries where enrollment 
rates for pre-primary school remain low. While the enrollment gap remains below 
10 percentage points in countries where more than 90% of the children are 
attending school, the gap reaches up to 39 percentage points in Guatemala, 36 
percentage points in El Salvador, and 34 percentage points in Costa Rica. 
For younger children who are not subject to the mandatory education 
requirement, enrollment rates are substantially lower, and therefore care demands 
become higher. Figure 8.6 illustrates gross enrollment rates for different age 
groups by country and the corresponding enrollment gap between children in 
the richest and poorest income quintiles. Although enrollment rates differ widely 
across countries, achievements remain significantly below the levels obtained for 
children aged 5 years old in all cases. For instance, despite showing rates above 
90% for children aged 5 years old, Mexico exhibits an enrollment rate slightly 
above 60% for children aged 3-4 even when enrollment is mandatory for this 
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Figure 8.4: Age for starting compulsory education
Latin America (18 countries), early 2015.
Source: SITEAL and countries legislations.
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age group. Argentina, another country where coverage is almost universal for 
primary school, covers less than 40% of children aged 2-4. Finally, enrollment 
for children aged 0-4 reaches the maximum level in Uruguay5, 47%, and the 
minimum in Guatemala, 5.5%. 
The enrollment gap by economic condition is significant, no matter the age 
group considered. The coverage rate in the richest quintile duplicates the level 
of the poorest ones in Argentina, Brazil, and Panama; it triplicates in the case of 
Colombia and El Salvador; it quadruples in Honduras and is 7 times as great in 
Costa Rica. Regarding the type of supply, enrollment of children below 5 years 
old also takes place mainly in public institutions, though with a lower share than 
for children aged 5 years old, in all countries. 
5 Nollenberger and Perazzo (2014) estimate the effect of rising vacancies for pre-primary 
school (non mandatory) on women’s employment in Uruguay during the 1990s. In the 
context of a low take-up rate, authors did not identify general effects on women’s supply, 
with the exception of significant and positive effects on women with intermediate level of 
education.
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Figure 8.5: Gross enrollment rates for children aged 5 years old
Latin America (15 countries), circa 2012.
Source: Own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: Household surveys correspond to 2012 in most countries with the exception of 
Nicaragua (2009), Chile, Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay (2011).
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The high shares of children outside the formal education system increases the 
demand of care services at the household level, raising the costs for mothers to 
participate in the labor market. In addition, even when these services exist, they 
provide an incomplete solution. In general, early childhood school hours are 
shorter than the typical workday, and thus they do not completely solve women’s 
challenges of work-family balance. 
In many countries, the gap in the early childhood care services provision is 
complemented with public programs and community involvement. The main 
objective of these types of initiatives is to provide assistance to families in poverty 
during early childhood. Table 8.2 summarizes the main initiatives already in 
place, by country. For example, Crece contigo in Chile, Hogares Comunitarios de 
Bienestar in Colombia, Hogares Comunitarios in Guatemala, Estancias Infantiles 
de apoyo a madres trabajadoras in Mexico, Cuna más in Peru, and Hogares de 
Atención Integral para Niños y Niñas in Venezuela, target populations in need as 
a way to break the poverty cycle. 
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Figure 8.6: Gross enrollment rates for children under 5 years old
Latin America (13 countries), circa 2012.
Source: Own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys. 
Note: Household surveys correspond to 2012 in most countries with the exception of 
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The level of coverage and quality of the care services provided by these programs 
varies across countries and programs. They also focus on the family instead of 
the individuals, and assign caring roles mainly to women, deepening gender 
stereotypes (CEPAL, 2013a). 
Table 8.2: Public initiatives for care services during childhood
Selected initiatives in place, 2014.
Country Program Description
Chile Crece Contigo
Gives support to vulnerable families with children under 4 years 
old and includes assessment on care services.
Colombia
Hogares Comunitarios de 
Bienestar
Targets children under 5 years old living in poverty. Provides 
support for childcare and child development. Care providers are 
the parents.
Costa Rica Red Nacional de Cuido
National network that includes centers for childcare for children 
under 7 years old, in two formats: (i) extended time –10 or more 
hours/day; (ii) reduced time –4 hours/day; Also includes incen-
tives to promote the private supply of care services. It sets goals 
for childcare coverage on a yearly basis.
Cuba Educa a tu hijo
Targets children up to 6 years old, with different interventions for 
the 0-2 and 2-6 age groups. Provides care and education outside 
of formal institutions. It is based in communities and performed by 
the families themselves. 
Guatemala Hogares Comunitarios
Targets children of working mothers in poverty under 7 years old 
providing community-based care services. 
Mexico
Estancias Infantiles para 
Apoyar Madres Traba-
jadoras
Subsidizes the full cost of daycare for poor mothers in the labor 
force, with children aged 1- 4 years old. In the case of children 
with disabilities, the age of eligibility increases up to 6 years old.
Nicaragua
Centros de Desarrollo 
Infantil
Early childhood support for children up to 6 years old, in rural and 
poor areas. It trains parents on children care.
Peru Cuna más
Targets children up to 3 years old in poverty and extreme poverty, 
providing cognitive, social and health support. The centers offer 
two care models: (i) daily care –integral care for children aged 6 
months to 3 years old; and (ii) encompassing families –advise on 
childcare and early childhood development by performing home 
visits and training in the centers.
Trinidad & 
Tobago
Early Childhood and 
Education 
Set of interventions that enhance children’s development prior to 
mandatory school level. Targets children aged 3-5.
Venezuela
Hogares de Atención 
Integral para Niños y 
Niñas 
Targets children aged 0-6 in poor families where mothers are care 
providers. It has two care models: based in families or based in 
communities.
Source: SIPI – SITEAL, and official agencies.
The initiatives offer a set of services beyond childcare that are related to children’s 
nutrition, health, and early stimulation. The programs in Chile, Colombia, 
Nicaragua, Trinidad & Tobago, and Venezuela provide integral services to 
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children. In addition, some day nurseries offer extended schedules to allow 
mothers to engage in employment, such as Red Nacional de Cuido in Costa Rica, 
Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar in Colombia, and Crece contigo in Chile. 
The programs also differ in their connections to the formal education system. 
Most programs are based in the home or in community centers and are not 
regulated by an education agency. In these cases, social development agencies 
lead the initiatives. They provide care services to children at an early age and 
to mothers, in some cases. Mothers become potential caregivers in home or 
community childcare schemes. Hogares Comunitarios de Bienestar in Colombia, 
Educa a tu hijo in Cuba, Cuna más in Peru, Hogares Comunitarios in Guatemala, 
and Hogares de Atención Integral para Niños y Niñas in Venezuela adopt this 
scheme. A smaller set of programs is more connected to the education system. 
For instance, the Ministry of Family and Social Welfare has implemented the 
Red Nacional de Cuido program in Costa Rica since 2010, which integrates 
children aged 4 and above into a pre-primary education level. Chile’s Crece 
contigo includes a formal education component in the services network, assuring 
vacancies for children in day nurseries and kindergartens, which are regulated by 
the Ministry of Education.
Chile’s Crece Contigo is a social protection program targeting children 0-4 years 
old in vulnerable socioeconomic conditions. Although the program primarily 
focuses on health services, including early stimulation during the growth stage 
and integral development, it also provides free access to high quality care services 
such as day nurseries (salas cuna) for children under 2 years old, and maternal 
kindergarten ( jardín maternal) for children aged 2-4. To qualify for these 
care schemes, the mother or the legal tutor should be in vulnerable economic 
conditions. 
A network of centers formed by National Council of Kindergarten (Junta 
Nacional de Jardines Infantiles - JUNJI) and Integra Foundation provide these 
care services. Reyes and Urzúa (2012) found that labor participation of mothers 
increases the likelihood of children being enrolled in the JUNJI and Integra day 
nurseries and maternal kindergartens. These centers adapt their schedules and 
models to the population in need, offering part time or full time schedules (until 
8 pm), opening kindergartens during January and February to cover the needs 
of seasonal workers, and implementing kindergartens ‘on wheels’ (“sobre ruedas”) 
to reach rural and isolated areas. The program was launched in 2006 and it has 
continuously expanded. Figure 8.7 (left panel) shows that between 2006 and 
2010 day nursery vacancies increased by six times and maternal kindergarten 
vacancies increased by nearly fifty percent. These centers have become the main 
providers of childcare for children at an early age. By 2011, around 17% of the 
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children 0-2 years old were attending a care center (right panel), where almost 
10 percentage points corresponds to JUNJI and INTEGRA centers –8 and 2 
percentage points respectively. Child attendance at these centers is biased to the 
poorer income quintiles (right panel). While 9.4% of children in the poorest 
quintile were attending a JUNJI center and 2.6% an INTEGRA center, only 
4.3% and 0.7% of the children in the richest quintile were attending those 
centers, respectively.
Colombia has a long tradition implementing childcare programs for vulnerable 
households. The Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (Instituto Colombiano de 
Bienestar Familiar – ICBF) has been running the program Hogares Comunitarios 
de Bienestar since 1987. This program achieved a wide coverage in comparison 
to similar initiatives in the region, reaching 13% of the target population 
(González Ramírez and Durán, 2012). The supply includes different types of 
childcare. Figure 8.8 depicts the scale adopted by the referred types. It organizes 
care services mainly through a network of community mothers who receive 
children at their own homes on a daily workday basis, during 4-8 hours per 
day (HCB Tradicional). Other types of childcare services support the family 
through community centers where pregnant women, breastfeeding women, and 
mothers with children under 2 years old participate (HCB FAMI). A community 
educational agent trains families on childbearing issues like nutrition and 
childcare. Both HCB Tradicional and HCB FAMI provide more personalized 
care services, attending 13 children per unit in 2013. In contrast, the remaining 
childcare types, Atención Integral Centros de Desarrollo Infantil and Atención 
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CASEN (right panel).
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Integral Modalidad Familiar, offer similar services, but the groups are larger, 
joining community mothers or educational agents in local centers. 
Following a similar scheme, Peru launched a pilot national program, Cuna más, in 
2012. This program is based on a former initiative, the Wawa Wasi program, which 
worked through homes and community centers to support working mothers and 
provide integral services (daily care, education, nutrition, identity documentation) 
to children under 4 years old in vulnerable conditions. Cuna más implements a 
progressive plan that expands daycare coverage to the whole country, while also 
providing support to children’s families. Enrollment is expected to be 20% higher 
in 2014 than in 2013, reaching approximately 65,000 children (Figure 8.9, left 
panel). Targeting is based on poverty condition and support focuses on family 
care in rural areas and day nurseries in urban centers. In 2012 the pilot program 
covered only 0.7% of children aged 3-4 (Figure 8.9, right panel).
Evidence coming from the region indicates that childcare services have positive 
effects on women’s labor outcomes. Paes de Barros et al. (2011) examined a 
program in Rio de Janeiro that expands free childcare in poorer neighborhoods 
and found considerable positive effects on mother’s employment. CIEE (2012) 
measured positive effects on women’s employment for the program Estancias 
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Infantiles para Apoyar Madres Trabajadoras (PEI) in Mexico, which subsidizes 
childcare to mothers and single fathers employed or searching for a job and in 
low socioeconomic condition. Berlinski and Galiani (2007) identified that the 
positive impacts of free childcare centers on mother’s employment ranged from 7 
to 14 percentage points in Argentina. Katzkowicz and Egas (2014) microsimulated 
the potential effects of extending pre-primary education to children aged 3 years 
old in Argentina and found that, ex ante, this universal policy would increase 
female labor participation, particularly for married women. Effects would appear 
lower for women in the poorest 30% of the population. 
Uruguay is planning to implement Sistema Nacional Integrado de Cuidados, 
aimed at addressing the care needs of children, dependent elderly persons, and 
people with disabilities. It would focus on the vulnerable population, with the 
aim of universalizing access to care services. In the case of children, it would 
target those aged 0-3. The project fundamentals emphasize the need to formalize 
the care services and promote co-responsibility between households and the 
State, as well as between women and men. 
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In some countries, legislation has assigned an active role to employers in employees’ 
care services provision; these are usually gender biased. These norms set a 
mandatory supply of nurseries and care services for those firms above the medium 
staff size (Rodríguez, 2010; Pautassi & Rico, 2011). In Chile, the Labor Code 
states that an employer who hires 20 or more women should offer day nursery 
services (either within the firm or via outside contracting) for employed women 
with children under 2 years old. Legislation in Venezuela does not discriminate by 
gender; employers with more than 20 employees must offer childcare services. In 
Colombia, employers must offer day nurseries for breastfeeding workers. In Bolivia 
and Ecuador, the regulation requires that firms with more than 50 employees offer 
childcare services. In Bolivia, employers must arrange for an in-house nursery for 
children under 1, while in Ecuador, legislation also allows employers to contract 
these services outside if an onsite child-care center is not available (Navarro 2008).
In addition, some firms offer childcare to employees as part of their corporate 
social responsibility policy or their human resources strategy. These initiatives 
are common among big or multinational firms, and public sector agencies. They 
often offer flexible or reduced working hours arrangements to working parents 
with young children.
The supply of care services for elderly and people with disabilities also faces 
constraints. The presence of household members with illnesses, disabilities or old 
age, increases women’s attachment to housework, given that care supply to cover 
these particular needs is scarce. Even when these care services exist, they rely on the 
social security system available for people in formal employment (actual or former 
formal employees). The problem is expected to deepen over the following years, as 
the rising life expectancy will add new pressures on the existing care systems. 
In a study based on time use surveys for Latin America conducted in the 2000s, 
Batthyány (2010) showed that women were the main party responsible for care 
services at the household level, particularly among households in poverty. Batthyány 
et al. (2012) used a care survey to analyze the National Care System in Uruguay in 
2010, and found that women were more willing than men to reduce their working 
hours in order to care for family members over 70. While 65% of working women 
answered that they would be able to reduce workday time, only 58% of working 
men answered that they would be able to do so. Figures reveal two additional facts 
according to socioeconomic condition. First, the gender gap is wider for people 
in better socioeconomic conditions, where 63% of working women and 51% of 
working men showed a willingness to reduce their working hours; meanwhile, the 
shares were 66% and 61% for those in lower socioeconomic conditions. Second, 
the willingness to reduce working hours to take care of the elderly—for both men 
and women—was negatively associated with socioeconomic status. When employed 
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people were asked whether they would drop their jobs to care for their mothers or 
fathers when they were elderly, women appeared more willing to do so than men, and 
the gap became particularly higher for people in better socioeconomic conditions. 
Figures suggest that the share of women potentially affected by caring for elderly 
household members could be significant. Figure 8.10 illustrates the share of 
people aged 18-50 not studying nor working as salaried workers in households 
with at least one member older than 64 years old. The share of people in that 
condition ranges from 9.1% in Brazil to 16.7% in Chile. Women represent a 
higher share in Honduras and Guatemala (almost 69%) and a lower share in 
Uruguay (37%) and Argentina (40%).
3.2. Improving women’s agency
Interventions based in the social protection arena dominate these policies, in 
contrast to those interventions related to the regulatory environment. While 
some countries in the region demonstrate advances in women’s rights in regards 
to economic resources, others are still lagging behind. CCTs are common 
initiatives within social protection programs, and even though women’s agency 
is not a key objective of these programs, they nevertheless made an impact. 
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Social protection
CCTs are tools for attacking poverty that are widespread across the region6 and 
have given more attention to women (CEPAL, 2013b). First, these programs assign 
a significant role to women in their households. The majority of CCTs entitle women 
to receive the subsidy–only a few do not state a preferred gender for entitlement–
which usually translates into better compliance with the conditionalities of the 
program. Second, women are overrepresented among beneficiaries for two reasons. 
On the one hand, there are more women than men in poor households, and on 
the other hand, some programs define female quotas for targeting to guarantee a 
higher share of women among total CCT beneficiaries. 
The decision to select women for CCT entitlement is based on evidence that 
women are better resource allocators than men (Fizbein et al., 2009). This 
capability for managing home resources does not necessarily translate into 
a higher productive role. In fact, most programs treat women as responsible 
for care tasks within the household, and do not promote their entrance into 
the labor market through training, employment services or microcredit for 
small businesses. Moreover, even in cases where men could receive transfers, 
the household decision is to entitle women. Thus, CCTs can be functional to 
social attitudes regarding women’s responsibilities in the household. Table 8.3 
summarizes main CCTs programs in the region, identifying the member of the 
household entitled (preferred) and the role attached. 
Most CCT programs entitle mothers to receive the transfer with compliances 
linked to the maternity role. In fact, mothers must assure conditionality 
compliance in children’s school attendance and health checks in order to receive 
the benefit. For instance, the CCT Avancemos in Costa Rica incentivizes young 
people in poor households to go back to school; the tutor becomes responsible 
for student’s attendance. The CCT Bono de Desarrollo Humano in Ecuador 
requires compliance with school attendance and health checks for children 
under 16 years old. Some social protection initiatives, such as the programs in 
place in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Paraguay, 
and Peru, also establish conditionalities for pregnant women as a method of 
reducing maternal and infant mortality. The program Comunidades Solidarias in 
El Salvador offers a health bonus for pregnant women and children under 5 years 
old, and an education bonus for children aged 6-15. 
6 The initiatives launched shared similar features related to eligibility—vulnerable households 
with children—and conditionalities—certification of children’s health controls and school 
enrollment (Fizbein et al., 2009).
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These programs less frequently focus on the enhancement of women’s capabilities 
outside the household –like ALMPs. As exceptions, Chile Solidario in Chile, 
Bolsa Família in Brazil and Red de Protección Social in Nicaragua provide access 
to labor-oriented programs. For instance, employers who hire beneficiaries of 
Chile Solidario receive a wage subsidy equal to 50% of the minimum wage 
and training financing. Women are entitled to a specific component called 
the Asignación Social, which provides a subsidy to those beneficiaries who get 
a formal job. Bolsa Família beneficiaries may attend training courses via the 
program Próximo Passo. There is a participation quota of 30% for women, as a 
minimum, in order to preserve their vacancies. Besides the transfer and health 
and education services to families and their children, Red de Protección Social in 
Nicaragua contemplates an occupational training bonus to young people aged 
14-25 with basic mandatory level of education. 
Table 8.3: CCTs entitlement and responsibilities
Selected Latin American and Caribbean programs.
Country CCT 
Transfer receiver
Household 
member
Responsible for 
conditionalities on Attends 
training
children mother
ARG Asignación Universal por Hijo mother x x no
BOL Bono Juana Azurduy mother x x no
BRA Bolsa Familia mother x no x
CHL Chile Solidario mother x x x
COL Familias en Acción mother x no no
CRI Avancemos tutor x no no
DOM Programa Solidaridad tutor x no no
ECU Bono de Desarrollo Humano mother x no no
SLV Bonos comunidades solidarias mother x x no
GTM Mi Familia Progresa tutor x x no
HND Programa de Asignaciones Familiares mother x x no
JAM Programa de Avance mediante salud y educación mother x x no
MEX Oportunidades mother x no no
NIC Red de Protección Social mother x no x
PAN Red de Oportunidades mother no no no
PRY Programa Tekopora mother x x no
PER Programa Juntos tutor x x no
TTO
Programa de Transferencias monetarias condicionadas 
focalizadas
tutor no no no
URY Programa de Asignaciones Familiares mother x no no
Source: ECLAC – database of non-contributory social programs, and official agencies.
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In some countries, these programs cover a significant share of women. According 
to Figure 8.11, the highest share is found in Uruguay, where Programa de 
Asignaciones Familiares covers nearly 37% of women; Bono de Desarrollo Social 
in Ecuador, which covers approximately 31% of women, ranks second. Both 
programs prefer to entitle the woman of a household. 
The significant share of women in poverty who are beneficiaries of CCTs raises 
questions regarding the type of women’s agency that these programs promote. 
Some argue that CCTs reinforce gender-role stereotypes, with negative effects for 
economic empowerment. Moulyneux (2009) notes that evidence suggests that 
CCTs have weak effects on economic empowerment, and reinforce a “maternal 
model of care,” since they do not promote cooperation within the household. 
Based on evidence from evaluations of the Mexican Progresa/Oportunidades 
program, the author highlights that women’s economic autonomy is mainly 
centered on consumption and mostly measured by beneficiaries’ perception, 
like becoming more “creditworthy,” which does not necessarily translate into 
empowerment. In their literature review, Cecchini and Madariaga (2011) propose 
that women’s empowerment depends on resource management and that some 
CCT designs reinforce a maternal role. In almost all CCTs, barriers seem to 
deepen in the absence of care co-responsibility components. Chile Solidario and 
Oportunidades are exceptions, as they provide their beneficiaries preferred access 
to the program Chile Crece Contigo and Programa de Estancias Infantiles para 
Madres, respectively, to reconcile childcare with employment responsibilities. 
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Figure 8.11: Women covered by CCTs
Latin American countries (16 countries), circa 2010. 
Source: Own calculations based on microdata from national household surveys.
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Conversely, CCT evaluations reveal improvements in self-esteem tied to a feeling 
of being a “good mother” that depend on compliance with time-consuming 
conditionalities. As these types of programs strengthen the gendered division of 
household responsibilities (women are tasked with care instead of men), women 
may face disadvantages toward assigning their time in paid-work activities, 
and thus may remain outside the labor force. Indeed, women are rewarded for 
contributing to program goals, which are centered on child development. 
Existing evaluations do not reveal a clear picture about the impact of CCT 
programs on women’s labor outcomes in the region. Most studies do not find 
that these poverty-alleviation programs have a significant effect on female labor 
supply (Alzúa et al., 2010 for Nicaragua, Mexico and Honduras; Foguel and 
Paes de Barros, 2010, for Brazil; Martorano and Sanfilippo, 2012, for Chile; 
Adato et al. (2000) for México’s Progresa). However, some studies do find some 
disincentives for female labor force participation (e.g. Gasparini et al., 2015, for 
vulnerable women in Argentina; MDS, 2007, Teixeira, 2010, and Ferro and 
Nicollela, 2007, for rural women in Brazil; Borraz and Gonzalez, 2009, for some 
areas in Uruguay). 
Besides CCTs that seek women’s economic autonomy, other social protection 
entitlements contemplate women’s agency in the economic arena. This is the 
case of compensations to social security contribution records that seek to avoid 
interruptions during the maternity break. Chile has offered universal contribution 
credits for maternity, known as “bonus per child,” since 2009. Mothers up to 
65 years old are entitled to this benefit (Rofman et al., 2013) no matter their 
contribution history in the pension system. This bonus increases the pension 
benefit by 10% of 18 minimum wages at the moment of childbirth. 
Regulatory environment
Latin America has made progress in its efforts to enable women’s more equitable 
control of assets. Particularly, housing, land, and business assets are more equally 
distributed by gender than what would be expected given numbers on the gender 
of the head of household (Deere, Alvarado, and Twyman, 2009). Inheritances 
and property rights do not discriminate between women and men, though land 
ownership is concentrated on men, in contrast to housing (Deere and Leon, 
2003). 
Peru is one of the countries in the region that reformed land ownership to improve 
gender equality (Malhotra et al., 2009). The country established mandatory joint 
land titling for married couples. Nicaragua also implemented a joint land titling 
reform to correct gender imbalances in assets possession (Box 1).
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Wiig (2012) evaluated the effect of land property rights on women’s empowerment 
based on the Peruvian Proyecto Especial Titulación de Tierras y Catastro Rural 
(PETT, see Box 1), finding that the land property program had increased women’s 
involvement in household decisions at a higher level than men, particularly in 
the realm of agriculture. An impact evaluation of the Nicaraguan Proyecto de 
Ordenamiento de la Propiedad (PRODEP, see Box 1) will be carried out in the 
near future.
3.3. Getting fair labor markets for women
Promoting women’s participation in employment also enhances their voice 
within the household. A woman’s empowerment through employment changes 
both her set of choices and the way her household spends money and invests 
in their children. This policy grouping comprehends a dynamic set of public 
interventions that are subject to redesign and permanent readjustment.
 
The core interventions can be categorized as the “promoting opportunities” type 
rather than the “guaranteeing outcomes” type. Thus, they mainly provide incentives 
Box 1: Land titling programs with gender approach in Latin America
Proyecto Especial Titulación de Tierras y Catastro Rural (PETT) in Peru
The program was established in 1992 to address the formalization of 
property rights through land titling in rural communities. In the first phase, 
registration did not promote gender equality within couples, recognizing 
mainly men’s rights over land. Taking into account these outcomes, a second 
phase that began in 2000 considered spouses or cohabitants –i.e. joint 
titling– in recognizing the property over land. PETT was merged with the 
Commission of Formalization of Informal Property (COFOPRI) to include 
the formalization of urban properties in 2007. 
Proyecto de Ordenamiento de la Propiedad (PRODEP) in Nicaragua
Implemented in 2002, it addressed the registration of land to indigenous 
communities. Later, it adopted a gender strategy in 2007 to guarantee 
equitable access to property for both women and men and accomplished its 
goals. Women represented 51% of the beneficiaries in PRODEP during the 
2003-2012 period. 
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura y Riego in Perú; Instituto Nicaraguense de 
Estudios Territoriales in Nicaragua; and The World Bank.
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and are less concerned about establishing quotas. ALMPs with a specific focus on 
women are common tools used to empower women’s participation in the labor 
market and to alleviate negative employment shocks. Labor laws also represent 
a significant avenue for female empowerment policy, as they can guarantee a 
desired gender-equilibrium result or prevent and punish discriminatory practices 
in labor relations. Finally, public sector advocacy has an important place in 
women’s empowerment agenda, providing assessments and incentives, as well as 
demonstrative practices, to be imitated by the stakeholders in the labor market.
ALMPs
The interventions in this set of employment policies are oriented to populations 
with difficulties in finding a job, particularly among the vulnerable population, 
including women, youth, indigenous and rural populations, people with 
disabilities, and people with socioeconomic deprivations. Although women make 
up a substantive portion of participants in general programs, some countries 
develop initiatives specifically targeting women in order to increase their chances 
of employment. However, these kinds of initiatives do not represent the majority 
of the interventions in place under ALMPs. 
Initiatives that aim to foster the female labor supply include training programs 
that increase employability. They are mainly centered on women outside the 
labor force who face vulnerable conditions (Table 8.4). The training is often 
vocational, with some modules focusing on soft-skills development. In Trinidad 
& Tobago, the Non-traditional Skills Training Program offers poor women, 
aged 18–50 with low or no qualifications, vocational training. In Chile, the 
Mujer Trabajadora y Jefa de Hogar program offers women vocational training to 
increase their chances of getting a job. The program focuses on women in the 
poorest quintiles. They receive a stipend for transport costs. Evaluation studies 
show positive effects on women’s training but not on labor insertion for the 2007 
cohort; they also show that the program had positive effects on the likelihood 
of being employed and labor market activation for the 2008 cohort (SERNAM, 
2010). In Uruguay, Proimujer provides in-classroom and on-the-job training 
for unemployed women, with the aim of enhancing employability conditions. 
Evaluation analysis did not identify effects on employability and employment 
quality—i.e. formalization (DINAE, 2008). 
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Table 8.4: ALMPs to enhance women’s employment
Selected countries and programs ongoing during 2014.
Country Program Type Target group Benefit Lenght
CHL
Mujer Trabajadora y 
Jefa de Hogar
Training
Women aged 18-65, 
economically active, in 
charge of household 
members, in vulnerable 
conditions
Ad-hoc to women’s needs, 
including training and 
labor intermediation, 
formal education, 
entrepreneurship support
1–2 years
Bono al trabajo de 
la mujer
Subsidies to 
employment
Women aged 25-59, with 
pensions contributions 
up to date, in the poorest 
35% 
Monetary benefit to the 
employer and worker - 
according to earnings level 
2 years for 
employers, 
4 years for 
workers
COL
Ley de Formalización 
y Generación de 
Empleo
Subsidies to 
employment
Women below 28 or above 
40 years old, without a 
formal contract in the 
last year
Fiscal incentives to 
employers for new jobs 
oriented to women 2 years
Mujer Rural
Support to 
own business 
Women head of household 
in rural areas and 
associations where at 
least 80% of members 
are women in vulnerable 
conditions
Training, technical support 
and access to productive 
networks and financing
-
SLV
Programa de Apoyo 
Temporal al Ingreso
Temporal 
employment
Head of households 
-women preferred- and 
young people aged 
16-24 without formal 
employment
Monetary transfer and 
training for working in 
community projects 6 months
MEX
Impulso Productivo 
de la Mujer
Support to 
own business 
Social firms or associations 
formed by women 
exclusively
Training and support 
to project development 
through technical 
assistance and 
micro-financing
-
TTO
Non-traditional skills 
training
Training
Women aged 18-50 who 
are unskilled, unemployed, 
or earn low income
“Specialized training 
(construction; woodwork- 
furniture; automotive; 
technology; industrial 
maintenance) and life skills 
development; remedial 
literacy and numeracy 
training”
6 months
Craft training 
program for women
Support to 
own business 
Women aged 25-50 who 
are single, unskilled, and 
unemployed
Training and marketing 
support to establish home-
based craft business
-
URY Proimujer
Training or 
support to 
own business 
Unemployed women aged 
25-55
Vocational training and 
soft-skills development up to 6 months
Source: own elaboration based on information from official agencies.
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Another set of ALMPs promotes labor market insertion by concentrating on 
the labor demand side. Benefits for women’s hiring, also known as “protected 
employment,” have been developed in some countries. Bono al Trabajo de la Mujer 
in Chile targets poor women aged 29-59 who become employed. The program 
provides a bonus (this benefit depends on current incomes) to employed woman 
for 4 years as a way of compensating her effort, and to her employer for 2 years, to 
incentivize women’s hiring. The law Ley de Formalización y Generación del Empleo 
Nº 1429 in Colombia gave employers fiscal incentives to hire women under 28 or 
over 40 years of age, to support their transition toward formal employment. The 
wage subsidies program Objetivo Empleo in Uruguay has a specific component 
for women aged 45-65 who have experienced a long period of unemployment 
and who are living in conditions of vulnerability. The program offers employers 
a high subsidy for hiring women, which reaches 80% of two minimum salaries 
during 18 months; for hiring men, the subsidy reaches 60%. In Chile, Bono al 
Trabajo de la Mujer offers an economic incentive to women aged 25-59 who 
are among the 35% poorest beneficiaries and who find employment. The bonus 
serves as a method of encouraging employment outside the program. 
Generating direct employment is another strategy used to support women through 
public programs. Programa de Apoyo Temporal al Ingreso (PATI) in El Salvador 
offers public temporary employment to women, combining income support and 
training. The program focuses on women, particularly heads of households, and 
youth aged 16-24. An impact evaluation estimated a positive effect on women’s 
expectations and prospects of labor market insertion in the short run, but this 
effect vanished in the long run. Regarding labor outcomes, the program had 
positive effects on labor participation (around 9 percentage points) as well as on 
employment (8 percentage points) (Beneke de Sanfeliú, 2014). 
The promotion of small businesses in the region has also reached women as a 
target group. One out of four working women in the region is self-employed, 
and her participation in micro-business seems to be related to low-productivity 
and informal activities, compatible with familial responsibilities (Heller, 2010). 
Recognizing the barriers that women in poverty must overcome in order to 
develop their own business, current initiatives rely on micro-financing schemes 
and organization through cooperatives. In Mexico, the program Impulso 
Productivo de la Mujer supports social enterprises formed exclusively by women 
–with the financing of the Fondo Nacional de Apoyo a las Empresas de Solidaridad. 
In Colombia, the program Mujer Rural also supports women’s cooperatives 
and small business in vulnerable rural areas. The programs aid businesses and 
cooperatives in which women represent 80% of membership and aim to improve 
their living conditions of rural women and boost businesses productivity as well. 
In Trinidad & Tobago the Craft training program for women collaborates to 
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develop home-based craft businesses. Currently, there are no rigorous evaluations 
that evaluate these programs’ impact on labor outcomes. 
A weakness in employment programs centers on the need to reconcile women’s 
participation with motherhood responsibilities. The lack of care services induces 
dropout and “cream skimming effects.” Employment programs, particularly 
those without cash-transfers, usually face low participation rates among women 
because mothers cannot afford childcare services. Considering this fact, the 
program Cuna Más in Peru celebrated a partnership with the Ministry of Labor 
in order to offer childcare services to women attending the one-stop window 
for employment. The School Crossing Guard Programme in Trinidad & Tobago 
also connects participants with childcare centers. In Chile, beneficiaries of social 
programs like Programa Mujer Trabajadora y Jefa de Hogar also have preferred 
access to childcare services. Another innovative initiative is Subsidio al Empleo 
Joven in Chile, which targets youth without gender distinction, but allows an 
extension of the participation period for young mothers. The program targets 
people aged 18-25, and offers a wage subsidy for both employers and the workers 
themselves. Workers should earn low wages and pertain to the poorest 40% of the 
population to qualify for the subsidy. Female participants who become mothers 
may extend their participation in the program until they are 27 years old.
Labor laws
Anti-discriminatory clauses, as well as women’s participation quotas in 
employment, are enforced through labor legislation across the region. Laws 
protect workers from discrimination based on pregnancy or motherhood. 
Labor laws forbid pregnancy tests during the selection process, unless a pregnant 
woman cannot perform the type of task described in the vacancy. This is the 
case of Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela. Pregnancy anti-
discrimination is explicitly stated in the labor laws of Colombia, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Jamaica, and Uruguay. 
Labor laws often include penalties for dismissal during pregnancy or initial 
motherhood. There is also protective legislation that regulates the type of work 
and occupation women can take while pregnant to preserve their former salary 
level. In Argentina, legislation considers that a woman has been unjustifiably 
dismissed if dismissal takes place during the seven and half months following 
childbirth. In Bolivia and Venezuela, laws protect women against dismissal for a 
year after childbirth; Chile and Panama extend this guarantee through the year 
after maternity leave. Mexico is an exception: there, women can be dismissed 
after maternity leave.
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Some protective norms may bias labor outcomes against women. The General 
Labor Law in Bolivia regulates both youth (workers under 18) and women’s work. 
For example, working days for both types of workers cannot exceed 40 hours per 
week and the workday should take place during daylight hours—night work is 
forbidden. Beyond this, other clauses within the law reinforce gender stereotypes. 
There is a female work quota of 45% by firm—though there is no control on its 
compliance—unless “job characteristics” require more women workers (Article 
no. 3). These protective norms assume women’s weaknesses or lack of capabilities 
and may reinforce discriminatory practices (Marco Navarro, 2014).
During the 1990s and 2000s, some Latin American countries set gender quotas 
for the legislature, enhancing gender equality at the policy-making level. As a 
result, the share of women in National Parliament has increased 11 percentage 
points between 2000 and 2014, surpassing the figures for OECD countries 
(Figure 8.12) (excluding Nordic countries). In Argentina, legislation requires a 
minimum percentage (30%) of female candidates on party lists in legislative 
elections. Similarly, Brazil sets a minimum percentage of female candidates 
(30%) in elections for the Chamber of Deputies. In Bolivia, a law sanctioned in 
2010 established that there should be equal numbers of men and women in the 
candidates list for Parliament elections. This was implemented for the first time 
during the 2014 elections. Some countries also established gender-quotas for 
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candidates for elected offices. For example, Colombia requires 30% of candidates 
to be women, and Costa Rica sets the requirement at 50%.
Recently, unions have also begun to use gender quotas. Most organizations in the 
region adopted quotas for women at around 30-40%. Indeed, 17 of 32 unions 
now have a set gender quota. However, employers’ organizations and unions 
do not include regulations on women’s participation in the social dialogue. 
Only 13% of women in Central American countries and 29% in Southern 
Cone countries are directly engaged in social dialogue. This illustrates a barrier 
to include a gender component in tools like collective agreements, which rule 
outcomes in labor market such as salaries, labor conditions, and labor benefits 
(ILO et al., 2013).
Advocacy
Experiences pushing the gender agenda into private institutions have taken 
the form of advocacy. The most common strategy aims to incentivize them to 
develop their own gender-equality policies or to disseminate good practices and 
promote peer effect. 
In some countries, the State certifies a firm’s gender policies. This is the case of 
Sello Iguala–Conciliación vida laboral, familiar y personal in Chile. The public 
sector, NGOs, and the private sector are able to obtain this certification by 
demonstrating good labor practices that seek to close the gender gaps at the 
workplace. The Sistema de Certificación Laboral con Sello de Equidad de Género 
in Costa Rica constitutes the pioneer certification program in the region. Private 
and public sectors must obtain this acknowledgement (which has to be renewed 
in the third year) to fulfill the minimum requirements of gender equality 
practices. The Modelo de Equidad de Género in Mexico advises and supports 
organizations as they adapt human resources policies that reinforce gender 
equality for certification. The Modelo de Certificación del Sello de Calidad con 
Equidad de Género in Uruguay encourages gender equality in human resource 
policies, particularly in regards to application requirements for positions and 
training opportunities.
Regarding assessment of gender issues, the Social Entrepreneurship Service7 and 
the State of Parana Project in Brazil advises employers on how to create gender-
equal corporate policies. It seeks to remove anti-discriminatory practices and 
generate more balanced work-family responsibilities among workers. 
7 This entity represents industry in the country.
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4. Challenges
Despite these policies’ intentions, they may not result in women’s economic 
empowerment. Even mechanisms to protect women may weaken their economic 
participation and lessen the likelihood that they become equal participants in 
society. Difficulties in establishing causal links between gender policies and labor 
outcomes, based on the scarce evidence and the proper complexities to perform 
this type of analysis, lead us to believe that some policy effects remain unclear.
Evidence for other regions (based on cross-country data) suggests that the policies 
that intend to relax constraints on women’s time and ease a balance between 
work and family responsibilities have had positive effects on female participation 
in the labor market. Blau and Kahn (2013) studied the role of some work-family 
policies in explaining the decrease in female labor force participation in the 
United States as compared with OECD countries. Authors found that parental 
leave had a positive impact on labor market participation for men and women, 
with a larger coefficient for women. Adema, Ali and Thévenon (2014) studied 
the relationship between family policies and outcomes like female employment 
in OECD countries. Their findings revealed childcare and pre-school enrollment 
rates had a small but significant effect (greater than the effects of leave policies) 
on female employment. In addition, tax incentives for part-time work were also 
positively associated with female employment.
Furthermore, findings suggest that the association between policies and female 
labor participation becomes complex and desired labor market outcomes are hard 
to obtain. As evidence still has not disentangled the hidden mechanisms between 
policies and outcomes in achieving intended results, additional challenges in 
policy design arise. 
First, the expansion of programs that provide transfers in the pursuit of anti-
poverty goals raises questions about whether child-oriented cash transfers might 
be used for other purposes, like encouraging female labor participation. As has 
been shown, evidence on the second round effects of CCTs on labor supply 
behavior is not clear. 
Whether or not cash transfers for childcare, or even in-kind transfers for 
kindergartens or daycare nurseries, can increase women’s employment, still 
remains a subject of debate in developed countries. Indeed, while some studies 
showed positive and moderate sized effects on female labor participation, others 
obtained modest or null effects. Findings suggest that elements of the program’s 
design and starting labor market conditions may be important factors. The Dutch 
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reform that raised childcare subsidies during the 2005-09 period increased 
mother’s participation by a modest 2.3% (Bettendorf et al., 2012). Other studies 
indicate that mothers’ characteristics may be relevant to distinguish results. 
The cash-for-care program in Norway has implied a small decrease on mother’s 
employment (Havnes and Mogstad, 2011), with an exception for mothers with 
higher levels of education (Rønsen, 2000). A study on childcare subsidies in Cook 
County, Illinois, reveals that access to subsidies has not generated employment 
effects for non-poor families (OPRE 2011).
Evidence on the effect of extending childcare services is still limited. For instance, 
free access to childcare in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil implied a 
considerable rise in mother’s employment and a crowding-out effect on private 
childcare supply, even in low socioeconomic neighborhoods (Paes de Barros et 
al., 2011). The expansion of free pre-primary school centers in Argentina also 
increased mother’s employment (Berlinski and Galiani, 2007). 
Moreover, there is also no consensus on the effect of maternity and paternity 
leave on labor participation. Thus, discussions and analysis of policy design 
will be important to avoid unintended effects. Despite legal work protection 
during childbearing, access to employment might be discouraged by the 
unequal gendered parental leave schemes. There is a growing trend in Latin 
America towards extending the lengths of maternity leave schemes over the 
ILO standard of 14 weeks. Child development and maternity form the basis 
of arguments in favor of this reform. However, there has been little discussion 
or evidence to evaluate the effects of the reforms on female labor participation. 
In fact, longer periods of leave may affect women’s ties to the labor market 
(Cerise et al., 2013). Moreover, effects may not only apply to mothers. For 
example, Puhani and Sonderhof (2008) have shown that increased maternity 
has negatively affected job-related training for young women (mothers or not) 
in West Germany.
Moreover, the near absence of paternity leave could make it difficult for women 
to return to work, particularly given the mother’s cost-benefit equation. Even in 
places where a paternity leave scheme exists, men were not able to take advantage 
of leave, because earners with higher wages face higher costs of staying at home. 
Mechanisms like leave-quotas discourage these effects. However, a mandatory 
paternal leave may also impact future earnings. For instance, the paternity-
leave quota of four weeks established in Norway in 1993 reduced fathers’ 
future earnings. This effect lasted for years (Rege and Solli, 2013). Additionally, 
enforcement issues regain particular relevance in terms of financing. There is a 
pending discussion on how to finance paternity leave in the region, and whether 
employers should bear the costs instead of the social security system. Hence, there 
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are potential disincentives to discriminating against workers in their childbearing 
age that need to be accounted for. Promising policy designs have underlined the 
importance of guaranteeing universal coverage, non-transferable paternity leave, 
protection against a “parent tax”, flexible scheduling, and collective financing 
(Ray, Gornick and Smith 2009).
Third, enforcing specific employment results to strengthen women’s role in the 
labor market is not a common practice in the region. Consequently, there is no 
evidence on its impact. Quotas serve as one way to counteract gender imbalances 
in decision-making spaces, and these have become progressively widespread in 
politics, particularly in Parliament, across the region. In Europe, some countries 
have made steps toward correcting gender inequality in corporate management. 
The direct (participation, wages and career prospects) and indirect (workers 
displacement or substitution, incentives to training accumulation) effects of 
quotas like these should be carefully assessed. For instance, Norway established 
a 40% female quota for the boards of public limited liability companies. 
However, while gains were obtained for qualified women at these top positions, 
there was no effect for women with similar qualifications beyond these positions 
(Bertrand et al., 2014).
Finally, we still do not know how to make ALMPs compatible with social 
protection policies. ALMPs and cash transfer programs usually share a target 
population. As programs are incompatible with one another, eligible participants 
must choose which one they will participate in. In addition, “one-stop shops” are 
uncommon and employment programs and CCTs are offered through different 
“institutional windows” (World Bank 2012a). As a result, a participant’s access 
to a program emerges mainly as a matter of chance, rather than via a proper 
information assessment. Thus, once a woman graduates from a social protection 
program, she may find herself in the same trap of low-productivity or subsistence 
work, lacking the benefits and social coverage associated with a formal job.
5. Final comments
Women’s economic empowerment and women’s performance in the labor 
market are relevant issues in Latin America and the Caribbean. Despite reducing 
disparities between men and women’s educational outcomes in recent years, the 
region still ranks low in terms of Economic Participation and Opportunity. 
Nevertheless, countries have developed public policies that aim to close these 
gaps. Existing initiatives in Latin America have been designed from a family 
approach; they have attempted to free-up women’s time, protect women’s 
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employment, ease access to social protection and entitlements, and support 
participation and productivity in the workplace.
The region has benefited from policies that help women reconcile home and work 
responsibilities, but more efforts are needed. Maternity leave is one of the most 
common initiatives to this end; paternity leave and childcare services for children 
under 5 years old are less common. Informal labor markets pose an additional 
challenge to efforts towards universalizing leave policies. In addition, supply of 
early-age childcare services is insufficient and access to high quality childcare is 
not easy to come by. Small-scale public programs function as remedial alternatives 
as they offer subsidies for women in vulnerable conditions.
Most of the active policies that address women’s agency have taken the form of 
CCTs. The primary objective of these initiatives was to alleviate poverty, but 
the programs may have also reinforced maternal roles for women. Although the 
effects of these policies on female labor supply might not be substantial, CCTs 
have been prioritized over employment-oriented interventions, gaining more 
attention in the policy agenda and more resources. Indeed, ALMPs compete 
with CCTs for beneficiaries and vulnerable women usually enroll in CCTs 
because those programs underscore that women are the most suitable candidates.
A lack of sufficient empirical evidence prevents us from examining the quantifiable 
effects of these policies on female labor participation. The existing evidence is not 
sufficient to assess the causal links between policies and outcomes, but they do 
highlight some of the potential problems that should be taken into account when 
designing public initiatives.
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